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 In response to the social fragmentation wrought in the wake of WWI, many 
French avant-garde writers integrated the findings of sociological studies of religion 
into their art. The authors considered here, including Georges Bataille, Michel 
Leiris, and Collette Peignot, believed that literature could effect a renewed religious 
sense of human communion able to redress the social and political fragmentation of 
interwar France. Integral to this endeavor was their conception of self-sacrifice, 
which they sought both to represent and practice in literary form. As I demonstrate, 
their vision of self-sacrifice describes a paradox whereby the expropriation of 
personal identity  is reappropriated in the form of a negative otherness.  While some 
scholars claim that such self-sacrifice unwittingly  endorses the fascist collectivism 
of the 1930s, others defend it as an ethical communitarianism resistant to any form 
of state politics or group identity. My argument subverts this debate by illustrating 
how their religiosity is based on a theory  of endless self-sacrifice, one that 
continually wavers between personal identity and an unknown, divine alterity. This 
self-sacrificial mechanism creates new hybrid identities, neither entirely  shared nor 
singular, neither entirely  collectivist nor communitarian. As a result, new raced, 
gendered, sexed, and political identities emerge in literary representations of self-
sacrifice that 1) overturn normative political and ethical categories and 2) anticipate 
contemporary  theories of identity formation. As such, this dissertation forcefully 
urges a reevaluation of established norms in the field concerning the status of 
religion, community, and personal identity in the French literary avant-garde.
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INTRODUCTION
Tel apparaît le sacré[:] Il émane du monde 
obscur du sexe et de la mort, mais il est le 
principe essentiel de la vie et la source de 
toute efficacité…toujours égale à elle-même, 
dangereuse et indispensable à la fois.
-Roger Caillois, L’homme et le sacré 1
In George Bataille’s famous short story Madame Edwarda, the nameless 
narrator describes his sexual encounter with the prostitute Edwarda as a moment of 
divine communion. Holding her in his arms, he says:
Je serrai Edwarda dans mes bras, elle me sourit : aussitôt, transi, je 
ressentis en moi un nouveau choc, une sorte de silence tomba sur moi 
de haut  et me glaça. J’étais élevé dans un vol d’anges qui n’avaient ni 
corps ni têtes, faits de glissements d’ailes, mais c’était  simple: je devins 
malheureux et me senti abandonné comme on l’est en présence de 
DIEU. C’était  pire et plus fou que l’ivresse. Et d’abord je sentis une 
tristesse à l’idée de cette grandeur, qui tombait sur moi, me dérobait les 
plaisirs que je comptais goûter avec Edwarda.2
The narrator’s description is noticeably full of ambiguity. When he is closest to 
Edwarda (dans mes bras), he is nevertheless ruefully  abandoned (abandonné).  The 
touch of Edwarda is felt like a paralytic shock (transi, me glaca), yet one that 
exultantly transports him towards the heavens of disembodied angels (élèvé dans un 
vol d’anges), toward a state more maddening than delirium (plus fou que l’ivresse). At 
this intense moment of intoxicating grandeur (grandeur), he nevertheless ironically 
feels a morbid malcontent (malheureux), one that silences him (silence tomba sur moi) 
and steals the away  the very pleasures (plaisirs) of Edwarda’s embrace.  The 
contradictory elements of the narrator’s description offer less a clear diegesis than a 
1
1 Roger Caillois, L'homme et le sacré, 3 ed. (Paris: Gallimard, 1963), 203.
2 Georges Bataille, Madame Edwarda. Le mort. Histoire de l'oeil (Paris: J.J. Pauvert, 1973), 33.
gestural portrait  of an encounter beyond representation. The language makes apparent 
the vexing challenge of evoking the silence that fell over him. His description is 
fragmented, paratactic.  He is simultaneously  embraced and alone, paralyzed and 
ascendant, abandoned and in the presence of God. Much like the frequent ellipses 
throughout the story, these moments of paradox and incoherence attempt to vocalize 
what is mute, to communicate what is ultimately incommunicable. This momentary 
encounter, caught between paralysis and transcendence, communion and 
abandonment, exultation and torpor, speech and silence marks a moment of vacillation 
and ambivalence, a paradoxical state in which the narrator is quite simply “at a loss,” 
having reached the limits of language and indeed the limits of his very  being.  He has 
entered a new realm beyond these limits, one of combined ascendancy and 
annihilation that Bataille elsewhere would call the sacred.
In L'érotisme (1957), Bataille offers one of his most explicit formulations of 
this concept. “La chose sacrée”, he writes, “n’a pas seulement le pouvoir de nous 
donner...un sentiment d’effroi et de tremblement. Ce sentiment se change à la limite en 
dévotion; il se change en adoration...[il] désigne en même temps les deux contraires.”3 
The protagonist of Bataille’s story exhibits precisely this ambivalence toward 
Edwarda, herself a figure for God, whom he finds both attractive and repulsive. The 
danger, audacity, and darkness she embodies both compel his desires and inspire his 
fear:  she is “ravishing” (ravissante), “fascinating” (Edwarda me facinait), and yet 
“obscene” (obscene), “agonizing” (agoissante). Edwarda and God, like “la chose 
sacrée,” echo the coincidenta oppositorum of Scholastic theology in which all 
2
3 ———, L'érotisme (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1957), 76.
opposites, logical and axiological, coincide in the unity of the Divine.4 If “Dieu est une 
femme publique,” as Bataille asserts in Edwarda, it is precisely because of the 
ambiguous commingling of opposing values and categories implied by the sacred.
This “ambivalence of the sacred”—as it came to be known—finds its earliest 
formulation in William Robertson Smith’s influential Lectures on the Religion of the 
Semites (1889). In the section entitled “Holiness, Uncleanliness, and Taboo,” Smith 
explains that certain examples of contagion in Semitic religion “may  suffice to show 
that it is impossible to separate the Semitic doctrine of holiness and uncleanness from 
the system of taboo.”5  Taboos such as menstruation, ritual clothing, contact with the 
dead, and sexual intercourse have a precarious value in Semitic religion since they 
betoken a divine power that is at once dangerous and beneficial. Taboo interdictions 
concerning holiness parallel those concerning impurity:
Alongside of taboos that exactly correspond to rules of holiness 
protecting the inviolability of idols and sanctuaries, priests and chiefs, 
and all…things pertaining to God… we find another kind of taboo 
which in the Semitic field has its parallel rules of uncleanliness. 
Women after childbirth, men who have touched a dead body  and so 
forth are temporarily  taboo and are separated from human society as 
unclean persons are in the Semitic religion…In most savage societies, 
3
4  Indeed,  when the scholastic philosopher Nicolas de Cusa invented this theological concept in his 
Apologia Doctae Ignorantiae, he was specifically referencing that quality of God in which all worldly 
oppositions and contradictions—especially good and evil—are reconciled in coincident unity.  See 
Iänigo Kristien Marcel Bocken, Conflict and Reconciliation : Perspectives on Nicolas of Cusa,  Brill's 
Studies in Intellectual History, v. 126 (Leiden ; Boston: Brill, 2004).   This concept also serves as the 
introduction to Michel Leiris’ Miroir de la tauromachie, wherein it is argued that the coincidenta 
oppositorum offers a means of understanding the reconciliation of all things in the divine. Just as 
infinity of lines may pass through a point, so is all multiplicity reconciled in the divine as the common 
locus. “Comme le Dieu de Nicolas de Cuse,” he says, “l‘absolu dans la seule mesure où il embrasse, en 
même temps qu’il s’y déchire, l’ensemble de toutes les lignes et de toutes leur déviations” (Michel 
Leiris, Miroir de la tauromachie [Paris: Fata Morgana, 1981], 25).
5 W. Robertson Smith, Lectures on the Religion of the Semites : The Fundamental Institutions,  3rd ed. 
(New York: Macmillan, 1927), 433.
no sharp line seems to be drawn between the two kinds of taboo just 
indicated…the notions of holiness and uncleanliness often touch.6
As an example, Smith later explains that the holy flesh of a sacrificial sin-offering 
“conveys a taboo to everyone who touches it, and if a drop of the blood falls on a 
garment, [it] must be washed, i.e., the sanctity  must be washed out in a holy place, 
while the earthen pot in which the sacrifice is sodden must be broken, as in the case 
where dead vermin falls in a vessel and renders it  unclean.”7  The uncleanliness of the 
sin-offering, in other words, must be removed or distanced from ordinary  life in the 
same manner as a holy  place or sacred object.8 In this “no man’s land,” estranged from 
the common, profane space of everyday life, the clean therefore mingles with the 
unclean and the unholy with the holy.  Able to both bless and curse, it thus becomes 
endowed with a precarious and ambivalent power. Indeed, its power resides precisely 
in this ambivalence, in its homeopathic potential to become both; without it, the pure 
could not become sullied, nor would it be possible to purify what has become 
contagious. The actual effects of this ambivalence are significant, since the very same 
object or space can heal or hurt, bless or curse. In either case, however, the sacred 
possesses no inherent positive attribute of its own. As Bataille’s colleague Roger 
Caillois writes in the introduction to L’homme et le sacré (1939), “la seule chose 
qu’on puisse affirmer valablement est contenue dans la définition même du terme: 
c’est ce qu’il s’oppose au profane.”9  Emile Durkheim was perhaps the first to suggest 
4
6 Ibid., 152-3. See also Lev 6:20 and Lev 16:19-20, which serve as examples of Smith’s claim.
7 Ibid.
8Hugette Fugier remarks, for example, that “les forces ou les êtres sacres qui réside en un 
lieu...demeurent ambiguës: à l'essai, ils risquent de se manifester plutôt pour le mal que pour le bien des 
arrivants.  C'est pourquoi le fait de s'aventurer loin des sites familiers pose au Romain un problème 
religieux.  Rien de tout cela n'est assurément particulier à Rome, ni très originale dans le monde antique
—non plus que la solution qui consiste à ‘propitier’ (piare) ces forces ou ces êtres inconnus.” See 
Huguette Fugier, Recherches sur l'expression du sacré dans la langue latine (Paris: En dépôt à la 
Societé d'éditions: Les Belles Lettres, 1963), 421.
9 Caillois, L'homme et le sacré, 17.
the negativity inherent  to their understanding of the sacred when he called called it an 
“essentially heterogeneous” phenomenon (essentiellement hétérogène).10 
 After Smith’s influential study, the sacred’s characteristic coupling of attraction 
and repulsion, purity and impurity, fear and fascination, veneration and condemnation, 
originating in the sociology of religion, was widely influential all throughout the 20th 
century human sciences. Durkheim, his nephew Marcel Mauss, and other members of 
the French Ecole sociologique—who in turn strongly influenced Bataille and his peers
—drew heavily on Smith’s observations and further formalized the tenet of sacred 
ambivalence. In “L’essai sur la nature et  la fonction du sacrifice” (1899), Mauss 
makes reference to Smith when he describes the transformation of the sacrificial 
victim from social pathogen to cure: “le caractère ambigu des choses sacrées, que R. 
Smith avait si admirablement mis en lumière, lui permettait d’expliquer facilement 
comment une telle transformation avait pu se produire.”11   Later, Mauss’ uncle would 
echo him in his more comprehensive Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse 
(1912) where he writes : “Il y  a deux sortes de sacrée, l’un faste, l’autre néfaste, et non 
seulement entre les deux formes opposés il n’y a pas de solution de continuité, mais un 
même objet  peut passer de l’une à l’autre sans changer de nature.”12  William Ward 
Fowler in “On the Meaning of the Word Sacer” (1911), Sigmund Freud in Totem und 
5
10 Emile Durkheim, Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse : le système totemique en Australie,  4th 
ed. (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1998), 53.  Bataille would later borrow this meaning of 
“heterogeneity” from Durkheim and develop it into a broader philosophy of political ontology in his 
pre-war writings and, still later, into a theory of political economy in La part maudite (1949). 
Counterpoised against this concept is of course “homogeneity,” which Bataille describes to be the order 
of identity and assured limits, one from which “all violence is excluded”: “en principe, toute violence 
est exclue du cours d’existence ainsi impliqué” (Georges Bataille, Œuvres complètes,  ed. Michel 
Foucault [Paris: Gallimard, 1970], vol. I,  340). Yet, he elsewhere will ascribe to the formation of 
homogeneity a constitutive violence he cannot fully exclude from its other,  the “heterogeneous”: “Au 
départ, une opposition calme à la violence n’aurait pas suffi...si l’opposition n’avait elle-même en 
quelque manière participé de la violence” (Bataille,  L’Erotisme, 90). This apparent contradiction is 
explored in greater depth in the first chapter. 
11 Marcel Mauss and Viktor Karady, Oeuvres, vol. I: Les fonctions sociales du sacré (Paris: Editions de 
Minuit, 1968), 195.
12 Durkheim, Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse : le système totemique en Australie, 588.
Tabou (1913), Rudolf Otto in Das Heilige (1917), and Roger Caillois in L’homme et le 
sacré (1939) would offer different interpretations of this same tenet, broadening 
significantly its conceptual and disciplinary  scope beyond ethnology and sociology 
into the fields of psychoanalysis, theology, and philosophy. It is appropriate therefore 
that, as Hugette Fugier shows in his voluminous study  Recherches sur l'expression du 
sacré dans la langue latine (1963), the definition of the Latin sacer and its historical 
descendants in the various European languages had officially adopted this dual-
definition sometime between 1910 and 1932, the publication dates of two authoritative 
Latin dictionaries (Fig. 0.1).13 
 The ambivalence of the sacred precipitated the association of a whole host of 
other terms, including the Greek ayos, the Hebrew kadesh, the Melanesian mana, the 
Malaysian pamali, the ancient Japanese kami, the Dakotan wakan, and the Iroquois 
orenda.14 The ambivalence and dualism characterizing taboo sacer was coincidental to 
each of these terms, as was their opposition, so it was argued, to profanum, i.e., what is 
6
13 Fugier, Recherches sur l'expression du sacré dans la langue latine, 238. The two dictionaries are A. 
Walde’s Latieinisches etymologishes Worterbuch (1910) and Alfred Ernout-Meillet’s Dictionnaire 
etymologique de la langue latine (1932). This section of Fugier’s study sketches the evolution of this 
concept from French ethnology to sociology in the early 20th century, attributing its transference to the 
intellectual cross-fertilization of different disciplines at the Sorbonne.  The close ties existing between 
the Ecole sociologique and linguists like Ernout-Meillet were decisive for the broader acceptance of this 
doctrine among the human sciences. Fugier cites Caillois explicitly as one of the heritors of this trend. 
As I later explain, Giorgio Agamben faults these intellectual influences with the acceptance of sacred 
ambivalence,  which as he claims in Homo Sacer : Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford, Calif.: 
Stanford University Press, 1998) obscures the true meaning of the sacred.
14 See Sigmund Freud and James Strachey,  Totem and Taboo : Some Points of Agreement between the 
Mental Lives of Savages and Neurotics, The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of 
Sigmund Freud (New York: W.W. Norton,  1989), 18. Also illustrative of this point is the section 
“Ambiguité du sacré” in Caillois, L'homme et le sacré, 43-77.
7Figure 0.1. Semantic genealogy of the word “sacred” (sacré, sacer, 
heilig, etc.) as a sociological term denoting religious ambiguity  or 
ambivalence. “E.M.” refers to Ernout-Meillet’s Latin Dictionary; 
“W.H.” refers to Walde’s Worterbuch. (Based on Fugier’s research 
in Recherches sur l’expression du sacré dans la langue latine).
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literally “outside the temple”: the quotidian, accessible, and ordinary. The apparent 
synonymy of the terms, accompanied by their heterogeneous time periods and 
geographical locations, permitted the postulation of sacred ambivalence as a universal 
or transhistorical axiom. In L’homme et le sacre, Roger Caillois exemplifies this trend: 
“à travers toute l’histoire religieuse” he writes, “la notion du sacre a garde une 
individualité bien marquée qui lui confère une incontestable unité, quelque diverses 
qu’apparaissent, de la plus grossière à la plus élaborée, les civilisations où on la 
constate.”15
The linguistic adoption of this tenet would culminate in Emile Benveniste’s 
celebrated 1969 study in comparative linguistics, Le Vocabulaire des institutions indo-
européennes, where he places the sacred (le sacré) among the most fundamental of 
Indo-European religious institutions. Though there exists, he claims, no known 
common pre-history or linguistic root for the term and that it presents some 
“difficultés de méthode,” its equivalents among the various Indo-European languages 
exhibit many  uncanny semantic and conceptual similarities. Distinguishing the sacred 
among that of its counterpart institutions is a curious lexical dualism; in each of the 
languages he considers, there seems to be not one, but two distinct terms referring to 
the same notion.16  The ancient  Avestan adjective spénta (“holy,” “sanctified,” L. 
sanctus), is coincident with yaozdata, meaning “adapted for religious purposes.”  In 
Greek, heiros (“sacred”) is often coupled with hagios, meaning again “sanctioned,” 
“sanctified” in some religious manner. The Latin sanctus (“sanctioned”) and sacer 
(“sacred”) are often similarly  juxtaposed, though Benveniste is careful to distinguish 
their meanings; whereas sacer refers to that which belongs to the gods and thus is to 
be banished from the the world of men, sanctus refers to that which delimits or 
8
15 Ibid., 75.
16 Emile Benveniste and Jean Lallot, Le Vocabulaire des institutions indo-européennes (Paris: Éditions 
de Minuit, 1969), 185.
proscribes those things called sacer.17  Though each language ascribes a different 
meaning and value to these dualisms, all of them commonly reveal a certain 
equivocation or ambivalence concerning the status of the divine, which itself seems 
metonymic for a greater, unnamed, and even perhaps unnamable notion that 
encompasses them both. “Voila comment se distribuent dans le vocabulaire de chaque 
langue ces deux qualités,”  he writes, “illustrant les deux aspects d’une même notion: 
ce qui est rempli d’une puissance divine; ce qui est interdit au contact des hommes.”18 
Indeed, the sacred came to encompass such a variety  of meanings, histories, and 
cultures that it seemed ultimately  devoid of meaning. Being that which is simply 
“opposed to the profane,” it is becomes a “negative concept” that, due to its vagary, 
would be subjected to skeptical scientific critique. 
Levi-Strauss was among the first to contest the notion in his introduction to 
Marcel Mauss’ Sociologie et anthropologie (1950), where he writes that mana, then 
synonymous with sacer, taboo, and so many other terms, has become nothing but an 
empty term or “floating signifier”: 
9
17 Benveniste explains: “La différence entre sacer and sanctus se voit en plusieurs circonstances. Il n’y 
a pas seulement la différence entre sacer, état naturel,  et sanctus,  résultat d’une opération...Ce qui est 
sanctus, c’est le mur, mais non pas le domaine que le mur enceint, qui est dit sacer; est sanctum ce qui 
est défendu par certaines sanctions.  Mais le fait d’entrer en contact avec le sacre n'entraîne pas l'état 
sanctus; Il n’y a pas de sanction pour celui qui, touchant le sacer,  devient lui-même sacer; il est banni 
de la communauté, on ne le châtie pas, ni non plus celui qui le tue.  On dirait que le sanctum, c’est ce qui 
se trouve à la périphérie du sacrum, qui sert à l’isoler de tout contact” (Ibid., 190).
18 Ibid., 207. Emphasis mine.
Les notions du type mana, aussi diverses qu’elles puissent être, et en les 
envisageant dans leur fonction la plus générale…représentent 
précisément ce signifiant flottant, qui est la servitude de toute pensée 
finie…en effet, le mana est tout…à la fois; mais précisément, n’est-ce 
pas parce qu’il n’est rien de tout cela.19
Hugette Fugier similarly calls for the adumbration of the concept, questioning its 
accuracy  for Latin and other particular cases. “Mieux vaut donc s’en tenir à l’autre 
méthode,” he argues, “celle déjà éprouvée et qui s’adapte le plus étroitement aux 
situations concretes.”20 Giorgio Agamben is the most prominent recent critic of sacred 
ambivalence in Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (1989), where he argues 
that this notion, so influential for French intellectuals of the 30s, is a recent historical 
“mythologeme” that has eclipsed the true history  and meaning of the Latin sacer, if not 
the notion of the sacred in general.21  Agamben, like Fugier, contests the history of 
which Benveniste’s comparative method is part, and implicitly  Benveniste himself, for 
obscuring through comparison the particularities of various languages, religions, and 
cultures and thus provoking erroneous generalities, if not a mythic transhistoricism. 
As Chapter One of this thesis illustrates, however, Agamben’s critique goes much 
further than Fugier and Levi-Strauss’, dismissing the concept of ambivalence entirely 
10
19  Marcel Mauss, Sociologie et anthropologie, 4th ed. (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1966), 
XLIX-L.  Freud’s definition in Totem and Taboo illustrates Levi-Strauss’ position: “The word ‘taboo’ 
denotes everything, whether a person or a place or a thing or a transitory condition, which is the vehicle 
or source of this mysterious attribute. It also denotes the prohibitions arising from the same attribute. 
And, finally, it has a connotation which includes alike ‘sacred’  and ‘above the ordinary,’ as well as 
‘dangerous,’ ‘unclean,’  and ‘uncanny’” (Freud and Strachey, Totem and Taboo : Some Points of 
Agreement between the Mental Lives of Savages and Neurotics, 22).
20  Fugier, Recherches sur l'expression du sacré dans la langue latine, 241. Though Fugier credits 
Durkheim for expounding upon Smith’s claim for the ambiguity of taboos in Semitic religion, he regrets 
that this begins a trend that transforms sacred ambivalence a sociological axiom by the time Caillois’ 
L’homme et le sacré. Fugier persuasively argues that it was the intimacy of the faculty at L'école 
normale supérieure that contributed to the dissemination of the sacred as a intellectually fashionable 
concept.
21  Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer : Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1998),  75-86.  Despite Agamben’s trenchant critique, it is nevertheless possible to detect a certain 
“ambiguity” in his notion of the “inclusive exclusion” or “exclusive inclusion,” whereby the sacred 
man, like the sovereign, occupies a juridical space that is both lawful and beyond the law.
and supplanting it  with his own concept of the sacred, one quite transhistorical in its 
own right. 
 Ironically, it  is also for its conceptual vagary--its “heterogeneity”--that  it  had 
become a dynamic notion of radical theoretical influence, especially  as it was 
developed and evoked by members of the College of Sociology (1937-9), including 
Georges Bataille. The College was a diverse group of French avant-garde artists and 
intellectuals who convened in Paris to use, study, and practice sociology as a means to 
redress the existing social ills of capitalism, corporatism, and fascism. The sacred’s 
“heterogeneity” empowered the College and its members to theorize new conceptions 
of aesthetic, political, and ethical existence they considered resistant to the inhuman 
“homogenizing” tendencies of fascism and capitalism. Bataille in particular would 
develop the concept of heterogeneity into a kind of radical political ontology in his 
controversial 1933 essay “Le structure psychologique du fascisme,” where he writes 
that heterogeneity, of which the sacred is a “restricted form” (forme restreinte), takes 
the shape of a violent madness and delirium able to break the laws of social 
homogeneity, such as industrialism, law, and the state.22 
 Through the work of the authors surrounding College of Sociology, it is 
possible to reevaluate the cultural and historical significance sacred ambivalence 
without denying the validity  of the above scientific concerns. It is through the work of 
Bataille and the College that the “heterogeneous” tenet of sacred ambivalence--which 
ultimately  concerns the paradoxical effects of violence on personal and group 
identity--became a concept of decisive, perhaps even unrealized importance for 
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22  Bataille writes “la violence, la démesure, le délire,  la folie, caractérisent à des degrés divers les 
éléments hétérogènes: actifs, en tant que personnes ou en tant que foules, ils se produisent en brisant les 
lois de l'homogénéité sociale” (Bataille, Oeuvres complètes, vol. 1, 347). 
interwar France and subsequent  French intellectual history.23  If the concept of the 
sacred failed the desired rigor and specificity of scientific nomenclature, it was 
nevertheless an influential, even generative failure. The tenet’s dissemination 
throughout the human sciences, especially  as they were practiced in France, revealed 
their links and common concerns—including the nature of magic, desire, 
transgression, war, taboo, and sacrifice—that transcended their more local disciplinary 
preoccupations and even hearkened toward a new discourse, if not  a new discipline, 
beyond their established purview. Philosopher Jean Wahl, himself a participant in the 
College of Sociology, saw in sociology’s growing influence the possibility  of a new, 
radical epistemology able to address disparate contemporary intellectual concerns:
Cette sociologie, dont je ne fus jamais un adepte très fervent, la voici qui 
s’empare d’esprits jeunes, avides de rigueur, qui pensent en elle trouver 
une réponse à des questions qu’ils ont cru auparavant pouvoir résoudre par 
le surréalisme, par la révolution, par le freudisme. Il faut tacher de 
comprendre ce phénomène, lui-même sociologique.24
It is likely  that Caillois shared Wahl’s view, having established Le College de 
Sociologie pour l’Etude du Sacré at the Université de Beauvais in the 1950s, after his 
publication of L’homme et le sacré.
 As these erstwhile students of sociology knew, that which permitted 
comparison of presumably disparate social phenomena were certain underlying 
12
23 The considerable impact of French classical sociology on the avant-garde has only recently become 
the focus of scholarly attention. The surrealists were similarly influenced by sociological studies of 
religion and the occult, in which they sought a kind creative or artistic mysticism. The chapter 
“Modernism as a State of Mind” in Celia Rabinovitch’s Surrealism and the Sacred: Power, Eros, and 
the Occult in Modern Art (Boulder, Colorado: Icon Editions Westview Press, 2002),  for example, 
examines the notion of sacred ambivalence in surrealist art. The most rigorous and extended 
examination of sociology on the French avant-garde can be found in Michèle H. Richman, Sacred 
Revolutions : Durkheim and the Collège de Sociologie (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
2002). 
24 Georges Bataille and Denis Hollier, Le Collège de sociologie : 1937-1939 (Paris: Gallimard, 1979), 
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“religious” qualities seldom stated but implicit; many, if not all, seem to bind human 
societies on inviolate, sacred practices. Exemplifying this understanding was Marcel 
Mauss’ concept of the fait social total, or “total social fact,” which describes the 
unintentional and comprehensive socially binding force of disparate everyday 
actions.25   Different social phenomena like gift-exchange, sacrifice, magic, war, and 
exogamy seemed commonly  able to provide answers to many  fundamental questions: 
how are society and community possible at all? How does one form social and ethical 
bonds with another? How are individual and group  identity  created and undone? How 
can violence--especially  in the forms of war and sacrifice--not simply destroy a 
society, but  provide for its very foundation? Indeed, why do almost all world religions 
attribute divine significance to violence? What is the apparent, yet  elusive link among 
violence, religion, and social unity? That the French Ecole sociologique sought 
answers to these questions through the study of disparate cultures, time periods, and 
social practices makes it a kind of testament to the virtues of comparative method. By 
bringing disparate cultures and social phenomena into comparative perspective, it 
created a kind of inter-cultural dialogue in which to understand European civilization 
and its others. But this method and dialogue were by no means restricted to sociology; 
the sacred also informed new aesthetic and intellectual practices, as evidenced by the 
College of Sociology  and their interdisciplinary interrogations into politics, myth, 
fascism, history, and philosophy. For figures like Bataille, Leiris, and Colette Peignot 
(otherwise known as “Laure”), the sacred also came to inform a new practice and 
understanding of literature.
For the more literary affiliates of the College, then, the sacred was a concept 
no less dynamic or important. The philosophical questions it  prompted concerning 
13
25 Mauss’ “total social facts” or fait sociaux totaux “sont à la fois juridiques, économiques, religieux, et 
même esthétiques, morphologiques, etc. Ils sont juridiques, de droit prive et publique, de moralité 
organisée et diffuse, strictement obligatoires ou simplement loués et blâmés, politiques et domestiques 
en même temps” (Mauss, Sociologie et anthropologie, 274).
identity, community, society, and art would become the preoccupation of their literary 
interests, which they considered a critical part of their endeavor to practice a “sacred 
sociology.” For Leiris, the writings of Rimbaud, Baudelaire, Balzac, and Nietzsche 
offered a critique of individualism and a new notion of social existence. Pierre 
Klossowski saw in Soren Kierkegaard’s translation of Antigone a critique of the state 
and the possibility of revolutionary action experienced as tragedy. Réné Guastalla 
outlined a theory  for the differing social functions of literature and myth. Jean Paulhan 
would discuss the “sacred language” of the proverb, and Jules Monnerot would write 
about the sacred nature of modern poetry. These essayistic forays into the nature of 
literature endeavored to examine, but more importantly  manifest the sacred in what 
they  called a “sacred sociology,” which “implique l'étude de l’existence sociale dans 
toutes celles de ses manifestations ou se fait  jour la présence active du sacré.”26 
Literature--and especially poetry--was envisioned as an affirmative form of combined 
aesthetic and political praxis, if not a kind of sacred or erotic ritual. It therefore could 
yield an experience akin to the narrator’s in Madame Edwarda, and this, in its turn, 
was not unrelated either to the fervor of political revolt or the ethics of community. In 
this way, literature was seen itself as sacred, as part of a vital and politically significant 
form of self-creation, an autopoeisis, that delivered humanity from the dehumanizing 
effects of modern life.  Such literature might be called a “poetics of the sacred.”
As Bataille writes in his famous essay  “La notion de dépense” (1933), for 
example, both poetry and class revolt are wed to violent sacrifice. Echoing Bataille, 
Laure writes that poetry  is a kind of sacred surrender or “denudation” fostering 
communion with others:  “l’oeuvre poétique est sacré en ce qu’elle est création d’un 
événement topique, ‘communication’ ressentie comme la nudité; pour que (le sacré) 
14
26 Bataille,  Georges, and Denis Hollier. Le Collège de sociologie : 1937-1939. Paris: Gallimard, 1979, 
27.
soit, il faut que cela soit  ressentie par les autres, en communion avec d’autres.”27 In his 
unfinished work L’homme sans honneur (1939), Leiris explains that language is sacred 
when it serves a similar communitarian purpose: “si tout ce qui touche au langage me 
parait au moins en quelque mesure, empreint d’un caractère sacré, c’est parce qu’il est 
de l’essence du langage d’être instrument de communication, de communion.”28 
Poetry in particular offers privileged access to the sacred and communal character of 
language: “Par rapport aux autres genres littéraires [roman, essai, etc.] la poésie—et 
spécialement la poésie lyrique—fait figure d’art sacré.”29  For these authors, then, the 
sacred provided a dynamic philosophy in which to conceive a communitarian ethics, a 
radical politics, and a new literary practice at the same time. As I will show, these 
issues commonly concern the shifting nature of subjectivity as it wavers between 
personal identity and alterity, selfhood and otherness. These shifts problematize not 
only the liberal notion of the self-possessed volitional subject, but also the social ties 
that bind it to others ethically  and politically. The intersection of these three issues--
identity, ethics, and politics--in the literary  practice of these three authors is the focus 
and argument of this thesis. 
 These related issues illustrate the sacred’s combined historical, theoretical, and 
literary  import in 1930s France. More than a history or revaluation of sacred 
ambivalence, however, my argument here will reveal how sacred ambivalence actually 
veils a particular philosophy of identity based on self-sacrifice, one that serves as the 
common tether binding the issues and authors mentioned above.  As I argue in Chapter 
One, the sacred actually describes not a binaristic ambivalence, but paradoxical 
process by  which a subject is repeatedly recreated, or indeed performed, due to the 
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27 Laure and Jérôme Peignot, Écrits de Laure (Paris: J.J. Pauvert, 1971), 89.
28 Michel Leiris and Jean Jamin, L'homme sans honneur: notes pour le sacré dans la vie quotidienne: 
transcription et fac-similé (Paris: J.-M. Place, 1994), 45-6.
29 Ibid., 41.
very violence that imperils it. The performative quality of subjectivity  common to 
these authors, I would argue, anticipates the later critical thought of Judith Butler and 
Eve Kosofsky  Sedgwick and their performative theories of identity. The first chapter 
of Butler’s The Psychic Life of Power, for example, offers perhaps the clearest 
illustration of this philosophy of identity.  In the section entitled “Ambivalence,” 
Butler explains that as “a power exerted on a subject, subjection is nevertheless a 
power assumed by the subject, an assumption that constitutes the instrument of that 
subjects becoming.”30  That the subject is both enabled and threatened in the process of 
subjection constitutes an “ambivalence” lying at the very heart of identity. 
This ambivalence, I argue, describes the ambivalence came to describe the 
sacred. For Bataille, Laure, and Leiris’ literature alike, the violent dissolution of the 
subject on the one hand provides for a communitarian existence grounded in death, 
eroticism, and ecstasy, one celebrated not only by these authors but contemporary 
figures in European thought.31  On the other hand, however, I would also argue 
resistantly that this dissolution, once identified through language and literature, 
outlines--though never completes--the possibility  of a reborn subject. Such 
representation is often figured as embodiment and new life, whereas the failure of 
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30  Judith Butler, The Psychic Life of Power, 64. Here I am specifically referencing Eve Kosofsky 
Sedgwick and Andrew Parker, Performativity and Performance, Essays from the English Institute, 
(New York: Routledge, 1995); Judith Butler, Gender Trouble : Feminism and the Subversion of Identity 
(New York: Routledge, 1999); and finally Bulter, The Psychic Life of Power (mentioned above). Butler 
offers a clear and thoroughgoing explanation of the phenomenon of subjectivity in the opening chapter 
of The Psychic Life of Power (1-30).  Her study of subjection throughout philosophical history argues 
for a double-bind characterizing the effect of power on the subject.
31  See Maurice Blanchot,  La communauté inavouable (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1983), Jean-Luc 
Nancy, La communauté désœuvrée (Paris: C. Bourgois, 1986). and Jean-Luc Nancy, La communauté 
affrontée,  Collection La philosophie en effet, (Paris: Galilée, 2001). In his celebrated response to 
Blanchot, Nancy seeks to theorize a notion of community that avoids basing itself on programmatic 
notions of common interests,  agendas, or goals, which he considers to be the wellspring of “collective 
hypostasis” and, ultimately, fascism. In contrast from community building as a form of work (oeuvre), 
he envisions community (with the help of Bataille) as a form of constant, self-deconstructive 
“unworking” (désœuvrement) that avoids such hypostasis.  A more recent foray into the question of 
community in continental thought is Roberto Esposito’s Communitas: origine e destino della comunità 
and  Immunitas: Protezione e  Negazione del la  Vi ta (Torino: Einaudi, 1998).
representation contrarily evokes dissolution and death. Thus does a subject  take on 
new identities--sexed, gendered, and raced--in and through the representation of 
mortal and erotic self-dissolution, such as is seen in Madame Edwarda. 32   The 
mechanism by which the subject in this literature “dies,” only  to be reborn into a new 
identity, is none other than self-sacrifice, an oxymoron that fully captures the 
paradoxical process by which subjectivity is simultaneously expropriated and 
reappropriated in the pursuit of the sacred: the self, to become a self, gives itself away 
in sacrifice, and yet this self, by virtue of its sacrificial gift, can never fully be a self at 
all.33 
As the vehicle that moves between the life and death of the subject, sacrifice 
represents “l’accord intime de la mort et de la vie,” to use Bataille’s phrase.34  The 
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32 Bataille criticism since the 1970s has been preoccupied with the question of Bataille’s politics. Much 
of this has to due with the complicated role of sacrifice and myth, which seem to legitimate violence or 
bear traces of fascist ideology.  Many of those who uphold the fascist claim are intellectual historians 
such as Richard Wolin and Daniel Lindenberg, who commonly detect a certain veneration for the 
mythology and social élan associated with fascist regimes. Agamben has also argued that Bataille, 
despite his anti-fascist tendencies,  actually developed a fascist philosophy in his conception of ecstasy 
and sovereignty. Bataille’s biographer,  Michel Surya, contrarily insists on Bataille’s radical opposition 
to fascism despite the sacred social energies it mobilized. The performativity of violence, as I argue in 
Chapter One, seems to simultaneously challenge and support both views, as the simultaneous condition 
of possibility for both statehood/subjectivity and revolution.  In his introduction to Visions of Excess, 
Bataille scholar and translator Alan Stoekl notes precisely this contradiction in Bataille: “the subversive 
violence of the masses...could easily be reversed into fascism, as Bataille quickly became 
aware” (Georges Bataille and Allan Stoekl, Visions of Excess : Selected Writings, 1927-1939 
[Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985], xviii).    Also see Daniel Lindenberg, Les années 
souterraines: 1937-1947 (Paris: La Decouverte, 1990), Michel Surya, Georges Bataille, la mort à 
l’oeuvre (Paris: Gallimard, 1992),  and Richard Wolin, The Seduction of Unreason:The Intellectual 
Romance with Fascism from Nietzsche to Postmodernism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004) 
and finally Agamben, "Bataille e il paradosso della sovranità," in Georges Bataille: il politico e il sacro, 
edited by Jacqueline Risset, Napoli: Liguori, 1987, 87-95.
33  In her recent book The Hostess: Hospitality, Femininity, and the Expropriation of Identity, Tracy 
McNulty exposes this very paradox within the host’s hospitable relationships to others. “How can 
identity,” she asks, “by definition so eminently proper, so thoroughly ‘mine’- be ‘dispossessed’?” 
Drawing comparatively from the Bible,  Kant, Lacan, and other diverse sources, she forcefully argues 
that this paradox of identity is particularly acute for the host, who,  according to “traditional wisdom” is 
best when he “has given the most, even to the point of giving away that which defines him as master 
and host” (xx). Chapter One explores this paradox in further depth, specifically within the context of 
self-sacrifice. See Tracy McNulty, The Hostess : Hospitality, Femininity, and the Expropriation of 
Identity (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007), xx, and "Hospitality after the Death of 
God," in Diacritics: A Review of Contemporary Criticism 35, no. 1 (2005).
34 Bataille and Hollier, Le Collège de sociologie : 1937-1939, 212.
subject’s death and life, in turn, parallel the malignant and beneficial dualism of sacred 
ambivalence. Given the sacred shift between life and death, the self, bound to the 
practice of self-sacrifice, remains only  a provisional and fictive totality, a “false-
identity” or masquerade that testifies as much to the dissolution of subjectivity as it 
does to its rebirth.  In self-sacrifice, the aporetic relationship  between the 
expropriation and reappropriation of identity, death and rebirth, selfhood and 
otherness--indeed selfhood as otherness--gives performative significance to the tenet 
of sacred ambivalence, one that I term the “divination of identity.”
 Chapter One reconsiders the intellectual history  of sacred ambivalence in 
France, concentrating on its specific meaning and importance for those in and around 
the College of Sociology, especially Georges Bataille. Bataille’s “excessive” 
conception of the sacred was of decisive importance not only in the work of Michel 
Leiris and Colette Peignot--his closest intellectual peers--but also in subsequent 
continental thought, especially in the work of the figures surrounding the revue Tel 
Quel (1960-1983) and, more recently, Jean-Luc Nancy  and Giorgio Agamben.35 
Rather than a binaristic concept that  “ambivalently” wavers between the adulatory and 
accursed, the fearsome and the fascinating, I argue that the sacred describes a theory  of 
identity  grounded in the performative contradictions of self-sacrifice.  While this 
theory  offers an account of how the sacred functions in Bataille’s work, it  also departs 
from Bataille’s own influential vision of the sacred as a radical expropriation of 
identity  in ecstasy and death. It also challenges both Jean-Luc Nancy and Giorgio 
Agamben’s radically divergent positions on Bataille and the sacred.  Whereas for 
Agamben the sacred signifies an eminently  unethical notion of human life as form of 
radical subjection or living political resource, for Nancy--who is considerably more 
sympathetic to Bataille--the sacred seems to describe an ethical or communitarian 
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35 See notes 31 and 32 above for the disparity between Nancy and Agamben.
space of alterity (specifically  in death). Indeed, for Nancy, community is the sacred: 
“ce qui du sacré, est disparu…révèle au contraire que la communauté elle-même 
occupe désormais la place du sacré. Elle est le sacré, si on veut.”36  The disparity of 
these approaches is useful for  tracing a more comprehensive account of the sacred 
that binds the ethical and the political together. Self-sacrifice, I argue, wavers between 
these alternatives as both an ethics of alterity and politics of subjectivity, which 
together constitute an aporetic limit that traces the contours of personal identity. 
 Chapter Two, “Georges Bataille and the Sacrifice of Gender” draws upon the 
argument developed in the previous chapter to reevaluate the role and meaning of self-
sacrifice and gendered subjectivity in Bataille’s oeuvre. While feminist  scholarship  has 
done much to highlight the controversial exemplarity of his female figures, only  few 
have begun to consider Bataille’s usefulness for queer theory and performance studies. 
I consider feminist  and queer criticism alike in a reading of Bataille that creates a 
dialog, if not a rapprochement, between their respective approaches to Bataille. 
Bataille’s literary and theoretical conception of the feminine has typically been 
understood as an “abject” alternative, though not an opposition, to subjectivity and the 
masculine. Whereas Bataille’s men are typically  associated with a restricted economy 
of subjectivity, reason, life, and law, his women, like Madame Edwarda, often provide 
the gateway to a general economy of sacred excess, eroticism, ecstasy, and death. In 
contrast to this more conventional understanding, I argue that gendered identity in 
Bataille describes less a categoric difference in kind (male/female) than a form of 
“queer” difference of degree (male ! female ! queer gender) along a continuum of 
possible gendered identities, for which the feminine is a provisionally privileged 
figure.
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36 Jean-Luc Nancy, La communauté désœuvrée, 86.
 Chapter Three, “Laure’s War,” elaborates the argument outlined in previous 
chapter through a rigorous engagement with the sordid and fragmentary writings of 
Colette Peignot, nom de plume Laure, who remains an underrepresented figure in the 
French literary avant-garde. As both a political activist and literary compatriot to such 
figures as Georges Bataille, Michel Leiris, and Simone Weil, her revolutionary politics 
came to be expressed aesthetically in equally revolutionary  forms of poetry, prose, 
aphorism, and essay. These disparate writings reveal an extended engagement with the 
notions of  the sacred, and sacrifice, which evoke in their turn a “religious” mode of 
identity  performance. The mutability of her characters into subjects varied and 
multiple, including sovereigns, revolutionaries, and animals, compellingly illustrate 
the effusive multiplicity implied in self-identity, which is revealed only  through 
various literary practices of sacrifice. Feminine identity in particular undergoes these 
performative transformations in a way  anticipating queer critique. Integral to such 
transformations is the figure of Nature, which, drawing (as Laure does) upon the 
thought of D.A.F. de Sade, represents a force of inexorable metamorphosis that 
compels the continual dissolution and rebirth of the subject. This serial process of 
dissolution and rebirth inaugurates relations to otherness that shift respectively 
between the ethics and politics of subjectivity.
 The fourth and final chapter, “Autopsies of Autobiography,” considers the self-
sacrificial dimensions of autobiography in the early writings of author, ethnographer, 
and museologist Michel Leiris who, though a close friend to Bataille and Peignot, 
remained a marginal figure for the College of Sociology.  Self-effacement is a well-
known paradoxical attribute of his autobiographical auteurism, which I argue evolves 
from his early embrace of Bretonian surrealism of the 1920s and its pursuit of the 
occult, unconscious, marvelous, and exotic. Encounters with these effected a sense 
self-estrangement not unlike the the one he would later attribute to autobiography, 
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ethnographic study, or even experience of the the sacred, to which he tethered the 
enchantments of everyday life. For many readers, his return to France in 1933 
signified an abandonment of ethnography and a return to (surrealist) aestheticism, 
traces of which can be found in his 1938 address to the College of Sociology “Le sacré 
dans la vie quotidienne” or even the famed L’Age d’homme (1939), his first extended 
work of autobiography. With this return came the significant influence of his friend 
Georges Bataille, from whom he self-avowedly tried to distance himself by  the 1940s. 
To be sure, Bataille’s conceptions of violence, eroticism, and the sacred lucidly appear 
in Miroir de la tauromachie (1939), for example, wherein bullfighting, love, and 
religion become common expressions of the same sublime experience.  Challenging 
the idea of this “aesthetic return,” however, I show how such aestheticism no only 
persists throughout his surrealist, ethnographic, and autobiographical writings--an 
established claim in Leiris studies--but also how religiosity and self-sacrifice 
constitute unrealized and integral features of this aestheticism. The experience of self-
sacrifice in turn gives reason to reevaluate not only Leiris’ surrealist roots or 
autobiography, but also the exoticism characteristic of his early  writings on Africa. 
Confrontations with exotic, marvelous, and sacred objects--for which women and 
Africa are exemplary--commonly effect an experience of self-dissolution coterminous 
with self-sacrifice, one that consequentially problematizes the meaning and 
relationship  of these objects to the subject  that  experiences them. As I will show, the 
identities of both the subject (Leiris) and the object (women, Africa, etc.) are 
continually undone, or even “redone,” through such “sacrificial” encounters. As a 
result, Leiris’ literature not only testifies to the inexhaustibility  of the object in sacred 
experience, but also that of identity itself, whether autobiographical, feminine, or 
African. 
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 In sum, therefore, the argument that follows represents a fourfold endeavor. 
First, it illustrates how the doctrine of sacred ambivalence, popularized in the early 
social sciences, develops into an aporetic notion of identity in interwar French 
literature.  Such identity  is based on the paradoxical effects of self-sacrifice on the 
representation of personal identity.  This conception of self-sacrifice is distinguished 
from--and yet able to explain--Bataille, Laure, and Leiris own exuberant 
proclamations of ecstatic, sacrificial self-loss in literature and eroticism. Secondly, the 
following argument seeks to show how self-sacrifice not only plays an integral role in 
the history of poststructuralist critique, but also how it anticipates more recent 
performative theories of the subject, especially  as they account for the (de-)
construction of sexed, gendered, authorial, and raced identities. Third, it shows how 
the literature of the authors here considered serves as a case-in-point for the second 
proposition above.  Lastly, it is to offer a reevaluation of “the sacred” as it is 
understood and applied in contemporary criticism and theory. Through the lasting 
influence of figures surrounding Tel Quel and their advocacy  for the work of Georges 
Bataille, the sacred has come to signify a form of radical expenditure, abjection, and 
expropriation without end on the one hand; on the other, it has come to signify the 
dialectical resolution of violence into social identity, especially in the work of Réné 
Girard and his adherents in the Colloquium on Violence and Religion.37  The account 
that follows represents what I hope to be third, alternate account  of the concept of “the 
sacred” within the literary and intellectual history of 20th century France. 
22
37  Girard holds the genesis of archaic religion--and indeed social order itself--to reside in the violent 
sacrificial expulsion of one element of what he calls the “mimetic double”: the two conflicting people, 
parties, or forces that desire the same power and influence in a society. This “mimetic desire” begins 
with covetousness or envy but resolves itself in the purgation of one party through violence. On the one 
hand, this violence threatens the society itself and yet, once completed,  restores unity. The 
“ambivalence of the sacred” thus describes the victor, who represents simultaneously the origin of 
violence and its resultant end in peace. Girard’s conception of the sacred is strictly dialectical, since the 
“monstrous double” always resolves itself through violence into a peaceable unity. See Girard, La 
violence et le sacré (above) and René Girard, Jean-Michel Oughourlian, and Guy Lefort, Des choses 
cachées depuis la fondation du monde (Paris: B. Grasset, 1978).
CHAPTER I
THE SACRED: FROM AMBIVALENCE TO APORIA
Au départ, une opposition calme à la 
violence n’aurait pas suffi...si l’opposition 
n’avait elle-même en quelque manière 
participé de la violence. 1
-Georges Bataille, L’érotisme
Le sacré unit en lui tous les contraires non 
parce qu’il diffère de la violence mais 
parce que la violence parait différer d’elle-
même... 2
-Réné Girard, Violence et le sacré 
The subject who would oppose violence, 
even violence to itself, is itself the effect of 
a prior violence without which the subject 
could not have emerged. 3
-Judith Butler, The Psychic Life of Power
 Introduction. The tenet  of sacred ambiguity  arises in Benveniste’s famed 
linguistic study Le vocabulaire des institutions européennes as a lexical dualism. 
Again, Benveniste argues that this dualism describes two aspects of “the same 
notion” (deux aspects de la même notion), suggesting a relationship between them that 
is somehow united or complementary.  In an 1938 lecture at the College of Sociology, 
Caillois seems to echo Benveniste’s assertion above by  describing the furtive 
singularity that underlies sacred ambiguity. “On peut saisir,” he writes, “un état  où elle 
est composée indissolublement avec d’autres antagonismes qui s’anastomosent et 
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1 Georges Bataille, L'érotisme (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1957), 90.
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3Judith Butler, The Psychic Life of Power : Theories in Subjection (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University 
Press, 1997), 64.
s’interpénètrent plus qu’ils ne se laissent ordonner ou distinguer.”4   It is, I would 
argue, this unspoken and more elusive “singular” notion with which Bataille, Laure, 
and Leiris were ultimately  concerned. What  this more comprehensive “state” or 
“notion” exactly is for Benvensite is unclear; for him, it remains a general comparative 
deduction from the various vocabularies he considers. Yet, drawing upon his analysis, 
I would claim that this more comprehensive state might be found in the meaning of 
“divine power” (“la puissance divine”) itself. It is this state, a state more complex than 
one of simple ambivalence, that I would argue undergirds the conception of sacred that 
gained such currency in among members of the College of Sociology and indeed 
subsequent continental thought. Though muted in Benveniste’s own etymological 
analysis, the meaning and function of divine power becomes potentially clearer upon 
closer analysis.
 Rather than the general omnipotence traditionally  accorded to the gods, the 
principle attribute of divine power seems to inhere more specifically in the ability to 
bestow vitality, life, and health—or take it away. Benveniste’s examination of the 
various Indo-European vocabularies attests to this. The Avestan adjective sura 
(“strength”), for example, describes a divine force or attribute, one belonging to gods 
like Zarathustra. Similiarly, the English words “whole,” “hail,” and “holy,” linked to 
the German heilig (“holy,” “sacred”), all derive from the ancient Gothic hails, a semi-
religious salutation (L. salus) meaning variously  “health,” “wholeness,” and “physical 
integrity.” The Greek term heiros itself derives from the Vedic word isirah, which 
could be translated as “vital force.”5  Echoing Durkheim before him, Benveniste tells 
us that the Latin sacer refers to that which is whole, an “absolute quantity, having no 
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analysis in Les formes élémentaires and the predecessor to his later L’homme et le sacré.
5 Girard, La violence et le sacré, 392.
degrees,” and the derivative sacerrimus describes that which is “sacred beyond all 
else.” Similarly, The Vedic root  su-, sva- refers to “growth” or “swelling” (se gonfler) 
in the sense of physical prosperity, fecundity, and strength.  Again, the Greek verb 
kuein (“to be pregnant”) is likewise cognate with kuma (“swelling”), kuros 
(“strength,” “sovereignty”), and the adjective kurios: “sovereign.”6  Benveniste’s 
divine power, it would seem, refers more specifically to that salubrious life-force that 
grants and governs health, specifically in the sense of bodily integrity. 
 As the above suggests, the doctrine of sacred ambivalence seems to veil a more 
fundamental concept lying at the heart of Benveniste’s analysis of the sacred, one 
found in the “divine potential” (puissance divine) of which he speaks. Rather than a 
case of simple ambivalence, the supposedly opposing aspects of the sacred actually 
seem to trace two sides of an aporetic limit, “deux aspects de la même notion.” On the 
one hand, the sacred refers to that dangerous, intractable divine potential able to affect 
life and bodily integrity. For this reason, it is taboo and must be kept at an apotropaic 
distance. On the other hand, the sacred is itself the very potential that “embodies”: it is 
the divine power of incarnation and incorporation, the salutary force that gives life and 
makes bodily  integrity possible. According to the aporetic logic this implies, an excess 
of life is tantamount to mortality  and disease, and excessive death, conversely, equals 
health and the exuberance of life. The supposed “ambivalence of the sacred” evinces 
an aporia in which the forces of life and death become both complementary  and 
antagonistic.  As that which imperils life and gives it at the same time, indeed imperils 
life insofar as it is given, divine power seems to inhere specifically in the potential to 
bestow life through death and/or death through life. The ontological excess--in a word, 
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the violence--that overturns the dualism of life and death, existence and non-existence: 
such is meaning of the sacred.
 As Benveniste’s reference to the Greek kurios suggests, this is not unrelated to 
the ancient notion of sovereignty. The power of the sovereign is not unlike God’s own, 
insofar as he to is empowered with the ability to decide life and death.7 To be sure, this 
is an ancient  idea, and one that spans wider than its representation within Indo-
European vocabularies. Yahweh possesses this power in Job 1: 20-1, for example, 
which in turn echoes the Mosaic law of Deuteronomy 30:19: “Naked I came from my 
mother’s womb / naked shall I return again / Yahweh gave, Yahweh has taken away  / 
Blessed be the name of Jahweh.” The very same “sovereign power” was given to the 
Roman pater familias; Hobbes writes that sovereignty evolved from the Roman law of 
patria potestas that permitted the father to take life, and thereby, through the deferral 
of this taking, obversely grant a “prior” right to life. He thus has “monopoly over the 
organization of violence.” Alluding to Hobbes, Michel Foucault similarly claims that 
the sovereign “lui avait donné [la vie], il pouvait la leur retirer.”8  The kindred 
“biopower” (as Foucault terms it) shared between the royal and the divine alike not 
only describes the governance of life and death, but also the violent, liminal space 
between them that gods and kings occupy in their common sovereignty.
 In the early 20th century human sciences, the power over life and death is 
identified as constitutive feature of what sociologists called the “sacred king”; While 
notable figures like Arthur M. Hocart and Gerardus van der Leeuw contributed to the 
understanding of this notion, James Frazer in The Golden Bough (1890) offers likely 
the most influential and well-known account, one that  Bataille and other members of 
the College knew well and frequently cited.  Frazer argues that all ancient religions 
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were originally fertility  cults that organized time around the sacrifice of a sacred king, 
who himself embodied the vital powers of the tribe.9 This sacrifice not only effected a 
communal life between the tribe and the god, therefore, but also maintained the life of 
the tribe and god themselves. This notion was powerfully  influential for the College of 
Sociology, since it explains the integral nature of sovereignty, revolution, and 
community  at the same time. The power of the sacred king, his sovereignty, is the very 
life of his subjects, and this fact is most strikingly revealed in his sacrificial death. 
Thus Bataille--who himself elaborates a more idiosyncratic theory of sovereignty  in 
La part maudite--makes much of sacrificing the godly “heads” of state in the figure of 
the acephale man (Figures 2.1-2.3).  Leiris speaks of the conferral of “sacred prestige” 
through the confrontation with death in Miroir de la tauromachie and L’homme sans 
honneur, and Caillois asserts in L’homme et le sacré  that “tout roi est dieu, descend 
d’un dieu, ou règne par la grâce d’un dieu.”10  As much as it is a religious concept, 
therefore, the sacred describes a “biopolitical” concept that commonly circumscribes 
the subject and sovereign in a vicious circle of life and death. Both the sovereign and 
his subjects are ultimately “subject” to this cycle, insofar as both commonly result 
from the cyclical work of sacred excess. This understanding of the sacred explains the 
possible reason for the ambivalence historically  associated with the concept, while 
providing a more accurate illustration of its conceptual import. It also marks the key 
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Œuvres complètes, ed. Michel Foucault, vol.  I [Paris: Gallimard, 1970], 350).   While Bataille argues 
that fascism betrays its heterogeneous origins by becoming a military state concretized in the head of 
state (chef), it is nevertheless the case that fascism represents a possible appropriation of these energies 
not unlike--as I argue below--the one found in sacrifice.
10 Roger Caillois, L'homme et le sacré, 3 ed. (Paris: Gallimard, 1963), 119.
difference between Agamben’s sacred and that of the French history of which 
Benveniste and Bataille part; as I will explain shortly, the former describes a “broken 
circularity” between life and death, whereas the latter makes such circularity  a sine 
qua non condition: life through death and/or death through life. Again, as Bataille says 
of existence in L'expérience intérieure, “ce qui seul demeure est l’agitation circulaire--
qui ne s'épuise pas dans l’extase et recommence à partir d’elle.”11  While being mindful 
of the intellectual and literary differences among members of the College of 
Sociology,12 I would argue that  this aporetic conception gestured in Benveniste’s study 
that persists in various ways throughout the work of Bataille, Laure, and Leiris, even 
despite their own overtures to ambiguity and ambivalence. 
 Indeed, the stage is set for such an aporetic conception of the sacred well before 
Benveniste, and even before Bataille. Marcel Mauss himself plants the seed for this 
excessive conception in his account of sacrifice, to which he “rattacher la théorie de la 
renaissance.” The “vertu vivifiante du sacrifice,” he explains, “ne se limite pas à la vie 
d’ici bas, elle s’est  étendue à la vie future.”13  Such reversals already anticipate 
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13 Marcel Mauss and Viktor Karady, Oeuvres, vol. I: Les fonctions sociales du sacré (Paris: Editions de 
Minuit, 1968), 268-9.  Mauss echoes this aporetic formulation in his description of the executioner. 
“Sacrifices of sacralization,” he explains, “  convient également à ceux qui on pour effet non pas de 
créer de toutes pièces un caractère sacre chez le sacrifiant, mais simplement d’augmenter un caractère 
préexistant. Mais il n’est pas rare que l’homme qui va sacrifier se trouve déjà marquée ‘d une caractère 
sacre,  d'où résultent des interdictions rituelles qui peuvent être contraire à ses desseins” (Ibid., 258). In 
other words, the sacralization of the victim achieved through sacrifice is not unlike the preexisting state 
of the executioner himself, which is augmented through the sacrificial act. The sacred death of the 
victim essentially magnifies the “sacred life” of the executioner, which in turn protects the life of the 
tribe. In his recent book Law and Sacrifice,  Johan Van der Walt makes an analogous observation 
concerning the simultaneously destructive and creative qualities of sacrifice in Mauss. See “Law and 
Sacrifice” in Johan Willem Gous Van der Walt, Law and Sacrifice : Towards a Post-Apartheid Theory 
of Law (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2005).
Bataille’s appropriation of Mauss and later theory of sovereignty in La part maudite; 
they  are at work in Bataille’s valorization of the king’s beheading or the intimacy 
between executioner and victim, whereby a common experience of death festively 
animates life. It is the characteristic “l’approbation de la vie jusque dans la mort” of 
his eroticism, which “soit d’abord une exubérance de la vie,” although it  “n’est pas 
étranger à la mort.”14  It is also Caillois’ implication when he writes in L’homme et le 
sacré that “tel apparaît le sacré[:] Il émane du monde obscur du sexe et de la mort, 
mais il est le principe essentiel de la vie et  la source de toute efficacité…toujours égale 
à elle-même, dangereuse et indispensable à la fois.”15  When Jules Monnerot writes 
that “le pouvoir existe, arbitraire. C’est une grâce qui est donné. Le pouvoir est la 
force sacrée dont il ne peut y avoir de raisons, puisque les raisons sont après elle, non 
avant. Au-dessous, non au dessus,”16  he refers to a power that, much like Aristotle’s 
divine unmoved mover (ho theos), is self-grounded as its own condition of possibility. 
It is “its own reason,” the reason for its own existence, which both catalyzes and 
impedes its own becoming; thus “le héraut du pouvoir...n’est pas une chose qu’on a 
mais une chose qu’on est.”17  The hero’s power is his very life. This is not unlike 
Leiris’ heroic matador in Miroir de la tauromachie, who “[incorpore] la mort à la vie” 
through “les parages hasardeux d’un seuil aussi étroit qu’un tranchant de rasoir,” 
which “mince zone d'interférence” between life and death, “qui constituerait le 
domaine par excellence du sacré.”18  Colette Peignot similarly  will call sacred the 
“permanence de la menace de la mort,” which “est l’absolu enivrant qui emport  la vie, 
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la soulève hors d’elle-même, projette au dehors le fond de moi-même.”19  The 
excessive quality  of the sacred, that which deconstructs the opposition between life 
and death, is more than simply ambiguous because of the mutually prior conditionality 
inherent to its presumably ambiguous alternatives.  Within this context, as that which 
exceeds life in death, death in life, the life that seeks its own death reveals self-
sacrifice to be the quintessential expression of the sacred.  All life, death, and rebirth is 
thus beholden to the same process of self-sacrifice due to the self-deconstructive 
nature of sacred excess. For better or for worse, all life and death thus becomes self-
sacrificial. Self-sacrifice so conceived reveals the due nuance obscured by the tenet of 
sacred ambiguity, while offering a rejoinder to Agamben’s hasty dismissal of its 
accuracy and theoretical import in his book Homo Sacer. 
 Agamben’s Exception.  Whereas Levi-Strauss and Hugette Fugier argue for 
historicity  and a general philological wariness for the study of the sacred, Agamben 
dismisses the doctrine of sacred ambivalence tout court as the unfortunate effect of a 
secular, squeamish, and timid bourgeoisie trying to come to terms with uncanny 
religious facts. Unable to consider such realities under rigorous intellectual scrutiny, 
Durkheim’s and Smith’s use of “ambivalence” ultimately  describes their own vague 
affective reactions to them. As a result, these sociologists, in a kind of quasi-orientalist 
gesture, simply  supplanted scientific truth with more intimate personal reactions. He 
dismisses Durkheim’s account of the sacred, for example, as “the psychologization of 
religious experience,” “the ‘disgust’ and ‘horror’ by which the cultured European 
bourgeoisie betrays its own unease before the religious fact.”20  This unsubstantiated 
opinion, coupled with brief mention of Fugier, provides Agamben with the fodder 
necessary  to dismiss the concept of sacred ambivalence as a misrepresentation of the 
30
19 Laure and Jérôme Peignot, Ecrits de Laure (Paris: J.J. Pauvert, 1971), 85.
20  Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer : Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1998), 78.
sacred that carries forth in subsequent European intellectual history.  He claims it 
“compromised” Bataille’s thinking on the concept  of sovereignty, for example, and 
that it ruefully found its way  even into Benveniste’s own venerable 1969 study.  He 
also cites Freud and Caillois as unwitting victims of this concept, which, agreeing with 
Levi-Strauss, lost its “immediate intelligibility” and “like all empty  terms,” became 
“overburdened with contradictory meanings.” As a result, he claims, it lent itself to 
widespread abuse and misappropriation and, more importantly, obscured its hidden 
juridical meaning and force to the detriment of political thought. “An assumed 
ambivalence of the generic religious category of the sacred,” he claims, “cannot 
explain the juridico-political phenomenon to which the most ancient meaning of the 
term sacer refers.”21 
Seeking to correct this error, Agamben supplants the tenet of sacred ambiguity 
with this more “ancient meaning,” wherein “the sacred” (specifically  the Latin sacer) 
describes a life banished from social sphere and its juridical safeguards. Taking his cue 
from Ernout-Meillet and Benveniste, he draws the meaning of sacer from Roman 
statesman Pompeius Festus, who in De verborum significatione writes: “at homo sacer 
est, quem populous iudicavit ob maleficium; neque fas est eum immolari, sed qui 
occidit, parricidi non damnatur,” or “‘sacred man’ is used to describe a person whom 
the people have judged on account of a grave crime; it is against the law (neque fas) to 
sacrifice this man (immolari), yet he who kills him (occidit) will not be condemned for 
murder (parricidi).”22  Consequentially,  homo sacer seems doubly  excluded by the 
law, since such a life may be killed—but neither murdered nor sacrificed. In other 
words, as a criminal, homo sacer has transgressed the law as a criminal, but having so 
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transgressed, the similarly  transgressive juridical categories of murder and sacrifice--
i.e., unjustified and justified death--no longer apply. What remains according to 
Agamben is a kind of life that can die without any juridical consequence, a life that is 
essentially ready-to-die in the manner of sovereign’s subjects: zoe, or “bare life.”
Agamben’s argument merits brief recapitulation of the classical theory of 
sovereignty. As Thomas Hobbes explains, the defining characteristics of the sovereign 
are that he may  “maketh his children to submit themselves, and their children, to his 
government, as being able to destroy them if they refuse; or by war subdueth his 
enemies to his will, giving them their lives on that condition.” He has therefore the 
“monopoly on the organization of violence.” The life of the subject (or enemy) is little 
more than the sovereign’s deferral of its death, making death therefore not only the 
end but the very precondition of the life of the subject.23   This is the connection that 
permits Agamben to align the sacred with sovereignty, insofar as both juridically 
constitute life as the potential to die without juridical consequence. Both the sacred 
and sovereignty  make the exception to the rule the rule itself, to paraphrase Agamben. 
Such is the juridical paradox to which his concepts sovereignty and sacred/bare life 
refer: “The sovereign sphere,” he writes, “ is the sphere in which it  is permitted to kill 
without committing homicide and without celebrating a sacrifice, and sacred life...is 
the life that has been captured in this sphere.”24
Thus when Agamben posits sovereignty and the sacred within this sphere, he 
seeks to evoke a state of static immanence, an “arrested dialectic” not only between 
the legal and illegal, but existence and non-existence, life and death. The result might 
be called “a-legal” death, death without juridical qualification. The first step  in this 
deadly double negation is (1) the juridical delimitation of violence into legitimate and 
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illegitimate spheres (nomos/anomie; law/nature; sacred/profane; etc.); the second is 
(2) the juridical interdependence of legitimate and the illegitimate violence, which 
closes the gap between law-preserving and law-threatening violence (the “state of 
emergency,” “rogue states,” “extraordinary rendition,” etc.); and the third (3) is the 
alegality of violence which, through the synthesis suggested above, refers 
paradoxically to both (a) violence unlimited by any form or law and (b) the 
constitution of law itself as unlimited violence. Sovereignty and the sacred for 
Agamben characterize a progressive and ineluctable state of immanence--a “zone of 
indistinction,” “state of exception,” etc.--for which there is no way out. It  is 
Agamben’s forceful thinking about immanence that makes his analyses of law, 
animality, and the sacred so provocative; yet  this immanence also has a way  of 
homogenizing all difference in a way that obscures the historicity  and nuance of many 
of the examples he interrogates, as many critics have suggested. I would include the 
Ecole sociologique and College of Sociology among these.
 To the degree that Agamben like Fugier emphasizes Pompeius Festus’ definition 
of the sacred as particular to Roman law and Latin, one that should not be conflated 
(like sacred ambivalence) with different juridico-religious concepts or histories, it is 
ironic that Agamben does precisely  this throughout Homo Sacer, with its analyses of 
medieval political theology, Salic, Semitic, Ripuarian, and Nazi sterilization law as 
steps on the same warpath of modernity. If an erroneous ambiguity has overshadowed 
Festus’ account, the sacred’s “true” meaning for Agamben, it is equally possible 
mutatis mutandis that Agamben has dismissed contradictory evidence or alternative 
formulations of the sacred--as well as his related concepts of zoe, sovereignty, the ban, 
etc.--with his privileging of this single Roman source, one formulation among many in 
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Benveniste’s study and Western history more broadly.25  According to Agamben’s 
history, an elusive Roman juridical concept becomes a teleological and transhistoric 
metanarrative that culminates in the death camps and biometric systems of 
identification.26  If the mythic transhistory of sacred ambivalence is to blame for 
obscuring Roman law and the meaning of sacer, the latter seems to become equally 
mythic and transhistorical in the form of “bare life” which, given Agamben’s 
teleological history, dismisses if not misrepresents the meaning of the sacred (le sacré) 
specific to the French avant-garde, especially Bataille. 
 The most significant instance of this misrepresentation can be found in an short, 
somewhat cryptic 1989 essay anticipating his argument in Homo Sacer entitled 
“Bataille e il paradosso della sovranità,” or “Bataille and the Paradox of 
Sovereignty” (see Appendix). The essay endeavors to explain why Walter Benjamin, 
after hearing Bataille at a meeting of the College of Sociology, exclaimed to him “You 
are working for fascism!” Agamben rightly considers this to be ironic, since Benjamin 
knew Bataille to be resolutely  antifascist  and was, like him, an unorthodox Marxist 
who sought to “broaden the theoretico-practical horizon of Marxism” (ampliare 
l’orizzonte teorico-practico del marxismo).27  Though Agamben admonishes that he 
does not have an immediate response to this question,  Agamben works through 
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Bataille’s theory of community  with the help of Maurice Blanchot and Jean-Luc 
Nancy to theorize a response. Ultimately, Agamben finds Bataille’s fascist tendency 
within the theoretical kinship between community and sovereignty, which are for him 
grounded in a form of mortal suspension that, in Homo Sacer, he will call “bare life.” 
What seems to be an explanation for Benjamin’s thinking, therefore, becomes actually 
a foray into his own. 
 To make this connection, Agamben briefly  recapitulates Blanchot and Nancy’s 
elaboration of Bataillian community  in La communauté inavouable and La 
communauté désoeuvrée respectively.28  Agamben, drawing upon Blanchot and Nancy, 
explains that Batail le’s community  is not founded on “a common 
assumption” (presupposto commune) and has nothing to do with commonly interested 
people working toward a common goal, or any  of the work that builds the community 
itself. Such is the vision of community posited by  communism or fascism, which 
commonly assume a homogenous group with a common project. Bataille’s theory of 
community  precludes communism and fascism because, as Nancy  explains, it  refuses 
the “immanence of man to man” (immaneneza assoluta dell-uomo all’uomo) within a 
larger group, or the quality of “any communal fusion into a collective 
hypostasis” (ogni comunione fusionale in una ipostasi collectiva) as Agamben puts it, 
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theorizes in Force de la loi and continues throughout his later thought, he offers a more hopeful and 
utopian vision of a “community to come” (see Jacques Derrida, Politiques de l'amitié ; suivi de L'oreille 
de Heidegger,  Collection La Philosophie en effet, [Paris: Galilée, 1994], 98-100).  The messianicity of 
community, like that of democracy,  neither presumes nor predetermines the form a community is to 
take, and in this way, Derrida’s thinking is sympathetic to Nancy’s efforts, even though he tries to 
theorize community as an open possibility rather than simply the effect of death. Despite his avowed 
departure from the Bataille-Blanchot-Nancy frame of thought, it is possible (as I will show) to detect 
the same kind of performativity in their thinking on community and the sacred. 
echoing Nancy.29   In other words, members of a Bataillian community  are never 
additive and they  never constitute a sum. Agamben rightly explains that Bataille 
alternatively posits the idea of a “negative community” that is made possible through 
the experience of death and whose efforts cannot be transformed into a form of a 
“communal substance or work” (una sostanza o in un’opera comune).30   Predicated on 
the common and communal experience of death, Bataille’s community  precludes the 
possibility of “community building,” so to speak, since the realization of death realizes 
nothing, the nothing that is death. Bataille’s community is thus “based in some way on 
the impossibility of community” (riposa cioe, in qualche modo, nell’impossibilita 
della comunità) as Agamben says, making it  according to Bataille’s formulation “the 
community  of those who have no community” (comunità di coloro che non hanno 
comunità).31
 This “antinomic structure” (struttura antinomica) of Bataillian community--that 
community  is achieved in its failure--provides Agamben with a theoretical paradigm 
he connects with Bataille’s articulation of ecstasy and sovereignty. Like the 
community  that is realized through the “unrealization” of death, the subject in a state 
of ecstasy is somehow beyond itself to itself (Grk. ekstasis). Agamben puts it, “the 
subject must be there where it cannot be, or, vice versa, that it must be missing there 
where it must be present” (il soggetto deve essere là dove non può essere, o, viceversa, 
che egli deve mancare là dove dev’essere presente).32  Given that  the experience of 
death is the essence of ecstasy  for Bataille, ecstacy comes closest to achieving the 
paradoxical position of being-there-where-it-is-not. At the juncture of life and death, 
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31 Ibid. This is Bataille’s own expression (communauté de ceux qui n’ont pas de communauté),  which is 
cited by Nancy and Blanchot alike. 
32 Ibid., 117.
identity  and otherness, Agamben explains that ecstasy brings the subject closest to 
what Bataille called “the sovereignty of being” (la souveraineté de l'être) or the 
“sovereign operation” (l'opération souveraine), which Bataille explains “ne tient que 
d’elle-même son autorité, expie en même temps cette autorité.”33  In other words, the 
fusion of life and death in ecstatic experience, the experience of death, brings the 
subject closest to the very operation of Being, which one might say “holds dominion” 
over the regimes of existence and non-existence. Bataille’s formulation of sovereignty 
might therefore be called in short the “rule” over life and death.
 It is at this moment in the argument where Agamben begins to depart from the 
Bataillian schema and inject the argument he was concurrently developing for Homo 
Sacer. This also marks (I would say) Agamben’s misappropriation of Bataille, which is 
made in the service of his own position. He associates Bataille’s ecstatic concept of 
sovereignty--the paradox of being-there-where-it-is-not, living-there-where-it-dies, 
etc.--with Carl Schmitt’s formulation of sovereignty in Political Theology. For 
Schmitt, the “Sovereign is he who decides on the exception,” meaning that the 
sovereign is he who can decide the exception to the laws he nevertheless embodies 
and safeguards.34  Citing Schmitt’s idea of the exception, Agamben aligns Schmittian 
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33  Ibid. (Agamben’s citation). It is important to note that Bataille’s conception of sovereignty differs 
sharply from the Hobbesian version described above. Whereas Hobbes classical definition of 
sovereignty describes the exceptional status of the sovereign being “above the law,” able to use 
otherwise unlawful violence in defense of the law, Bataille posits sovereignty within the ontology of 
existence itself as that part of “human” being that cannot be used or appropriated for any end, political 
or otherwise. In essence, sovereignty for Bataille represents a form of expropriative violence that 
contravenes all law, accumulation, and autonomy. “Profondément,” writes Bataille, “la souveraineté n’a 
jamais rien de personnel. Seule une valeur personnelle est en jeu dans la décision qui oppose 
l’accumulation...et la consommation” (Bataille, Oeuvres complètes, vol. 8, 350).
34  Carl Schmitt, Political Theology : Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, Studies in 
Contemporary German Social Thought (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1985), 5-6. He explains “the 
exception, which is not codified in the existing legal order, can at best be characterized as a case of 
extreme peril, a danger to the existence of the state, or the like.” In other words, the sovereign can 
suspend the law or make exceptions to it in moments of urgency without hypocrisy, since it is his own 
exceptional character that enables his ability to decide the legal and illegal in the first place. As Schmitt 
himself explains, sovereignty is therefore a “borderline concept” (Grenzbegriff), one that Agamben 
finds analogous to the Bataillian concept of ecstasy. Based on the concept of excess, however, ecstasy is 
to be distinguished from the more resolute exceptional space of the sovereign. 
sovereignty with Bataille’s “sovereign operation.” “The paradox of sovereignty,” 
Agamben writes echoing his account of Bataille’s ecstasy, “can also be formulated 
thus: ‘the law is outside itself; it is itself outside the law,’ or ‘I myself, the sovereign, 
being outside the law, declare that there is nothing outside the law’” (si può anche 
formulare in questo modo: la legge e fuori de se stessa, e fuori della legge; ovvero: io, 
il sovrano, che sono fuori-legge, dichiaro che non c’è fuori-legge).35  Ultimately, 
Agamben seeks to link, if not render synonymous, Bataille’s concept of ecstasy with 
Schmitt’s concept of exception. 
 Given the uncanny juridical similarities between ecstasy and exception, 
Agamben’s insight is a provocative one. Indeed, both signify  a certain transgressive 
state beyond law and life, and both concern the constitutive limits of life and death. 
Bataille’s valorious anomie echoes Schmitt’s state of exception, and Bataille’s thinking 
on taboo and transgression likewise posits the origin of law in violence and death, 
those things which the law presumably  excludes. And, like Schmitt, sovereignty in 
Bataille results from a certain embrace of anomic violence. Nevertheless, Bataille is 
careful to distinguish sovereignty qua exception from his own notion, which (in part) 
describes liberation from the state of being a passive, servile thing in a world of work 
and utility. Sovereignty restores the subject to an “inner” state of disindividuation (like 
death) prior to and exceeding subjectivity itself; yet this state is not “exceptional,” 
insofar as it recognizes sovereignty as a “general” and “shared” condition of humanity 
itself. In other words, sovereignty for Bataille is a state of multiplicity, or else of 
nothing. In La part maudite, Bataille writes:
La souveraineté traditionnelle est  souligné d’une façon voyante. C’est  la 
souveraineté de l’exception (un sujet seul, entre autres, a les prérogatives 
de l’ensemble des sujets). Au contraire, le sujet quelconque maintenant 
38
35 Agamben, "Bataille e il paradosso della sovranità," 117.
la valeur souveraine opposée à la subordination de l’objet possédé cette 
valeur en partage avec tous les hommes. C’est l’homme en général, dont 
l’existence participe nécessairement du sujet, qui s’oppose en générale 
aux choses, et par exemple aux animaux, qu’il tue et qu’il mange. 36  
For Bataille, sovereignty signifies a uniquely human kind of ontological suspension or 
withdrawal from “thinghood.” If it is “exceptional” at all, it  is so only insofar as it is 
irreducible to the useful world of things and shares such irreducibility with other men 
communally. Nevertheless, Agamben dismisses Bataille’s formulation of sovereignty 
in deference to Schmitt’s by emphasizing the juridical suspension characteristic of the 
latter’s state of exception, which structures the law specifically through the combined 
exclusion of and potential for anomic violence. Such a move suggests that sovereignty 
becomes a new form of radical subjection wherein the potential to die becomes the 
necessary  precondition for the life of the individual subject. In essence, ecstasy in 
Bataille becomes for Agamben Schmitt’s sovereign exception:
Se questo e il paradosso della sovranità, possiamo dire, allora, che 
Bataille, nel suo appassionato tentativo de pensare la comunità, sia riuscito 
a spezzarne il circolo? Cercando di pensare al di la del soggetto, cercando 
di pensare l’estasi del soggetto, egli ha pensato, in verità, soltanto il suo 
limite interno, la sua antinomia costitutiva: la sovranità del soggetto, 
l’esser sopra de ciò che e sotto. E certo che Bataille stesso si e reso conto 
di questa difficoltà. 
(If indeed the paradox of sovereignty is such, could we say then that 
Bataille, in his passionate attempt to think about community, successfully 
broke its circularity? By  seeking to think beyond the subject, by seeking to 
think about the ecstasy of the subject, in reality  he only  thought of its 
internal limit, its constitutive antinomy: the sovereignty of the subject, the 
being above of that which is below. It is certain that Bataille himself 
realized this difficulty).37
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For Agamben, Bataille “failed in his failure,” so to speak, to think the impossible 
thought of that which lies beyond subjectivity in the forms of sovereignty, ecstasy, 
death, etc. This thinking ultimately  produced nothing more than another form of 
subjectivity one characterized by its “ecstatic” capacity  to die.  Bataille’s efforts, in the 
end, achieve Schmittian results. To wit, Agamben thinks Bataille’s critiques of 
subjectivity and sovereignty ultimately, albeit unintentionally, create a highly 
problematic political product in their the effort to (un)produce community beyond the 
“subjective” needs of law and life. This product  is the subject defined by  its capacity 
to be killed, i.e., homo sacer. This is ecstasy's “internal limit” (limite interno). 
Agamben’s essay presents more than an unorthodox or resistant  reading of Bataille, 
however, since he obscures the meaning and function of ecstasy in service to his 
argument concerning exception; Bataille’s ecstacy, simply stated, is not equivalent to 
(Schmittian) exception. The reason for this, as I will explain, is role of excess, which 
differs dramatically  between Bataille and Schmitt or, for that matter, between Bataille 
and Agamben’s account of him.  
 To be sure, Schmitt’s “state of exception”--like Agamben’s theory of the ban or 
homo sacer--represents a position that “exceeds” the law, but the nature and function 
this position remains purely static. As the German Ausnahmenzustand suggests, the 
state of exception describes less a vague exceptional space than a “standing place,” a 
unmoving and unmovable posture,  one that commonly grounds the juridical limits of 
the law and ipso facto the state of exception. Indeed such a state must “stand firm,” so 
to speak, lest it compromise the demarcation between the law and exception or, more 
importantly, the position of the sovereign or homo sacer vis à vis the law. As Schmitt 
states, the sovereign belongs to the law through his exception from it; he cannot 
transgress the law, nor be entirely  subject to it, but he is yet nevertheless always bound 
to the law. In Political Theology, Schmitt writes that “although the sovereign stands/
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stays outside (steht ausserhalb) the normally  valid legal system, he nevertheless 
belongs (gehört) to it, for it is he who must  decide whether the constitution can be 
suspended in its entirety.”38   Agamben himself will insist on this stationary posture 
when he writes that “the sovereign, who can decide on the state of exception, 
guarantees its anchorage (ancoraggio) to the juridical order.”39  This “belonging” or 
“anchorage,” which is ironically nevertheless found in the “ban,” “state of exception,” 
or “suspension” of the law is that which Agamben calls “ecstatic belonging,” recalls 
his (mis)interpretation of Bataille’s ecstasy.40  Indeed, this is the very same state he 
attributes to homo sacer and bare life. “What is captured in the sovereign ban is a 
human victim who may be killed but no sacrificed: homo sacer.”41  Describing the 
same state of “capture,” “belonging,” “anchorage,” “standing,” and “suspension,” 
sovereignty and the sacred for Agamben essentially represent forms of static 
potential : bare life or homo sacer reserve the potential to be killed,  just like the 
sovereign who, inversely, reserves the potential to kill his subjects. Their (bio)power is 
commonly located in their unmovable position between juridical inclusion and 
exclusion, not in the actual realization of their potential; the sovereign need not 
declare a state of emergency, nor need homo sacer be killed, since their potential to do 
so will always remain. Such a position, as Agamben (referencing Derrida) notes, 
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39 Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 35.
40 Ibid.
41 Agamben, Homo Sacer : Sovereign Power and Bare Life, 83. Emphasis mine.
marks the “separation of the ‘force of the law’ from the law.”42  Agamben’s state of 
exception, characterizing both sovereignty and the sacred, is therefore essentially a 
form of unactualized potential, that which Thomas Aquinas called potentia passiva, or 
“passive power.”43  Such is the singular result of sovereignty/the sacred for Agamben, 
and this is also the result he sees reflected in Bataille’s work.
 In this way, Agamben is able to explain Alexandre Kojève’s quasi-Hegelian 
reading of Bataille’s sacred, one which Kojève offered in the early years of the 
College of Sociology. For Kojève, the sacred (specifically in the form of Bataille’s 
“déchaînement des passions”) represents the exhaustion of the dialectic and the 
romantic, post-revolutionary  end of history in self-sacrifice.44  In “Bataille and the 
Paradox of Sovereignty,” Agamben implies that Kojève’s interpretation of passion is 
not mistaken in its analysis, but rather in its conclusion.  Whereas Kojève considers 
passion to be liberatory, Agamben considers it to be the potential for sovereignty and 
infinite subjection. Drawing upon the etymological link between passion (pathos), 
suffering (paskhein), and passivity (patire), Agamben seems to argue that  “the power 
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founded use of violence without precondition. Due to this “groundless self-grounding,” one might say, 
the law as such is a violence devoid of moral value or conditions,  yet it also is unable to justify its 
violence in terms of what is its “right” (droit).   Droit is also founded in this violence. Derrida thereby 
argues that this groundlessness continues to haunt it in its application through three aporias, all of which 
amount to this: while the institutions of law are put in place to ensure the universal application of 
justice, in practice such applications are inextricably laden with a particularity that admits of the 
arbitrary (see Jacques Derrida, Force de loi: le << fondement mystique de l'autorité >>,  La philosophie 
en effet [Paris: Galilée, 1994]).
43  Aquinas (drawing upon Aristotelian metaphysics) explains in his ontological argument for God that 
He cannot “not be,” and thus expresses his power as pure activity or pure action. God is never the 
potential or passive object of another force, but instead a being that is in-itself, and thus constitutes its 
own force pure in the form of action. In contrast, “passive power (potentia passiva),” as Agamben 
writes, “is the principle of being acted on by another (principium patiendi ab alio),” and “a thing is 
passive (patitur) to the extent to which it is in potentiality.” In other words, divine action can be 
independent and cannot be overcome by potentia passiva. See chapter XVI of Thomas Acquinas, 
Summa contra gentiles (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975). 
44 In his presentation “Les conceptions hégéliennes,” Kojève writes “le poète qui se réduit à lui-même, 
s'épuise lui même enfin, et s'anéantit dans son propre néant”; he thus percieves negativity to be 
exhausted in acts of self-sacrifice like revolution and art.  See Bataille and Hollier,  Le Collège de 
sociologie : 1937-1939, 70-74.
to be acted upon” rather than “the power to act” becomes the ultimate and politically 
disastrous meaning of sovereignty/the sacred.  When the power of the subject  is 
defined as its potential to be acted upon--potentia passiva--“potentially” endless 
victimization is the result:
 
Di questi due poli attraverso I quali la filosofia occidentale ha pensato 
l’essere, il pensiero moderno, da Nietzsche in poi, ha costantemente 
pensato quello della potenza. Per questo in Bataille--e in quei pensatori, 
come Blanchot, che gli sono più vicini--decisiva e l’esperienza della 
passione, di quel déchaînement des passions in cui egli scorgeva il senso 
ultimo del sacro. E che questa passione fosse da intendere nel senso di 
potentia passiva, e ancora une volta Kojève a sottolinearlo, indicando 
come chiave dell’expérience intérieure il passo in cui si dice “l'expérience 
intérieure est le contraire de l’action”...il pensiero della passione e ancora 
pensiero dell’essere. Il pensiero contemporaneo, cercando di superare 
l’essere e il soggetto, abbandona l’esperienza dell’atto, che ha indicato per 
secoli il vertice della metafisica, ma solo per esasperare e spingere 
all’estremo la polarità opposta della potenza. In questo modo, pero, esso 
non va al di la del soggetto, ma ne pensa la forma più estrema e stremata: 
il puro star-sotto, il pathos, la potentia passiva, senza riuscire a spezzare il 
nesso che lo tiene stretto al suo opposto polare.
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(Given these two poles through which Western philosophy has thought 
being, modern thought, from Nietzsche onward, has constantly  privileged 
potential. This is the reason why for Bataille—and those thinkers closest 
to him, like Blanchot—the experience of this passion, this déchaînement 
des passions is decisive and considered to be the ultimate meaning of the 
sacred.  Kojeve emphasized that this passion was to be understood as 
potentia passiva, indicating that the key passage of L’éxperience intérieure 
is the one where he states “l’expérience intérieure est le contraire de 
l’action”.... [T]hought about passion still remains thought about being. In 
its attempt to surpass being and the subject, contemporary  thought has 
abandoned experience of the act, which for centuries has constituted the 
highest point of metaphysics, only in order to push and exasperate the 
opposing pole of potential to the extreme. In this way, however, modern 
thought does not go beyond the subject  but rather thinks of it in the most 
extreme and exhausted way: that of pure being-below, pathos [patire], 
potentia passiva without ever breaking the tie that binds it to its opposing 
pole).45
In other words, if soveriegnty/the sacred describes a form of power at all, it is one of 
virtually  pure unactualized potential (passivity, passion, potential, etc.). If any  form of 
action can be associated with this power, it is found in the form of being acted upon, 
i.e., “pure being-below, pathos, potentia passiva” that, through its passivity, can never 
break its “tie that binds it to its opposing pole”: action. According to Agamben’s 
formulation, therefore, sovereignty and the sacred describe a form of political power 
that never truly acts, but can only be acted upon, much like homo sacer who is always 
ready  to be killed. It’s own activity is sin qua non precluded as suspended inactivity, 
passivity, or potential. It  therefore never goes beyond or exceeds itself in the form of 
action; all action is always already recaptured within the sphere of “passion.” Such a 
power remains within a restricted economy, excluding itself from action: it simply 
“remains,” so to speak, in a state of exception. By neutralizing and foreclosing 
actuality within the sphere of potentiality, by “remaining in its state,” sovereignty  and 
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the sacred for Agamben always ultimately assume the static, unactualized potential 
discussed above. In the final analysis, therefore, it might be more accurate to say that 
these categories do not merely describe forms of unactualized potential in Agamben, 
but rather forms of unactualizable potential. This might be the most concise and 
accurate description of the state of exception, characterized as a static form of 
“belonging,” “anchorage,” “standing,” “suspension,” etc. In conclusion, sovereignty 
and the sacred for Agamben do not  evoke a potential for action, but rather a potential 
that never becomes actualized,  in brief, an economy of “impotence.”46  
 In essence, this marks the difference between exception and excess, and thus 
Agamben’s departure from--and misrepresentation of--Bataille’s thinking on 
sovereignty and the sacred. In Bataille, the nature and function of excess--whether in 
the form of ecstasy, sovereignty, the sacred, etc.--is markedly different. Whereas 
exception denotes a form of power as static, unactualizable potential, excess describes 
instead a potential always ready to be actualized. In other words, while Agamben’s 
exception describes “the potential not  to do” exemplified by his Bartleby, Bataille’s 
excess describes actualizable unactualized potential, or what one might describe as 
the infinite potential “to do undoing” or, equally, “to undo doing.”47  The potential to 
do undoing (or undo doing) is, for Bataille, ultimately the meaning of all action, 
insofar as he considers action itself to be the doing of death, the ultimate “undoing.” 
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crossing aesthetics (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1999).
 Bataille’s conception of work is an excellent example of this; even though work 
is a form of action that seeks to prolong survival or avoid death, it is nevertheless the 
fear of death that ultimately  motivates Bataille’s worker. As a result, even the most 
actively industrious attempts to survive bespeak the presence of death and undoing. 
Such is essentially the meaning of what Bataille’s biographer Michel Surya referred to 
as “la mort à l’oeuvre,” a phrase that concisely captures Bataille’s ironic formulation 
in his prose-poem “Le jeu” for example: “Qui travaille, de ce fait, sent la mort 
approcher...l’indigent qui ne travaille pas ne mange pas et, faute de manger, se promet 
à la mort.”48  As a form of excess,  death does not simply describe that which surpasses 
working life as a suspended possibility; it  also enacts this possibility  in the very  form 
of work. For Bataille, death is always “at work,” so to speak, even in life, even though 
this work, in the end, achieves death too and thus nothing--but this nothing is also a 
potential readiness for everything.
 Bataille is most explicit about the relationship between action and potential in 
his responses to Hegel. In his noted 1937 letter to Alexander Kojève, “Lettre à X, 
chargé d’un cours sur Hegel,” for example, Bataille insists upon the inexhaustible 
potential of negativity (i.e., death) latent in Hegel’s thought, it’s “négativité sans 
emploi,” even despite Hegel’s insistence that the dialectic exhausts all negativity.49 He 
would later develop this position in L'expérience intérieure and most famously in 
“Hegel, la mort et le sacrifice.” Departing from Kojève’s assertions that  Hegel’s 
dialectic is “en dernière analyse une philosophie de la mort,” a philosophy that 
elaborates death through dialectical negation, Bataille argues that actions 
accomplished through these processes also implicates the undoing of these actions. In 
his letter to Kojève, for example, he writes 
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le fait--qui ne parait pas contestable--qu’une négativité se détournant de 
l’action s’exprime en oeuvre d’art n’en est pas moins chargé de sens quant 
aux possibilités subsistant pour moi. Il indique que la négativité peut être 
objectivé...Mais ni dans l’oeuvre d’art, ni dans les éléments émotionnels 
de la religion, la négativité n’est “reconnue en tant que telle,” au moment 
ou elle entre dans le jeu de l’existence...Tout au contraire, elle est 
introduite dans un processus d’annulation.50
In other words, the negativity  of death can be “objectified” (négativité peut être 
objectivé), realized as a positive form of action, like creating a work of art for 
example. Once objectified, however, once it  enters “the game of existence” (le jeu de 
l'existence), it never realizes negativity as such (en tant que telle) but rather only  a 
distilled instance, a single possibility, one among others (possibilités subsistant pour 
moi). Thus negativity is enacted, but never entirely  exhausted in its potential. Indeed, 
this potential is further enacted in the form of its annulment (annulation), i.e., the 
undoing of the former action done. Thus, when Bataille writes that, for Hegel, 
“l’Action est Negativité, et la Negativité, Action,” he seeks to emphasize not that 
which action does with negativity (à la Hegel and Kojève), but rather the doing and 
undoing that  is the inexhaustible action of negativity.51  In a word, this is the action of 
excess, that which goes beyond doing and undoing alike. 
 As a result, action is not the simply the opposite of the potential associated with 
negativity and death; it is also the realization of this potential--however limited--in the 
forms of doing and undoing. Action is less a category  than a circular process, one that 
continually traverses the limit  between life and death, existence and non-existence, 
law and anomie, due to the insistence of excess. Yet this circle never achieves 
complete closure for Bataille; action is never exhausted (il ne s’epuise pas). In the 
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section on Hegel in L'Expérience intérieure (1951), Bataille makes this circularity 
explicit:
L’action introduit le connu (le fabriqué), puis l’entendement qui lui est lié 
rapporte, l’un après l’autre, les éléments non-fabriqués, inconnus, au 
connu.  Mais le désir, la poésie, le rire, font incessamment glisser la vie 
dans le sens contraire, allant du connu à l’inconnu. L’existence à la fin 
décèle la tache aveugle de l’entendement et s’y  absorbe aussitôt tout 
entière. Il ne pourrait en aller autrement que si une possibilité de repos 
s’offrait en un point quelconque. Mais il n’en est rien: ce qui seul demeure 
est l’agitation circulaire--qui ne s'épuise pas dans l’extase et  recommence 
à partir d’elle.52
In this passage, Bataille echoes the response he made to Kojève some years earlier, 
insisting on the inexhaustible nature of negativity  and death even in the form of action. 
That which is known (connu) or produced (fabriqué) is always tethered to the 
unknown (inconnu) and unproduced (non-fabriqués) because of the slippage 
(glissement) induced by the circular agitation (l’agitation circulaire) of existence. This 
would not be the case were it not for the inexhaustible potential of existence (qui ne 
s'épuise pas), whose inherent and constant excess propels action forward.  Ecstacy 
(exstase) is also the expression of this incessant action, contrary  to Agamben’s 
interpretation. As a form of circular movement between doing and undoing, being and 
non-being, life and death, excess therefore represents a form of infinite potential ready 
to be actualized, not a form of unactualizable potential. In essence, one might say that 
excess describes a constant state of performativity, whereas exception denotes the 
unperformable.  Thus action for Bataille not only marks the eternal return of 
negativity, but also a negativity that escapes this circle, and thus also undoes it.
  To the degree that “ambivalence” does obscure the conceptual nuance belonging 
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52 Bataille, L'éxpérience intérieure, 129-30. The “circular agitation” that remains (demeure) because of 
the excessive nature of death strongly echoes Derrida’s analysis of demeurer and survival in the 
writings of Blanchot. See Jacques Derrida, Demeure : Maurice Blanchot, Incises (Paris: Galilée, 1998).
to it, I agree with Agamben when he says that “an assumed ambivalence of the generic 
religious category of the sacred, cannot explain the juridico-political phenomenon” to 
which it refers. To investigate the precise nature of this phenomenon, however, it is 
necessary  to conduct a close examination of the sacred as it is represented and 
deployed within the specific context of the College of Sociology and the Ecole 
sociologique, giving special attention to the period’s most influential theorist of the 
sacred : Georges Bataille. Such an examination will respond to Agamben’s 
misrepresentation, provide historical nuance to the sacred as a concept of excess 
particular to 20th century  French thought, and illustrate this concept’s function 
specifically within the work of those authors surrounding Bataille and the College of 
Sociology. Moreover, I would argue that this conception of the sacred provides not 
only an alternative to Agamben’s formulation, but indeed a response to its polemical 
teleology and fatalism.
  The Unworking of Excess. Due to the essentially sacred character of 
existence, and due to the essentially excessive character of the sacred, all life 
according to the logic of sacred excess is ultimately always already also on the horizon 
of death, making even those actions that try to keep  death at bay a “potential” form of 
death in action. As I have shown above, this is the case in Bataille’s understanding of 
work. By the same logic, however, the sacrificial pursuit of death in intoxication, 
eroticism, and art--those activities valorized by Bataille and his peers--also achieves 
the vital reaffirmation of life that, as such, ultimately itself transcends the result  of this 
pursuit. Indeed, they will commonly talk about the sacred and sacrifice as a form of 
rebirth or raison d'être. In his review of Gabriel Marcel’s La parole est aux saints, for 
example, Bataille writes “c’est dans l’instant même où la mort a lieu, non dans un 
calcul impliquant  les résultats à venir, qu’il faut trouver la raison d'être de l’attitude de 
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martyr.”53  Echoing Bataille, Laure writes “Tout ce qui relève de la raison d’être est 
sacré pour moi, raison d’être encore, raison de vie, de mort.”54  Given the apparent 
equivalence of life and death, sacrifice and rebirth in sacred excess, the four following 
assertions become equivalent: the sacred is life beyond death, life beyond life, death 
beyond life, and death beyond death. 
 Such is the problematic ethical consequence of sacred excess. It precludes the 
defense of life or privileging of life over death, since death represents culmination of 
life as it is negated (and vice versa), forming a logic whereby violence reigns supreme 
and renders inconsequential, if not “in-valuable,” the difference between life and 
death, how they come about, or who/what is responsible for them.55  The sacred is 
manifest the violence that instantiates the the law, just as it is manifest in the violence 
that transgresses it, whether this transgression take place for reasons of revolutionary 
justice or tyrannical oppression. This why Leiris, like Bataille, will say for example 
that the sacred represents the juncture of Left and Right political forces.  “L’idée du 
sacré”  represents “ce point fulgurant ou le droit coïncide avec le gauche” writes Leiris 
in Miroir de la tauromachie. Whatever their cause, life and death--like the Left  and 
50
53 Georges Bataille, Œuvres complètes, vol. 11, 121.
54 Laure and Peignot, Ecrits de Laure, 86.
55  Arguments of this sort have become more prevalent in Bataille criticism, especially with regard to 
Bataille’s equivocal response to the Holocaust.  In his essay “L’Insacrifiable,” for example,  Jean-Luc 
Nancy will illustrate show how Bataille brief writings on the Holocaust broach a highly problematic 
sacrificial conception in Une pensée finie (Paris: Galilée,  1990). Taking a cue from Nancy, Paul Hegarty 
further explores Bataille’s sacrificial thinking on the the Holocaust in Paul Hegarty,  "Bataille, Agamben, 
and the Holocaust," Other Voices: A Journal of Critical Thought 2,  no. 2 (2002): 94-99. Dominick 
LaCapra advances a similar critique of Bataille’s violence in History and its Limits : Human, Animal, 
Violence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009), where he takes particular exception to Bataille’s 
unnuanced vision of the sacrificial victim, which “stresses the role of voluntary victims” and not 
unwilling “scapegoated outsiders,” if not uncritically (if not unethically) conflating the two though 
“projective identification with the victim” (See Ibid., 100-110).
Right--represent two modes of the same violent, vicious circle of sacred excess.56  It is 
in this specific regard that  Agamben’s polemical analysis of the sacred merits serious 
attention, since its results concerning the value of life for homo sacer are proximate to 
the logic of the sacred mentioned here. While not a life “with the infinite capacity to 
be killed” without juridical consequence in this case, sacred life, as an excessive 
concept, does risk the potential for its own “in-valuation” as an absolute form of value 
beyond all particular values--even life itself--and thus beyond all normative limits that 
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56 Leiris,  Miroir de la tauromachie, 57. In this way, the conception of the sacred particular to the authors 
under consideration implies an inextricable relationship between violence and law. Unlike Paul Hegarty 
has suggested, for example, Bataille does not present a conception of “divine violence” as suggested in 
Walter Benjamin’s essay “The Critique of Violence” (Kritik der Gewalt) whereby violence (like the 
proletarian general strike, for example) can be mystically divorced both from law and bloodshed. (See 
Paul Hegarty, "Undelivered: the Space/Time of the Sacred in Bataille and Benjamin," Economy and 
Society 32, no. 1 (2003).  Rather,  Leiris,  Bataille,  and Caillois will commonly insist, drawing upon the 
conception of sacred ambiguity, that the sacred always inscribes a juridical limit at which converges 
revolution and oppression, nomos and anomie, etc. By insisting on the retracing and transgression of the 
juridical limit through violence, this conception of the sacred comes closer to Derrida’s “messianicity 
without messianism,” in which the originary groundlessness of juridical violence, of force, of droit 
continues to haunt its application in his Force de la loi. Still,  by anchoring his analysis of law in the 
concept of justice always “on the way” (à venir), Derrida offers a more optimistic vision of the failure 
of juridical violence (force, droit) than Bataille or the other authors considered here, who I would argue 
cannot dissociate the transgressive quality of justice--what they might call the “Left sacred”--from the 
egregious violence of oppression (the “Right sacred”). This does make the “politics of the sacred” 
potentially problematic; Zeev Sternhell has argued that such a synthesis of political poles, combined 
with anti-rationalist affectivity,  characterizes the fascism of the 1930s in Zeev Sternhell, Ni droite, ni 
gauche : l'idéologie fasciste en France, 3 ed., Historiques 35 (Bruxelles: Editions complexe, 2000).  
would responsibly seek to defend such values.57    As absolute values, life and death 
have no value in particular, except in their ability to remain absolute through 
exceeding, transgressing life in death, death in life: to do undoing, to undo doing.
 Being greater than the sum of any part, having a meaning beyond all meaning, 
a value beyond all values, the sacredness of life or death can ultimately  only  be 
realized there where it ceases to have particular value or specific meaning--i.e., there 
where the sacred itself can only be achieved in its failure. Such is perhaps the ultimate 
consequence of the sacred’s excessive, absolute logic: sacralization must achieve its 
own undoing--its own desacralization, its own “profanation,” as it were, as the case of 
Bataillian work suggests. Thus does the notion of the sacred sacrifice itself; it implies 
“the sacrifice of sacrifice.” This too results from its aporetic excess. It is this more 
self-defeating quality of sacred excess--a quality that results from its own logic--that 
Bataille, Laure, Leiris did not consider in their pursuit for the resacralization of life 
through means of a radical negativity  or expenditure without end.  Insofar as this 
excess continually transgresses the line between life and death, it is also recuperated 
as a resource for the actualization of life and death themselves in a vicious and violent 
circle of absolution. Just as sacred excess undoes the subject  in death, so does it give it 
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57  This is, in essence,  philosopher Jan Patocka’s claim in “La civilisation technique est-elle une 
civilisation de déclin, et pourquoi?” in Jan Patocka, Essais heretiques sur la philosophie de l'histoire, 
trans. Erika Abrams (Paris: Verdier, 1981), 105-27.  For Patocka, the world of the sacred, presumed to 
be a form of liberation from the profane world of things, is not “true liberty” since it is a form of 
escapism, untethered to the responsibilities of everyday life. Thus is it what he calls the “orgiastic” or 
“demonic” sacred, to which he opposes the Christian mystery,  a more responsible and ethical 
formulation of sacred life.  Citing Durkheim, Patocka writes “du point de vue du dépassement du sacré 
orgiaque, il est vu alors justement comme démoniaque,” but “le démoniaque doit être mis en rapport 
avec la responsabilité; à l’origine, ce rapport n’existe pas” (Ibid., 110). Derrida, in his analysis of 
Patocka in the opening pages of Donner la mort,  exposes the problems with this opposition by focusing 
on the ambiguity inherent in the notion of the sacred. Derrida exposes this ambiguity within Patocka's 
argument by showing how the demonic sacred and Christian mystery are not mutually exclusive; 
Christian mystery indeed incorporates the orgiastic, and thus its presumed responsibility also 
incorporates the “demonic” quality of irresponsibility and violence.   He goes on to argue that 
Christianity,  especially in the case of the crucifixion, inaugurates a new sense of individual 
responsibility based on a recognition of shared human guilt for sacrificial violence. Thus for Derrida 
does sacred violence both disrupt and foster an ethical link to alterity. Bataille, Laure, and Leiris’s 
evocation of the sacred would likely more side with Derrida’s account in Donner la mort, though 
Patocka’s position is not without its merits as a political and ethical critique of the sacred.  (See Jacques 
Derrida, Donner la mort [Paris: Galilée, 1999], 1-55).
life: it becomes both a purpose and resource, a means and end. Thus does sacred 
excess exceed itself, express itself, in a ceaselessly  useful and productive form as well, 
however transient, creating different lives subject to this excess, different  “sacrificial 
subjects.” In contrast to homo sacer which may be killed but not sacrificed, valued as 
a resource for only for its juridico-political capacity to die, the sacrificial subject is 
valued “absolutely” both in and beyond (both) life and death as a resource for their 
common expression. Thus does the sacred manifest itself, at least partially, in the form 
of use or action. If the world of work and utility represent  the profanation of life for 
Bataille and other members of the College, it nevertheless remains an unavoidable 
residue in the pursuit  of the sacred. The attempt to realize in sacrifice the unactualized 
potential of the subject’s inner-negativity  and death nevertheless repeated actualizes 
this unactualized potential in the form of the self-sacrificial subject. This would seem 
akin to what  Agamben has in mind when he says that Bataille, “by seeking to think 
beyond the subject, by seeking to think about the ecstasy  of the subject, in 
reality...only thought of its internal limit, its constitutive antinomy.”
 Marcel Mauss’ famed analysis of sacrifice already anticipates the 
reappropriative and utilitarian mechanism described above. With the exception of the 
sacrifice of the god--the only  victim who “se sacrifie [et] se donne sans retour”58--that 
which is given in sacrifice, the life of the taboo scapegoat, is also given back  to the 
executioner and the tribe according to Mauss.  The survival of the tribe represents the 
salubrious dialectical resolution of life over death.  Life is returned to the executioner 
and his kin through consuming the sacrificial offering or substitutively  diverting death 
toward the scapegoat. To do this, however, the executioner, through the power 
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58  Mauss and Karady, Oeuvres, vol.  I: Les fonctions sociales du sacré, 304. Despite Bataille’s 
valorization of god’s endless self-sacrifice, Mauss himself insists that, except for the sacrifice of the 
god, it is “l’acte d'abnégation”--not that of expenditure--“qui est implique dans tout sacrifice,  en 
rappelant fréquemment aux consciences particulières la présence des forces collectives, entretient 
précisément leur existence idéale” (Ibid., 306;  see following note).
afforded to him by  the tribe or rite, must perform a kind of magical legerdemain 
wherein he transposes the life of the tribe onto the scapegoat only to withdraw and 
preserve that very life again for the tribe.  This may be done, for example, through 
sharing the sacrificial offering with the tribe or by diverting potential violence away 
from it. The executioner therefore both surrenders and denies his life (and that of the 
tribe) at the same time; “dans tout sacrifice,” Mauss writes, “il y a un acte 
d’abnégation, puisque le sacrifiant  se prive et donne…Si le sacrifiant donne quelque 
chose de soi, il ne se donne pas; il se réserve prudemment. C’est que, s’il donne, c’est 
en partie pour recevoir.” The gift the executioner gives in expiation--life--is also taken 
back as purification. Mauss claims, therefore, that the practice of sacrifice is 
predicated on the idea of rachat—“buyback,” or perhaps more precisely in English, 
“redemption.” “Il n’y a pas de sacrifice,” he writes, “où n’intervienne quelque idée de 
rachat.”59  Life is reappropriated--redeemed or “bought back”--at the expense of life 
itself in death--its expropriation. The life so (re)appropriated transformatively  sublates 
into the enduring life of the executioner, tribe, and God at the same time.  That which 
the tribe does to attain this sublation Mauss calls the group’s “personnalité sociale,” 
but one might more simply call it the tribe’s personal identity.
 In her study  of hospitality, Tracy  McNulty  compellingly posits this impossible 
exchange within the identity of the host, whose prestige is “bought back,” one might 
say, at the cost of his own hospitable self-sacrifice. Her analysis shows the host to be 
quintessential figure of self-sacrifice: to divest himself of his property, his “house,” 
denies him what makes him host; on the other hand, this dispossession makes him the 
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59 Ibid.,  306. Drawing upon Mauss’ analysis of the sacrifice of the god, Bataille writes in Théorie de la 
religion that “le sacrifice est l’antithèse de la production.” For Bataille, sacrifice, unlike traditional 
potlatch and gift-exchange, constitutes a form of radical expropriation without return. “C’est en ce sens 
qu’il est don et abandon, mais ce qui est donné ne peut être un objet de conservation pour le 
donataire” (Georges Bataille, Théorie de la religion [Paris: Gallimard, 1974],  66). Bataille does make 
great use of Mauss’ conclusion that the most expropriatory form of all sacrifice consists in sacrifice of 
the god(s), however, with which he associates the Nietzschean death of God and Dionysian intoxication.
hospitable host par excellence.  Hospitality thus presents “a double bind,” she writes, 
“since the host  must both take in the stranger and respect its foreignness...welcome the 
stranger there where he is at home and risk homelessness or dispossession at his 
hands.”60  The identity  of the host, she argues, cannot therefore achieved through 
opposition or antagonism with a foreign (and frequently  feminine) otherness, as the 
host’s identity  precisely depends upon openness to what is foreign. Rather, the host--to 
be a “host”--must somehow re-appropriate his own hospitable sacrifices to others 
while maintaining their “otherness” within himself. Thus does hospitality  trace “an 
aporetic limit where identity is established at the very  moment of its dissolution, 
through contact with the nonidentical, the other.”61
 As McNulty’s analysis suggests, hospitality  illustrates the mobile divide 
between identity and difference in acts of self-sacrifice. Self-sacrifice animates this 
divide because it is forever completed through incompletion. The identity, whether 
personal or communal, that sacrifice fosters must  be maintained through the 
mechanism of sacrifice itself, without which such life cannot endure, nor the gods 
survive. Sacrifice thus “s'étend à la vie future,” Mauss writes, through its own 
repetition and mimesis.  In his analysis of divine sacrifice, he explains:
c’est par le semblable qu’on nourrit  le semblable et la victime est la 
nourriture des dieux. Aussi le sacrifice a-t-il été rapidement considéré 
comme la condition même de l’existence divine...Ainsi, non seulement 
c’est dans le sacrifice que quelques dieux prennent naissance, mais 
encore c’est par le sacrifice que tous entretiennent leur existence.62
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(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007), xv.
61  ———, "Hospitality after the Death of God," Diacritics: A Review of Contemporary Criticism 35, 
no. 1 (2005): 72.
62 Mauss and Karady, Oeuvres, vol. I: Les fonctions sociales du sacré, 298.
Sacrifice must  be repeated for the gods--and thus for the tribe and its identity--as the 
very conditio sin qua non of their existence. As Mauss suggests, however, their 
survival depends on the mimetic relation (semblable) between victim and the gods 
whereby the two become two sides of the same coin. In other words, sacrifice requires 
the simultaneous opposition and equivalence of the life lost in sacrifice (-x) with the 
“immortalized” life restored to the gods, the tribe, their identity  (+x). Both equal and 
opposite, the life restored is “commensurately incommensurable” with the life lost, 
insofar as both are of the same absolute value (/x/). Rendered “absolutely  invaluable” 
through the sacred, both life and death preclude the possibility  avoiding the vicious 
circle of violence which, through death, both creates and redeems life. “Les retours 
offensifs du chaos et du mal requièrent sans cesse de nouveaux sacrifices, créateurs et 
rédempteurs” writes Mauss.63
 As equal and opposite, the attempt to immunize life against violence and death 
through sacrifice also, in the end, results in violence and death from immunity  in 
sacrifice; in other words, the sacrifice to avert violence is, in the end, itself somehow 
sacrificed through this violence. In essence, this phenomenon makes sacrifice at once 
self-destructive and self-creative, both prodigal and useful as a simultaneous 
affirmation and destruction of life, recalling once again the character of sacred 
ambivalence. Drawing upon Benveniste’s conception of the sacred (above), Jacques 
Derrida in Foi et savoir (1996) considers this precise aporetic logic that ties together 
these two dimensions of sacrifice--the conservative and creative, the excessive and 
destructive. The latter he calls “autosacrifice” (l’autosacrifice), or the “sacrifice of 
sacrifice,” whereas the latter he will call autoimmunity (l’autoimmunité), referring to 
the process whereby the body’s immune system actually destroys the body.  In an 
interview published in Philosophy in A Time of Terror, Derrida summarizes that an 
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autoimmune condition is one where “a living being, in a quasi-suicidal fashion, ‘itself’ 
works to destroy  its own protection, to immunize itself against its ‘own’ immunity.” 
Autoimmunitary actions “produce, invent and feed the very monstrosity they claim to 
overcome.”64   An autoimmune condition both animates and threatens itself in a “quasi-
suicidal” fashion insofar as the “excessive” defense of life necessarily  culminates in 
death. Indeed, given that sacrifice is typically a form of death used to avert more 
egregious life-threatening circumstances, it principally  serves an immunizing function. 
And, to the extent that life and death, conceived to be excessive, absolute values, 
autoimmunity and autosacrifice may likewise be conceived as alternative appellations 
for the same repetitive, machinelike, absolute process. 
 In Foi et savoir, Derrida posits the mechanism of self-sacrifice within the 
inviolable dignity often associated to life, i.e. its sacredness. The dignity of life--a 
concept Derrida borrows from Kant’s analysis of teleological judgement--is based on 
the logic of absolute value whereby the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. 
Absolute value is essentially a concept of (sublime) excess:
Cette dignité de la vie ne peut se tenir qu’au-delà du vivant présent. D’où 
transcendance, fétichisme et spéctralité, d’où religiosité de la religion. Cet 
excès sur le vivant, dont la vie ne vaut absolument qu’a valoir plus que la 
vie, plus qu’elle même, en somme, voilà ce qui ouvre l’espace mort qu’on 
lie à l’automate...la technique, la machine, la prothèse, la virtualité, bref 
les dimensions de la supplementarité auto-immunitaire et autosacrificielle, 
cette pulsion de mort qui travaille en silence toute communauté...et en 
vérité la constitue comme telle, dans son iterabilité, son héritage, sa 
tradition spectrale.65
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Dialogues with Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 
94-99. Author’s emphasis. 
65 Derrida, Foi et Savoir, suivi de Le Siecle et le Pardon, 79.  
In other words, the sacred dignity of life (dignité de la vie), conceived as an end in 
itself, offers no form of exchange value. As such, the opposition of life and death is no 
longer appropriate, since both conditions are equally representative of the same 
excessive, absolute value. It  has a value beyond everything else (plus que), even 
beyond itself (plus qu’elle même) in death (l’espace mort), so the growth or 
diminution of life is, in Derridean parlance, always already recaptured within the same 
economy, presenting thereby a form of excess inherent to life (excès sur le vivant) in 
the form of an absolute value, one ultimately independent of its negative (death) or 
positive (life) representation. In other words, the sacredness of life, its inherent 
dignity, is ultimately  found (n)either in life (n)or in death. As Derrida’s analysis 
implies, therefore, there are (at least) two forms of “life”: the first signifies normative 
meanings of birth, growth, or vital effulgence; the second signifies an absolute 
economy of excess--what Bataille might call a “general economy”--wherein life has an 
absolute value unopposed to death, its inverse but  equal expression. According to the 
same logic, Derrida implies likewise (at least) two forms of death. That which 
transforms one form into the other is the “supplementary” machine (la technique, la 
machine, etc.) that reproduces itself through autoimmunity (autoimmunitaire)--the 
effulgence of life that causes death--and/or its complement, autosacrifice 
(autosacrificielle)--the death that causes the renaissance of life.  Thus does the 
immunization against immunity achieve the same result as the sacrifice of sacrifice; 
Derrida writes that “l'auto-immunisation et le sacrifice du sacrifice” commonly result 
from “le respect absolu” of life, its excessive, sacred character, for which the 
quintessential expression is self-sacrifice: “le sacrifice du soi, du plus précieux 
intérêt.”66   In other words, by sacrificing itself to itself in order to be “itself,” the 
excessive quality of the sacred becomes sublated through the constant (re-)
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appropriation of its own excessive self-expropriation. In this way, the sacred does not 
only refer to the self-sacrificial gift of one’s “own” existence,  identity, or interests, but 
the very  sacrifice of this sacrifice in and through its iterated (iterabilité) 
reappropriation qua sacrifice. The “excess” implied in sacrifice, that is, does not 
entirely exceed some form of residual reserve, provisional closure, or tentative 
conservation that gives “a greater life” to the subject through self-sacrifice and death. 
Such makes holy the ascetics, saints, and martyrs, who serve not only to bind the 
faithful together religiously or communally  but  also to unify and distinguish the faith 
as its exemplars, as its guarantors of collective identity. 
 The Work of Conservation. Appropriately, the question of reappropriation and 
conservation through the supposedly  expropriate work of excess has become a 
controversial issue in Bataille studies, as Agamben’s essay already suggests. To what 
degree can expropriation, excess, and death be articulated, represented, without some 
necessary  recourse to their opposite(s)?67  Jean Luc Nancy  will make much of the 
reappropriative mechanism of sacrifice in his essay  “L’insacrifiable,” wherein he 
argues that the sacrifice of sacrifice--the sacrificial negation (rebirth) of negation 
(death)--is the ultimate “truth” of sacrifice in the West, one that Bataille in particular, 
despite his efforts, does not escape. In his brief genealogy of the concept, Nancy 
claims that four characteristics are essential to the ontotheology of sacrifice in 
Christianity  and Platonism. The first of these is that all sacrifice is self-sacrifice. He 
uses as examples the sacrifices of Socrates and Christ who he explains realize their 
identity  through their own self-destruction. For both Socrates and Christ “l'événement 
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Bailey Gill (Routledge, London, 1995), 76.
du sacrifice proprement dit...la mise-à-mort, vient seulement ponctuer et  exposer le 
procès et la vérité d’une vie qui est de part en part elle-même le sacrifice.”68  In other 
words, Socrates and Christ can only properly  become who they are through their own 
sacrificial demise. Citing Saint Augustine and Saint  Paul, he explains that second 
constitutes the “uniqueness” of this sacrifice, by which he means that “il est 
consommé pour tous, ou plus précisément encore, tous y  sont rassemblés, offerts, 
consacrés.”69  In other words, the singular act of sacrifice dialectically resolves the one 
with the many in the form of a communal substance (much like the corpus christi 
mysticum, for example). Thirdly, this sacrifice is inseparable from the “truth” of all 
sacrifices, by  which he means the elevation of a single sacrifice into a general essence 
of sacrifice, one able to unify all sacrificial acts and thus make them all part of the 
same eternal and communal fusion. This characteristic is found in rites of forbearance 
or fasting, for example, which operate to unify the religious community around an 
analogous, if not identical sacrifice made by God or His representatives. The fourth 
and final is “the truth of the sacrifice”--a decidedly Hegelian notion--which sublates 
(relève) “le moment sacrificiel du sacrifice lui-même” or the “sacrifice of sacrifice,” 
the reappropriation of sacrifice to itself as the essence sine qua non of expropriation. 
These combined characteristics attest to its transcendence and infinity, which must 
nevertheless “résorbe en lui le moment fini du sacrifice lui-même, et donc en ce qu’il 
doit, logiquement, pour accéder à sa vérité se sacrifier en tant que sacrifice.”70  In other 
words, an individual sacrifice must  paradoxically recapture its infinite essence and 
universality  as its own “finite” truth. Citing Hegel, he explains therefore that sacrifice 
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will be sacrifice only in the “figurative sense” (un sens figuré), because it is truly “la 
réconciliation avec soi-même de l’essence absolu.”71 
 The reason for this final characteristic is what he revealingly  terms the 
“transappropriation” (trans-appropriation) of sacrifice, by  which Nancy  means an act 
of reappropriation that 1) transgresses the limits of law and life, giving them up to the 
infinite negativity of death, and 2) appropriates this infinity  through a resumptive 
nominalism back into a particular, finite essence, such as the tribe, Christ, or personal 
identity. In other words, “on pourrait dire: c’est en s’appropriant la mort que le 
sacrifice se dérobe à la vérité du moment de désappropriation”72; “‘sacrifice’ veut dire: 
appropriation du Soi dans sa propre négativité.”73   The gift  of sacrifice is to give 
“itself” away, but sacrifice always somehow “gets itself back” qua “giving itself 
away,” thus sublating the appropriation and expropriation of the sacrificial gift, 
sacrificing its own sacrifice. Indeed, Nancy’s analysis of sacrifice recalls Bataille’s 
analysis of potlatch and the gift in La part maudite, wherein he explains that gift-
exchange is not true sacrificial expenditure because prestige is conferred upon the one 
who gives. In gift-exchange, something is given back; hence Bataille’s insistence that 
sacrifice represents the only true form of absolute expenditure. Nancy’s critique of 
Bataille likewise faintly echoes Derrida’s argument in Donner le temps, wherein he 
claims that the gift, including a sacrificial gift to the gods, cannot retroactively identify 
the giver without putting the gift itself into an economy of exchange and return.74 
Nancy claims that, despite Bataille’s overtures to expenditure and radical 
expropriation, he too cannot and does not escape the sublative transappropriation of 
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sacrifice.  Referring to Bataille’s essay “L’art, exercice de cruauté,”75  Nancy shows 
how the Bataillian search for self-sacrificial abandon and death ultimately 
accomplishes only its simulacrum or mimesis--which is also its sublation--especially 
in the form of art. 
 As Bataille himself writes in his letter to Kojève (above), the work of art 
represents the “objectification of negativity,” but one that ultimately betrays the 
negativity from which it  derives and to which it eventually  returns.  Nancy departs 
from Bataille’s thought by emphasizing that such negativity, even in Bataille’s own 
oeuvre, cannot be realized without the substantiation of such “a work”; indeed there 
may be no greater evidence for this than the very  existence of Bataille’s Oeuvres 
complètes. Conceived and practiced as a form of transgression that places the artist “à 
la hauteur du pire” and “en révèle l’ouverture à tout le possible,” the work of art for 
Bataille lets one commune “avec la jouissance d’une appropriation instantanée de la 
mort.”76   This appropriation, despite Bataille’s insistence on the prodigal expenditure 
of sacrifice, illustrates the inherent self-envelopment of negativity  and death within the 
sacrificial act, which thus precludes (for Nancy) the possibility of an elusive “excess” 
negativity. As a result, sacrifice represents “l’institution même de l'économie absolue 
de la subjectivité absolue, qui en effet ne peut que mimer le passage par la négativité, 
d'où elle ne peut symétriquement, que se réapproprier ou se trans-approprier 
infiniment.”77   With the a priori and complete reappropriation of a negativity within 
sacrifice, the subject and identity are reborn--reborn as negativity--like Christ, in 
fulfillment of the nascent condition of sacrifice for such identity. For Nancy, this 
places Bataille’s thinking within the ontotheological tradition of sacrifice.
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 Selfish Self-Sacrifice. As a form of re-appropriation that mediates between the 
sign of death and death itself, the finite and the infinite, between “simulacrum and 
nothingness” (le simulacre et le néant), Nancy explains that Bataillian sacrifice 
constitutes of mimesis that “supplements, relays, or sublates” (suppléer, relayer ou 
relever) in finite fashion the infinite “impasse of sacrifice” (l’impasse du sacrifice), 
and thereby completely reappropriates the self-expropriation of sacrifice.78  Insofar as 
all forms of sacrifice accomplish this, Nancy  is able to insist on the ontological unity 
of all sacrifices as a common “sacrifice of sacrifice.”  The attempt to identify  a 
sacrificial act, therefore, requires a sublation of its infinite expropriative and 
appropriative movements into finite and complete expression. Sacrifice is “identified” 
somehow as that which “dis-identifies” from itself, something that is always and 
forever what it is not. The sacrifice of sacrifice produces the impossible 
“identification” of identity  and non-identity in its reappropriation of death and the 
radical alterity it  represents--such is the sublation of sacrifice. The Hegelian 
architecture that undergirds Nancy’s conception of sacrifice permits him to compare 
art with the reconstituted subject in Bataille. “Une représentation dominante de l’art,” 
he asks, “n’est-elle pas celle de l’exposition transgressive d’un sujet, qui par la 
s’approprie et se laisse approprier?”79  For Nancy, the negativity  of sacrifice, even in 
Bataille, is reconstituted and reappropriated as a positive, finite manifestation of its 
truth qua negativity  (death), especially in the form of mimesis (art, the subject, etc.), 
which in turn attests to the failed attempt to attain the excessive, transgressive, and 
irrecuperable negativity Bataille fervently  seeks in sacrifice.  Such is, in essence, the 
“unsacrificeable”: reconstituting negativity and death themselves into positive finite 
form.
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 In essence, Bataille and Nancy envision two different forms of negativity  in 
sacrifice. Whereas Bataille’s is radical, excessive, and purely  expropriative, Nancy’s is 
conservative, useful, and dialectical. Bataille’s oeuvre gives us reason to believe--as I 
do--that his thinking on sacrifice illustrates neither the complete reappropriation 
(Nancy) or complete expropriation (Bataille) of negativity/death. Whereas the mimesis 
implied in sacrifice for Nancy testifies to and completes the operation of its inherent 
negativity, its “truth,” the critic Elizabeth Arnould gives reason to believe that 
mimesis--especially in the case of Bataille’s poetics--produces still a certain 
irrecuperable excess. In her essay “The Impossible Sacrifice of Poetry: Bataille and 
the Nancian Critique of Sacrifice,” Arnould compellingly challenges Nancy’s 
argument by way of Bataille’s critique of poetry, which she claims illustrates the 
“structural undecidability of sacrifice” in Bataille’s poetics.80 Taking Bataille’s account 
of Rimbaud’s renunciation poetry  as a centerpiece--an act Bataille considers to be the 
departure point for all new poetry--Arnould claims that such a sacrificial disavowal of 
the poet’s own identity  both inaugurates a new identity  for the modern poet  while 
robbing him/her of this identity through imitating this self-sacrificial disavowal. Such 
is the mandate for all poets after Rimbaud, “to imitate the moment of the ‘poetical 
lamma sabachtani’ where the desperate crucifixion of words defines the ‘impossible’ 
laws of a new poetics.”81  As a result, the sacrifice of poetry by the “poet” refuses 
complete sublation because of the mandate to imitate an impossible act--the poet’s 
sacrifice of poetry--infinitely, even excessively. The poet must somehow write the 
cessation of writing, and thus “take into account Rimbaud's ‘silent 
contestation’ (contestation sans phrases), imitate its sacrifice, and write under the 
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imperative of its impossibility.”82  Such a task marks not only the impossibility of the 
simultaneous achievement and failure of poetry, or even that of the poet’s 
simultaneous identity and dis-identification (which would support Nancy’s analysis), 
but also the infinite deferral of the poet and poetry  themselves through an endless and 
impossible imitation of what is impossible to write: how does one imitate the 
inimitable endlessly? In other words: how does one mime nothingness or infinity 
themselves? “In what does this imitation consist?” she asks, “How can one write 
sacrifice or, for that matter, the impossibility  of writing? And how can one imitate a 
gesture that, or so it seems, forever forbids all imitation?” The infinite possibilities for 
the finite representation of “poetic sacrifice” renders it thus effectively  impossible, and 
testifies to the excessive quality  of self-sacrifice, indeed I would say the excessive 
quality of all such imitation resulting from such a sacrifice.83  
 Arnould’s argument sheds light more broadly on the paradoxical function of 
negativity/death in Bataille’s sacrifice.  Though Arnould does not explore this point, 
she implies that excess confounds the complete sublation of sacrifice by evincing a 
negativity categorically different from and the one produced and presumably re-
appropriated (“trans-appropriated”) by  the (self-)sacrifice of writing or poetry.  How is 
it different? I would argue that  sacrifice in Bataille entails at least two functionally 
different forms of negativity, a claim implied in my analysis above. The first form 
would be mimetic in the manner Nancy suggests, whereby all sacrifices reduplicate the 
same “truth” of sacrifice, and thus essentially the same “original” sacrifice that 
comprehensively prebinds all sacrifices. “Mimesis, mais répétition,” Nancy writes, “le 
sacrifice n’est dépassé que pour un mode plus élève, plus vrai, de la logique 
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sacrificielle.”84  Mimesis and repetition are captured within the essence of sacrifice, 
and thus enable all sacrifices to be part of the same unity. Mimesis would thus 
characterize the more conservative, apophatic ontotheological negativity  he describes. 
 Yet the negativity that precludes or challenges this mimesis due to (what 
Bataille might call) “the impossible,” however, describes an inimitable or non-mimetic 
negativity that exceeds the regime of mimetic representation and thus renders 
incomplete, if not provisional, the dialectical unity presumably  achieved in sacrifice. 
The mimesis that sacrifice implies, while necessary, is yet ultimately  “impossible” to 
achieve due to this non-mimetic negativity. While this form of negativity ultimately 
divorces Bataille’s notion of sacrifice from the Hegelian architecture Nancy suggests, 
the former departs from the general economy of radical expenditure Bataille himself 
insists upon. To wit, both forms of negativity--the mimetic and inimitable, the 
ontothetological and “atheological”--are equally constitutive of self-sacrifice in 
Bataille, as well as those who share his conception of sacrifice, including Laure and 
Leiris. On the one hand a form of radical expenditure, on the other a resource re-
appropriated in subjectivity or art, it  would seem that sacrifice for Bataille (and the 
other authors here considered) represents a negative dialectics between life and death, 
identity  and difference, one whose synthesis offers tentative, albeit incomplete closure. 
What results from the sacrifice of sacrifice is the ultimately  unproductive reproduction 
of sacrifice itself, its incomplete--yet tentatively identifiable--sublation. This result 
recurs due to two different yet complementary  phenomena: 1) the “sacrifice of 
sacrifice” as Nancy suggests, or the positive and finite re-appropriation of negativity; 
and 2) an excessive negativity  expressed through such finite and repetitive 
appropriation.  Whereas the first gives form to the sacrifice as art or subjectivity, the 
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(mimesis and
repetition)
expropriation
appropriation
sacrifice (of) sacrifice(∞)
Legend: ! = negativity; ! = unity (art, subjectivity)
Figure 1.1.  Jean Luc Nancy’s dialectical model of sacrifice. “‘Rien’ 
n’est pas un abime ouvert au dehors. ‘Rien’ affirme la finitude, et ce 
‘rien’, aussitôt, ramène l’existence à elle-même, et à rien 
d’autre...L’existence, en ce sens, c’est-a-dire en son sens propre, est 
insacrifiable” (Nancy, “L’insacrifiable,” 103-4). 
appropriation (mimesis andrepetition)
non-mimetic negativity non-mimetic negativity
(etc.)
Legend: ! = negativity; ! = unity (art, subjectivity)
appropriation
(mimesis and
repetition)
(∞)
expropriation expropriation
Figure 1.2. Model of sacrifice as negative dialectics, illustrating simulation 
and performativity.  Whereas Nancy unifies all sacrifice within existence as 
bounded by negativity, the model above, (representative of Bataillian 
sacrifice) permits plurality  within existence due to the different  functions of 
mimetic and non-mimetic negativity.
expropriation
second heralds possible art  and subjects yet to come, and thus their individual implicit 
failure.
 When Bataille writes, for example, that  “l’homme du sacrifice donne à la mort 
une destinée plus grande” in his essay “Le sacrifice,” for example, he effectively 
illustrates this very dualism: not only  does the l’homme du sacrifice realize his own 
mortal identity  through sacrifice (TU ES tragédie)--which might support the 
ontotheological grounding of the subject--but death itself is given a new future on the 
horizon of this sacrifice, one that exceeds the particular result to which l’homme du 
sacrifice is bound and in which God is absent; this is its “destinée plus grande.”85 
Sacrifice in Bataille thus transforms both the subject and the nature of this 
transformation itself, revealing a plausible middle-ground for the dialectics of sacrifice 
that rests between Bataille’s desired radical expenditure and Nancy’s more 
conservative Hegelian schema. Sacrifice, as a form of negative dialectics, presents 
thus less the sublation of life and death, expropriation and appropriation, than their 
continual transformation in and through unresolved dialectical encounter. And such a 
transformation necessarily begs the question of identity, the provisional and dialectical 
result of this encounter (Figures 1.1-1.2).
 Emblematic of the distinction between these two forms of negativity is 
Bataille’s distinction in L'expérience intérieure between the “self-who-dies” (moi-qui-
meurt) and the “self-who-lives” (moi-qui-vit). As dual modes of identity, these two 
categories--analytic, not binary--of selfhood find themselves commonly tethered to 
death as their primary condition; their difference arises only in their reaction to or 
comportment toward death itself.  The self-who-dies reveals itself in ecstasy, 
eroticism, and inner-experience only in this negativity “itself,” without recourse to or 
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accordance with “what exists” (ce qui existe); the self-who-dies cannot be mimetically 
represented “in life,” so to speak; the self-who-dies is realized only  in death, which 
properly understood means it can only  be “unrealized.” It “abandons its 
link” (abandonne cet accord) with life and existence; it “véritablement aperçoit  ce qui 
l’entoure comme un vide et soi-même comme un défi à ce vide.” The self-who-lives, 
on the other hand, exists as a challenge (défi) to death, but in its defiance, it remains 
only a tentative, masked emanation of death itself, which is both its inevitable end and 
primary condition.  The self-who-lives of course also dies, but does so as if it is not 
dying: it is a mimesis of death in the guise of life.  The self-who-lives is a prescient or 
portentious “sign” of death, which in itself, in its radical negativity, cannot be 
signified: “le moi-qui-vit se borne à pressentir le vertige où tout finira” writes 
Bataille.86  Ultimately, the self-who-lives signals only  that it ultimately  does not truly 
signal “le vide” or “le vertige où tout finira,” but instead only mimics this 
signification, indirectly, obliquely, even negatively through an equivocal 
portentousness, a “feeling,” or even perhaps an “inner-experience.” Insofar as death is 
a negativity that cannot be positively signified,87  the portentous “sign” of death, in its 
turn, betrays its own betrayal as a sign by negating the absolute negativity  of death 
through signification.  In other words, the self-who-lives is a sign that is not  [the sign 
of what [is not]];  it is a form of mimesis, copy, or simulacrum. In contrast to the non-
mimetic negativity  of the self-who-dies, the self-who-lives mimes this negativity 
through negating this negativity itself.
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 An untitled poem from L’expérience intérieure illustrates the dual dimension 
of personal identity described above, as well as the encounter between mimetic and 
non-mimetic negativity:
Qui suis-je
pas “moi” non non
mais le désert la nuit l’immensité
que je suis
qu’est-ce
déserte immensité nuit bête
vite néant sans retour
et sans rien avoir su…88
An unknown speaker asks an equally unknown interlocutor to respond to him/her, to 
the “I” that questions.  But the “I” that questions is not the “I” that is answered, for the 
“I” in the poem is not—and never is—exactly the same “I.” The “I,” as the poem later 
reveals, remains only a provisional and fictive totality, one that operates by excluding, 
even perhaps producing all of that which is presumably  “not I” (pas“moi”): the desert, 
the night, immensity. Whereas the first “I” in the poem initially implies the speaker’s 
identity  as a whole, the mimetic “moi” that s/he refutes, it also thereby delineates the 
“not I” (pas “moi”) or the non-mimetic “excess” implied by  this self-determination, 
however. In other words, if this first “I” can call itself a self, a “moi,”  then that which 
it excludes in order to make this determination somehow also constitutes the 
determination itself. The “mimetic self” in the poem (moi)--the subject I create by 
repeatedly referencing it as “self”--is also not itself (pas moi) in some fundamental 
way.  As s/he says, the “I” is “pas ‘moi,’ non, non”; rather, it  is something else, 
70
88 Georges Bataille, L'expérience intérieure,  183.  The conceit of Bataille’s poem strikingly recalls Judith 
Butler’s analysis of performative subjectivity in The Psychic Life of Power: “To claim that this is what I 
am,” writes Butler, “is to suggest a provisional totalization of this ‘I.’  But if the I can so determine 
itself, then that which it excludes in order to make that determination remains constitutive of the 
determination itself.  In other words, such a statement presupposes that the ‘I’ exceeds its determination, 
and even produces that very excess in and by the act which seeks to exhaust the semantic field of that 
‘I’” (Butler, The Psychic Life of Power, 309).
somewhere else, “deserted,” lost in the immensity of the night. The “I” implies also 
the dark desert of not “I,” not “me,” indeed everything else, else nothing in particular, 
no-thing at all. This nothingness, this nocturnal and deserted immensity that seemingly 
undoes identity  (pas “moi”) also partially reconstitutes it: it is the “désert immensité 
nuit bête / que je suis” the speaker says. As s/he suggests, identity  therefore implies 
non-identity, and selfhood implies an inexorable otherness that cannot, does not 
completely mime the I, and yet accompanies it. Thus the interrogative, provisional I 
(je) never completely returns; it becomes “pas moi,” a “néant sans retour.” The 
response to the speaker’s original question “Who am I?” thus cannot be given simply, 
since the “I” that questioned no longer completely exists in the response.  Indeed, it 
never really had completely existed, since the “I” that questions is—or was—always 
already the immense dark desert: the “pas moi.”  The “I” bears within its own 
immense nothingness, such that the “pas moi”--the impossible response to the 
speaker’s question “Qui suis-je?”--answers successfully, albeit tentatively  in its 
failure. Indeed, as the speaker explains, “nothing” (rien) is learned in the response 
(sans rien avoir su), which means not only that “no particular lesson” is learned, but 
that nothingness proper is the lesson. 
 In “Le tombeau,” Bataille writes analogously “le néant n’est que moi-même.” 
Selfhood is annihilated, rendered nothing, as much as it is constituted only (n’est que) 
by such nothingness.  As the poem above illustrates, is it not so much the subject that 
undergoes mimesis through negativity; rather, it  is the state of subjectivity  itself, the 
retracing and recrossing of the limits that delineate selfhood from the deserted night of 
nothingness.  The declaration that “I am not what I am” in the poem above is not 
tautology, therefore, but rather the paradoxical, iterative practice of identification 
itself; the continual (re-)becoming of the “I” in the act identification. This practice 
fortuitously captures the semantic richness of the French répétition which refers at 
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once to “redoing” and “rehearsal”;  in essence, the repetition of the “I” is a dramatic 
performance, a kind of role play, and the character one plays at the moment of uttering 
“I” will not be exactly the same in the next utterance. The “difference” between these 
two “I”s cannot, nor can ever, therefore be fully  mimed.  Identity—in the strong sense 
of the Latin idem (“sameness”)—is therefore impossible for Bataille’s subject strictu 
sensu, since a non-mimetic foreignness, estrangement, or negativity  is identity’s very 
condition of possibility.  That there is identity  at all, however, implies a sameness or 
mimicking of the conditions--whether ontological, linguistic, or juridical--that give 
rise to the subject.  While the means are mimetic, the ends endlessly differ: Qui suis-
je? Pas moi...que je suis.
 Sacrifice and Simulation. In an account that strongly anticipates the concerns 
of Nancy’s essay, Pierre Klossowski in “A propos du simulacre dans la communication 
de Georges Bataille” draws attention to precisely  this feature of Bataille’s identity 
critique.89 While Bataille defends and promotes the dissolution of the subject in deadly 
experiences like ecstasy and sacrifice, such dissolution seems to be recaptured by the 
subject in limit experiences and, to be sure, poetic language. Like Agamben after him, 
Klossowski underscores the role that pathos plays in Bataille for re-inscribing 
subjectivity. Supported by  Bataille’s own assertions, Klossowski claims the search for 
death reached in pathetic moments of sovereign experience like ecstasy, laughter, 
anguish, orgasm, or tears is still wed to personal identity and subjective experience, 
however much they hearken toward the deadly hereafter. In his response to Bataille’s 
L'expérience intérieure and its ecstatic “méthode de méditation” Klossowski writes:
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Un sujet  existant, expérimentant sa discontinuité, soi la fuite de l'être hors 
de existence, subsiste dès que son rire, ses larmes, ses effusions--en un 
mot son pathos se trouvent par lui désignés comme moments souverains, 
et cet existant, porté fortuitement à la vacance du moi...ne les recherche en 
tant que moments souverains nécessairement qu’à partir de son moi 
réintègre, donc à partir de la servitude de l’identité...cela à chaque fois 
qu’il veut enseigner cette méthode de méditation.90
Moments of pathos recapture the flight towards sacrificial self-absence (porté 
fortuitement à la vacance du moi) in those “sovereign” moments of inner-experience 
where pathos is felt and expressed by the self; such moments thus become possible 
only on the precondition of identity, to which it becomes ironically bound in servitude 
(à partir de la servitude de l’identité).  There thus can be no actual sovereignty 
experienced or expressed without a concomitant submission to the limits of 
subjectivity, those limits sovereign experience was to breach in delivering the subject 
to its inner negativity.  To play  upon Klossowski’s conceit, one might say that there is 
“no sovereignty without subjects”; indeed, the “sovereign” himself is always already 
himself a subject, bound to the limits of selfhood insofar as he exceeds or even the 
attempts to exceed them in ecstasy or inner-experience. Thus when Bataille writes that 
such experience “modifie le sujet qui s’y exerce,” the subject is “modified” only 
insofar as sovereignty, absence, and death are experienced by a subject, and thus 
recaptured within the bounds of subjectivity. Though subjectivity itself endures 
through such experience, the subject that experiences it, the self (son moi), though its 
subsequent “reintegration” (réintègre), nevertheless changes with every such 
experience. Again, sacrifice first expends then conserves, as Nancy and Mauss 
similarly explain.
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 For Klossowski, the question of subjectivity  in Bataille hinges on the operation 
of this “reintegration,” to which I would parallel Nancy’s concept of trans-
appropriation. Yet Klossowski does not insist on the dialectical sublation of the subject 
in the manner or to the degree Nancy does. The subject that reemerges from inner-
experience is not precisely identical to its “disintegrated” forebear, since such would 
preclude the avowed “modification” (modifie) through such experience or even the 
experience itself. Whereas Bataille would suggest that such modification results in the 
disappearance of the subject, its absence, Klossowski argues that  the subject so 
modified, instead, has become a simulacrum of itself, a copy, a (re)presentation of its 
own absence in and through its provisional subjective reintegration. As such, it is 
never entirely the same; it changes with each and every form of sacrifice. “Le recours 
au simulacre,” he explains, “ne retrouve cependant ni l’absence d’un événement réel 
ni ce qui remplace ce dernier.”91  With each new reintegration occurs an incomplete 
reidentificaiton of the subject that is neither entirely the same, nor entirely  “other,” nor 
even the identification of sameness and otherness, but rather a “simulated” identity-- 
i.e., a phantom, a masquerade--whereby that which resists all identification under 
language or law nonetheless confronts the insistence of language and law to identify. 
“Le simulacre au sens imitatif,” writes Klossowski, “est actualisation de quelque chose 
d’incommunicable en soi ou irreprésentable : proprement le ‘phantasme’ dans sa 
contrainte obsédante.”92  This conflict between the unrepresentable and constraints of 
representation is seen in the poem above; identity becomes the repeated abolition of 
identity, that which it is, it is not--or not yet. Bataille begins, again and again, 
describing those notions that unmake him, that  transform him into what he is not, 
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indeed what is not, nothingness itself, such that the very description manifests the “he” 
unmade, transformed. As Klossowski explains,
Quelque chose arrive à Bataille, quelque chose dont  il parle comme si il 
ne lui arriverait pas...il ne s’attribue ni ne peut s’attribuer jamais un 
énoncé (d'expérience) assez défini qu’il ne se réfère aussitôt  à l’angoisse, 
à la gaieté, à la désinvolture: puis il rit  et il écrit qu’il meurt de rire ou 
qu’il rit aux larmes---état dans lequel l'expérience supprime le sujet.93 
The experience of negativity  culminates remains inexpressible, transforming the 
failure of language into laugher and tears; yet  laughter and tears thereby become a 
“language,” so to speak, or more precisely  a simulated language, which can signify 
only that it  does not truly signify--or if it signifies at all, it (“significantly”) signifies 
“nothing.” In L’expérience intérieure, for example, Bataille speaks of anguish and 
tears ironically as signifiers of selfhood:
je puis saisir le moi en larmes dans l’angoisse (je puis même a perte de 
vue prolonger mon vertige et  ne plus me trouver que dans le désir d’un 
autre--d’une femme--unique, irremplaçable, mourante, en chaque chose 
semblable à moi), mais c’est seulement quand la mort approchera que 
je saurai sans manquer ce dont il s’agit.94
Anguish and tears, while heralding the advent of death, nevertheless permit the 
recapture (saisir) of identity (i.e., the self-who-lives) as the self-who-dies. As a result, 
as Klossowski explains, Bataille must “développ[e] encore une fois à partir des 
notions, des identités la voie propre à ouvrir les notions, à abolir les identités--et de 
cette ouverture et de cette abolition ne saurait jamais donner autre chose que le 
simulacre.”95  Describing and developing the means of self-absence and of 
75
93 Klossowski, "A propos du simulacre dans la communication de Georges Bataille," 744.
94 Bataille, L'expérience intérieure, 85.
95  Klossowski,  "A propos du simulacre dans la communication de Georges Bataille," 750. Emphasis 
mine.
“abolishing” identity  nevertheless re-inscribes identity  endlessly  as a form of self-
absence, self-abolition, and ultimately self-sacrifice: i.e., simulacrum.96   Bataille’s 
subject seeks itself there where no self, or rather the “non-self,” cannot be found, but 
only recreated in and by  the search itself. In a word, the subject can be only 
performed, and each performance, to use Klossowski’s nomenclature, represents the 
simulation of genuine, yet unattainable, subjectivity.
 Conclusion. It is this re-appropriation of identity through the effort to 
expropriate it in different modes of self-sacrifice (in inner-experience, eroticism, 
sovereignty, etc.) that  partially counteracts the avowed intentions of Bataille and his 
intellectual kin--especially  Laure and Leiris--in their search for the experience of the 
sacred, death, or a negativity without end. The search for the sacred through sacrifice--
which is also the self-sacrifice of sacrifice--broaches a concept of identity based on 
(self-)disidentification and (self-)simulation, an inexhaustible, repetitive, mimetic 
process of continual self-(re)realization. In a manner “identical” to Bataille’s work of 
art, identity itself represents the reproduced residues of sacred excess that they 
themselves ultimately  both use and exceed. This may indeed be the ultimate result  of 
what Bataille called the “impossible,” which in its attempt to (un)produce an 
impossible nothingness actually (re)produces the limits of possibility in the form of 
literature and, perhaps above all, of identity. This is what his literature “attains.” “Je 
crois même qu’en un sens mes récits atteignent clairement l’impossible,” Bataille 
writes; and insofar he claims this literature to be his (mes récits), there can be little 
doubt that, however indirectly, Bataille’s own disavowed authorial identity  is likewise 
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96  It is in this vein that one might understand Bataille’s frequent use of letter-symbols for literary 
characters,  their frequent name changes, or even indeed the overlaps of narrative voice.  These features 
are most apparent,  for example, in L’Abbé C, Le mort, and L’histoire des rats. See Œuvres complètes, 
vol. 3.
“attained.”97  The work and the author are commonly established, and then lost, in the 
impossible search for an expropriation without end.
 The reproduction of identity  through sacrifice becomes a kind of 
performativity, indeed a “performance art” that anticipates contemporary  modes of 
identity  critique. Whereas more recent theorists of performativity  like Judith Butler 
and Eve Sedgewick seek to explore the production of subjectivities within the 
regulatory regimes of discourse and cultural practice, however, writers like Bataille, 
Laure, and Leiris--who serve as the focus of this study--illustrate how the subject 
arises from the intersecting religious regimes of law and life, the “divine power” of the 
sacred, which is repeatedly, ritualistically confronted in the pursuit of divine and 
deadly excesses.  But exactly what kind of subjects are produced through such a 
confrontation? How does the identity of such subject get (re)configured and (re-)
produced as a result, and how might such subjection specifically  inform contemporary 
critical debates on the specific production of gendered, sexed, and raced identities? 
For answers to these questions, it  is necessary to take a closer look at the 
performativity of the sacred.
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97  Georges Bataille, L'impossible: Histoire de rats, suivi de Dianus et de L'Orestie,  2nd ed. (Paris: 
Editions de Minuit, 1962), 9.  
CHAPTER II
GEORGES BATAILLE AND THE SACRIFICE OF GENDER
Je puis saisir moi en larmes, dans l’angoisse 
(je puis même à perte de vue prolonger mon 
vertige et ne plus me trouver que dans le désir 
d ’ u n a u t re - - d ’ u n e f e m m e - - u n i q u e , 
irremplaçable, mourante, en chaque chose 
semblable à moi).
-Georges Bataille, L'expérience intérieure 1
Introduction. To speak of “queerness” is not to speak of one thing, but of 
something that is not one. The German root of queer – twer, cognate of the English 
“thwart”—refers to the oblique, the crossed, the wrongheaded, that which goes against 
the grain, that which is not limited, not  linear, not bounded, not “straight.” It’s Latinate 
synonym, common to English and French--“ec-centricity” (l’eccentricité)—
auspiciously echoes the negativity of its Germanic cousin, referring to that which is 
“not centered.”  Its other synonyms possess the same negativity as well: the unusual, 
the unfamiliar, the unorthodox, the uncanny.  These definitions of queerness are, of 
course, all to orthodox and familiar in our public discourse on queerness, which 
frequently insists upon the alienating or marginalizing of differently gendered or sexed 
people.  Less familiar and more “queer,” however, is the ontological role of negativity 
in queerness, the precise value and meaning of a thing that, by definition, “is not.” 
What is the philosophical significance of this negativity? How can one describe the 
negative space of queerness? Not centered, not straight, having neither point nor line 
as cartographic tools, “queerness” cannot properly delineate a space, meaning, or 
identity  of its own without risking contradiction. To say that “queerness is not one” 
means, in some sense, that it remains in-between, always neither/nor, either/or; it is 
neither that from which it is said to differ, nor that  from which another thing can 
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1 Georges Bataille, L'expérience intérieure (Paris: Gallimard, 1954), 85.
entirely  differ.  Instead, one must imagine queerness, as its Germanic root suggests, as 
a kind of intersection, a crossing--or, as Georges Bataille might have called it, a kind 
of transgression.  As such, queerness does not move from one territory  into another. 
Rather, it passes from a territory into a deterritorialized realm, into the nomadic, the 
unbounded, the limitless, the unknown, what Bataille might have called a “sovereign,” 
“heterogeneous,” or “sacred” space beyond the reassuring limits of (sexual/gendered) 
identity  and its normative regimes. It differs therefore not only  from the limits that 
would otherwise contain it, constrain it, make it “one”--but also from itself--as that 
which by definition is not “one”--or rather simply is not. Queer identity—if one can 
speak of such a thing--does not and cannot exclude, though it is excluded, since, as 
queer, it  inherently bears a certain exclusion and negativity within. Queerness is a 
stranger not only to others, but to itself.  In this way, I would call “queer” Bataille’s 
fictional and philosophical evocation of feminine identity.
Indeed, the question of queerness in Bataille studies, especially it relates to the 
common concerns of eroticism, death, and sacrifice, remains largely unexamined. 
While few have considered his relevance for contemporary queer critique, however, 
many have debated the significance and meaning of femininity  in his work.2   On the 
one hand, this is expected, given the (hetero)sexist essentialism Bataille’s writings 
frequently exhibit; in L’érotisme for example, Bataille writes “Il n’y a en chaque 
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2  Though this list is by no means exhaustive, I am referring in particular to Andrea Dworkin, 
Pornography : Men Possessing Women (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1989), who contends the misogynistic 
violence that accompanies the sexual act in Madame Edwarda; Hélène Cixous, Prénoms de personne, 
Collection Poétique (Paris: Seuil, 1974), wherein Cixous situates the feminine within a general 
economy of expenditure and loss; Julia Kristeva, Pouvoirs de l'horreur : essai sur l'abjection (Paris: 
Editions du Seuil, 1980), in which Kristeva references Bataille’s proposition that the interdiction can 
never fully bar the abject or, for that matter, the feminine; Jane Gallop,  Intersections: a Reading of Sade 
with Bataille, Blanchot, and Klossowski (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1981), who evaluates 
Bataille’s reception of Sade and the former’s concept of the “sovereign man.” Also worthy of note are 
Suzanne Guerlac, "'Recognition' by a Woman!: A Reading of Bataille's L'Erotisme," Yale French 
Studies, no. 78 (1990), Amy Hollywood, "Divi-ne Woman/Divine Women': The Return of the Sacred in 
Bataille, Lacan, and Irigaray," in The Question of Christian Philosophy Today, ed. Francis J.  Ambrosio 
(New York: Fordham University Press, 1999); Susan Rubin Suleiman, "Bataille in the Street: The 
Search for Virility in the 1930s," in Bataille: Writing the Sacred, ed. Carolyn Bailey Gill (Routledge, 
London, 1995).
femme une prostituée en puissance, mais la prostitution est le conséquence de 
l’attitude féminine.”3  On the other hand, fact is surprising given how much Bataille is 
read and referenced in relation to identity  critique, sexuality studies, and the editor of 
his complete works--Michel Foucault--whose importance for contemporary study of 
gender and sexuality is beyond dispute. The breadth and variety of feminist 
scholarship  on Bataille by figures as diverse as Andrea Dworkin, Hélène Cixous, 
Lucette Finas, Julia Kristeva, and Jane Gallop testifies not only to the controversial 
complexity of feminine identity in his oeuvre; it also illustrates how the feminine 
offers a unique segue into the more perennial concerns of eroticism, death, and 
personal identity so commonplace and indispensable for Bataille and his readers. 
For this reason, it is unnecessary, perhaps even mistaken, to ignore feminist 
scholarship  in emerging queer critiques, which broach kindred issues of gender and 
sexuality albeit with different presumptions, goals, or interpretive frames.  Indeed, I 
would argue that some feminist scholarship  on Bataille anticipates queer critique in a 
manner analogous to Bataille’s own female characters, who like Madame Edwarda 
herald self-dissolution into a “queer” space of ecstasy  and death.  In this way, it  is 
possible to read the feminine in Bataille as a privileged category  not only for 
understanding his figuration of gender, but also its self-critique. Such a reading might 
also illustrate Bataille’s significance for emerging theoretical rapprochements between 
feminism and queer studies.4
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3 Georges Bataille, L'érotisme (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1957), 145.  
4 While several queer theorists (like Judith Butler) have typically opposed feminism and queerness due 
to the essentializing tendency of the former, sociologists Corie Hammers and Alan Brown argue that 
sociological research in gender and sexuality can benefit from a “feminist-queer alliance” that 
challenges traditional epistemological frames of man/woman, gay/straight, etc. in defense of multiple 
forms of femininity in Corie Jo Hammers, "Not for Men Only : The (De)-construction of Lesbian/Queer 
Public Sexualities" (Thesis, University of Oklahoma, 2005) and Corie Jo and Brown Hammers, Alan 
D., "Towards a Feminist-Queer Alliance: A Paradigmatic Shift in the Research Process," Social 
Epistemology 18, no. 1 (2004).  Kathy Rudy makes a similar case in Kathy Rudy, "Queer Theory and 
Feminism," Women's Studies: An Interdisciplinary Journal 29, no. 2 (2000).  For Butler’s argument 
concerning feminism, see Judith Butler, Gender Trouble : Feminism and the Subversion of Identity 
(New York: Routledge, 1999), 6-10.
 The feminine is an exceptional category precisely because it illustrates where 
and how Bataille--even despite himself—confounds the limits of the masculine and 
feminine. Rather than a binaristic or even analytic alternative to the masculine, the 
feminine masks a form of queerness that grounds the construction of identity, 
masculine and feminine both, into priests, prostitutes, lovers, beloveds, whores, and 
mothers. To be sure, to claim that the feminine is “exceptional” in this way seems to 
imply a challenge to the goals of queer critique; how can one simultaneously defend 
the exceptional status of femininity in Bataille and yet claim the feminine not actually 
to be feminine per se, but rather a masked form of queerness, a subversion of 
femininity itself? Two subtle negotiations must be made to respond to this question. 
The first concerns conceiving gender in Bataille as a kind or as a degree of 
subjectivity; the second concerns the means and ends of Bataille’s critique of the 
subject, specifically as it  relates to his conceptions of transgression and sacrifice. 
Provisionally, it will suffice to say that gendered identity  in Bataille is itself 
provisional, permitting for tentative differences between masculine subjects and abject 
femininity, between potent and impotent men, between holy and whorish women that, 
to varying degrees, commonly  herald the queerly  common and communal space of 
eroticism and death in which these are redone along a continuum of possible genders 
and sexualities. Ultimately, I would argue that queerness in Bataille concerns the 
inherently  self-sacrificial quality  of all subjectivity in Bataille, whether masculine or 
feminine. As I argue below, the concept and function of sacrifice in Bataille offers an 
unexplored entry point into the queer qualities of his work. 
Queering Bataille. The following argument concerning the queer aspect of 
sacrifice in Bataille merits a brief discussion of the scarce queer scholarship on his 
work. Only recently  have critics begun to recognize the incomparably rich theoretical 
and literary itinerary Bataille offers for queer critique; this is a surprising fact given 
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Bataille’s popularity for feminist, gender, and sexuality  studies and the editor of his 
complete works--Michel Foucault--whose importance for queer studies is beyond 
dispute. In her new edited book Reading Bataille Now, Shannon Winnubst invites 
comparison of Lacan and Bataille in the essay “Bataille’s Queer Pleasures: The 
Universe as Spider and Spit,” wherein she seeks to renew the latter’s significance as 
writer and thinker of queer desire.5  Her approach to Bataille revisits familiar 
theoretical terrain for queer studies via Lacan and Foucault, who commonly 
investigate the discursive impasses that arise from the “never-ending quest  of desire” 
as she calls it. Citing L’usage des plaisirs, for example, she claims that Foucault’s 
brand of desire, at least in his reading of the Greeks, presents a double-bind wherein 
the subject’s lack is problematically also the lamented source of its pleasurable 
fulfillment. “Desire thereby misleads us doubly  for Foucault: it  reads our subjectivity 
as anchored in an ontological lack and simultaneously  locks us into the nostalgic quest 
for that pure origin of fullness and plenitude.”6
Winnubst goes on to explain that Lacanian lack is found in the Real which 
“articulate[s] the limits of knowledge and representation as [it] constitutes the limits of 
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5 There is a rich body of criticism that explores the theoretical harmonies between Lacan and Bataille, 
which can be understood as an important precursor to queer criticism. Among the first of these is 
Carolyn J. Dean, The Self and its Pleasures : Bataille, Lacan, and the History of the Decentered Subject 
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press,  1992), which posits the two at the center of the idea of 
decentered subjectivity in French intellectual history; Jean Dragon, "The Work of Alterity: Bataille and 
Lacan," Diacritics: A Review of Contemporary Criticism 26, no. 2 (1996), which interrogates the 
importance of feminine alterity for both figures. Juan Carlos Ubilluz’s recent Sacred Eroticism: 
Georges Bataille and Pierre Klossowski and the Latin American Novel offers a compelling account of 
the theoretical kinship Bataille and Lacan share.   Ubilluz presents Bataille’s sacred feminine as Lacan’s 
concept of the Thing in L’éthique de psychanalyse,  the “extimate object” (objet ex-time) or “intimate 
exteriority” (extériorité intime) which treads upon the path of anal eroticism, the death drive, and 
jouissance. For Lacan and Bataille alike, he claims, woman poses a threat to subjectivity, being “an 
ambiguous sign between presence and absence…the not-whole object a (petit objet a)…the ruined 
poetic image that take author and reader from the meaning of discourse to the rupture/rapture of 
jouissance, from the known to the unknown” (Juan Carlos Ubilluz, Sacred Eroticism : Georges Bataille 
and Pierre Klossowski in the Latin American Erotic Novel, The Bucknell studies in Latin American 
Literature and Theory [Lewisburg Pa.: Bucknell University Press, 2006], 87).
6 Shannon Winnubst, "Bataille's Queer Pleasures: The Universe as Spider or Spit," in Reading Bataille 
Now, ed. Shannon Winnubst (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007), 79.
our experiences of desire.”7   These “constitutive limits,” in turn, invite Bataille’s 
thinking on transgression as a mode of identity  critique.8   Indeed, Bataille enters the 
argument almost as a kind of synoptic figure, an intellectual link between Foucault 
and Lacan’s quite divergent approaches, insofar as 
they  all recognize, albeit  differently, how this dynamic of desire 
emerges primarily through the logic of prohibition and 
transgression. Whether [as] Lacan’s Law of the Father or Foucault’s 
analysis of ‘the Repressive Hypothesis,’ prohibition functions as the 
mechanism through which subjectivity is cathected.9  
 
Winnubst’s analysis as a result risks collapsing the uniqueness of these different 
figures and their respective projects into an ethereal metadiscourse on lack, limits, and 
transgression.  To buttress the relationship among these different figures, she writes 
simply and surprisingly  “both Foucault and Lacan read Bataille.”10 
 While the conceptual harmonies between these figures cannot be disputed, and 
while the nuance due to these different figures may be beyond the purview of her 
argument, the equation is not so simple. The lack or prohibition that compels desire 
functions differently in Lacan, Foucault, and Bataille in a manner that may not shed 
reciprocal illumination nor serve the goals of queer critique. In his seminar “La 
relation d’object,” for example, Lacan distinguishes among three different kinds of 
lack--“imaginary frustration,” (frustration imaginaire), “privation” (privation), and the 
most important, “symbolic castration” (castration symbolique)--which in turn denote 
three different lacking objects--the “imaginary phallus” (phallus imaginaire), the “real 
breast” (le sien), and finally  the “symbolic phallus” (phallus symbolique). While all 
83
7 Ibid., 80.
8 Ibid.
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lack metonymically hearkens ontological absence--“le désir est la métonymie du 
manque à être” Lacan writes--all function differently vis à vis the Other and the Sign, 
and are not simply reducible to a primary ontological lack, the manque à être. Rather, 
it is how the psyche negotiates this lack among the Real, Imaginary, and Symbolic that 
determines the outcome of desire for self-identity. 
 Foucault’s analysis of the use of pleasures (aphrodesia) in Ancient Greece 
illustrates the intimate relationship that the self-governance of desire and pleasure 
shares with Greek subjectivity. The practice of governing one’s pleasures, which 
Foucault calls a form of savoir-faire or art de vivre, grants the self an ethical form of 
autonomy, which might be understood as independence from the self’s own excessive 
tendencies. Greek sexuality for Foucault is thus a form of ethical and aesthetic 
autonomy, an "esthetique de l’existence, l'art réfléchi d'une liberté perçue comme jeu 
de pouvoir.”11 In this sense, power might be understood as the ludic freedom to “self-
stylize,” a liberating vision of sexuality quite distant from the double-bind of desire 
Winnubst sees in Foucault’s Histoire de la sexualité. To be sure, the Greek philosophy 
of self-governance and self-creation stands in stark contrast  to contemporary queer 
theory’s more constructivist approach to the subject; moreover, such preoccupations 
with autonomy are far removed from Bataille’s celebratory embrace of alterity and 
anomic self-obliteration, wherein one’s sovereignty  from oneself is found. Thus does 
Bataille link sovereignty with a communitarian otherness. “Le sujet quelconque,” 
Bataille writes, “maintenant la valeur souveraine opposée à la subordination de l’objet 
[et] possède cette valeur en partage avec tous les hommes.”12
 To its merit, however, Winnubst’s study persuasively identifies at least two 
analytically distinct modes of queerness in Bataille’s work, which themselves have 
84
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12 Georges Bataille, Œuvres complètes, vol. 8, 285.
become veritable commonplaces in queer criticism. This gesture is successful in 
bringing Bataille into dialogue with queer criticism’s extant concerns, and insofar as 
these two modes commonly relate to anal eroticism and the death drive, one might say 
psychoanalytic criticism as well. The first—polymorphous perversity—is obvious in 
Bataille’s fiction, especially in Histoire de l’oeil, wherein characters frequently and 
fetishistically  transfix their desire onto a sordid amalgam of objects, body  parts, and 
detritus, such that heteronormative desire is overturned.13  “Brimming with arms, 
hands, blood, eyes, heads, urine, dirt, ejaculations, and eggs,” she writes, “these are 
stories of bodies and fluids and very  odd, very queer, pleasures.”14  The very listing of 
these various objects seems to suggest some of the “constitutive limits” mentioned 
above that, though ignored in Winnubst’s analysis, nevertheless reveal the 
performative mutability of desire in Bataille. The second mode of queerness, not 
unrelated to the first, concerns non-productive sexuality--what Foucault called ars 
erotica--a conception of sex devoid of reproductive purpose and motivated purely  by 
pleasure and desire. She rightly finds and positions this mode within Bataille’s notions 
of eroticism, general economy, and prodigal expenditure, which rend “the logic of 
utility  at the heart of sexuality” from the queer desire that subtends and subverts it. 
Winnubst claims that, correctly understood, such queerness “needn’t necessarily be 
understood as properly ‘sexual’ at  all,” but  rather as an unmitigated and inexhaustible 
form of desire. In this way, Winnubst’s account of desire appropriately broaches 
Bataille’s radical conception of eroticism, which comprises not only  sexual 
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13  Feminist critic Judith Still was among the first to make this critical observation concerning 
polymorphous perversity, but comes to different conclusions concerning sexual difference. “In My 
Mother, Pierre is circulated between women in almost a reversal of the hom(m)o-sexual economy--his 
name begins to conjure up pierres précieuses, reminding us of what Bataille wrote about jewels. ‘In the 
unconscious, jewels, like excrement,  are cursed matter that flow from a wound” (Judith Still, "Horror in 
Kristeva and Bataille: Sex and Violence," Paragraph: A Journal of Modern Critical Theory 20, no. 3 
[1997]: 230).
14 Winnubst, "Bataille's Queer Pleasures: The Universe as Spider or Spit," 89.
experience, but  intoxication, love, and religion as well.15 
Beyond bringing Bataille within the realm of queer studies, Winnubst also 
laudably seeks to highlight Bataille’s practical significance for queer politics and 
activism.  She writes that Bataille’s “non-teleological framing of experience would de-
center several of the normative assumptions that seem to be paralyzing l/g/b/t  political 
movements.”  In other words, the mobility  of sexual desire in Bataille illustrates how 
different sexual identities (l/g/b/t) are merely  differing effects of a common, prior 
ontological lack within the subject, one which might serve as a theoretical rally point 
for the factions among gender activists. Bataille could be instructive for these activists, 
insofar as he would remind them of a “common” queer desire prior to any  particular 
object. This gesture, however noble, remains problematic on two grounds.
The first concerns the possibility  of appropriating Bataille for democratic 
political ends--or any “end” for that matter, as Bataille’s tendentious insistence on the 
infinite and inachevé would suggest. As Winnubst herself notes in her reading of La 
part maudite—a text whose entire project is to illustrate how excess both founds and 
confounds all forms of socio-political organization—civilization is based on the 
exclusion of all forms of “non-productive expenditure” such as non-reproductive sex. 
To be sure, Bataille makes it fairly clear in L’érotisme that reproduction lies squarely 
within the restricted economy of “discontinuity,” though its origin and end are the 
“continuum” or general economy of eroticism and death. Whereas “la reproduction me 
en jeu des êtres discontinus,” death “a le sens de la continuité de l'être.”16  Yet 
Winnubst seems to suggest  at the same time that Bataille’s unproductive eroticism is 
nevertheless “productive,” as it were, by  providing an illustration of a common 
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coeurs, [et] enfin l'érotisme sacré,” which respectively comprise the physical, affective, and spiritual 
dimensions of erotic experience (Georges Bataille, L'érotisme, 22).
16 Georges Bataille, L'érotisme (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1957), 18-9.
multisexual, pansexual, or polymorphously perverse desire that typically serves l/g/b/t 
politics through divorcing sexuality  from the regime of reproduction. She appropriates 
Bataille’s conception of desire, for example, as a lesson for political activists fighting 
sodomy laws. “If queer acts of pleasure are to dislodge the totalizing restricted 
economies of desire-prohibition-teleology, it may be through the valorizing of their 
very lack of purpose.”17 Yet this desire that she compellingly highlights would remain 
ultimately  unbound to any  particular political identity  or political end--even those ends 
that would presumably serve queer politics. Evidence for this can be found not only in 
La part maudite, but also in Bataille’s earlier interwar writings, wherein the ultimate 
“end” of political engagement is the obliteration of statehood and subjectivity, ends 
quite divorced from the more democratic program that motivates Winnubst’s 
argument. To appropriate Bataille for democratic ends, however noble, necessarily 
risks decontextualization, misappropriation, or misunderstanding of his critique of 
subjectivity and democracy; in his early political writings, Bataille considers 
democracy to be the other  Janusian face of capitalism, if not fascism as well.18
The second concerns the gesture to neutralize different sexual identities found 
in Bataille as equivalent  effects of desire.  By insisting on the desirous lack that 
ultimately  makes all sexuality pleasurable and unproductive expenditure, she eclipses 
the representation of particular sexed and gendered identities in Bataille, which are 
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18 Susan Suleiman, for example, illustrates why “it did not occur to Bataille or other revolutionaries on 
the revolutionary Left to start defending the bourgeois democracies against the threat of 
fascism” (Susan Rubin Suleiman, "Bataille in the Street: The Search for Virility in the 1930s," 36). As 
she implies, the Marxist allegiances of the interwar French Left of which Bataille was part held 
democracy to be a bourgeois form of government preluding fascism. Hence Bataille’s emphasis on an 
anarchic, “acephalic” society that resists systematic organization and governance and allows for 
ongoing anomie, ecstasy, and exuberance. 
hardly  equal in significance.19  To wit, she provides no specific examples of either 
heteronormative or queer desire in Bataille’s work. While desire may be a monolithic 
idea for Bataille, the sordid effects of desire which, as she rightly claims “needn’t be 
sexual at all,” are difficult  to prove entirely  equivalent in Bataille, especially as these 
effects relate to gender and sex. For example, his narrators, like Pierre in Ma mère or 
Troppmann in Le bleu du ciel, are typically heterosexual male subjects who, in pursuit 
of their desires, experience a disorienting ecstasy that subverts their subjectivity and 
upturns the object of their desire.  Such is the case elsewhere for his male bullfighters, 
revolutionaries, and lovers alike. While it is certainly difficult  to determine which 
came first--the subject or its subversive desire--the primacy of the heterosexual male 
desire in Bataille’s oeuvre is beyond question, and cannot be easily explained as a 
consequence equal to “other” sexualities in Bataille. These other sexualities seem to be 
only aftereffects of a failed masculinity  or its complement--a disruptive femininity--
which reveal themselves in Bataille’s erotic scenarios. It is always the heteronormative 
desire for the woman that  precipitates the downfall of the heterosexual male subject, 
its fusion with the desired female object, and thus, finally, the dialectically discovered 
queerness of desire itself.  
While it  could be persuasively  argued that such queerness is constitutive of 
desire prior to the heterosexual pursuits of Bataille’s protagonists, it nevertheless 
remains true that a heteronormative logic frames the scenario in which such queerness 
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19  Equally questionable, but related,  is her implied distillation of these different identities for queer 
politics; for some time, queer scholars and activists have debated the problems that arise in conflating 
lesbian, gay, trans-sexed, transgendered,  and queer identities for political purposes, since such a gesture 
ironically supports a heteronormative logic of sexual identity by positing as “other” all non-
heteronormative sex and genders and/or eclipses factors of class and race. Winnubst herself gesturally 
notes that “g/l/t/b political movements have suffered from an inability to articulate our political agency 
effectively without recourse to the the essentializing moves of identity politics” (Ibid., 91). Activist 
Jamie Heckert writes in a similar vein that “collective organization in order to reduce feelings of 
isolation and to resist oppression are worthwhile efforts. However, the success of this approach has been 
limited in its own terms; heteronormativity remains dominant throughout many social contexts” (Jaimie 
Heckert,  "Towards Consenting Relations: Anarchism and Sexuality," Infoshop.org, http://infoshop.org/
library/heckert:_Anarchism_and_Sexuality).
is revealed, and this fact  must be considered in any queer reading. Thus while desire (I 
agree) should be understood as a queer category in Bataille, such queerness is 
frequently figured as a “limited” or “failed” heterosexuality--a conception at once 
subversive and potentially  problematic for l/g/b/t politics. One the one hand, eroticism 
deconstructs the binarism between men and women, masculinity  and femininity and 
opens upon a queer space of mutable gender and sexual identity. On the other hand, 
such queerness reveals itself only secondarily as “taboo” limit of heteronormativity, its 
“other.”  As I will later show, in Bataille’s fiction narrative is primarily focalized 
through straight  male narrator, and it  is the disruptive effects of his desire specifically 
for women that yield a queering of identity. Pierre in Ma mère, Troppmann in Bleu du 
ciel, or Charles in L’Abbé C, for example, commonly  report what we might call the 
“queer” effects of desire (polymorphous perversity, abjection, desubjectivisation, etc.) 
always in response certain feminine presence: Mother, Dirty, and Eponine 
respectively. Alternate genders and sexualities--including those of women--are thus 
primarily  figured as the “negative” of straight male desire, even though the straight 
male becomes himself finally “negated” in death or ecstasy by this desire. The 
provisional delimitation of heterosexual-masculine desire in Bataille functions as a 
tentative point of orientation for the subsequent disruptive effects of femininity and, 
ultimately, queerness. In short, while the former delimits and prohibits, the latter 
transgresses.
As a result, Bataille’s oeuvre only evokes queerness--what Bataille might call a 
form of sexual transgression--in a manner that  not only  compromises, but indeed 
recreates heteronormative sexual limits upon which it depends. If (as Bataille states in 
L’érotisme) the transgression both exceeds (dépasse) and completes (complète) the 
prohibition--i.e., both defies and reifies it--it would seem that queerness, as a 
transgressive realm of gender and sex, likewise and simultaneously  exceeds and 
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completes heteronormative prohibitions.20  Evidence for this claim can be found in 
Bataille’s account of the infamous Gilles de Rais, for example, whose homosexuality 
Bataille tethers to his legendary violence, intoxication, and sexual excesses.21  Desire 
in Bataille does queer sexed and gendered identity, but in contrast to Winnubst 
argument, it is unclear if this queering is possible other than through a failed, albeit 
privileged, heteronormative (masculine) desire. If this is the case, queer desire goes 
unrealized independently of heteronormative law which, to paraphrase Bataille, it both 
completes and exceeds. This conclusion starkly  challenges Winnubst characterization 
that “to be queer is not  to respond to the law of desire: it is to have no idea who or 
what you are, or where you’re going.”22  To the contrary, queerness is a form of 
transgression in Bataille, and as such, it can never be entirely divorced from the 
(heteronormative) laws of desire. Yet I think this is not as tragic as Winnubst’s account 
implies; rather, the interaction of transgressive desire and the law enables, however 
provisionally, a variety of genders and sexualities formed as much by a 
heteronormative law as by  its violation--a phenomenon quintessentially illustrated in 
the form of sacrifice. It is in this way that a politics and ethics of queerness can be 
elaborated in Bataille.
Zeynep Direk’s article from the same volume, “Erotic Experience and Sexual 
Difference in Bataille,” mobilizes an argument in this vein. Inspired by Luce Irigaray’s 
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20 Bataille, L’Erotisme, 71.
21 Bataille writes “En fait, dans la formation de Gilles de Rais, les seules éléments qui liassent des traces 
sont, d’une part la violence guerrière, entrainant...le courage extreme et une rage de bête fauve; enfin 
une pratique de la boisson dont nous avons vu qu’elle pouvait traditionnellement se lier aux excès 
sexuels, par exemple à l’homosexualité” (———, Œuvres complètes,  ed. Michel Foucault, vol.  10
[Paris: Gallimard, 1970], 303).
22 Winnubst, "Bataille's Queer Pleasures: The Universe as Spider or Spit," 91.
efforts to elaborate an ethics of sexual difference,23  Direk foregrounds the 
communitarian dimension of sexual difference in Bataille’s oeuvre. Drawing 
specifically upon Bataille’s notions of “communication” and “profound subjectivity” 
in La part maudite--which commonly  reveal “being” itself, or the inner-limits of 
subjective existence--presents a porous subject that remains open, or “communicates,” 
to difference in gender and sexuality, making him thus “a thinker of the possibility of 
sexed communication beyond sexual identities.”24  To wit, Direk explains that erotic 
experience in Bataille presents access to this profound subjectivity, and thus gendered/
sexed difference in its turn. “Bataille speaks of the erotic truth in communication,” 
writes Direk, “which I take to be nothing else than a dangerous openness to the 
profound subjectivity  of our sexed being.”25  Such openness is “dangerous” for 
imperiling the subject, but it also enables a hospitality toward sexual difference. 
Whereas Winnubst sees in such openness the complete dissolution of all sexual 
subjectivity in a common desirous lack, however, Direk emphasizes the playful queer 
differences between male and female identity in Bataille, especially in the concept of 
communication.  He remains sensitive to Bataille’s heteronormative tendencies and 
quasi-misogynistic representation of women, without dismissing them tout court as a 
facile sexism. Regarding sexual difference in Bataille, Direk writes:
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23 See Luce Irigaray, Ethique de la différence sexuelle, Collection "Critique" (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 
1984). Another fruitful comparison of Bataille and Irigaray’s ethico-feminist thought can be found in 
Amy Hollywood, "Divine Woman/Divine Women': The Return of the Sacred in Bataille, Lacan, and 
Irigaray," in The Question of Christian Philosophy Today, ed. Francis J Ambrosio (New  York: Fordham 
University Press, 1999).
24  Zeynep Direk, "Erotic Experience and Sexual Difference in Bataille," in Reading Bataille Now, ed. 
Shannon Winnubst (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007), 105.
25 Ibid., 109.
A close reading of his literary works may prove that he was not  critical 
enough of his own sexist prejudices...Is not the subject of [erotic] 
experience always masculine and virile?...Was not the feminine “a dark 
continent” for him? In the erotic experiences Bataille narrates, the 
virility  of the “I” is put in question as much as the femininity of the 
femininity of the specular other. Neither virility nor femininity  can be 
objects of knowledge, for they are contingent, miraculous differences 
impossible to know or to predict  in the immanent experience of 
communication. Although Bataille does not explicitly contest the 
heterosexual divide, he is constantly obsessed with creating and sharing 
queer pleasures.26
In other words, sexed differences are aleatory effects of communication, the 
“miraculous” byproducts of the queering communication occasions.  Thus while 
sexed, if not  sexist differences proliferate in Bataille’s work, such differences arise 
from a shared experience of an “unknown” sexual self-identity--what Bataille might 
call a non-savoir--that, for Direk, provides the basis of a communitarian ethics. The 
ethical bond to others is revealed in self-estrangement to one’s own sexual 
subjectivity, what one might more simply call “queer communication.” Thus “in a 
Bataillian discourse, this queerness appears as our own lost strangeness, a longing in 
our very being,” Direk summarizes, yet “this is not to deny that queerness is 
constantly created,” but rather that the “creation and return to the self belong to one 
and the same immanent movement of differences,” providing “a space for the respect 
for differential manifestation.”27   In this way, Bataille’s accounts of virility and 
femininity should be understood as aleatory analytic differences, not binary  ones--a 
controversial claim considering Bataille’s frequent heteronormative contrasts. In the 
section of L’érotisme entitled “Les femmes, objets privilégiés du plaisir,” for example, 
Bataille writes that women “se proposent comme des objets au désir agressif des 
hommes.”28 
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28 Georges Bataille, L'érotisme, 145.
With “queer communication,” Direk’s argument already anticipates a 
performative conception of sexual identity in Bataille. Ethical openness toward the 
“creative,” “immanent,” and “miraculous” manifestations of mobile (self-)difference 
unmask the multiple identities that underly le moi of erotic experience.  While these 
conclusions are largely  persuasive, however, Direk’s details are largely lacking. For 
example, it  remains quite unclear exactly how the “immanent movement of 
differences” takes place in Bataille’s writings, or precisely where and how virility  and 
femininity (for example) are commonly  “put into question.” In other words, how 
precisely are sexual identities created--or “un-created”--by Bataille? What gives rise to 
Direk’s obscure “differential manifestations,” and how, if at all, might one illustrate 
them? Might it not it be possible, for example, to concretely identify different forms of 
masculinity in Bataille, or indeed different forms of femininity, without implying the 
stability  or exhaustion of such possibilities? Moreover, if all sexual identity in Bataille 
is tethered to the same dynamic space of (self-)differentiation--the same “unity 
through difference,” so to speak--how are we to make sense of Bataille’s categoric 
emphasis on feminine identity which, for better or worse, serves as the exemplary 
figure for radical alterity itself, sexed or otherwise? Also, finally, if indeed Bataille’s 
queer communitarianism depends on transgressing the limits of (sexed) subjectivity as 
Direk convincingly claims, what are the juridico-political consequences of such 
transgression, insofar as it (to paraphrase Bataille) “transcends and completes” 
heteronormative interdictions?  In brief, is it ever possible in Bataille to think of a 
queer, communitarian ethics without a certain heteronormative regime, a politics of 
sexual difference?
Subjectivity and Sacrifice. Responses to many of the questions above, as I 
have suggested above, can be found in clearly distinguishing between the means and 
ends of Bataille’s challenges to subjectivity and the degree to which heteronormative 
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identities represent differing degrees of subjectivity. While critical consensus in queer 
scholarship  on Bataille persuasively defends the undoing of sexed and gendered 
identity  in liminal categories like community, communication, sovereignty, eroticism, 
etc., these represent only half the story, only one of the consequences of Bataillian 
critique, those “excessive” ends exposed in transgressing the limits of subjectivity. 
Absent from such accounts however are the means through which such transgression 
is possible and able to be repeated: the law of heteronormativity. In terms of gender, 
sexed, and sexual identity, heteronormativity  limits the type of lovers we see in 
Bataille’s work: men seek women and women seduce men; men are the virile subjects 
of erotic experiences and women the objects of erotic desire. And while Bataille’s 
conceptions of “virility” and “objectivity” themselves commonly pose challenges to 
subjectivity, subjectivity itself, indeed heteronormative subjectivity, nevertheless 
remains definitive and unmistakable in both his thought and fiction.29  However 
provisionally, however weakly it stands, heteronormativity  perdures as the sine qua 
non condition of queerness in Bataille.  It is just as important, therefore, to understand 
the role(s) of heteronormativity in Bataille as it is to understand queerness, for 
queerness frequently, if not always, depends on a certain heteronormative convention. 
To the degree that this “rule” in Bataille studies has been the province of feminist 
scholarship, it therefore is important to consider such scholarship en route to any queer 
approach. In anticipation of a queer critique, feminist critic Judith Still has written, 
“Bataille’s texts do not effect a denial of sexual difference, rather they set difference 
94
29 “La vie est l’unité virile des elements qui la composent,” writes Bataille in “L’apprenti sorcier,” and 
“life” (vie) refers to “l’existence simple et forte, que la servilité fonctionnelle n’a pas encore 
détruite” (Georges Bataille and Denis Hollier, Le Collège de sociologie : 1937-1939 [Paris: Gallimard, 
1979], 314). In striking parallel, concerning the feminine object of desire, Bataille writes “l’objet du 
désire est l’univers ou la totalité de l'être” (Georges Bataille, Œuvres complètes, ed. Michel Foucault, 
vol. 8 [Paris: Gallimard,  1970],  97).  Both virility and femininity reveal a similar ontological plenitude 
that undoes limited states subjectivity and objectivity both.
afloat.”30
It is likewise true, however, that such heternormative law reciprocally betrays 
the transgressive underpinnings that  transcend and complete it. Heternormativity in 
Bataille therefore does not describe a single, unified state of sexual subjectivity, but 
reveals the queerness inherent to the subjective state of heternormativity itself. In this 
way, the accounts above reveal much about the queer role of desire for Bataille’s 
sexual subject. In L'expérience intérieure, for example, Bataille at once traces and 
erases the limits of gendered difference with statements like the following:
Je puis saisir moi en larmes, dans l’angoisse (je puis même à perte de 
vue prolonger mon vertige et ne plus me trouver que dans le désir d’un 
autre--d’une femme--unique, irremplaçable, mourante, en chaque chose 
semblable à moi).31
Bataille’s grasps his identity  (saisir moi) in mortal experiences like anguish 
(angoisse), blindness (perte de vue), and vertigo (vertige); yet such self-discovery  (me 
trouver) through self-loss--i.e., self-sacrifice--is ultimately only possible (ne...que) 
through the desire of another, i.e., the desire of a woman (le desir d’un autre--d’une 
femme).  At once Bataille posits a difference between (male) selfhood and female 
otherness while claiming that selfhood itself imbricates Self and Other, man and 
woman. Otherwise stated, Bataille paradoxically asserts “I am other than who I am,” 
or more germanely “I am sexed other than my sex,” simultaneously challenging and 
reproducing heteronormative difference in the self-realization of a queer difference 
within. Redoubling the queer ambiguity of Self and Other in this declaration of self-
discovery  is the phrase “désir d’un autre,” which may mean equally Bataille’s desire 
of another--i.e., desire of women--or another’s desire for him, a woman’s desire. In 
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30  Judith Still, "Horror in Kristeva and Bataille: Sex and Violence," Paragraph: A Journal of Modern 
Critical Theory 20, no. 3 (1997): 230.
31 Bataille, L'expérience intérieure, 85.
this way, just as Bataille’s declaration here therefore challenges or queers the 
boundaries of (male) subjectivity, so does it  make possible by implication a desirous 
female subject, another, or an Other, who herself desires “him.”  Thus in the same 
movement does Bataille subvert and reify  heteronormative identity, betraying varying 
possible degrees of masculinity and femininity within any  sexual subject.  Hans 
Bellmer, illustrator for the folio editions of Bataille’s early fiction, underscores the 
undoing of gender boundaries in images like these (Figure 3.1).
Given this example, it would seem that there is ultimately  no meaningful 
difference between heteronormativity and queerness in Bataille. The heteronormative 
becomes queer, the queer heteronormative. Yet close comparison of the representation 
of men and women, virility  and femininity in Bataille do reveal a difference between 
them, and this difference, in a word, concerns “difference” itself. While Bataille’s men 
and women both desire the other sex, and such desire ultimately undoes male and 
female identity  both, the desire of each provisionally differs in Bataille. This 
provisional difference not only inheres in differing object choices of desire, whether 
men or women, but also, and more importantly, in the degree to which his men and 
women desire. And to the extent that (as Winnubst shows) such desire indicates a 
subjective, inner-lack, a different degree of desire indicates a commensurately 
different degree of lack--a lack that cedes to (as Direk explains) an “openness” to 
others and otherness. The degree to which a subject desires others is also therefore the 
degree to which it is lacking itself, or indeed giving itself away, if not sacrificing itself 
to others. “L’objet qui provoque le mouvement d’Eros,” writes Bataille, “se donne 
pour autre qu’il n’est.”32 The degree of lack or desire, therefore, would seem inversely 
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32 Georges Bataille, Madame Edwarda. Le mort. Histoire de l'oeil (Paris: J.J. Pauvert, 1973), 18.
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Figure 2.1. Hans Bellmer, Untitled (Illustration for the 
folio edition of Histoire de l’oeil), 1946. “Ivres et 
relâchés, Simone et moi nous étions échappés l’un à 
l’autre, aussitôt élancés à travers la pelouse comme des 
chiens” (Bataille, Georges. Madame Edwarda. Le mort. 
Histoire de l'oeil, 113).
related to the degree of subjectivity. By extension, the desirer’s degree of subjectivity 
is inversely related to his/her degree of sacrifice. Subjectivity  and sacrifice are thus 
complementary  ways of measuring the same “queer” condition of personal identity in 
Bataille: self-differentiation. As the following analysis shows, Bataille’s account of 
self-sacrifice provides the model by  which such self-differentiation should be 
understood.  This model can account for the apparent antinomy between queerness 
and heteronormativity in Bataille’s literature and thought. 
Sacrifice, or Self-Differentiation. While the first chapter offers a more 
thorough evaluation of Bataille’s theory of sacrifice (and the debates surrounding it), 
the following argument merits a brief recapitulation of its main claims as well as 
reexamination of its implications for gendered identity. Appropriating Marcel Mauss’ 
famed study  of sacrifice Essai sur la nature et fonction of sacrifice, Bataille 
understands the ultimate goal of all sacrifice to be pure expropriation of life and 
subjectivity combined with the transgressive violation of their social safeguards, 
including reproduction, law, and work. Bataille draws primarily from Mauss’ analysis 
of the sacrifice of the god, in which he claims that “la notion du sacrifice arrive à sa 
plus haute expression.”33  The sacrifice of the god is to be distinguished from other 
forms of sacrifice not only because the god is the guarantor of human life, but because 
the god’s sacrifice reveals sacrifice itself to be the very essence of all life, even the 
god’s own. “Non seulement c’est dans le sacrifice que quelque dieux prennent 
naissance,” Mauss writes, “mais encore c’est par le sacrifice que tous entretiennent 
leur existence. Il a donc fini par apparaitre comme leur essence, leur origine, leur 
créateur.”34  Sacrifice reveals life to be an essence common to man and the divine. 
Sacrifice to the god is also therefore a sacrifice of the god; the life given is the very 
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Minuit, 1968), 283.
34 Ibid., 299. Emphasis mine.
same life that is taken. “En somme, on offrait le dieu à lui-meme...la notion du 
sacrifice au dieu s’est développé parallèlement à celle du sacrifice du dieu.”35  Thus 
Mauss’ insistence on the identification of the executioner and victim in sacrifice; thus 
“la mort de Dieu est souvent un suicide.”36  Sacrifice is the sacrifice of life to the same 
life, of life for the same life, revealing all sacrifice to be, in the end, inherently self-
sacrificial. 
Given that sacrifice is paradoxically the conditio sine qua non of life and 
survival in the account above, sacrifice both precedes and exceeds God as the 
guarantor of all both life human and divine, which comes at the cost of life’s own 
deadly donation. Thus for Bataille does the proverbial death of God, with all its 
Nietzschean implications, come to overturn the dualisms between life and death, God 
and man, and--perhaps most significantly--selfhood and otherness. Citing Mauss in his 
essay “La mutilation sacrificielle et l’oreille coupée de Vincent Van Gogh,” for 
example, Bataille explains that sacrifice “rompre l'homogénéité habituelle de la 
personne” and thus allows access to the “heterogeneous,” divine alterity  that 
personhood habitually  hides. In essence, personal identity itself is sacrificed such that 
the original identity  of selfhood and otherness, mortality and divinity  are revealed in 
the same manner as Mauss’ executioner and victim, who commonly “go beyond 
themselves” (hors de soi). “Le sacrifiant est libre--libre de se laisser aller lui-même à 
un tel dégorgement, libre, s’identifiant continuellement à la victime...c’est à dire libre 
de se jeter tout à coup  hors de soi comme un galle ou un aïssaouah.”37  Like the god’s 
sacrifice of himself to himself, so does the identity  of execution and victim arise and 
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37  Georges Bataille, Œuvres complètes,  vol. 1, 269-70. A “galle” in this context refers to a priest of 
Cybele and Attis; the Aissawa (aïssaouah) is a Sufi brotherhood founded in Morocco circa 1500.
dissolve--arise through dissolution--in the ecstatic liberation of sacrifice. At once one 
and many, singular and multiple, sacrifice “ununifies” all possible lives in death. Thus 
in his essay “Sacrifices,” Bataille evokes the coincidence of divinity, mortality, life, 
death, identity, and alterity achieved through sacrifice, their common condition: 
Lorsque l’homme-dieu apparait et meurt à la fois comme pourriture et 
comme rédemption de la personne suprême, révélant que la vie ne 
répondra à l’avidité qu’à la condition d'être vécue sur le mode du moi 
qui meurt, il élude cependant l'impératif pur de ce moi: il le soumet à 
l'impératif appliqué (moral) de Dieu, et, par la, donne le moi comme 
existence pour autrui, pour Dieu...38
As the passage suggests, sacrifice overturns the customary  conditions under which 
self-identity (moi) is traditionally understood. Far from an amalgam of attributes that 
presumably comprise an essence, sacrifice reveals the prior dependence of “living 
identity” on the negativity of death and divine alterity; sacrifice both ruins (pourriture) 
and redeems (rédemption) the identity of the “man-god” (l’homme-dieu), who is 
manifested and dies at the same time (à la fois). The life of this being, its “lived-
being” (être vécue) is conditioned upon its death, which is the more fundamental 
“mode” of selfhood (le mode du moi qui meurt) than the one that follows imperative of 
being a living self “pure and simple” (l'impératif pur de ce moi), a self that would 
deny or avoid death. Instead, through death, sacrifice makes a gift of selfhood (donne 
le moi) to a communal otherness, indeed a divine otherness (existence pour autrui, 
pour Dieu).
This is, of course, the “groundless ground” so to speak, upon which Bataille 
ethics of community and communication are based.39  This form of ethics is not 
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39 See Chapter One for further details on Bataille’s conception of community and its reception in French 
thought, especially in the work of Jean Luc Nancy.
“known,” but rather “unknown” as an affective form of what he calls “non-
knowledge” (non-savoir), acquired through the experience of a communal self-loss in 
sacrifice. True recognition of others rests not in the head but in the heart, in the 
primordial ground of anguish and death not thought, but  felt. Of communication, “il ne 
suffit pas de reconnaitre, cela ne met encore en jeu que l’esprit,” writes Bataille; “il 
faut aussi que la reconnaissance ait  lieu dans le coeur...ce n’est plus la philosophie, 
mais le sacrifice (la communication).”40  Such a form of sacrifice conjoins not only 
executioner and victim as per Mauss’ claim, but all identities, insofar as they 
commonly experience the death common to all and particular to no one, making it a 
“sacrifice où tout est victime.”41 
Not only therefore is all sacrifice ultimately  a form of self-sacrifice--indeed the 
sacrifice of selfhood itself--but the progress of self-sacrifice seems to follow a 
dialectical structure wherein two become simultaneously one and none: victim, 
executioner, life, death, self, other. Yet, as I have already suggested in the first chapter, 
this structure evokes a negative dialectics wherein the “reconciliation” of one and 
none is retained in an indeterminate, “plural unity.” This dialectics is very roughly 
schematized in his renown 1955 essay “Hegel, mort, et le sacrifice.” This essay, his 
effort to “recommence et défait la phénoménologie de Hegel,” offers an analysis of 
sacrifice in ways atypical for Bataille, insofar as it is interrogated expressly within a 
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dialectical framework.42  While sacrificial death for Bataille ultimately represents the 
subversive unworking of all dialectical thought, such unworking is not accomplished 
itself without another kind of “work” that  Jean-Luc Nancy has appropriately called 
désœuvrement. This “work of unworking,” as it were, describes Bataille’s mode of 
praxis with no product, one that (suggesting Hegel) “consummates in nothing” (la 
consummation en RIEN).43   Yet Nancy’s famed analysis demands some qualification: 
the “active negation” of this so-called unworking also evinces an infinite series of 
potential works or potential products that the normative, singular synthesis 
(Aufhebung) of dialectical thought eliminates. The process of unworking 
“unproduces,” so to speak, a multiplicity of provisional results. This “work of 
potential,” elided in dialectics, itself assumes a dialectical form, albeit an unproductive 
one. As already seen in the essay “Sacrifices,” sacrifice for Bataille evinces a kind of 
synthesis that is never “one” and always “potentially” other: it effects the union of the 
executioner and victim, man and God, self and other; the man-god both appears and 
dies (apparait, meurt), is both ruined and redeemed (pourriture, rédemption). On the 
one hand, sacrifice realizes human transcendence, apotheosis, and communal 
existence (pour autrui, pour Dieu); on the other, it achieves this precisely through “un-
realization” in death. Whereas Hegelian dialectics produces a unified synthesis over 
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Asger Sorensen, "The Inner Experience of Living Matter: Bataille and Dialectics," Philosophy and 
Social Criticism 33,  no. 5 (2007).   James Creech offers a compelling analysis of this indeterminacy in 
his essay “Julia Kristeva’s Bataille,” wherein he argues that Kristeva reads Bataille as a Hegelian, in a 
manner similar to Sorensen (James Creech, "Julia Kristeva's Bataille: Reading as Triumph," Diacritics: 
A Review of Contemporary Criticism 5, no. 1 [1975]).
43 As already discussed in the first chapter, désœuvrement for Nancy (as for Blanchot) is the paradigm of 
Bataille’s community, a “community with nothing in common” (rien en commun).  “La communauté a 
nécessairement lieu dans ce que Blanchot a nommé le désœuvrement” he explains; “En deca ou au-delà 
de l’oeuvre, cela qui se retire de l’oeuvre, cela qui n’a plus à faire ni avec la production ni avec 
l'achèvement, mais qui rencontre l’interruption, la fragmentation, le suspens” (Jean-Luc Nancy, La 
communauté desouvrée [Paris: C. Bourgois, 1986], 79).
and against the negativity  of death, Bataille’s dialectics preserves such negativity 
within dialectical synthesis itself. 
In “Hegel, mort, et sacrifice,” Bataille explains that sacrifice accedes to the 
“truth of humanity” (in the Hegelian sense of Wahrheit) by foregrounding death, that 
which both begins and animates the dialectic itself.  “Du sacrifice,” Bataille writes, “je 
puis dire essentiellement, sur le plan de la philosophie de Hegel, qu’en un sens, 
l’Homme a révélé et fondé la vérité humaine en sacrifiant.”44  The difference between 
Hegel and Bataille--which is also, I would argue, the difference between Hegelian 
dialectics and Bataille’s negative dialectics--is this: whereas Hegel’s Aufhebung is 
teleological, singular, and unified, Bataille’s is radically infinite, multiple, and 
bivalent. Bataille critiques Hegel’s rational effort to conciliate identity with otherness, 
the living subject with death, by highlighting the insistence of dialectical negativity, 
i.e., “the work of potential.” In a phrase, the work of potential might more simply be 
called the performativity  of sacrifice, as I have argued in the first  chapter. “En vérité” 
writes Bataille, “le problème de Hegel est donné dans l’action du sacrifice. Dans le 
sacrifice, la mort, d’une part, frappe essentiellement l'être corporel; et c’est, d’autre 
part, dans le sacrifice, qu’exactement, ‘la mort vit une vie humaine’.”45   “Death living 
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Emphasis mine. It is worthy to note that, to the extent that Bataille’s work exhibits a what I call a 
negative dialectics, it should not be entirely conflated with Adorno’s famous model in Negative 
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says) “under the aspect of identity.” The body represents for both an unthinkable limit that cannot be 
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understanding and importance of religion differs radically for these figures.  Also different, albeit less 
evident, are their evaluations of suffering. Whereas Adorno seeks to alleviate suffering by showing how 
“identity-thinking” either causes or ignores suffering, even causes it without knowing it (especially in 
the case of the Holocaust), Bataille often valorizes suffering as a “virile” or quasi-mythic struggle to 
achieve the sacred, inner-experience, etc. Their respective accounts of the Holocaust are instructive for 
highlighting their differences on the problem of suffering more generally. For more on this issue, see 
Paul Hegarty,  "Bataille, Agamben, and the Holocaust," Other Voices: A Journal of Critical Thought 2, 
no. 2 (2002); Theodor W. Adorno and Rolf Tiedemann, Can One Live after Auschwitz? : A 
Philosophical Reader, Cultural Memory in the Present (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 
2003); and, of course, Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics (New York: Continuum, 1983). 
a human life”--an expression borrowed from Kojève--constitutes humanity at the 
threshold between life and death, indeed the very threshold exposed in and by sacrifice 
itself. In sacrifice, human life dies--but this is hardly  different from the “lived death” 
of mortal existence. The simultaneous potential to live or die--indeed live through 
death or die through life--is the precarious “human” synthesis that a man must 
recognize to achieve true human self-consciousness.  A man’s “propre négativité le 
tuera,” writes Bataile, “mais pour lui, désormais, rien ne sera plus: sa mort  est 
créatrice, mais si la conscience de la mort...ne le touche pas avant qu’il meure, il en 
sera pour lui...comme si la mort  ne devait pas l’atteindre, et cette mort à venir ne 
pourra lui donner un caractère humain.”46   In a sacrificial death, the destruction of 
man is also the (re-)creation (créatrice) of humanity, (re-)transforming the identity of a 
single man into the mortal (w)hole that, “unconsciously,” he already was.
The human is thus (un)synthesized as a a disunity or dichotomy, lying in, at, or 
on the threshold between potential law and lawlessness, ruination and redemption, 
death and resurrection.47  Recognition of this threshold--a threshold reached 
quintessentially in sacrifice--is the endless result  of the human dialectic of self-
consciousness. Bataille’s negative dialectics therefore ends with realization of the 
endless potential for life or death that  is humanity. Sacrifice is this realization par 
excellence. As such, humanity is forever divided and infinitely  multiple; it is the life 
that dies, the death that lives. For humanity, therefore, life is not the opposite of death 
but rather an performance of human existence as a potential death or a potential life, 
indeed as potential lives: victim and executioner, God and man. In this way, humanity 
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47  Emblematic of this paradox is Bataille’s distinction between the “self-who-lives” (moi-qui-vit) and 
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comme un vide et soi-même comme un défi à cette vide” (———, L'expérience intérieure, 85-6).   As 
such, Bataille’s “self” occupies both sides of a sacrificial divide in a manner analogous to women, 
revealing a common queer space of self-identity.
is a role-play masking the chimerical potential of “life-death” realized at the threshold 
of sacrifice, the “divided-unity” transiently recognized and synthesized in the human. 
This analysis sheds light on the significance of aesthetic representation in the 
essay. Bataille himself insists on the significance of subterfuge and spectacle in the 
human recognition of death. To recognize death in life requires representation 
analogous to drama, especially  in the form of tragedy. Realization of death, he writes, 
“annonce la nécessité du spectacle, ou généralement de la représentation...Il s’agit, du 
moins dans la tragédie, de nous identifier à quelque personnage qui meurt, et de croire 
mourir alors que nous sommes en vie.”48  In terms of sacrifice, Bataille’s allusion is 
suggestive. In a manner analogous to Bataille’s executioner and scapegoat, the 
Aristotelian identification with the tragic hero--who’s sacrifice purifies the polis---
induces a parallel purgation in the spectator in the form of catharsis. As Aristotle tells 
us, however, catharsis is not unique to the spectator since it is shared by the tragic hero 
himself, and the hero’s catharsis couples itself with anagnorisis or “recognition” of the 
truth, or the hero’s awareness of himself. When Oedipus learns of his incest and 
patricide, the Oedipus he “truly” is, he loses his father, his wife, his sight, and his rule. 
Through his tragic loss, he learns his true fate and becomes truly self-conscious; 
indeed loss is his self-consciousness, the sacrificial means through which he becomes 
himself through a certain self-loss. For Bataille, Oedipus reflects the state of humanity 
itself, which must similarly “lose itself” to achieve the self-consciousness of mortal 
being. Tragic drama thus represents the drama of self-consciousness, so to speak, the 
theatrical discovery of human identity  acquired specifically  through self-sacrificial 
loss. In Bataille’s tragic theatre of sacrifice, therefore, human actor and audience, like 
the executioner and victim, recognize a shared human truth at the moment of 
sacrificial loss, namely that to identify oneself as “human” means to wear the mask of 
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tragedy.  For Bataille, human identity represents a form of tragic performance 
“staged,” as it were, on the altar of self-sacrifice.
This performance of human identity conceived as sacrificial loss would 
presumably subvert all subdivisions of human identity, including those that pertain to 
gender and sex. As seen in his essay on Hegel, humanity, life, and death are 
represented as neutered universals belonging indifferently to both men and women. 
Yet, as we see above, “humanity” as such is hardly  universal at all; as a product of 
self-sacrifice, it already implies a multiplicity  of tragic masks worn in the play of 
personal identity.  As particular forms of personal identity, gendered and sexed identity 
are likewise  multiple, one might also say  queered, at the threshold of self-sacrifice. 
The threshold of sacrifice, the bivalent divide it creates between life and death, is kin 
to the the threshold at which genders are also created and undone repeatedly. In this 
way, one might imagine a spectrum of differing males and females, masculinities and 
femininities, that the law of heteronormativity both constrains and enables. Given that 
heteronormativity and queerness commonly exist  in Bataille, they  should be 
understood as representing opposing sides of the subject’s (self-)sacrificial self-
differentiation: whereas queerness would characterize the side of sacrificial negativity, 
death, tragedy, and transgression, heternormativity characterizes the side of sexual 
subjectivity, life, and the law. Sacrificial self-differentiation is sexual self-
differentiation; the bivalence of sacrifice at the limit between life and death, law and 
lawlessness, embodies the bivalence of personal identity  itself. The degree to which a 
subject is queered is the degree to which it is sacrificed; the degree to which it  opposes 
self-sacrifice, conversely, is the degree to which it  is a subject  that abides 
(heteronormative) law. 
Different Differences. These different  degrees enable us to explain the 
apparent antinomy of heteronormativity  and queerness in Bataille’s work. It is indeed 
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possible to defend his heternormative, sexist tendencies and their subversion. In 
Bataille, I would argue that men and women provisionally differ in their degrees of 
self-sacrifice, and thus also in their respective degrees of subjectivity, along a 
continuous spectrum of genders, sexes, and sexualities. Insofar as men and women 
provisionally differ in these respective degrees, they likewise provisionally  differ in 
their degree of queerness. These differences, as I show below, also provisionally 
structure the heteronormativity between men and women. If self-sacrifice itself 
describes an erotic, religious, and ethical mode of self-differentiation as described 
above, heteronormative difference should be understood as provisionally different 
degrees of sacrificial self-differentiation.  In other words, sexed and gendered 
differences are provisional differences in degrees--not kinds--of subjectivity and self-
sacrifice. Whereas Bataille’s men and masculinity  provisionally err on the defensive 
side of subjectivity, experience, and thought, women provisionally tend toward self-
sacrifice unto the divine limit of complete otherness, abjection, openness, and absence. 
As Bataille famously writes in Madame Edwarda, “Dieu, néanmoins, est une fille 
publique, en tout pareille aux autres...Dieu n’est rien s’il n’est pas dépassement de 
Dieu dans tous les sens;...à la fin dans le sens de rien.”49  God, others, eroticism and 
nothingness are provisionally  feminine things, whereas the subjective experience of 
these a re charac ter i s t ica l ly  mascul ine . Counterpoised aga ins t the 
“ravishing” (ravissante) Edwarda (L. rapere, “to seize,” “to take away”), for example, 
the narrator reflects upon her absence: “je tremblais, devinant devant moi ce que le 
monde a de plus désert.”50
Besides explaining the prevalence of heteronormativity in Bataille, these 
differing degrees of self-difference explain the controversial exemplarity of women as 
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well. The gender divide seems intimately related to a divide provisionally particular to 
women before or beyond men and their desires. In Bataille, women always traverse 
the sacrificial threshold between life and death with a facility foreign to men, making 
them figuratively  (dis-)embody the bivalence characteristic of sacrifice itself. In a 
short essay, Phillipe Sollers notes that Bataille’s women signify 
the compromise that humanity establishes between prohibition and 
transgression, a compromise which, through marriage, is transpierced by 
the possibility of erotic violence; not  only  does she assume the role of 
(pure) mother and (impure) animal, of respect and the violation of 
respect (of “sexual frenzy” and childcare), but she lends her consistency 
to a structure of exclusion within which a resistant milieu--a stage 
(scene)--may be constituted in terms of its potential reversal.51 
The “compromise” between prohibition and transgression, pure and impure, violation 
and respect Sollers describes recalls the dialectics of sacrifice described above. In 
short, women are the compromise, the threshold between taboo and transgression, 
identity  and alterity, life and death. In this way, women (provisionally, I would add) 
exhibit a greater degree of self-difference and self-sacrifice than men or masculine 
identity, so to speak, and thus a lesser degree of subjectivity; yet once this is 
recognized or experienced by  men, they too cross the same sacrificial divide 
provisionally proper to women such that, in the end, self-sacrificial difference queers 
all gender difference. This result is especially apparent in Bataille’s erotic fiction. If 
queering is the effect of sacrifice on gender however, and women seem linked more 
intimately  to sacrifice, it would seem in consequence that women and feminine 
identity  are provisionally “queerer” than men and masculine identity--even though 
such queerness ultimately obscures the heteronormative difference that gives rise to 
femininity (and masculinity) itself. In other words, women exemplify  sacrifice insofar 
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as they are the primary provisional gender that “ungenders” itself, that queers itself, 
and becomes the gender it “is not.”  Becoming so compels the desire of men--i.e., the 
desire that  compels an analogous inner-lack and openness--setting them along the path 
of self-sacrifice, which queers them in turn. With both genders commonly  lost  in erotic 
self-sacrifice, they “unwork” (in Nancy’s parlance) all heteronormative difference, 
yielding to a queer, shared sacrificial self-differentiation. 
It is remarkable to note how often Bataille’s construction of sexual difference 
advances a notion that itself deconstructs the sexual difference upon which it is based. 
In his famous essay “L’apprenti sorcier,” for example, Bataille promotes the quality of 
“virility” (L. vir, “man”) in the pursuits of myth, art, eroticism, and secret  societies, 
since all express a form of amor fati that heroically  embraces mortality. To be sure, 
Bataille takes his cue from other intellectuals of the period such as André Malraux, 
who in novels like Le Temps du mépris (1935) and L’espoir (1937) extols a “fraternité 
virile” in which individualism is challenged through communal rebellious action, 
including self-sacrificial death. For Bataille, the virile challenge to individualism takes 
place in transcending the material conditions of life that hide the presence of love, 
myth, and human destiny, those more mortal things that give life meaning. In 
“L’apprenti sorcier,” Bataille writes:
L’homme à qui la destinée humaine fait peur, et qui ne peut pas supporter 
l’enchainement de l'avidité, des crimes et des misères, ne peut pas non 
plus être viril...ceux qui dominent alors l’existence sont presque toujours 
ceux qui savent le mieux se mentir à eux-mêmes...la virilité décline, dans 
ces conditions, autant que l’amour de la destinée humaine.52
In addition, he writes:
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La virilité n’est rien de moins que l’expression de ce principe: quand un 
homme n’a plus la force de répondre à l’image de la nudité désirable, il 
reconnait la perte de son intégrité virile. Et de même que la virilité se lie 
à toute image qui suscite de l’espoir et de l'effroi.53
In short, virility is wed to those avid (l’avidité) experiences of fear (peur) and hope 
(espoir), crime and misery  (des crimes et des misères), that compel a man (homme) to 
transcend individualism through destiny. As for Malraux, Bataille conceives virility  to 
be a fearless confrontation against oppressive forces (ceux qui dominent), one that not 
only righteously rebels against such oppression but exposes a greater human “truth.” 
This truth, as Bataille later explains, is nothing other than death itself, the ultimate 
mortal human condition: “La destinée d’un homme ne devient pas réelle à la seule 
condition qu’il combatte. Il faut encore que cette destinée se confonde avec celle des 
forces dans les rangs desquelles il affronte la mort.”54   As such, virility describes 
nothing other than a man’s heroic self-sacrifice in the battle against individualism, a 
sacrifice wherein “tout est victime.”
Yet this man, presumably  emblematic of a universal humanity, is nevertheless 
later quite intimately  wed to heterosexual masculinity, shifting the universal meaning 
of man (homme) to manliness. The most prominent illustration of this shift is found in 
sections IX-XII of the essay, in which he talks about the relationship between the lover 
and beloved. The male lover confronts the beloved woman in a manner analogous to 
death and destiny. “La femme vers laquelle un homme est porté comme à la destinée 
humaine incarnée pour lui n’appartienne plus à l’espace dont l’argent dispose. Sa 
douceur échappe au monde réel où elle passe sans se laisser enfermer plus qu’un 
rêve.”55 If the man “faces” destiny, the woman “incarnates” it, yet  not in a manner that 
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would enclose her within the living “real world” the lover tries to heroically 
overcome. Instead she represents a dreamy portal to destiny, a gateway between the 
real and transcendent, thingness and nothingness, life and death, much like the one 
sought in sacrifice. Staring at the woman is not enough for the man to capture his 
destiny and achieve true virility, however; this remains only “une emotion 
aesthetique” without the “volonté de la posséder et  de rendre vrai ce que son 
apparition avait semble signifier.” It is only when the feminine figure of fate is 
“conquise, ou perdue” that the “l’image fugitive du destin,” becomes realized, and 
“cesse d'être une figure aléatoire pour devenir la réalité arrêtant le sort.”56  The 
fulfillment of the man’s virility lies in conquering or losing the woman, whereby  she 
becomes the reality of human destiny--i.e., his own destiny.
As Bataille explains later, this erotic pursuit is analogous to transgressing the 
limit that demarcates the profane from the sacred, making it  tantamount to a form of 
self-sacrifice: “dans le domaine ou il s’avance, n’est pas moins nécessaire a ses 
étranges démarches qu’il ne l’est aux transports de l'érotisme (le monde total du 
mythe, monde de l'être, est  séparé...par les limites mêmes qui séparent le sacré du 
profane).”57  On the one hand, therefore, virility is a condition seemingly particular to 
the masculine subject and his (heterosexual) desire; he is the one who loves, fights, 
dies, and self-sacrificially  embraces destiny through eroticism. On the other hand, 
however, virility goes unrealized without capturing the feminine, which exemplarily 
provides a gateway to this destiny. While it represents the “human” fulfillment of the 
heterosexual male subject  (through its divestiture in sacrifice), virility  is possible only 
on the condition of a femininity to be “conquered” (conquise) or “lost” (perdue).  Yet 
these alternatives are themselves significant, insofar as they describe the same 
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sacrificial result of “realizing the unrealization,” so to speak, of the masculine subject, 
identity, and self-consciousness. A man does not accomplish his virile destiny without 
the presence of a woman, yet  this presence must be both appropriated (conquered) and 
expropriated (lost) by the man himself. In other words, the presence of virility is 
conditioned on feminine absence. In both conquest and loss, appropriation or 
expropriation, the feminine confronts the masculine only in absentia, in its turn 
absenting the masculine subject in its virile quest for destiny and death. 
Therefore, if woman is understood as an absence in Bataille, so is therefore, 
ultimately  a virile man. “La virilité,” Bataille writes, “n’est rien de moins que 
l’expression de ce principe: quand un homme n’a plus la force de répondre à l’image 
de la nudité désirable, il reconnait la perte de son intégrité virile. Et de même que la 
virilité se lie à l’attrait d’un corps nu.”58   The man’s virile attraction to the woman’s 
nude body (attrait d’un corps nu), his desire to “appropriate” her, so to speak, 
ultimately  leads also to the expropriation of this constitutive virility  in self-loss (la 
perte de son intégrité). Several questions thus arise: does this obligatory  expropriation/
appropriation of the feminine subsume femininity  under a virile manhood, or does it 
rather feminize this virility in some way, such that human destiny  would go unrealized 
without the woman, without femininity? Is not this “unmanliness” tainted with 
femininity? As the above demonstrates, the man’s self-sacrifice for virility  is also, in 
some way, the self-sacrifice of virility  itself.  Being a man necessarily  implies also not 
being a man, the loss of manhood, a type of “loss” always akin to feminine absence. 
The virile man seeks out femininity  as the fulfillment of his destiny, and yet such a 
destiny seems queer, neither--and yet both--masculine and feminine.
An analogous moment occurs in La part maudite, where Bataille advances his 
epistemological notion of non-savoir, to which he elsewhere tethers the notion of 
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sacrifice: “le sacrifice est la folie, la renonciation à tout savoir.”59  Non-savoir, in brief, 
concerns the knowledge of nothingness, negativity, sacrifice, and ecstasy, which is to 
be distinguished from a more determinative or “positive” knowledge, indeed what 
Hegel might have called “Absolute Knowing” (das absolute Wissen) in the 
Phenomenology of Spirit.  Hegel’s epistemology sheds light on Bataille’s more 
indeterminate non-savoir, insofar as Hegel too links knowledge to self-sacrifice. 
Comparison of their respective epistemologies might  further illustrate the difference 
between the dialectical models above described. In the final section of the 
Phenomenology, where Hegel delineates how Spirit becomes self-aware, he writes that 
the “self-knowing Spirit knows not only itself but also the negative of itself, or its 
limit: to know one’s limit is to know how to sacrifice oneself. This sacrifice 
(Aufopferung) is the externalization in which Spirit displays the process of its 
becoming Spirit.”60  In other words, Spirit becomes self-aware through a “self-
sacrificial” externalization--i.e., a self-differentiation--that permits it to recognize itself 
qua Other which, once recognized, reconciles Spirit for-itself and in-itself into self-
conscious Absolute Spirit, Spirit that knows itself “absolutely.”  Thus is Absolute 
Knowledge positive, productive, determinative; it identifies the Absolute to itself, 
realizing thus, in its turn, Absolute Spirit. 
In this way, non-savoir for Bataille represents the very inversion of Hegelian 
epistemology, especially in the form of self-sacrifice and the sacred. “Dieu est un effet 
du non-savoir. Mais toujours est-il que, comme effet du non-savoir, il est connaissable, 
comme le rire, comme le sacré.”61  Such inversion is implied in an obliquely  Hegelian 
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statement written in L'expérience intérieure: “quand l’extreme du savoir est là (et 
l’extreme du savoir que je viens d’entendre est l’au-delà du savoir absolu), il en est de 
même que dans le savoir absolu, tout se renverse.”62   Non-knowledge rests outside 
(au-dela) the limits of the knowledge; yet if Absolute Knowledge, as Hegel seems to 
suggest, represents the sure knowledge of knowledge itself, the self-identity  of 
knowledge, it would seem likewise that non-savoir, as the extremity (l’extreme du 
savoir) and inversion (se renverse) of absolute knowledge (savoir absolu) is, in a 
phrase, the absolution of absolute knowledge, in the strong sense of the Latin 
absolvere (“to set free,” “to make separate”). The inner-separation of knowledge from 
itself, which might be liked to the sacrificial self-differentiation described above, 
represents the rending not only of knowledge, but also the dialectical self-
identification upon which it depends. If knowledge implies self-identity, therefore, 
non-savoir implies self-differentiation. Non-savoir represents not, therefore, 
“ignorance” or the opposite of knowledge, but rather the very self-differentiation upon 
which knowledge itself depends.
In his essay “Les consequences du non-savoir,” Bataille elaborates this 
epistemology  along gendered lines. Women in particular occasion an epistemic break 
that treads along the path of non-savoir. 
Si l’on est en face d’une femme, tant  qu’on la connaît, on la connaît 
mal, c’est à dire qu’on en a une “connaissance qui touche au savoir.” 
Dans la mesure où l’on cherche à connaître psychologiquement une 
femme sans se laisser emporter par la passion, on s’éloigne d’elle. C’est 
seulement lorsqu’on cherche à la connaître par rapport à la mort qu’on 
se rapproche d’elle.63
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To know a woman, in other words, is not to know her and ultimately to “know” 
nothingness itself; non-savoir is the only “knowledge” possible of a woman, and this 
knowledge implies self-sacrificial (se laisser emporter) eroticism and death (passion, 
la mort). By  extension, Bataille implies that savoir is ordinarily, by contrast, the 
province of men. Simply stated, savoir is man and non-savoir is woman. However, 
non-savoir, as explained above, is not binaristically opposed to knowledge or 
knowing, however, bur rather, it  suggests the impasse of knowledge, the knowledge of 
not knowing, the acknowledgement of the unacknowledgable. Just as the self-identity 
of knowledge upset in its rapprochement with non-knowledge, so too here masculine 
identity  in its relation to the feminine, which remains somehow “unidentifiable.” Thus 
the feminine does not oppose knowledge or the knowing masculine subject in Bataille; 
nor does it oppose this opposition, however, since such an opposition would rationally 
constitute two distinct dialectical categories—and thus together an absolute, positive 
form of knowledge. As such, the heteronormative categories of “masculine” and 
“feminine” constitute a rational distinction, and therefore another form of savoir.  Non-
savoir, however, denies such distinctions while denying such denials, insofar as it 
“résulte de toute proposition lorsqu’on cherche à aller au fond de son contenu, et 
qu’on est gêné.”64  The “end” (fond) of knowing onself as a man is no different  than 
that of knowing a woman, since both ends are the at the singular end of knowledge 
itself. For this reason, non-savoir, though provisionally feminine, ultimately reveals 
itself to be queer—(n)either masculine (n)or feminine—subverting the provisional 
heterosexism of Bataille’s epistemology.
Sexual Fictions. Literary  analogs to the theoretical models above can be found 
throughout Bataille’s oeuvre. The feminine as pure desire and lack provides the 
transgressive portal to eroticism, death, and the sacred that the solitary  man, “lacking 
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the lack” of woman, conquers and loses. Bataille’s feminine characters (and 
characterization of the feminine) initially  offer privileged access to this otherworldly 
space where subjectivity is lost and the sacred is found in self-sacrifice. The figures of 
presence and absence as a result mark gendered difference in Bataille; whereas men 
are present, women are frequently  absent, if not absence itself figured in the form of 
death. Male characters approach the feminine as they approach death, a death that 
seems to fulfill their prior “human” fate while apparently feminizing their male 
character. In Madame Edwarda, for example, a nameless and impotent male narrator 
enters a brothel in Paris in search of a fille publique and finds the mysterious Edwarda, 
whom he approaches with (sacred) ambivalent feelings of fear and wonder, as she is 
God (Je suis Dieu). These sentiments are no less equivocal than Edwarda herself, who, 
he explains, constantly disappears and is yet always “sensibly absent” (sensiblement 
absent). Though he desirously follows her through the night, he cannot broach her 
without sensing his own absence and self-loss, which he morbidly describes as a 
“shattering” (se briser), “sickness” (être malade) and “decomposition” (décomposer). 
Edwarda is essentially constituted, or de-constituted, as the night itself; she becomes a 
vortex, an absence, a black hole, one the male narrator cannot fill. Epitomizing the 
distinction between masculine presence and feminine absence in Bataille’s story is the 
scene at La Porte Saint-Denis, shown in this illustration by Hans Bellmer (Figure 2.2). 
This arch, located in the former red-light district of North Paris, embodies a threshold 
analogous to that Edwarda herself who crosses the realms of life and death. Recalling 
the quote from Sollers above, Hans Bellmer’s illustration captures this with the figure 
of the transgressive foot, placed both on the La Porte Saint-Denis archway and at the 
summit of Edwarda’s inverted, tortuous body.
On the far side of the archway, the narrator explains, is the “obscurity of 
death” (l'obscurité de mort), absence (absence), and even emptiness itself (le vide 
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Figure 2.2. Hans Bellmer, Untitled (Illustration for the folio 
edition of Madame Edwarda), 1946. “Elle avait disparu, 
mais je n’y  pouvais croire. Je demeurais accablé devant la 
porte et j’entrais dans le désespoir immobile, le domino se 
perdait dans l’ombre.”
même).  With a seductive back-step, Edwarda traverses threshold, disappearing into 
what the narrator calls “the nothingness of the arch” (le néant de cette arche). 
Though he follows her in frenzy, eager to embrace the agony (agonie) and suffering 
(je désirais souffrir) into the emptiness (jusqu’au vide), he never entirely  traverses the 
arch: “je demeurais accablé devant la porte” he says, suggesting he is both 
“overwhelmed” and “condemned” (accablé).  While he hesitates before the absence 
that would consume him and render him lost, Edwarda crosses the arch and “loses 
herself” (se perdre), only to be found later by  the narrator on an empty terrace.  As if 
woken from sleep (comme si je l'éveillais), she turns to the narrator and asks him 
“where am I?” (Où suis-je?).  Whereas the narrator finds Edwarda, Edwarda herself is 
absent, lost in the night.65 As this example illustrates, the difference between male and 
female characters in Bataille is less one of kind than of degree; Edwarda can “go 
further” than the narrator. She goes there where the narrator cannot; she is lost where 
he is found. Analogously, while the narrator continually describes the presentiment of 
absence, death, and loss, Edwarda actually achieves this absence; indeed, she is this 
absence. 
Yet the distinction between masculine presence and feminine absence becomes 
less clear in moments of erotic encounter.  The abjection, absence, and ecstasy 
Edwarda embodies infects the male narrator, who cannot desire or possess her without 
a commensurate experience of self-loss. When Edwarda first commands the narrator 
to kiss her, for example, he hesitates out of embarrassment but then proceeds, 
provoking an uncanny feeling of absence and vacuity: 
Je tremblais: je la regardais, immobile, elle me souriait si doucement 
que je tremblais. Enfin, je m’agenouilla, je titubai, et je posai mes 
lèvres sur la plaie vive. Sa cuisse nue caressa mon oreille: il me sembla 
entendre un bruit de houle, on entend le même bruit en appliquant 
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l’oreille à de grandes coquilles. Dans l'absurdité du bordel et dans la 
confusion qui m’entourait (il me semble avoir étouffé, j’étais rouge, je 
suais), je restai suspendu étrangement, comme si Edwarda et  moi nous 
étions perdus dans une nuit de vent devant la mer.66
As the narrative suggests, it becomes progressively  ambiguous who is solid and who is 
hollow, who is present and who is absent. While the narrator trembles, Edwarda 
remains static, imperious. When he kneels before her, however, to kiss her “living 
wound” (plaie vive), he senses her emptiness as if hearing the sea inside of a conch 
shell. Yet this emptiness does not solely belong to Edwarda; the narrator too poses his 
“lips” (lèvres) to her “wound”--i.e., her “lips”--and the sound of her thigh fills his ear. 
With his mouth to her wound, her shell to his ear, it would seem that orifice meets 
orifice, emptiness meets emptiness, creating a greater “queer absence” between them 
both that, in the confusion of the bordello, becomes an even more vacuous “windy 
night before the sea” (une nuit de vent devant la mer) in which they are both lost  (nous 
étions perdus).  Edwarda’s inner-absence is ultimately indistinguishable from the 
narrator’s own suspension (suspendu), suffocation (étouffé), and self-loss in the 
bordello, as the figure of the abyssal sea is metonymically common to both (houle, 
coquille, mer). As a result, the narrator experiences Edwarda’s femininity 
“extimately,” Lacan might say--both from without and from within--encroaching upon 
the inner and outer-limits of his (masculine) identity.67  
In his “Prostitution” chapter in L’érotisme, Bataille offers one of his more 
controversial and well-known (hetero)sexist claims. He asserts that prostitution is the 
logical result of what he calls the “l’attitude feminine”: “Il n’y  a en chaque femme une 
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prostituée en puissance, mais la prostitution est le conséquence de l’attitude 
féminine.”68  In other words, while women typically withhold, men typically pursue, 
and the classic amorous project for men therefore becomes the discovery of the 
conditions under which the woman will surrender herself to the man. Yet, for Bataille, 
by restraining eroticism to a restricted commercial exchange, modern prostitution 
represents a degraded form of what was formerly a religious matter in the practice of 
hierogamy. This latter form constitutes “true” or “sacred prostitution” for Bataille 
because its purpose is religious rather than economic.  Religious prostitution disrupts 
the profane world of commodity exchange and instead approximates sacrifice as a 
divine self-giving: “Dans la prostitution, il y avait consécration de la prostituée à la 
transgression.  En elle l’aspect sacré, l’aspect interdit de l’activité sexuelle ne cessait 
pas d’apparaître: sa vie entière était vouée a la violation de l’interdit.”69  Given the dis-
identificatory, self-differential practice of sacrifice elaborated above, there is an 
implicit challenge made to the heterosexist logic that undergirds his account of 
prostitution here, however. First, if indeed the prostitute is an “object of desire” for the 
male suitor, she is no mere object since the object of desire is “l’univers ou la totalité 
de l’être” and, as such, indivisible into distinct (gendered) parts.70  Moreover, the 
sacrifice and transgression implied in prostitution for Bataille broaches an annihilation 
in which the identity  of the woman—if not gendered identity itself—is lost in erotic 
self-surrender.  Though Bataille emphasizes the sacrificial quality of the feminine, 
sacrifice is ultimately  not uniquely feminine in this example; the man, too, gives 
himself up, if not in property, at least in the very erotic act itself, as we vividly  see in 
Madame Edwarda. In religious prostitution, therefore, both man and woman engage in 
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a self-sacrifice that compromises their identities as man and woman, although the 
woman prostitute heralds this compromise before the man’s approach. She 
provisionally embodies a degree of self-lack that the man lacks himself. The self-
sacrificial eroticism of prostitution, by ultimately  dissolving the limits of gendered 
identity  and difference, transport masculine and feminine identity together into a queer 
realm of indeterminate genders and sexualities.71
Bataille’s novel Ma mère is unique insofar as it structures subsequently  queers 
gendered identity  along Oedipal lines. The father is absent, and the specific audience 
of the narrative is obscure; Pierre addresses the reader as he does himself, making the 
addressee, indeed even the difference between him and the addressee, largely 
indeterminate. This narrative feature parallels the obscure fusion that continually 
occurs between Pierre and the other characters during those of “supreme 
voluptuousness” as he calls them: prayer, sex, and death. Against, or even because of 
his mother’s admonitions, however, Pierre slowly comes to sample erotic indulgences 
which, ironically enough, his mother later forces upon him. In time, she comes to 
personify this indulgence itself, with all its accompanying transgressions and taboos. 
“Je connaissais maintenant ces voluptés: et malgré elle n’avait eu de cesse avant de 
m’avoir fait de quelque façon partager ce dont un commun dégoût l’exaltait jusqu’au 
délire. Elle était à l’instant devant moi—semblable à moi—dans l’étreinte de 
l’angoisse.”72  Noticeably, Pierre and his mother never embrace each other in Oedipal 
desire, but remain rather in the common embrace of disgust, anguish, and delirium that 
interrupts the Oedipal relation.  Their “sameness” or identification (semblable à moi) 
arises not from a familial identification, nor from a mutual identification of any  kind, 
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but from a common (self-sacrificial) loss of self in voluptuousness. This loss 
consequently obscures not only the difference between son and mother, Self and 
Other, but man and woman as well.
As a result, Pierre tells us he can fulfill the desire for his mother 
“indiscriminately in the arms of any other.” Explaining why he never physically 
approaches his mother, Pierre writes : 
Le désir qui souvent me congestionna devant ma mère, indifféremment 
je pouvais le satisfaire dans les bras d’une autre.  Ma mère et moi nous 
mettions facilement dans l’état de la femme ou de l’homme qui désire 
et nous ragions dans cet état, mais je ne désirais pas ma mère, elle ne 
me désirait pas. Elle était comme je sais qu’elle était dans les bois, je 
lui tenais les mains et je savais qu’elle était devant moi comme une 
ménade, qu’elle était folle, au sens propre du mot, et  je partageais son 
délire.  Si nous avions traduit ce tremblement de notre démence dans la 
misère d’un accouplement, nos yeux auraient cessé leur jeu cruel: 
j’aurais cessé de voir ma mère désirant  de me regarder, ma mère aurait 
cessé de me voir délirer de la regarder. Pour les lentilles d’un possible 
gourmand, nous aurions perdu la pureté de notre impossible.73
Insofar as any other will suffice, because any other will suffice, Pierre can presumably 
choose indiscriminately  between lovers--even indiscriminately between men and 
women--because his desire itself overturns such a gendered “state”: “nous mettions 
facilement dans l’état de la femme ou de l’homme qui désire et nous ragions dans cet 
état.” It is not so much that Pierre can or should desire others like he desires his 
mother; rather, it is that  the state of desire itself, despite its object, which describes a 
deadly self-differentiating delirium. Desire as such becomes a self-sacrificial 
queerness, that which is “impossible” to attain in another, any  other, since others are 
all equally inadequate, and therefore inversely  equally adequate vis à vis this inner-
otherness. According to Pierre, a physical advance towards his mother constitutes a 
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degradation of the desire she represents and that he bears within. Ultimately, Pierre 
desires not a man, nor a woman, nor even his mother, but desire itself, which is 
dramatically captured in the frozen exchange of gazes. Given the pun on lentille 
(“lens,” “lentil”), their exchange of gazes “consume” each other, redoubling the spatial 
ambiguities between them. Should his desire be satisfied by union with his mother, the 
purity  of their “impossible” desire (pureté de notre impossible) would have been 
compromised. Maintaining such desire instead maintains the mythic sylvan flight 
(bois, ménade) toward delirium in which gender differences are “consummated”; this 
consummation in turn relates to the woods, Pierre’s place of birth, linking their shared 
deadly delirium to life renewed.
 The queer effects of desire arise again in “Sainte,” a short story part of the 
collection Divinus Deus of which Ma mère and Madame Edwarda are part. The 
unnamed protagonist recounts an orgy with the suggestively  named Theresa and 
Sainte. When the church bell strikes nine, he looks at Sainte and says
cette sonnerie lente qui avait en moi, dans mon corps épuisé qu’une 
sueur froide baigner, une résonance pénible mais lointaine, me fit 
l’effet d’un accord intime avec cette femme si étrangère, si indument 
nue sur le lit, et que peut être je n’avais pas encore embrassée. Je ne 
sais quoi d’affreux nous séparait qui, plus profondément, nous unissait, 
nouait en nous ce lien de l’excessive souffrance, que de nouvelles 
souffrances feront plus étroit. A ce moment, je pressentis l’horreur du 
désir que déjà nos corps avaient l’un de l’autre, que peut être jamais 
nous n’aurions le pouvoir d’assouvir, et que dans cet espoir de 
l’assouvir, nous ne ferions que rendre plus impatient.74
The narrator’s curious “communion” with Sainte lies in the suffering and horror of a 
shared heteronormative desire. Again, it is a feminine presence that precipitates the 
male narrator’s reflection and deadly  desire, yet  such desire is not solely his own (as 
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Winnubst’s argument above already suggests). Powerless to satisfy such desire, both 
Sainte and the narrator, as commonly desiring subjects, realize the personal limits of 
their shared desire through suffering; going beyond these limits is “impossible,” as he 
later tells us, as such would mean complete self-expropriation in death: “‘assouvir,’ 
‘impossible’ étaient les mot qui balbutiait  en moi.”75  Yet it is at these limits that 
reciprocally animates their desire and transforms it into impatience, giving them 
renewed life as desire.  At the limits of desire, the shared experience of death is also 
the shared experience of life, a sharing that at once unites (unissait) and separates 
(separait) them. This double-movement of desire simultaneously erases and retraces 
the boundaries of subjectivity, causing at once the undoing and division of subjects. 
Thus does the heteronormative subject, in its turn, die and get reborn, get queered and 
proliferate, illustrating a forever unfinished dialectic of sexual difference.
Dialectic of Sexual Difference. As can be seen in the examples above, sexual 
difference in Bataille frequently follows an unresolved dialectical structure analogous 
to sacrifice. In literary  form, this structure frequently  occurs as topos with three 
narrative stages. The first stage of this topos establishes provisional heteronormative 
oppositions. Femininity incarnates eroticism and death, a sacred object of desire, while 
the male subject--frequently the narrator--occupies the profane space of law and life. 
Like the sacred for Durkheim, Bataille’s women are “essentially heterogeneous” at 
this stage, and this heterogeneity establishes a more generally gendered 
heteronormativity. The woman signifies not  masculinity’s binary opposite, but rather 
abject non-identity or dis-identification, a kind of “present-absence” that differs 
analytically from masculinity and subjectivity. He is; she is not. She is pandemically 
everywhere, everyone and yet nowhere, nothing; as a result, the male character 
experiences the chimerical fear and fascination characteristic of sacred ambivalence, 
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while the woman figures the sacred itself.  “On sait que les Anciens identifient,” writes 
Bataille in L’Histoire de l’érotisme, “la possession d’une femme au sacrifice. Je ne 
puis manquer à ce propos d’insister sur le fait que la femme est plus que l’homme le 
centre de l'érotisme.  Elle est seule a pouvoir s’y consacrer.”76
In the second stage, the (male) subject confronts the feminine--like God--with 
ambivalent feelings of fear and wonder, perceiving it  to be a seductive albeit perilous 
threat. Bataille’s male narrators, such as Pierre in Ma mère or Troppman in Le blue du 
ciel, for example, frequently announce their anxieties of death and delirium coupled 
with exultations of delight and desire. At this point, the heteronormative model of the 
first stage becomes compromised. The abject woman becomes an object of desire, and 
the male subject realizes that his identity becomes a false guise for a his own inner-
otherness or self-differentiation, which surfaces through contact with the woman he 
desires. This is the property of the object of desire itself, which Bataille writes “est par 
essence un autre désir. Le désir des sens est le désir, sinon de se détruire, de bruler du 
moins et de se perdre sans réserve.”77  Through contact, the woman thus transforms 
from a heterogeneous, abject Other into what Jacques Lacan called the “extimate 
object” (objet extime), the Other that also lies within the bounds of identity, being both 
exterior and intimate. Erotic contact with the feminine thus not only transcends 
masculinity into femininity, subject into abject, but it also manifests an immanent 
alterity--an “inner-woman” as it  were--that is akin to death itself. Such is the ecstatic 
kinship between femininity, death, eroticism, which broaches self-sacrifice and 
otherness by both encroaching within and hollowing out the limits of masculine 
subjectivity.78  The narrator of Madame Edwarda provides illustration of this 
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paradoxically immanent interiority and exteriority:
Mon angoisse s’opposait au plaisir que j’aurais du vouloir: le plaisir 
douloureux d’Edwarda me donna un sentiment épuisant de miracle. Ma 
détresse et ma fièvre me semblaient peu mais c'était là ce que j’avais, les 
seules grandeurs en moi qui répondissent à l’extase de celle que, dans le 
fond d’un froid silence, j’appelais “mon coeur.”79
The narrator’s own inner anguish (angoisse), distress (détresse), and fever (fièvre), 
reinforced by the use of personal and possessive pronouns (me, ma, mon), are 
indistinguishable from the ecstatic self-expropriation of Edwarda herself (l’extase de 
celle), whom he suggestively calls his “heart” (mon coeur). Her “outside” is also his 
“inside,” tracing both the inside and outside of the narrator’s dissolving subjectivity. 
Femininity  and woman occupy  the space of the narrator’s own self-differentiation, 
making them the figure for self-sacrifice par excellence. The link between the 
immanence and transcendence of the feminine already  betrays the undoing of the 
limits that trace male subjectivity, thus queering the provisional gendered difference 
between them.
The third and final stage achieves the queer (1) fusion and (2) profusion of 
sexed identities, overturning the dualisms described in the first  stage and imperiled in 
the second. This stage is that of intoxication, ecstasy, or death, wherein narrative voice 
is lost either in (a) ellipsis/empty space or, its complement, (b) the proliferation of 
parenthesis and possible voices, a formal feature accentuated by the chimerical genres 
combined in Bataille’s texts. The fusion and profusion of identities parallels 
respectively the erasure and multiplication of narrative voices (1-a, 2-b).  The 
illustration of (a) and (b) can readily  be seen in L’impossible and Madame Edwarda 
(Figures 2.3, 2.4).  These, in turn, can be understood as opposing sides of the 
dialectical threshold between life and death of self-sacrifice, or indeed mimetic and
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Figure 2.3. This facsimile from L’impossible illustrates the series of disjointed 
sentences, colons, parenthetical comments, double-slashes, ellipses, exclamations, and 
quotations characterizing (a) and (b). The narrative here continues a previous one that 
is apparently  absent, lost in the ellipsis between them.  The narrator and narratee are 
uncertain, as are the relationships among the narrator, character A., and character B. 
mentioned in the second paragraph. 
Figure 2.4. This is a facsimile from the concluding page of Madame Edwarda. The 
lower left illustrates a concluding parenthetical metacommentary with a recursive 
series of statements, including a footnote that  appears at the bottom of the following 
pages (lower right). This recursive structure emulates a vortex at whose 
“bottom” (the footnote) is God, ecstacy, and death.
non-mimetic negativity, rendered in the form of literature and language (and their 
“self-sacrificial” limits in silence).
The concluding pages of Madame Edwarda exemplarily illustrate the narrative 
movement between 1-a and 2-b. The “human,” which arises in “L’apprenti sorcier” 
reappears at the conclusion of Madame Edwarda implies the fusion of different 
(sexed) identities (1-a) under a universal category that  soon reveals itself to be hardly 
universal at all, or at least “universally  different.” Much like Bataille in “L’apprenti 
sorcier,” the male narrator presents an analogous pursuit of the “human” attained at  the 
cost of death, which in its turn suggests a potential multiplicity  of narrators through a 
recursive framing structure that ambiguates the identity of narrative voice. While 
author Pierre Angelique (Bataille) writes the introductory essay, an unnamed narrator--
from whom Angelique distances himself--tells the fragmented story  itself, which 
concludes with the intervention of parenthetical metacommentary  indiscernibly 
belonging to either Angelique or the male narrator, or even perhaps a potential “third” 
unknown voice. This parenthetical aside is itself peppered with a series of 
parenthetical statements and a single footnote--itself containing a parenthesis--that 
reprises the theme of humanity. This recursive, vertiginous narrative structure “ends” 
with ecstasy and God, which have a curious relationship to humanity:
J’ai dit: “Dieu, s’il ‘savait’, serait un porc.” Celui qui (je suppose qu’il 
serait, au moment, mal lavé, ‘décoiffé’) saisirait l’idée jusqu’au bout, 
mais qu’aurait-il d’humain? au-delà, et de tout...plus loin, et plus 
loin...LUI-MEME, en extase au-dessus d’un vide...Et maintenant? JE 
TREMBLE.80
This enigmatic note recalls the narrator’s earlier comment concerning his painful 
desire: “J’acceptais, je désirais de souffrir, d’aller plus loin, d’aller, dussé-je etre 
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abattu, jusqu’au ‘vide’ même.”81 Such agonizingly transgressive movements into 
(self-)absence, animated by desire for Edwarda, in turn echo Anglique’s essay, 
wherein he writes “nous devrions faire enfin table rase et revenir au temps de 
l’animalité...comme si l’humanité entière ne résultait pas de grands et  violent 
mouvements d’horreur suivie d’attrait.”82  These “grand and violent  movements” 
Angelique describes are precisely those of the narrator as, who in his incessant 
desirous advances (plus loin) toward Edwarda--i.e., God, the supreme absence--cause 
him horror precisely due to a growing sense of self-absence akin to self-sacrifice, 
exemplified in the form of ellipsis. Yet  this absence, in the form of ecstacy (ecstase) 
and emptiness (vide), also represents a certain “human” fulfillment, the realization of 
the human; that which captures (saisir) the human quality  (avoir d’humain) of God is 
His--or rather Her--inherently ecstatic, transgressive nature (au-delà, plus loin) that 
embraces absence. Noticeably, Angelique and the narrator’s self-differentiating 
narrative voices commonly imply  the trace of a self-sacrificial femininity figured in 
the form of “Madame Edwarda,” understood as both the character and the text itself. 
Conceived as a series of recursive predicates, to be “human” is to be [not human 
[insofar as it is God [who is woman [who “is not”]]]]. Equally, a “man,” like the 
narrator or Angelgique, is a man insofar as he is [not a man [insofar as he is God [who 
is woman [who “is not”]]]].  Such recursive predicates structurally  parallel the 
dialectical self-differentiation of self-sacrifice earlier described. 
 Conclusion. In Bataille, women and femininity are often exemplars of self-
sacrificial violence, eroticism, and death; they appear to be essentially  self-
differentiating. This character in turn structures a heteronormative, albeit provisional, 
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sexual difference from men who, as narrators, illustrate a more stable subjectivity  and 
a lesser degree of self-differentiation. It also structures Bataille’s apparently 
heteronormative “law” of desire. Yet the man’s heteronormative desire for women 
hews the path toward his self-sacrifice, first figured as sacred ambivalence but finally 
so in the form of radical self-differentiation, recounted in silence and the proliferation 
of narrative voices.  Such self-differentiation reveals itself to be the same formerly 
specific to the feminine, first revealing the “extimacy” of femininity within masculine 
identity, but finally the prior sacrificial self-differentiation of all subjects, whether 
male or female, masculine or feminine. Predicated upon such self-differentiation, a 
plethora of possible sexed and sexual identities become possible in a common, 
transgressive space that  both transcends--and completes--the law of heteronormativity. 
This queer space, which challenges such law, therefore also supports this law when 
figured as exemplarily feminine.
Such is the double-bind of Bataille’s women. As femininity is provisionally 
“nothing,” i.e., that which it is not, there where it is not, it can not and does not 
provide an exclusive or totalizable category  under which identity  can be securely 
assumed. The feminine is also somehow not feminine or, perhaps more accurately, the 
feminine “is not.” It remains essentially self-differentiating, non-identitical, which 
should not be confused with a lack of identity or the unidentified: whereas the latter 
implies the unfortunate absence of identity, the former provocatively and repeatedly 
challenges identity itself. As such, it is impossible to ultimately  oppose the feminine to 
men or the masculine--or indeed to anything else--since that to which it would be 
opposed is always already included by its inherent non-identicality.  By  extension, to 
say that “the feminine is not,” also means also to say that  “the feminine is,” since, by 
differing from itself, it is always also that  which it not, including men.  One might 
even say that, for Bataille, the feminine in some sense is always the masculine, or that 
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the male is always also female, since both are equally  possible in Bataille’s queer, self-
differentiating space of self-sacrifice.  
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CHAPTER III
Laure’s War: Life, Sovereignty, and the Sacred in Colette Peignot
Le sacré...c’est ce pour quoi j’aurais donné ma vie.
-Colette “Laure” Peignot
 Introduction. Despite the publication of her writings some 35 years ago, 
woman author and political activist Colette Peignot (1903-1938)—also known as 
Laure, “la sainte de l’abîme”1—remains an obscure figure of the French avant-garde. 
The reasons for this are many; among them was her early  death from tuberculosis at 
35 and her relatively scant number of publications. Indeed, the greater part of her work 
might never have seen the light of day  had it not been for her more visible friends, 
many of whom were among the most prominent French intellectuals of the inter-war 
period. In addition to Michel Leiris and Georges Bataille, who (illegally) prepared her 
writings for posthumous publication, she was friend to philosopher-activist  Simone 
Weil and intimate with Boris Souvarine of Le Cercle communiste democratique.  Like 
them, she was politically engaged in the tumultuous interwar years, rejecting 
republicanism, Catholicism, fascism, and Stalinist Russia. In response to the growing 
fascist threat in the early 30s, she befriended Trotskyists and anti-Stalinists for 
political cause and inspiration and shared their political engagements. Her fervent 
dedication to the worker’s cause motivated her learn Russian, visit the U.S.S.R., join 
Souvarine’s anti-Stalinist group, and write for many  preeminent leftist  journals, 
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1  “The saint of the abyss,” an appellation from Michel Leiris given in La Regle du jeu. This epithet 
derives from Gerard de Nerval’s poem “Artemis,” in which the Greek goddess is presented as a femme 
fatale. Milo Sweedler offers an excellent textual analysis of the name “Laure,” which Peignot gave to 
herself in the final years of her life. More than a pseudonym, he claims that it is a playful, polysemic 
text given meaning by her two closest interlocutors,  Bataille and Leiris. Whereas “Laure” offered yet 
another “erotic female figure” comparable to sacred elements like gold (Laure, l’or) for Bataille, for 
Leiris she served as a poetic muse much like Petrarch’s Laura of Rime sparse. See Milo Sweedler, 
"Pierres angéliques and incandescences un peu chattes: Bataille, Leiris, and the Name of Laure," 
Cincinnati Romance Review 21 (2002): 34-48.   Also useful for understanding the pseudonym is linguist 
and critic Mitsou Ronat’s article “The Glorious Body of Laure” in Georges Bataille and Paul Buck, 
Violent Silence : Celebrating Georges Bataille, 1st ed. (London: Georges Bataille Event, 1984), 32-6.  
including Le Travailleur communiste syndical et cooperatif,  La Critique sociale (in 
which Bataille published his famous “La Notion de dépense”) and, later,  Bataille’s 
own political journal Contre-attaque. Her fidelities to the politics of the French Left 
would wane in the mid-1930s, however, when she would embrace an even more 
radical, if not entirely unwieldy position strongly  influenced by  her friends—
principally Bataille—and her reading of William Blake, D.A.F. de Sade, and Friedrich 
Nietzsche.   To be sure, she was not alone in this departure from normative politics; 
1930s France fomented with diffuse and complex political attitudes of all kinds. The 
Spanish Civil War and the failure of the Front populaire in 1937 further intensified 
this trend. Figures like Louis Aragon called for the “crusade of poetry and art” while 
others like Georges Bernanos championed a gallic anti-fascist  Catholicism. 
Disenchanted with the failures of both the Right and Left, many like Laure sought out 
a radically new politics beyond both sides of the political spectrum. As historian Jean 
Touchard explains, “dans les années 1930...tous rêvent de dépasser les oppositions 
traditionnelles, de rajeunir, de renouveler la politique française; tous se déclarent 
animés par une même volonté révolutionnaire.”2 
Perhaps the earliest traces of Laure’s own “volonté révolutionnaire” are to be 
found in her highly revealing self-chosen pseudonym, “Claude d’Araxe,” which 
derives from a memorable phrase taken from the Virgil’s The Aeneid, Book VIII, later 
placed atop a private letter to paramour Bataille: “Pontem indignatus 
Araxes” (“Araxes, indignant of bridges”). The Araxes, dividing Iran and Turkey on the 
one side and the former Soviet Union on the other, is a legendarily  rapid and vehement 
river, one that historically confounded all attempts to build a bridge over it.3   That 
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2  Guy Michaud, ed. Tendances politiques dans la vie francaise depuis 1789,  Colloques: Cahiers de 
civilisation (Paris: Hachette,1960), 89.
3 As Jerome Peignot notes, the legend derives from Xerxes and Alexander the Great’s failed attempts to 
build a bridge over the river. See Laure, Ecrits retrouvés (Saint Pierre du Mont: Les Cahiers des 
Brisants, 1987), 13.
Laure used this as a pseudonym in her political writings no doubt recalls the culture 
that she admired, but it also exhibits a general virulence, rebelliousness, and 
recalcitrance, an obstinate refusal of all things stagnant, a denial of established limits, 
and an impassioned assent to transgress them. Her contempt for fixity—
l’emmerdement d’être fixé as she once termed it—is ironically quite fixed throughout 
her writing, actions, and thought from this period. Her politics were by no means 
exempt from this contempt; ultimately, they adhered neither to an orthodox Marxism 
nor to the more coherent agenda of Souvarine and le Cercle communiste 
democratique. If her early political revolt first found its home in the more established 
communist movement, it would later resist this very movement, taking the form not of 
organized coalition or political essay, but of poetry, aphorism, and fragmentary flights 
of the pen. These fervent yet ultimately unallied political beliefs made her a 
remarkable albeit  enigmatic figure to her fellow leftist contemporaries. In her personal 
journal, for example, she wrote the following, privately addressing the enamored 
activist Jean Bernier: “Ma vie inconsistante, ne servant à rien, ce non-conformisme 
absolu te séduisait. N’étais-je pas éternellement inadaptable à tout ce qui m’entourait, 
irréductiblement cabrée contre [sic] tout.  Mais révoltée? On ne l’est que si l’on agit—
si on prouve sa révolte.”4  Her unwieldy “revolt” represented not only a departure from 
Bernier or conventional politics, but the embrace of a more general revolt  irreducible 
to virtually any positive political affirmation. “Je ne suis jamais là,” she writes in 
1938, “où les autres croient me trouver et pouvoir me saisir.”5 Some 50 years later, her 
nephew and editor similarly explains that, in the years before WWII, “il est  assez vain 
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4 Jean Bernier and Dominique Rabourdin, L'amour de Laure,  Textes (Paris: Flammarion,  1978), 89. As 
evidenced by their collected correspondence,  Laure engaged their tumultuous relationship with equal 
caprice and resistance, understanding it to be an expression of life’s inherent mutability.
5 Laure and Jérôme Peignot, Ecrits de Laure (Paris: J.J. Pauvert, 1971), 126.
de se demander quelle eut été son attitude à l'époque.”6  The obdurate revolt  Laure 
avowed, however, represents neither a facile stubbornness nor an obscurantist 
equivocation. Though surely a profound departure from normative political thought 
and action, it also signifies the embrace of a radical praxis that compelled her to 
perpetually redefine her political identity, indeed personal-identity  itself, thus enabling 
subject-positions varied and multiple: sovereign, revolutionary, feminine, queer. By 
revealing the mutability  of self-identity, she sought to expose the manifold identities— 
indeed the social and political plurality—implied in any singular notion of selfhood. 
Such was the praxis of her literary endeavor: to reveal the paradoxical role of power—
especially divine power—in the ongoing production of different identities. The many 
figures that animate her writings, which include angels, whores, and sovereigns, share 
this in common: all are “revolutionary” subjects resulting from the transformative and 
revolutionary  qualities of this power, a power that Laure, following her peers, would 
name “the sacred.” To live a revolutionary life, for Laure, was thus to live a religious 
life, a life lived in pursuit of the sacred.  Perhaps above all, this pursuit entails a life—
and, for Laure, a literature—dedicated to the practice of self-sacrifice. 
Revolutionary Life. Bataille and Leiris, who were perhaps her closest friends 
during her final years, took her protean tendencies quite seriously as a “position” that 
transcended all forms of political partisanship. After her death, Leiris writes that Laure 
was “un être dont ceux qui l’ont approchée n’ignorent pas combien inentamable était 
son exigence de hauteur et  violent sa rébellion contre les normes à quoi souscrivent la 
plupart.”7  This radical tendency caused her to abandon established political 
engagements and embrace a “position” that required a new conception of the political 
itself. In his notes for the published collection he entitled Le Sacré, Bataille explains:
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6 Laure et al.,  Une rupture 1934 : correspondances croisées de Laure avec Boris Souvarine, sa famille, 
Georges Bataille, Pierre et Jenny Pascal, Simone Weil (Paris: Editions des Cendres, 1999), 21.
7 Laure, Ecrits retrouvés, (back cover).
Les faits l’ayant amenée à rejeter comme dénuée de valeur l’activité 
politique, il lui fallut se relever, selon son expression: ‘de ce grand 
tremblement de terre qu’est la perte d’une foi’. Sans cesser de connaître 
des moments de détresse—comme de bonheur ou de caprice—elle 
parvint à retrouver un état de conscience plus total que jamais, 
l’ambition la plus haute que put réaliser quelqu’un pour qui l’intégrité 
de l’être a sans doute occupé, dans l’échelle des valeurs, le rang 
privilégié. 8
According to Bataille’s description, Laure’s divorce from political engagement was a 
fortuitous “loss of faith” (perte d’une foi), since it seismically ungrounded her political 
position and delivered her over to an abyssal consciousness greater still (plus total que 
jamais), an awareness of a totality that political orthodoxy restrained, the so-called 
“integrity of being.”9  Her former revolt against the established bourgeois state, it 
would seem, transformed into the revolt against all things establishmentarian and 
stagnant, all things that would deny  the “integrity” of all things in being. It  is in this 
latter, more ontological sense that  revolt has its ultimate meaning for Laure. The fight 
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8 Laure and Peignot, Écrits de Laure, 129. 
9 Laure mentions this “integrity” frequently in her writing. In an unsent letter, she references “tout ce 
qui dépend seulement de l’intégrité totale” (Ibid.,  124). In the “Carnet rouge” dated 1938, she begins a 
short free-verse poem with the following: “Retrouver la vie dans son intégrité/dans sa totalité” (Ibid., 
197). In a sordid letter to Bataille, she writes “Pas de transaction dans l’intégrité, la plénitude…la 
vie” (Ibid., 263). In each case, integrity describes an amorphous composite rather than a unified whole. 
In the letter to Bataille, the “integrity of life” is reason not for unifying their relationship but for 
challenging it; it demands that the relationship should resist comfort and predictability.  Likewise, the 
capricious moments of “happiness and distress” Bataille describes in his note—whether felt in the act of 
love or political revolt—seem to evoke an intransigence akin to this “integrity.”
against all ends is the impossible and paradoxical “end” of authentic revolt.10 
Expressing this revolt, her writings are consistent—or consistently inconsistent—in 
their variety and recalcitrance, evincing a struggle against the oppressive violence of 
all normative limits—whether political, economic, moral, or religious.  Equally 
revolutionary  were her chimerical literary amalgams of poetry, prose, citations, 
epistles, calligrams, notes, and philosophical aphorisms.  Indeed, Bataille and Lieris 
noted how much she detested normative literature and the bourgeois traditionalism it 
represented.11  Yet this revolutionary disposition is not  simply a “counter-violence” to 
the violence of restrictive norms, whether political or literary; rather, it is a violence 
even more fundamental, one (as she says)“irréductiblement cabrée contre tout.” A life 
lived faithfully to the “integrity of being” maintains this state of violent revolt, which 
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10 Bataille advanced a similar notion in his essay “L’apprenti sorcier,” when he writes that “...la destinée 
d’un homme ne devient pas réel à la seule condition qu’il combatte. Il faut encore que cette destinée se 
confonde avec celle des forces dans les rangs desquelles il affronte la mort” (Georges Bataille and 
Denis Hollier, Le Collège de sociologie : 1937-1939 [Paris: Gallimard, 1979], 322).  In the mythopoesis 
Bataille advances in this essay, the violent confrontation with death is paramount as an expression of 
amor fati, i.e.,  the only “real” human destiny.  The conditions, purpose, or means of such a 
confrontation are secondary if not irrelevant, since Bataille views these as profane limitations of a 
grandiose, sacred meeting with death. Such an expression, absolute and unqualified, does not preclude 
the possibility of combat fought either in the name of the state or revolution. This is precisely what 
permits Bataille’s critics to question his relationship to fascism, despite his own opposition to it.  I would 
argue that the same debate would likely apply to Laure as well. Pierre Klossowski for example, 
famously reports that Walter Benjamin, who was in attendance at the meetings of the Collège, indicted 
Bataille for fascism. For more on the Benjamin-Bataille relationship and the question of fascism, see 
Michael Weingrad, "The College of Sociology and the Institute of Social Research," New German 
Critique, no. 84 (2001); Pierre Klossowski and Jean-Maurice Monnoyer, Le peintre et son démon : 
entretiens avec Pierre Klossowski (Paris: Flammarion, 1985), 185-6; Jochen Horisch, “Benjamin entre 
Bataille et Sohn-Rethel: Theorie de la dépense, dépense de la théorie,” in Miguel Abensour et. 
al.,Walter Benjamin et Paris : colloque international 27-29 juin 1983, (Paris: Cerf, 1986).
11  As a reader of (then) subversive authors like Sade, Nietzsche, Blake, and Dostoevsky, Laure 
associated traditional literature and literati with a stagnancy inimical to revolutionary life. “Mais la 
misère,” Leiris and Bataille note, “inhérent a tout ce qui est littérature lui faisait horreur: car elle avait le 
plus grand souci qui puisse se concevoir de ne pas livrer ce qui lui apparaissait déchirant à ceux qui ne 
peuvent pas être déchirés” (Laure and Peignot, Écrits de Laure, 47).
is not unlike that of Nietzscheian self-overcoming or Camusian rebellion.12  Eternally 
mutable, the violence of authentic resistance for Laure acts neither for nor against 
particular ends but, like a Sadean libertine, strives endlessly against everything servile 
to such ends. In other words, such violence not only resists; it  also forever resists this 
resistance in a kind of combined literary, political, and philosophical mise en abyme. It 
is therefore difficult to precisely  characterize those attributes that place Laure, la 
sainte de l'abîme, among the French Left and avant-garde; such attributes, even those 
that presumably undermine convention and progressive politics, are often found to 
undermine themselves, thus evoking a kind of “absolute resistance” refusing 
codification. The rejection of her bourgeois republicanism, for example, and her 
subsequent rejection of this rejection—such as her break from communism, 
commonly express such resistance without a transcendental endpoint. As she writes 
repeatedly in her letters, poetry, and prose, “tout va à l’encontre du but.”13 
Generally speaking, Laure sought a more vital “activism” in which life 
violently  confronts its own “end” through endless revolt. She considered revolt itself 
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12 Indeed, she asks in one of her political writings if “Nietzsche a plus fait pour la liberation de l’homme 
que Lénine?” (Ibid., 184).   If the eternal return and self-overcoming could emancipate man more 
effectively than the Bolshevik Revolution, it was presumably because they do not limit themselves to 
national or personal affairs, political ends,  or class interests, but rather embrace all of existence as an 
eternal and revolutionary will to power. To be sure,  Camus’  articulation of revolt is different, especially 
insofar as he distinguishes it from “le monde du sacré,” yet the comparison is still fruitful.  In L’Homme 
revolté, the significance of revolt lies simply in the fact that men assert their existential freedom to resist 
in unjust circumstances. Camus is wary, however, to make the explicit connection between 
metaphysical revolt and a particular political program, however revolutionary; there is no particular 
action or duty given to l’Homme revolté. Laure is like Camus in this regard: revolt has value in itself in 
giving value and meaning to existence, and this revolt can be expressed either through self-sacrificial 
life or death. “On croit tout détruire et emporter avec soi,” in suicide, “mais de cette mort même renaît 
une valeur qui, peut-être, aurait mérité qu’on vécût.” See Albert Camus, L'Homme révolté, Collection 
Idées 36 : Philosophie (Paris: Gallimard,  1973).  Ruth Reichelberg argues that there is a notion of 
sacredness in Camus’ thought, though it is anchored rather in a sense of existential nostalgia and being-
in-the-world; see Ruth Reichelberg, Albert Camus : une approche du sacré (Paris: A.G. Nizet, 1983).
13 Ibid., 110. This statement is repeated in her correspondence and poetry alike. In this way, Laure could 
be considered an author in dialog with the resurgent Hegelianism of 1930s France under Jean Hyppolite 
and Alexander Kojève, who actively attended (like Laure) the periodic meetings of the College of 
Sociology.  Though she never mentions Hegel in her writing, her “negative dialectics” might be 
considered analogous to that of Bataille in “Hegel, la mort, et le sacrifice.”  See Bataille, Œuvres 
complètes, vol. 12, 326-345.
to be a raison d’être, an activity  integral to “true life” (la vrai vie) as she called it, 
borrowing from Rimbaud’s Une saison en enfer.14  In response to an article in the 
Soviet newspaper Pravda, for example, she writes “je trouve que la valeur de la vie 
dans la société actuelle ne peut être que dans l’esprit  de résistance et de révolte et dans 
l’expression active de cette résistance et de cette révolte.”15  The object of revolt  is 
curiously  absent in this statement, seemingly eclipsed by the apparent value of revolt 
itself. More than political vigilance or the search for justice, she advances revolt as the 
very condicio sine qua non (ne peut être que) of authentic life, la vrai vie. The 
resistance “for” or “against” a particular cause is far less meaningful than the 
resistance itself, since life, in its “true” form, in its “integrity,” is nothing but this 
resistance.  To resist  the conditions of life is thus to promote life itself: “Laisser aller 
contre la vie,” she writes, “ce serait ceux-là qui sont pour la vie.”16  In this way, 
Laure’s conception of life evokes a non-systematic Lebensphilosophie that falls within 
the tradition of Heinrich Rickert, Wilhelm Dilthey, and Nietzsche.
Thus Laure’s revolutionary life is a contraditio in adjecto. True life, la vraie 
vie is death, and death would be, so to speak, a “successful revolt without a victory.” 
This life, the life of revolt, the revolt that is life is possible for Laure only as an 
impossibility; such a life becomes possible only at the limit when life continually 
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14 Bataille confirms the reference in his notes (Ibid., 77). The reference is found in the section “Délires 
I” in Une saison en enfer when the Vierge Folle says: “Quelle vie! La vraie vie est absente.  Nous ne 
sommes pas au monde.” For the widow speaker, “true life” is the otherworldly life of deliverance from 
the marital yolk of the Epoux infernale.  In repose, he proclaims his disdain for marriage and the female 
pursuit of security: “L'amour est à réinventer, on le sait. Elles [women] ne peuvent plus que vouloir une 
position assurée.” Rimbaud’s “true life”—his otherworldly place of desire beyond constraint—recalls 
Laure’s dynamic vision of life and revolt.   Milo Sweedler explains that this term and Rimbaud reference 
illustrates Laure’s sadomasochistic relationship with Edward Trautner in Berlin. See Milo Sweedler, 
"Autohagiography: The Ecrits de Laure," Dalhousie French Studies 71 (2005).
15  Laure and Peignot, Écrits de Laure, 191. She echoes this claim in her poetry and political essays 
alike; elsewhere she writes “la valeur de la vie ne peut être que résistance et révolte exprimées avec 
toute l’énergie du désespoir” (Ibid., 183). 
16 Laure, Ecrits retrouvés, 82.
confronts its end in death.17 Life thus lived constantly undermines its own possibility, 
and yet also rediscovers its own purpose and value as impossibility. Such a life 
therefore traces an aporetic limit: it  acquires value and meaning on the condition of 
revolt and death, and such revolt, qua absolute, necessarily revolts against this 
acquisition of meaning. For Laure, then, one might say that revolt is the condition of 
life, for life, against life. Such a life meets its fateful end endlessly in moments of 
creative self-transformation for which “revolt” is the model. With this creative caprice, 
Laure believed that she lead such a life—and thus had long been dead. “Je n’habitais 
pas la vie,” she writes in the opening poem of Le sacré, “mais la mort.”18  In the 
ongoing confrontation with death that Laure’s work elaborates, the dualism of life and 
death are undone in a simultaneous and mutual negation and affirmation. What 
remains is an undetermined space, a radical potential wherein both the life and death 
of the subject are both possible outcomes of this same immanent potential. This 
potential possesses therefore an instance of radical power able to affirm life or 
threatens its end, even affirm life while threatening its end. “Revolt,” “life,” and 
“death” represent different phases of the “movement” Laure might say, i.e., differing 
vectors of an immanent and absolute power working in, for, and against the life of the 
subject called “the sacred.” 
Living as Part of the Movement.  Moments before her death in 1938, Laure 
scrawled her last words on a small piece of paper: “faire passer votre charrure sur les 
os des morts.” This proverb, taken from William Blake’s “Marriage of Heaven and 
Hell,” was less a momento mori than a kind of valediction forbidding mourning: if, as 
the irony of Blake’s proverb suggests, the dead serves as the fertile soil of new life, 
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17 Having suffered from tuberculosis from the age of 13, Laure constantly confronted the limits of her 
own mortality.  As she frequently mentioned in correspondence to family and friends,  she considered 
her frequent illness as a testament to the “true life” that always bears witness to death. 
18 Laure and Peignot, Écrits de Laure, 83.
then the occasion of her own death was for Laure not simply  a tragedy but a 
celebration, indeed the greatest expression of life itself, the successful revolt of life 
against death. This repeated proverb, perhaps more so than any other she quotes, 
exemplifies the paradoxical “movement” between life and death characterizing the 
sacred itself.  At the very beginning her brief theoretical description of the concept (le 
sacré), Laure insists on the paradoxical movement of a life lived principally through 
and for death:
Le sacré est ce moment infiniment rare où la “part éternelle” que 
chaque être porte en soi entre dans la vie, se trouve emporté dans le 
mouvement universel, intégrée dans ce mouvement, réalisée. C’est ce 
que j’ai ressenti comme mis en balance avec la mort, scellé par la mort. 
Cette permanence de la menace de la mort est l’absolu enivrant 
qu’emporte la vie, la soulève hors d’elle-même, projeté au dehors le 
fond de moi-même comme une éruption de volcan, une chute de 
météore. 19
The “eternal share” (part éternelle) of every  life is “carried away” (emporté) into this 
universal movement sustains itself, actualizes itself, only through the constant threat of 
death (scellé par la mort; permanence de la menace de la mort). Thus, the sacred is 
not the triumph of death over life or in life, but the integration (integrée) of life and 
death in a movement that  conjoins them in and through opposition.  Death is not the 
end, but the “movement” of oneself from oneself, the “division” or “sharing” (part, 
partage) of oneself, one’s “getting carried away” with death, by death—in life (entre 
dans la vie, se trouve emporté). Thus in the movement of life, death is the plus ultra of 
the ultimate nec plus ultra, a kind of condemned salvation lived in and through death 
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19  Ibid., 85. The momentariness of the sacred described here echoes Bataille’s essay “Le sacré” 
published in 1939.  What he calls “l’instant sacré” is a “privileged instant” something is witnessed that 
never “constitue une substance a l’épreuve du temps, tout au contraire,  ce qui fuit aussitôt apparu et ne 
se laisse pas saisir.” See Georges Bataille, Œuvres complètes, vol. 1, 560. The endeavor of modern art, 
he explains, was to recapture this lost moment.   Bataille speaks analogously of “movement” as well in 
L’Erotisme when he writes “Il y a un excès horrible du mouvement qui nous anime: l’excès éclaire le 
sens du mouvement” (Georges Bataille, L'érotisme [Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1957], 26).
itself. Each being (chaque être) is continually divided between life and death in the 
very exchange described above. In this “universal movement” where death is a 
constant threat, death enables life to transcend itself (emporte la vie, la soulève hors 
d’elle-même), but this transcendence does not necessarily culminate in a heavenly 
afterlife or fascist state; rather, transcendence is found in the “movement” itself, the 
“intoxicating absolute” (l’absolu enivrant) that sustains life through sustaining the 
threat of death, through the impossible exchange of life for death, death for life.20 
Properly speaking, this is not true “transcendence” at all, but  rather a form of response 
or return, even an eternal return, to the self-same life, the same death, that “eternal” 
share, carried away by the prior universal movement that is its both its origin and 
destination. Life is thus ecstatic, “raised beyond itself” (soulevé hors d’elle même), 
like a shooting star or erupting volcano. Indeed, if it goes beyond itself, it was always 
already going beyond itself, embroiled in the “universal movement” that  disperses and 
dispenses the universal share of every being.21   The polysemy of scellé here is hence 
poignant and evocative, referring at once to a tell-tale mark, a form of sanctioning, and 
a kind of limit or closure.  The sacred is indeed all three: the sign of a vital eternal 
share, a sanctioned mortal threat, and a limit of possible transcendence.
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20  The rhetoric of life, death, and transcendence evoked here may reverberate with fascist ideology of 
life lived for the state and communal sacrifice; as Denis Hollier remarks, “the triumph of death is part of 
a somber mysticism that is indissociable from fascist ideology“  (Denis Hollier and R. Howard Bloch, A 
New History of French Literature [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994], 923).  Such is 
also an unmistakable aspect of Georges Sorel’s political thought and what some have called his “Left 
fascism,” especially with its mythic conception of the proletarian general strike, which Sorel understood 
to be a kind apocalyptic sacrificial violence able to realize the solidarity of the working class and its 
future. However, the unbound potential implied in Laure’s idea of “movement” and the “universal 
share” remains analytically distinct from—though not necessarily opposed to—the corporative nature of 
fascism, which would represent only a single possible (and ultimately transient) result. Laure’s 
formulation of self-sacrifice, which demands ongoing resistance and repetition, would not content itself 
either with the violent triumph of the proletariat or the realization of a transcendent Volksgeist. Vis à vis 
Bataille, Denis Hollier carefully negotiates the equivocal and sometimes competing values of French 
avant-gardism and political engagement in Denis Hollier, "On Equivocation (between Literature and 
Politics)," October 55(1990): 12.
21 This is another instance in which Laure’s writings echo Nietzsche’s amor fati, eternal return, and self-
overcoming; in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, stars and volcanoes serve as metaphors of self-transcendence. 
The meaning of “movement” is therefore itself quite mobile. While at times it 
refers to a kind of motivation, cause, or direction, it elsewhere suggests a more 
metaphysical concept of ecstasy  and transcendence akin to what Bataille calls 
“continuity.”22  In a letter to Simone Weil concerning her own personal relationship 
with the aloof Boris Souvarine, Laure explains that she must rediscover her own inner-
strength and live sua sponte: “je veux vivre de mon propre mouvement.”23  While 
movement here would appear to be a form of focused self-assertion and self-
motivation, it elsewhere describes a more ambivalent stance (albeit one more 
trustworthy than the presumed certainty  of reason): “Pour moi: ne jamais douter de 
mon propre mouvement, de ce qui est en moi attirance et répulsion quand le jugement 
intellectuel me fait défaut.”24   As an alternative to the failures of “intellectual 
judgment,” this movement of offers a more affective, bodily  response without precise 
direction, one lead precariously  by the vicissitudes of a physical attraction and 
repulsion like those found in the tenet of sacred ambiguity. In the former case, 
movement is a kind of will that forcibly “moves” her closer to herself, away from 
Souvarine. In the latter, movement is an alien power that, through desire, moves her 
away from herself. The ambiguity  of “movement” as either a form of self-motivation 
or self-annihilation itself suggests not two forms of movement, but rather a paradox 
inherent in the same movement. Vacillating between a native and foreign impetus, 
such movement traces and retraces the very limits of embodiment and disembodiment, 
identity and alterity. In an untitled poem that itself vacillates on the page, Laure writes: 
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22  Bataille offers his most explicit explanation of this concept in L’érotisme: “Nous sommes des êtres 
discontinues, individus mourant isolement dans une aventure inintelligible, mais nous avons la nostalgie 
de la continuité perdue.”  This concept is the ontological starting point for the rest of his argument in a 
text otherwise dedicated to diverse social phenomena. See Bataille, L'érotisme, 22.   
23 Laure et al., Une rupture 1934 : correspondances croisées de Laure avec Boris Souvarine,  sa famille, 
Georges Bataille, Pierre et Jenny Pascal, Simone Weil (Paris: Editions des Cendres, 1999), 46.
24  Laure and Peignot, Écrits de Laure,  193. This statement is taken from Notes sur la revolution,  a 
sordid collection of reflections on communism, the USSR, the Left, and the meaning of political 
resistance.
  Et puis un jour le MOUVEMENT
    restreint
   et puis
    libre
  Vie physique
  le corps comme
  la plante
  la plante la 
  terre 
  Comme s’il s’implantait dans la terre 
par 
le mouvement…25
The restraint and release of this movement, echoing the alternation between life and 
death, identity  and alterity, also marks a form of organic continuity in which pure 
physical life may become actualized as, for example, plant or earth.  “Movement” 
pervades physical life of all kinds, thus the identity of the plant, body, and earth are 
commonly created and undone in the radical metamorphosis this vital movement 
describes. As the poem suggests, such a metamorphosis is predicated upon a common 
vital embodiment (vie physique), a common living potential that Giorgio Agamben 
calls “bare life.”26  This potential becomes actualized in the “movement” that 
transforms bare life into body, plant, and earth—and back. 
 Perhaps among the most concise evocations of this vital movement is to be 
found in an untitled prose poem from Le Sacré: “La vie répond—ce n’est pas vain / on 
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25 Ibid., 198.
26  See Chapter One, pp. 30-46. Agamben claims in Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life that 
sacred or “bare life,” what Aristotle calls zoe,  “expresses the simple fact of living common to all living 
beings,” is a state that leaves life open to the most violent political use under sovereignty, its juridical 
twin. Drawing upon jurist Carl Schmitt, he claims that both commonly occupy “the state of exception” 
from the law, whereby, for example, a life may be killed but not sacrificed or murdered since it is 
“beyond the law.” Whereas Agamben polemically views bare life as violent politico-juridical category, 
Laure presents it to be a state that cannot be wholly appropriated or reduced to specific juridical or 
political ends. This may serve as a counterpoint for Agamben’s analysis of the French Ecole 
sociologique and the College of Sociology in the section of the book (itself) entitled “Homo Sacer,” 
wherein he argues that sacred life always ends up becoming a violent political power. 
peut agir / contre—pour / la vie exige le mouvement.”27 “The movement” life requires, 
like revolt, is necessarily  countervailing; it is the movement for or against something 
that, through resistance, defines and actualizes the action as such.  The movement or 
action of life always moves toward or against a potential threshold that will define it 
and delimit it, giving it significance as a form of resistance and thus a form of “true 
life.”  In this sense, the future goal of the movement is less significant than movement 
itself, that is, the potential of or for movement at all, which life necessitates (exiger). 
The movement of life trumps any  future purpose, cause, or limit towards which it is 
directed, though such direction is necessary; everything is equally  and simultaneously 
possible in the vital unified movement “for—against” (contre—pour) in which life 
confronts its own mortal limits.  At these limits, the movement of life is always for or 
against, always for and against, in a futural ebb and flow whose vectors 
simultaneously  mandate and defy the limits that bind it. Therefore, “la vie répond.” 
Life “responds” to these limits as both as a prior condition for “movement” and a 
possible threshold to trespass. Thus the movement of life and life’s limits are bound 
only to be unbound; if life “responds” to such limits—one might say it exchanges 
promises with such limits (L. res-pondere, “to promise back,” “to pledge in return”) 
by requiring them to define and understand the direction and purpose of life’s actions. 
Any action, whether for or against a particular end, is thus never “vain” (vain) since 
life only acquires value, meaning, and purpose in response to that end. 
Given Laure’s description, therefore, the following propositions concerning 
“universal movement” describing the sacred are simultaneously possible. Such 
“movement” is: 1) the movement of life toward life; 2) the movement of life away 
from life; 3) the movement of life toward death; 4) the movement of life away from 
death; 5) the movement of death toward death; 6) the movement of death away from 
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27 Laure and Peignot, Écrits de Laure, 95.
death; 7) the movement of death toward life; 8) the movement of death away from life. 
In each case, the binarism of life and death is both created and undone in and by a 
continual to-and-fro movement, a promised “response”—promised insofar as it is a 
response—to the movement of life, to the potential of life, to “bear life.”  The 
movement of the sacred universal share is a vectoring of an immanent possibility, i.e., 
the actualization of a native potential for life or death that always returns to itself. In 
each case, moreover, there remain infinite possible lives—like those of the plant or 
earth—and therefore infinite possible deaths as well. The “infinitely rare” moment in 
which the paradoxical coincidence of these eight potential movements arises (and 
returns) is, in brief, one potential way in which to articulate the “universal movement” 
characterizing the sacred.
Sacrificial Life.  For Laure, the figure of “life” is much like nature or the life 
of a political revolutionary; it describes not only  being part of a movement, but an 
action, a response, a pledge, a promise, the delivery of something to come.  It inheres 
in a futural economy of change and exchange with and into what is other, evoking an 
ethics to which I will later return. In the natural “movement” life describes, this 
promise succeeds without fulfillment, and this exchange is never completely 
transacted. “La vie répond—ce n’est  pas vain / on peut agir / contre—pour / la vie 
exige le mouvement.”28  By responding to such endless ends, life enters into a kind of 
eternal contract wherein it vows to “give itself up” to an impossible end in order to 
(re)acquire itself as that which has given itself up.  The movement of life, the 
“response” of life, in other words, therefore describes a form of sacrifice wherein life 
itself is both expropriated and (re)appropriated in a movement that is always “on the 
way,” always “returning” to itself—and (also) to that which is other. When Laure 
writes that the sacred is that “pour quoi j’aurais donné ma vie”— she describes 
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thereby a commodity that would have been both given up and given back as a 
meaning or value for the life she gave; her life would have been given back qua 
“something-given-up.” In the same brief essay on the sacred, for example, she writes:
Les ‘démarches’ les plus décisive de ma vie ont toujours été 
accomplices dans un état de transe qui seul me permettait  d’agir envers 
et contre toute entrave (lucidité, faiblesse physique, etc.). C’est ce pour 
quoi j’aurais donné ma vie.  Si un être ne peut pas ou plus éprouver ce 
sentiment, sa vie est comme privée de sens, privée de sacré.29   
The “decisive” stages of Laure’s life were essentially confrontational: those moments 
that she considered sacred and in which she “advanced” (démarche), were 
paradoxically those moments in which she was inhibited or incapacitated (entrave). 
Her movement toward is also a movement away. It is for these moments when she is 
most unable to give that she “would have given her life,” since such inability 
paradoxically enables life’s action (agir) and meaning (sens). In other words, when 
she explains that she would have “given her life to the sacred,” she implies that she 
will get something back--action, feeling (sentiment), value, meaning, etc.--those things 
without which life is meaningless (privée de sens).  Therefore, when she says that the 
sacred was worthy  of self-sacrifice, she means that she would have sacrificed her life 
in order to get it back. The gift of life gives back the gift it gave.
The kind of exchange described here recalls Marcel Mauss’ classic definition 
of sacrifice in “Essai sur la nature et fonction de sacrifice” (1899), which demands a 
brief recapitulation. “Dans tout sacrifice,” Mauss writes, “il y  a un acte d’abnégation, 
puisque le sacrifiant se prive et donne…Si le sacrifiant donne quelque chose de soi, il 
ne se donne pas; il se réserve prudemment. C’est que, s’il donne, c’est en partie pour 
recevoir.” The gift the executioner gives is also taken back. Mauss claims, therefore, 
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that the practice of sacrifice is predicated on the idea of rachat—“buyback,” or, in its 
religious context, “redemption”: “Il n’y a pas de sacrifice ou n’intervienne quelque 
idée de rachat.”30  If life is bought back by the executioner at the cost of the scapegoat 
in traditional sacrifice, however, the case of self-sacrifice, such as is found in Laure, is 
more sharply paradoxical. Laure insists that self-sacrifice is the proper form of the 
sacred in her extended description of the sacred; recounting a memory she claims 
“résume complètement ma notion du sacré” she writes that it “provoqua en moi un état 
d’exultation totale, fait de pressentiment certain, de sacrifice consenti d’avance et 
devant le visage même du sacrifié.”31  In this situation, wherein the executioner and 
scapegoat are identical, both life and death are given up and given back in the 
buyback, since what is given up  and what is received are the very  same “thing.” 
Unlike the case of traditional sacrifice wherein life remains at the expense of death, in 
this case, life and death are commonly both conserved and expended. What is (re-)
appropriated therefore in this paradoxical exchange is not the life the executioner, but 
the impossible coincidenta oppositorum of life and death, selfhood and otherness, 
executioner and scapegoat in the same immanent time and place of return.  Thus, in 
the final analysis, even the term “self-sacrifice” in the case of Laure is something of a 
misnomer, since the self thus sacrificed always already implies an otherness that 
precedes and exceeds it in death.
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30  See Marcel Mauss and Viktor Karady, Oeuvres, vol. I: Les fonctions sociales du sacré, (Paris: 
Editions de Minuit, 1968), 304.  In this way, Laure’s presentation of sacrifice, perhaps even despite her 
influences and intention, lies midway between Mauss’  and Bataille’s.   Though Bataille is reported to 
have derived his understanding of sacrifice from Mauss, his own conception differs considerably. 
When Bataille writes in Théorie de la religion that “le sacrifice est l’antithèse de la production,” he 
argues that sacrifice, unlike traditional potlatch and gift-exchange, constitutes a form of radical 
expropriation without return. “C’est en ce sens qu’il est don et abandon, mais ce qui est donné ne peut 
être un objet de conservation pour le donataire” (Georges Bataille, Théorie de la religion [Paris: 
Gallimard,  1974], 66). Bataille does make great use of Mauss’ conclusion that the most basic of all 
forms of sacrifice consists in sacrifice of the god(s), however, with which he associates the Nietzschean 
death of God and Dionysian intoxication.
31 Laure and Peignot, Écrits de Laure, 88. Emphasis mine.
In the prose-poem “8” from the same volume, the same impossible “return” of 
self-sacrifice occurs.  Indeed, the infinite (re)tracing the figure “8” implies makes 
visible the eternal return of the same described by the self-sacrifice described above. 
Throughout the poem, the speaker continually  “retraces” the intersection of life and 
death using different metaphors, making the poem itself a circuitous assemblage of 
circumlocutions.  The speaker’s sinuous voyage is replete with repetitions and returns 
of all kinds.  She “rediscovers” (retrouver) herself at a zenith or in close quarters; the 
infernal figure eight “comes back” (revenir) to lasso her; she leaves one circle only to 
fall again (retomber) into another; life again closes her in (refermer) with a lead seal. 
The best illustration of the eternal return described above, however, is the speaker’s 
winding path along the contours of the figure eight, which itself winds down the page:
Je me suis retrouvée
  toute enfermée
comme en un cercle
  auquel j’échappe
par cet autre
  qui m’y ramène 
It is unclear where precisely  the speaker “finds herself” (se retrouver) since she is both 
walled-in (enfermée), liberated (échapper), and brought back (ramener) at the same 
time. Her means of escape from one enclosed circle is another enclosed circle that yet 
returns her back to the former enclosed circle, and this circular journey  away  from 
where she was leads her back to where she was—back to “herself.”  The French 
reflexive se retrouver captures the rich ambiguity of the speaker’s situation, which 
could be at once a “a meeting with oneself,” “a finding oneself back in some place,” a 
“finding one’s way,” an “ending up somewhere,” or a “rediscovering oneself.”  The 
speaker rediscovers herself at the very  place she sought flight, returning to herself at 
the very place she sought to evade. The language of loss and return, destination and 
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origin takes on vital connotations when, in subsequent lines, she refers to the 
annihilation (s'anéantir), life (la vie), mutilation (mutilée), and fatal signs (signe fatal) 
experienced in her voyage, which culminate in the final line quoted from a newspaper: 
“Un prisonnier s’évade en sautant le mur à l’endroit même ou il devait être exécuté.”32 
The speaker’s passage around the figure eight is like the condemned prisoner who 
reclaims his life at a dead-end. Execution, as the statement implies, is not simply that 
which the prisoner evades but which rather serves as a site of life returned or regained 
at the point of death. The “escape” from life in execution or death signals the place at 
which life also returns to itself from death, at death, even as death.  Death thus 
becomes the reconstituted as the “living dead.”
For Laure, the gift of life therefore is given up and returned—given up insofar 
as it is returned—at the same time. The same gift is both given and returned, thus in 
effect exchanging “nothing.” “Pas de transaction dans l'intégrité, la plénitude…la vie” 
she writes to Michel Leiris.33   Yet this nothing is also a commodifiable “something,” 
the in-valuable gift of no-thing itself, the nothing from which and to which life 
eternally returns and thereby becomes living action, the movement of life, an 
emancipation, a reason to live, the value of life, life in its plenitude: bare life. In this 
exchange of something-for-nothing, bare life is therefore deconstituted and 
reconstituted as a potential commodity, both exchanged and sacrificed in the 
paradoxical “movement” between a general and restricted economy. In Laure’s 
evocation of the sacred, sacrificial expropriation of life in death is also the impossible 
(re)appropriation of that very  life: life qua [the value of life [qua death]].  In her 
undead “trance” between the active resistance (agir contre) and the active embrace 
(agir envers) of those mortal hindrances to life arises the value of life itself—which is 
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32 Ibid., 92-3.
33 Ibid., 263.
also death—and this value is the nothing-made-something, or something-made-
nothing, life-death that is the sacred. The sacred is the life that is death that is the 
meaning, purpose, and condition of life. “Tout ce qui relève de la raison d’être est 
sacré pour moi,” writes Laure, “raison d’être encore, raison de vie, de mort.”34 
Natural Life.  The topos of vital transformation in Laure describes therefore 
contradictory power that creates and destroys identity (as destroyed and created) under 
the guise of life and death. This includes not only personal identity, but biological 
identity  as well, evoking thereby a kind of radical naturalism. In her notes describing 
the sacred, she explains that  gardens conjure states of anguished solitude and 
perceived infinity: “de même qu’au jardin, ce premier contact avec l’idée d’infini…a 
quelque chose de sacré, en ce sens que le jeu est accompagne d’angoisse.”35  In the 
garden, she imagines herself as part of a vital continuum; like the poem above in 
which plant and earth are presented as possible lives, the subject in the poem “8” finds 
itself at the intersection of life and death, at which it becomes simultaneously an eel 
(anguille), dolphin (dauphin), and earthworm (ver de terre).36  Similar metamorphoses 
occur in Laure’s prose as well; in “Histoire d’une petite fille,” the narrator offers in a 
brief ekphrasis her first appreciation of nature vacationing in the countryside:
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34 Ibid., 86.
35 Ibid., 88.
36 Ibid., 93.
J’appris à connaître les fleurs d’ombre et les fleurs d’eau, héliotropes et 
millepertuis, nénuphars et  toutes sortes de roseaux. Je sus qu’il y avait 
des oiseux du soir et de la nuit, chauves-souris, hiboux, chouettes, 
chats-huants tombes du nid et noyés dans un seau hantèrent mes rêves. 
Un saule pleureur refermait sur moi ses feuilles lisses, une grotte 
m’accueillait dans sa fraîcheur humide avec un jeune chat aveugle 
cache dans ma robe et  glissant sur ma poitrine. J’allais disparaître et 
m’évanouir entre le mur et le lierre. Là, je devenais araignée, faucheux, 
millepattes, hérisson, tout ce qu’on veut ou peut être même bête à bon 
dieu.37
Embroiled in the spectacular natural scene surrounding her, the narrator undergoes an 
uncanny  transformation that, through her fainting and disappearance, at once undoes 
her and prompts her rebirth as an insect or beast. Her morbid fainting (s'évanouir) and 
disappearance (disparaître) parallels the fallen, drowning screech owls (chats-huants 
tombes/noyés), other obscure birds of the night (oiseux du soir et de la nuit), and the 
blind cat (chat aveugle).  In nature, she confronts the impasse of embodied 
consciousness much like the garden wall (le mur).  And yet nature is also her 
deliverance; like the ivy, she sprawls, overcoming the wall and becoming everything 
around her, even the lady-bug (bête à bon dieu) which, as the French legend suggests, 
heralds divine grace and salvation.38 
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37 Ibid., 63.
38  According to French legend, the ladybug’s more colorful name bête à bon dieu historically derives 
from the story of a condemned man’s salvation in the 10th century.  Philippe Huet recounts this story 
thus: “Suite à l’assassinat à Paris d’un homme, son apprenti est soupçonné et condamné à mort malgré 
ses protestations. Condamné à avoir le coup tranché il y avait foule ce jour là pour assister à cette 
exécution. Lorsque le bourreau lève sa hanche, il aperçoit une coccinelle posée sur le coup du jeune 
homme. A première vue le bourreau ne pouvait se décider à trancher le cou du jeune homme, il enleva 
donc la coccinelle très délicatement et lorsqu’il relève sa hache quelle n’est pas sa surprise de constater 
que la coccinelle était de retour sur le cou de ce pauvre jeune homme. Le bourreau eut beau insister, 
mais la coccinelle était obstinée,  au point que le roi d’alors (Robert le Pieux) intervint et souligna que la 
coccinelle accomplissait là une mission divine et qu’il s’agissait d’un miracle. On gracia le jeune 
homme, et quelques jours plus tard le véritable coupable fut découvert.  Dès lors les gens de Paris 
parlaient de la ‘beste du bon Dieu’  et plus personne ne pensait à écraser ce petit insecte sans que cela 
apparaisse comme un sacrilège.” See Philippe Huet, La Coccinelle ou la véritable histoire de la bête à 
bon Dieu. Editions de Terran, 2004. The excerpt hère derives from the entry « La coccinelle » from the 
website of the Musée de zoologie, Lausanne,  http://www.zoologie.vd.ch/1_actualite/ Le_Matin_DCh/
AcDCh02_01_05.html (accessed July 14th 2006). That Laure becomes a bete à bon dieu,  therefore, 
figuratively places her on the executioner’s block, that sacred and criminal threshold between and life 
and death, salvation and damnation, subjection and emancipation.
In Laure’s oeuvre, this “movement” from life to death (and back) is frequently 
associated with nature, which signifies less a bucolic Rousseauian serenity than a kind 
of violent Spinozian cycle between natura naturans and natura naturata. This cycle, 
in turn, is not unlike the macabre qualities of nature found in later French literary 
history of the 19th and 20th centuries. What Charles Bernheimer has called the 
“decadent naturalism” of the 19th century illustrates this trend, which finds some of its 
modernist residues in French surrealism and its dispossessed figures, including Laure. 
Not to be confused with the classical naturalism of Emile Zola and Guy de 
Maupassant, Bernheimer’s term refers to a virulent nature for which “all of life is in 
movement, in heat, close to explosion, filling up empty space, generating ever-new 
growth.” Such nature, Bernheimer elaborates, “cares nothing for…individuality and 
the desire to endure.  Death is nature’s gift to the fermentation of life.”39  While 
certainly a rejection of romantic nature à la Victor Hugo and Chateaubriand, it is also 
an exaggeration of nature’s inherent cruelty and indifference found in traditional 
naturalist literature.  In this vein, the imagery of forests, trees, flowers, mountains, 
prairies, and beasts in Laure frequently  signifies a morbid transformation both 
fearsome and fascinating. Such transformation testifies to a kind of “natural force” of 
becoming between life and death that precludes self-identity. “Où est l’accord profond 
entre soi-même et tous les instants de la vie?” Laure asks, “Etre non conforme / 
spontanément…naturellement / force naturelle comme une force de la nature.”40
What is perhaps the best illustration of nature to be found in Laure’s oeuvre is 
not literary, but visual.  Found among Laure’s manuscripts was one of André Masson’s 
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39 Charles Bernheimer, Decadent Subjects : The Idea of Decadence in Art, Literature, Philosophy, and 
Culture of the fin de siècle in Europe, ed. T.  Jefferson Kline and Naomi Schor (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2002), 56-7.  Bernheimer’s study makes daring connections between and 
among the logics of naturalism, decadence, and modernism using the figure of a violent nature as a 
common thread.  He places Bataille’s eroticism, for example, alongside Octave Mirbeau’s in Le jardin 
des supplices (1899).  Curiously absent from his study, however, is Sade and Spinoza, who are among 
the first elaborate the virulent conception of nature found in this later literary history (see note 40).
40 Laure and Peignot, Écrits de Laure, 158.  
many sketches of the acéphale man, which presumably derives from Bataille’s first 
“mystical” experience, recounted in his notes for Le bleu du ciel.41  Each of Masson’s 
sketches in the series is unique, emphasizing a particular thematic or metaphor 
associated with the Acéphale group, but Laure’s is exemplary in its graphic and violent 
depiction of nature (Figures 3.1-3.3). Against a mythic, Zarathustrian backdrop of 
mountains and abyss, the figure, beheaded and eviscerated, stands with his arboreal 
extremities reaching from earth to sky. A turbulent storm surrounds him from above, 
and from below, a marshy earth seems at once to germinate and envelop  him. He 
stands in the center of an animated, violent world that passes around him and through 
him. Traversing fertile earth and stormy sky, high mountain and dark abyss, inner 
body and outer world, Masson’s figure crosses many thresholds; indeed, the acephale 
man is the threshold par excellence, being at once constituted and deconstituted by the 
virulent forces of nature around and within. If nature is his origin, it  is also his mortal 
end,
Lorsange like many Sadean protagonists advances a philosophy of nature 
based upon criminality and transgression.  As that which mobilizes both the cruelest 
and noblest human sentiments, he explains (echoing the classic philosophical 
distinction between nomos and physis) that nature’s dynamism defies the 
dichotomizing of legal or religious interdictions. In an attempt to assuage the timid 
Thérese’s disquiet about his radical propositions, Lorsange says “Ah ! Tranquillise-toi, 
chère fille, nous n'éprouvons rien qui ne lui serve ; tous les mouvements qu'elle place 
en nous sont les organes de ses lois ; les passions de l'homme ne sont que les moyens 
qu'elle emploie pour parvenir à ses desseins.”42 In other words, human passions are the 
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41 The source for Masson’s drawing, and indeed Laure’s literary description, is most likely the powerful 
mystical experience Bataille recounts in his notes Les larmes d’eros, where he envisions himself as a 
swollen penis on the verge of a “torturous” yet “voluptuous” ejaculation.  Bataille takes this to be a 
metaphor for ecstasy and self-obliteration of the (phallic) ego. See Bataille, Œuvres complètes, vol. 5 : 
517 and vol. 4:165-66.  
42 D.A.F. de Sade, Justine, ou, les malheurs de la vertu (Paris: Gallimard, 1981), 134.
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Figure 3.1. André Masson, Untitled. (Sketch of acephale man found 
among Laure’s manuscripts). “Comme s’il implantait dans la terre / 
par le / mouvement / retrouvant / force de pesanteur / corps détaché 
de tous les lois physiques.”
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Figure 3.2. André Masson, Untitled. (Illustration for “Acephale, 
Nietzsche et les fascistes,” January 21st, 1937). The figure bridges earth 
and sky, recalling Nietzsche’s Zarathustra: “Verily...once you have 
recognized the need and land and sky and neighbor of a people you may 
also guess the law of their overcomings.”
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Figure 3.3. André Masson, Untitled. (Illustration for “Acephale: 
Dionysus,” July 1937). This illustration figures the acephale man 
as a Dionysian character (wine, grapes, serpents, etc.) placed 
within a hellenic setting. 
vehicle through which nature realizes its own inhuman ends. Lorsange continues, 
explaining that such passions express these naturally  wayward “movements” which, 
properly  manifested, take the form of crime: “La première et la plus belle qualité de la 
nature,” says Sade, “est le mouvement qui l'agite sans cesse, mais ce mouvement n'est 
qu'une suite perpétuelle de crimes, ce n'est  que par des crimes qu'elle le conserve.”43 
This conception of nature remains consistent throughout Sade’s oeuvre; again, in 
Philosophie dans le boudoir, Dolmancé compares the animation of nature to a static, 
foolish, and powerless God. Of nature, he says, “action perpétuelle et une de ses lois,” 
and such action continues of its own accord quite independently of man’s appreciation 
or God will: “la nature, toujours en action, toujours en mouvement, tient d'elle-même 
ce qu'il plaît aux sots de lui donner gratuitement.”44   For Sade, nature overturns the 
limits of justice, virtue, and law in its inherent exigency  to move beyond them, indeed 
beyond everything, including the laws of nature themselves.  In essence, Sade’s 
movement of nature is the movement of nature beyond itself.
In Sade, mon prochain, Pierre Klossowski explores this paradox in depth.  For 
Klossowski, the “perpetual movement” of Sade’s nature presents a double-bind 
wherein nature submits to its own law through defying it.  “Le mouvement perpétuel 
est aveugle,” he writes, “mais l’aspiration à échapper aux lois de ce mouvement (par 
les bouleversement des crimes), n’est que la prise de conscience de ce mouvement.”45 
Nature’s perpetual movement is at once its law and liberation; the “movement” of 
criminal escape from natural laws itself reifies the natural law of perpetual movement, 
making natural law thus also the emancipation from natural law: “Sans doute Sade 
158
43 Ibid.
44 ———, La philosophie dans le boudoir (Paris: Gallimard, 1976), 67-8.
45 Pierre Klossowski, Sade mon prochain, 1st ed. (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1947), 84. 
espère-t-il, à l’instar de cette Nature,” Klossowski writes, “esclave de ses lois, sa 
libération totale.”46 It  is not that lawful servitude opposes criminal liberation in nature, 
but rather that law and liberation are differing effects of a common “natural” potential
—“sa plus active puissance” to use Klossowski’s terms—beyond both law and crime. 
Drawing upon Klossowski’s analysis, Gilles Deleuze usefully distinguishes between a 
“primary” and “secondary” nature in Sade: secondary nature refers essentially  to finite 
nature, nature as limit. This is nature directed toward an order, goal, or end, such as in 
conservation, reproduction, or other principles of natural law. Yet secondary nature is 
only a residual effect of nature in its primary form, understood as an infinite negativity 
that exceeds law and limits as a form of pure becoming. This pure negation, 
“chaos,” (chaos) or “originary delirium” (délire originel) as Deleuze terms it, 
however, can manifest itself only  through a more sober finitude found in the form of 
secondary  nature.47  Primary and secondary nature are therefore not two different 
natures, nor even two different modes of nature, but nature’s own self-differentiation 
in and through its “perpetual movement” between an inexhaustible, infinite 
potentiality  and a (humanly) constrained finitude.  Therefore the law of nature is also 
the crime of nature; nature’s subjection (esclave) is also its emancipation (libération 
totale); nature’s revealing is also nature hiding; the blindness of nature (aveugle) is 
also its awareness (prise de conscience). One might say  in Klossowski’s terms that 
secondary  nature is a “simulacrum” of nature in its primary  form, or (perhaps more 
simply) that nature in Sade is a simulacrum of itself, the copy of an irreproducible 
original, or an original found to be originally  a copy. In other words, in Sade, for 
nature to be what it is, it must also be what it is not. 
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By extension, the products of nature are also not what they are. Flora and 
fauna, man and beast are mere simulacra of the bare living potential that inheres in 
nature’s perpetual movement. They remain mere “transmutations” or “formal 
changes” (changements de forme) in this movement, as Sade’s Chevalier mentions in 
La Philosophie dans le boudoir.  Skeptically, the Chevalier asks “Qu’est-ce l’homme, 
et quelle différence y  a-t-il entre lui et les autres plantes, entre lui et tous les autres 
animaux de la nature? Aucune assurément.”48 Death is the repetitious reincarnation of 
a life (that is to die) as plant, animal, or insect—or, for that matter, Laure’s ivy, 
earthworm, and ladybug.  Like the Chevalier, Laure’s poetics of nature suggests that 
these are all part of nature’s movement as iterations, manifestations of the same living 
potential, signifiers for the same signified (ivy=earthworm=ladybug). Yet the iteration 
itself betrays a difference internal to nature that precludes their common identity  in or 
as nature itself.  If they  are “identical” at all, it is only because ivy, earthworm, and 
ladybug already differ from themselves (ivy!ivy, earthworm!earthworm, 
ladybug!ladybug) in a natural movement that ad seriatim compels dis-identification 
into something else (ivy=earthworm=ladybug) in it’s own movement of becoming. 
Nature is thus this power to become what it is though becoming also what it is not. 
Sacrifice, Crime, and Class. To speak of nature’s inexhaustible potential is 
another way to speak of nature’s infinite power (L. potens). As the case of nature 
suggests, the representation and effects of power are varied and multiple in Laure; 
power is represented at once as law and crime, despotism and rebellion. In Le Sacré, 
for example, poems possessing a quasi-fascist veneration of state authority  are 
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métempsycose.”
grouped with others embracing sedition and revolt.49  This again recalls Sade’s 
conception of Nature, which enables both institutional corruption and anti-institutional 
rebellion. 
Sade vividly illustrates the ubiquitous efforts of human law to exert control 
over the unwieldy influence of Nature hidden but always operative in civilization, 
usually  in the form of a civil oppression or corruption. Such are the indulgences and 
injustices of Sade’s clergy  and aristocracy; their “civility” betrays a greater, natural 
incivility, one that actively  defies civilization rather than submissively obeying and, as 
such, reveals civilization itself to be a kind of “crime against nature.” This corruption 
of civilization, however, also ironically reveals the inexorable operation of nature 
within culture: the criminality  of human law (nomos) ironically weds it to Nature’s 
own more fundamental “criminality” or anomie, that primordial effulgence of life, 
death, growth, and decay that acknowledges no laws or bounds and therefore 
constitutes a continual state of crime, “une suite perpétuelle de crimes.” If, in Sade, the 
stasis of human law defies Nature, the movement of Nature both defies and defies this 
defiance.  The criminality of nature for Sade, therefore, is not merely  the self-violation 
of Nature against herself; it is a self-violation with and for herself as well. Nature, as a 
dynamic power of continual motion and change, always already implies self-violation 
in the act of moving beyond herself. If Nature is “agitated” by  movement (le 
mouvement qui l’agite) as the Marquis de Lorsange says, it is because nature is torn 
between herself and herself, being at once the perpetrator and the victim of her own 
crime. This criminal momentum, this torturous agitation, however, is also her 
deliverance and self-realization insofar as Nature is sine qua non this very momentum, 
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this very crime. Life becomes what it is through violating it  is. Nature’s law (physis) is 
to be criminal, and her crime is to be lawful. For both Laure and Sade, one might say 
in philosophical terms that  anomie is the nomos of physis: Nature or “life” traces an 
aporetic limit between interdiction and violation, law and crime wherein one 
paradoxically and commensurately realizes the other.  Both and neither guilty (n)or 
innocent before its own law, nature occupies a marginal, sovereign space that is at 
once beholden to and beyond the law in an eternal struggle with itself.
Like Sade’s nature, the speaking subjects of Laure’s poems turns traitorously 
inward. “Vivre en face de sa lutte intérieure,” she writes. This subject lives as a crime 
against itself, just as all of nature is a crime against itself; the coincidence of law and 
crime, authority and resistance presents a form of struggle not unlike her own as 
advocate (and skeptic) of the French Left.  Yet such coincidences suggest that the 
struggle for power is not simply a Manichean antagonism of dueling interests, desires, 
or parties as understood in normative politics and class struggle. Rather, they exhibit 
the paradoxical power inherent to the subject itself as a site of power. The political 
struggle for power in Laure’s writings is, in other words, the struggle of power 
inherent in the condition of subjection.  Subject to those powers that call the viability 
of subject’s life into question—God, law, nature, the state, etc.—the subject 
nevertheless acquires a certain power of its own that enables it’s very becoming. In 
this way, the speaking subject of Laure’s poetry  is always, at least in part, beyond the 
law in submission to the law.
Crime in Laure’s poetry traverses a threshold therefore between self-realization 
and self-undoing for which the body serves as frequent and appropriate metaphor.  The 
body not only traces the corporeal limit between life and death, but the juridical limit 
of the legal and the illegal.  As Laure and other members of the College of Sociology 
knew, laws and taboos were originally safeguards against sickness and death, 
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protecting the body of the person as well as the “body politic” of the tribe.  The body, 
in effect is the law par excellence: “ton corps/c’est ta Loi.”50  That which either 
invigorates or destroys the body figuratively  represents a place of transgression, a 
crime site. In a letter written to her sister-in-law Suzanne in the 1920s, Laure writes 
“Tu n’imagines pas la joie folle de chaque seconde que j’éprouve à constater mes 
forces entières depuis cet été seulement et je voudrais briser mon corps par mille 
efforts...Ainsi nous pouvons briser toutes les barrières, nous sommes encore limités.”51 
Her invigorating (mes forces), joyful (joie) summer is empowering not  because it 
reconstitutes the body, but because it overpowers crude barriers (barrières, limités) 
like the body. She therefore would like to “break out” (briser) of her body through 
forceful activities. Liberation from the body is a liberation from all limits, limitation, 
the law itself; it is a “corps détaché de toutes les lois.”52
Such transgressions describe therefore a journey that delivers the subject over 
to a criminal alterity, death, and the non-identical. If any identity is to be found on this 
journey, it is always returned to or (re)discovered in a place far and away; in a letter to 
Michel Leiris, she writes “La vie va toujours plus loin—elle se retrouve—ailleurs—la 
même.”53  In parallel to this statement, the following prose-poem announces an 
ambiguous adventure and return:
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et si les malheurs
ou l’extrême malheur
arrive c’est qu’il me sera nécessaire
pour me réaliser
pour aller plus loin
toujours plus loin
et ils parlent de CRIME!54
The precise nature of the crime and misfortune (malheur) remains unclear. The 
misfortune could be that of a martyr or convict’s lament; the “crime” described could 
be that of a virtuous revolutionary or that of a common thief.  Whatever the case, the 
crime and misfortune enable the speaker to continually transgress a threshold of self-
becoming (pour me réaliser), and this threshold is analogous, if not directly related, to 
the juridical threshold of legality  (crime) and the “subjective” threshold of well-being 
(malheur). She therefore does not lament her misfortune in crime but, though a 
forceful parataxis, exclaims a kind of empowering self-discovery.
If each step forward is a “new crime” figuratively speaking, the previous step, 
as part of a series of such steps, is no less criminal, making the journey the subject 
describes is less a voyage from law to crime than a incessant and continual trespass 
from crime to crime. Transgression here becomes the rule rather than the exception—
indeed, the exception becomes the rule—and crime becomes the “law” itself.  This 
incessant transgression reveals the curious paradox by which the law imposes itself 
through a prior crime, thus revealing the original criminality of the law criminally 
transgressed. The coincidence of law and crime in this eternally transgressive 
movement is analogous to the coincidence of selfhood and otherness in the subject’s 
onward journey. Being always elsewhere, always beyond, the law of this journey 
toward self-identity is a crime itself, even a crime to itself; yet as that which is non-
identical to itself, its “criminality” is thus also part of its “law.”  Between both law and 
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crime, beyond both law and crime, the subject can deny the crime it  commits, even 
deny the crime as crime, since crime permits by definition its very own self-violation. 
Thus, a subsequent poem from Le sacré reads: “La plus grande force / accomplir une 
crime / avec la certitude de le nier / devant tout le monde.” To violate the law in crime 
(accomplir une crime) is thus less powerful (force) than to deny the crime is a crime; 
such a denial implies the subject’s own position beyond the law in redefining the law 
itself. A crime is not a crime since the “true” crime both permits and denies its own 
criminality.  Echoing the confrontation described above, the struggle to go ever 
further, to cross thresholds that dare not be crossed, expresses here the paradoxical 
sovereignty of the criminal and fortune of the unfortunate: “Victime / ou coupable / 
Comment dire?”55
In contrast  to the triumph of crime, the speaker in the preceding poem pleads 
for a Machiavellian prince, singular in his power and authority.  Such an ennobling 
authority seems necessary in a life devoid of value and meaning:
Vivre? Plus de sens plus de critère.
Il faut bien introduire une valeur.  
 (Soi) s’imposer? Il faut être Machiavel.
 Au nom de quelles valeurs?
 Il faut rétablir une autorité
 Accuser avec mépris
 (un mépris définitive, qui claque comme une porte)
 le faible.56
As opposed to the weak person (le faible), those deserving of contempt (mépris), a 
Machiavellian prince would presumably have the authority to prescribe values (Il faut) 
and attribute to life its lost meaning (plus de sens). Life, in other words, acquires 
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meaning and value only on the prior condition of subjection.  Whereas the prince in 
his majesty  establishes the value of life, the weak are subjected to his authority and 
values (rétablir une autorité).  Thus subjected, however, the weak subject’s life 
nevertheless becomes endowed with the meaning and majesty  formerly unique to the 
prince. When the prince affords the subject a renascent reason for life, the subject 
thereby acquires a life-value that hitherto did not exist. A certain exchange of value 
takes place in which the subject acquires the value and authority of the prince to which 
it is subject. In other words, the subject at least in part becomes the prince. The poem 
itself manifests this curious reversal. The subject in the poem is ironically subjected to 
none other than itself: the subject itself says il faut, and it is the one who introduces 
the value and authority of value and authority themselves. It is therefore both the 
strong and the weak, the prince and the subject—and yet neither—in the poem’s 
contradictory  pronouncement of power. Life (vivre?) and self-empowerment 
(s’imposer?) remain very much in question: is this life or power that of either, both, or 
neither the prince and/the subject? Given these differing vectors of power, it remains 
unclear whether life has more meaning or no more meaning (plus de sens plus de 
critère) for the speaker. Though a life without apparent value defeats the purpose for 
living, it  nevertheless makes possible the creative revaluation of all values, and thus 
the (re)affirmation of life. As both the subject of and the subject to its own law, as both 
the condition of and for the law, the subjects in the two poems above can thus neither 
indict nor justify themselves. “Vivre enfin” is thus to live, as Laure writes elsewhere, 
“sans s’accuser / ni se justifier.”57  
As these poems illustrate, the sovereign and the subject, like the prince and the 
criminal, are two sides of the same coin. They  commonly  occupy the very same 
juridical space “beyond the law” that yet constitutes the law as such. Likewise, they 
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violate a mortal threshold that nevertheless makes life itself possible. This is the space 
of sovereignty, which, overturning the difference between the juridical and biological, 
is not unrelated to revolution, nature, or the sacred in Laure. In a loosely organized 
text entitled “D’où viens-tu?,” for example, the speaking subject finds the “singular 
value” (c’est la seule valeur) of “prestige” among rotting sewers, cadavers, and dung, 
there where flowers, funeral wreaths, and crowns (couronnes) are found.58   Again 
echoing Blake from “Proverbs from Hell,” death and degeneration here herald the 
advent of new lives, but with these new lives (in death) also comes the singular value 
and prestige of sovereignty.
As explained in Chapter One, the classical notion sovereignty inheres in the 
sovereign’s decision to put his subjects to death without legal consequence.  Of the 
sovereign, Foucault writes for example that “sans ‘se proposer directement leur mort,’ 
il lui est licite d’exposer leur vie.” 59  Similarly, Hobbes (whom Foucault implies) 
writes that “Whatsoever [the Sovereign] doth can be no injury to any of his subjects; 
nor ought he to be by  any of them accused of injustice.”60  Sovereignty, they explain, 
evolved from the Roman law of patria potestas that permitted the pater familias to 
take life, and thereby obversely  grant the “prior” right to life.61  Through the strange 
causal inversion effected by the logic of the patria potestas, the life of the subject is 
never opposed or free from death, but contrarily becomes possible through a prior 
possibility of death at the hand of the sovereign. This suggests that subject’s life 
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depends on the precondition of a death suspended, deferred, or refused—but never 
entirely  removed. Such a subject is therefore always already tethered to death as a 
power that paradoxically enables its life.  Under the power of the sovereign, the 
subject’s potential to live is thus also its potential to die. If the sacred describes a 
certain power able to mediate between life and death, flowers and cadavers, etc., than 
this power is the very same conferred upon the sovereign who decides the fate of the 
subject. The subject, in its turn, “embodies” this sacred mediation as a life lived in and 
through death and, by extension, in and through the sovereign. 
Yet the sovereign’s decision does not merely distinguish him from his subjects 
or life from death; it also suggests a prior state wherein life and death, as well as the 
identities of the sovereign and his subjects, are undetermined. If his decision is the 
sine qua non condition of the sovereign’s power and, by  extension, the subject’s 
existence, an antecedent “communal” situation is implied wherein the sovereign and 
his subjects are undifferentiated before the decision, before the life (or death) that the 
sovereign bestows.  In this state, the potential sovereign and his potential subject are 
both “alive and dead,” suspended within a prior communal state of “indecision” and 
pure potential to decide. In other words, before the sovereign had subjects, he was 
himself a subject in a certain sense, subjected to the decisive condition “beyond” his 
power—i.e., the conferral of decision, subjects, and the state—that nevertheless 
constitutes the power presumed unique and original to him. This prior condition 
reveals that the sovereign was originally not what he is, that  he is an effect of an 
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impossible prior cause, an “other life” that he himself did not bestow, indeed a prior 
“sovereign plurality” that compromises his sovereign unity.62 
Sovereignty in this more “pluralized” sense broaches Bataille’s own notion of 
sovereignty, which he would more fully elaborate several years after Laure’s death. 
Unlike the notion Carl Schmitt advances, Bataillian sovereignty resides not in the 
exceptional power of a single agent, but rather in the deliverance of human existence 
from instrumentality and work, which reduce it to a state of “servile objects” (des 
objets serviles). So delivered, existence remains sovereign insofar as it  maintains a 
certain disindividualized “generality” and, more importantly, shares this generalized 
state with others. Contrary to “traditional sovereignty” (souveraineté traditionnelle) 
which implies the exceptional (l’exception) state of a singular subject (un sujet seul), 
Bataille’s subject “maintenant la valeur souveraine opposée à la subordination de 
l’objet possède cette valeur en partage avec tous les hommes. C’est l’homme en 
général, dont l’existence participe nécessairement du sujet, qui s’oppose en générale 
aux choses.”63  For Bataille, sovereignty  implies a state of multiplicity secretly  inhering 
in the presumed singularity  of the subject, one acquired through self-sacrificial 
experiences, eroticism, and death.
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 Laure’s poem captures the multiplicity implied in Bataille’s notion of 
sovereignty. As the reciprocal repetition of command and self-questioning (il faut /
s’imposer?) suggests, sovereignty here inheres in the repeated act of decision, the act 
that severs (L. de-cidere) selfhood from otherness, the particular from the general, life 
from death--and thereby multiplies them. Decision is, in other words, the performative 
condition of the sovereign’s identity, one that must be reiterated to re-establish “his” 
authority (rétablir une autorité) over and against the subjects that he creates and on 
which he depends. Thus the necessity of decision, the repeated il faut of Laure’s 
sovereign, the “transgressive” returns of her subjects (ramener, revenir, etc.).  Insofar 
as he decides, the sovereign constitutes his identity as sovereign and, by  extension, the 
identity  of the subjects subject to his authority  and values. And these subjects, in their 
turn, assume the authority and value that make them subjects--as part of the 
sovereign’s plurality.  In essence, the sovereign decision decides identity itself.   In La 
part maudite, for example, Bataille writes appropriately that the sovereign “n’ignore 
pas moins les limites de l’identité  que celles de la mort, ou plutôt ces limites sont les 
mêmes, il est la transgression des unes et des autres.”64
 Thus Laure’s frequent conflation of God, Machiavelli, and even Bataille as 
sovereign figures. In different ways, all of them subvert self-identity and the limit 
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between life and death.  In three contiguous poems, for example, she concatenates the 
three, almost as if they were iterations of the same like ivy, earthworm, and ladybug: 
“Christ…Machiavel…Dieu”; “Bataille / Remplacer Dieu / Le Dieu / Machiavel”; and 
“Machiavel / Dieu / Nevrose.” The sovereign par excellence for Laure, however, is 
Christ, though her veneration and understanding of him are far from those of 
normative Christianity.65    For Laure, Christ is more of a contradiction than a savior. 
He is a criminal and yet a king, dead and yet alive, alive as “he who died” for others. 
In what seems to be a brief note for a letter to be addressed to André Masson, Laure 
describes the significance of one of Titian’s Ecce Homo paintings (Figures 3.4, 3.5).66 
Noticeable in her brief note on the painting is the significance of the figure’s lividity 
and the regalia mocking him as king of the Jews. While his pallid face makes him 
morbidly weak, his “reed scepter” (scepter de Roseau) and crown of thorns suggest for 
Laure neither meekness nor mockery but magnitude—indeed the “greatest  strength 
and force”—repeating immediately  below her statement from Le Sacré: “la plus 
grande force [sic] accomplir une crime avec la certitude de le nier devant tout le 
monde.” She embellishes on the title when says (implicating Nietzsche) that Titian’s 
Christ constitutes a “true Ecce Homo” (un veritable Ecce Homo).  This strange 
grouping of Nietzschean (over)man with Christ, God, and Machiavelli suggests an 
171
65  In Le Sacré Laure mentions that her goal is to destroy the saccharine understandings of death and 
sacrifice found in normative Christianity. “But: détruire l’esprit chrétien et ses équivalences” (Laure and 
Peignot,  Écrits de Laure, 122). She rather associates Christ at once with death,  eroticism, and a 
vehement nature, again making Him a figure for transgression and the limits of subjectivity (continued):
 Cela doit être bien irritant ce ver rongeur, sournois qui scie les heures
 Une chienne aux abois hurle à la lune
 (…)
 Petit Jésus je vous donne mon cœur
 La grange toute effritée
 (…)
 la petite fille est là
 qui se branle
 dans le foin.
66  Ibid. See Pontius Pilate’s presentation of Jesus in John 19:5. Titian did a large series of these 
paintings in the late 16th century; some offer a depiction of the crowd during Jesus’  presentation while 
others focus on the condemned Jesus himself. 
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Figure 3.4.  Titian, Ecce Homo. 1548. Oil on slate. Museo 
d e l P r a d o , M a d r i d . I m a g e t a k e n f r o m 
www.abcgallery.com.
Figure 3.5.  Titian (?), Ecce Homo. 1547-1550. Oil on 
canvas. Museo del Prado, Madrid. Image taken from 
www.savevenice.org.  Provenance of painting is unknown; 
attributed to Titian’s workshop of the late 1540s.
“overcoming” or revaluation of Christ’s subjection as a form of sovereignty: if the 
crown, robe, and scepter are an ignominious parody of nobility, they are so only 
because the parody suggests an unlikely  coupling at which the noble and ignoble 
converge.  The thorns and reed signify  that Jesus is the imposter king, the “king” 
identified as “non-king,” the king that is not who he is; though crucified like a 
murderous Barabas, he offers eternal life and the kingdom of heaven; though he dies a 
criminal, his death permits his divine rebirth; though he is murdered, he is also 
sacrificed for sin.  In effect, Christ personifies the paradox of sovereignty itself, 
insofar as he occupies both sides of the limit that divides life from death, the lawful 
from the criminal, the sovereign God from the servile subject.
 Like Titian’s Christ, Laure’s poetic subjects commonly  find themselves in 
precarious positions of empowerment and disempowerment. Neither perpetrator nor 
victim, neither servile nor sovereign—and yet both—they consistently overturn the 
hierarchies of power implied in normative understandings of law, sovereignty, and 
servitude through a constant performative repositioning of their self-identity.  The 
potential of the subject to perform what it is, i.e., the power to become other than it is 
paradoxically through the constraint  of being what it is, describes the very same power 
and potential proper to the sacred. Like the sovereign who’s power is and is not his 
own, or like the creature who’s life is and is not its own, the sacred describes an act of 
self-differentiation, or at least differentiation implied in the act of becoming a self. To 
be a self is also to be an other; it is to act, to perform a role that defines who one is that 
yet, as a performance, defies that definition. 
 The Other Woman. This role-play implies no disingenuousness however; is no 
“actual” identity to be compared to the role that the subject “plays,” since the identity 
of the subject is always a kind of performance in Laure.  In Le Carnet rouge, for 
example, Laure describes her encounters with unnamed intimate relation as a kind of 
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fiction and role-play: “Entrer dans un monde de fiction out tu joueras un rôle devant 
moi dans lequel tu m’assignes un rôle une place délimitée.”67   One here may recall 
Sartre’s classic analysis of mauvaise foi in L’être et néant, where Sartre assigns the 
identity  of a café waiter or the “waiterness” of the waiter in a way  that betrays the 
waiter’s “transcendence” and robs him of true recognition. Whereas Sartre would like 
to posit an identity that transcends the waiter’s role, however, Laure’s statement 
suggests that this ulterior transcendence and recognition are questionable.   Much like 
Sartre in the café, the figure she addresses assigns a delimited role and place to her (tu 
m’assignes un rôle une place délimitée). Yet this assignment itself describes a role (tu 
joueras un role devant moi), such that  one may question if this assignment of roles is 
not itself a role assigned to the addressee.  In such a “world of fiction” (monde de 
fiction), moreover, one may question if these “roles” are truly “roles” at  all: Is this a 
fiction in which these roles are played, or is it a fiction that these roles are played? I.e., 
are the roles they play  a fiction, or is it a fiction that they are playing roles at all? 
Perhaps in such a world of fiction, “true life” (la vraie vie?) has no place or, what is 
more likely, true life is actually nothing but a fiction. This does not mean that such 
roles are mere fiction opposed to true life, but rather that such fiction is the “truth” of 
true life, that identity is nothing but a transient, fictive role that will be played again 
and again along with other roles no less true, no less fictive. Like the ivy that becomes 
an earthworm, or the earthworm that becomes a ladybug, all identities are roles and 
rehearsals of roles that obscure an already-obscured “true life.”
 In Laure, the feminine seems initially  to play a privileged role in this regard. 
Whereas sovereign figures are typically  given a venerable, masculine cast, the 
feminine seems to possess a subversively privileged association with abjection and 
transgression. In a notebook dated from 1937, Laure writes “Combien j’aime une vraie 
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67 Ibid., 198.
putain…Par ma propre faute, par la volonté d’abaissement. Sentiment d’abjection. Le 
‘vaincu d’avance.’ Le ‘tu es poussière et tu retourneras en poussière’ donc ressemble 
dès maintenant à la poussière.”68  Indeed, Sade presents a similar case for women in 
the guise of Justine and Eugénie, whose blasphemies, sodomy, and crime fulfills the 
role nature gives to them. In this context, the feminine in Laure perpetuates the well-
established thematic coupling of the sacred and the feminine found in feminist 
criticism and sociological studies of taboo.69  Yet, a closer inspection of Laure’s poetry 
and prose suggests that the case is no so simple; the feminine actually overturns the 
gendering of the sacred—which in turn ultimately overturns “the feminine” itself.  The 
masculine and the feminine in Laure, in parallel to sovereignty  and the sacred, might 
be envisioned respectively as the opposing extremes of the same circumscribed limit 
of identity—a limit  compromised in this case by the very figuration of gender. Beyond 
this limit, the feminine becomes not masculine, nor even the “feminine-as-other,” but 
rather something other than masculine and other than feminine, i.e., something queer. 
The opposing extremes mentioned above might be compared to those 
describing the tenet of sacred ambiguity, which Laure describes in her notes on the 
sacred: “La vie eut tôt fait de pivoter entre ces deux pôles: l’un sacré, vénéré, adore, 
qu’il faut exhiber…l’autre innommable, sale, honteux, qu’il faut cacher.” Whereas the 
sovereign-masculine would parallel the former, the mysterium fascinans, the feminine 
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69  The history of this coupling is vast; Robertson Smith’s account of menstruation and childbirth in 
Judaism in Lectures on the Religion of the Semites (1899),  Freud’s account of the prohibited maternal 
body in Totem and Taboo (1913),  and Marcel Mauss’ analysis of women as holy gifts in Essai sur le 
don (1923) provide but a few examples. Later in 1949, Roger Caillois offers one of the first explicit 
examinations the sacred, sexuality, and sexual difference in the second edition of L’homme et le sacré in 
his essay “Sex et sacré.” One of the most significant recent studies of this phenomenon is found in Mary 
Douglas’ 1966 Purity and Danger : An Analysis of Concept of Pollution and Taboo. The reception of 
this phenomenon in feminist and queer scholarship varies greatly; Gayle Rubin’s famous 1975 response 
to Mauss’ account of women-exchange in “The Traffic in Women: Notes on the ‘Political Economy’ of 
Sex,” for example,  shows how the trade of women he describes in Essai sur le don undermines gift-
exchange and the sexual equality he advocates. On the other hand, Julia Kristeva seeks to expose the 
subversive power of the sacred-feminine in Pouvoirs de l’horreur (1980) and Le feminin et le sacré 
(1998). 
would contrarily represent the latter, the accursed mysterium tremendum.70  The 
gendered subject thus finds itself between these “religious” alternatives, which seem 
hardly  altogether alternate. In a poem beginning with yet another coupling of 
Machiavelli and God, she writes:
L’homme–Dieu vis à vis de la femme.
La libération?
  L’expression
Impossibilité de…….   
Deux existences qui se ressemblent
      71
Provocative in the definition of “man” (l’homme vis à vis de la femme) is the 
ambiguity  of l’homme as either a universal “mankind” or a masculine subject as it is 
defined by an equally ambiguous confrontation (vis à vis) between two gendered, 
axiological alternatives. Thus several interpretive possibilities for gendered identity 
present themselves in this first  phrase: 1) [humankind qua God] confronting woman; 
2) humankind qua [God confronting woman]; 3) [humankind] qua God confronting 
[woman]; 4) [man qua God] confronting woman; 5) man qua [God confronting 
woman]; 6) [man] qua God confronting [woman].  The first suggests an innately 
divine humanity confronted with the vice of woman. The second suggests that 
humanity describes an ongoing confrontation between a venerable God and 
womankind or even a gentle, feminine God. In the third, a feminine humankind must 
confront an oppressive God in the name of woman. The fourth posits the male as a 
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70  Laure and Peignot,  Écrits de Laure,  131.This is Rudolf Otto’s interpretation of the classic dualism 
described by the sociological tenet of sacred ambiguity, that which he calls the “numinous.” See Rudolf 
Otto, Das Heilige; uber das Irrationale in der Idee des Göttlichen und sein Verhaltnis zum Rationalen 
(Munchen: C. H. Beck, 1963).
71 Laure and Peignot, Écrits de Laure, 177.
divine, sovereign figure in opposition to a presumably accursed womankind. The fifth 
defines the male as an amalgam of the masculine and feminine, the venerable and the 
accursed, and the sixth presents a chivalric masculinity siding with woman against an 
imperious God. The proliferation of possible meanings obscures the relationship  of the 
masculine to the feminine and indeed the very meaning of masculinity and femininity 
themselves; without answers and without respite, the poet asks if there is any 
liberation (libération?) from the search to “express” the “impossible” (impossibilité 
de… ) resemblance between two “existences” (deux existences qui se ressemblent) in 
the violent conflict (écrase, supprime, etc.) between identity  and alterity (l’un / 
l’autre).  As suggested by the ambiguous gendering of man (l’homme) above, it is 
plausible to assume that these two existences are not two subjects, but  rather the 
presence of dueling (gendered) identities (l’homme, Dieu, femme) “internal” to the 
same subject. Such a duel might take place between the “existence” of two competing 
forms of manliness or, for that matter, between competing forms of femininity. 
When the feminine subject of another poem refers to itself an 
“archangel” (archange) on the one hand and a whore (putain) on the other, there is 
therefore an implicit  challenge posed to this axiological opposition. It is worthy to 
note that Laure’s close friends Bataille and Leiris shared a hieratic conception of 
prostitution that overturned the Freudian dualism of madonna-whore72, one that Laure 
expresses when writes in a private diary that she would like to “renouveler le sens de 
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72  See Freud’s early essay “The Most Prevalent Form of Degradation in Modern Life” in which he 
accounts for impotence in men with maternal women. (In Sexuality and the Psychology of Love, Philip 
Rieff trans., New York: Touchstone, 1997, 48-60).
l’érotisme mystique des prostituées chinoises.”73  The kinship between prostitution and 
hierophany, whore and angel emerges as the poem progresses:
Archange ou putain
je veux bien
Tous les rôles
me sont prêtés
La vie jamais reconnue
La simple vie
que je cherche encore
 Elle gît
tout au fond de moi
leur péché a tué
toute pureté 74
If the subject is either an “archangel or whore,” it  is because she is paradoxically both, 
indeed many others (tous les roles), and therefore ultimately none in particular. These 
“roles” are less alternatives for the feminine subject than false binaries obscuring a 
commonality found in religious prostitution and “life” (la vie) themselves. They  are 
transient, secondary, or “ascribed” (prêter), failing to fully  recognize a more 
fundamental vital state that invites all such roles. Life thus goes unrecognized or 
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73  Ibid.,  161. To be sure, this characterization results partially from a romantic conception of the East 
that Laure’s sociologically conscious peers occasionally perpetuated; nevertheless, Jinghao Zhou notes 
that early the in the ancient Shang Dynasty “Chinese men believed that they could gain more yin from 
prostitutes than from normal women. Since prostitutes had sex with many men,  they had acquired more 
yang essence from them. Thus, they could give a patron more yang essence than he had lost” (see 
Jinghao Zhou, “Chinese Prostitution: Consequences and Solutions in the Post-Mao Era,” in China: An 
International Journal 4.2,  2006: 238-262). In L’Age d’homme (1939), published shortly after Laure’s 
death, Michel Leiris notes that “actuellement, ce qui me frappe le plus dans la prostitution, c’est son 
caractère religieux” (Michel Leiris, L'Age d'homme,  2 ed. [Paris: Gallimard, 1964], 63). While sharing 
his belief in the religious character of prostitution, Bataille comes to the opposite conclusion in 
L’Erotisme concerning its more pecuniary modern form, which inheres more in a restricted economy of 
exchange than a general economy of orgiastic excess (see Bataille, L'érotisme, 143-54). Leiris and 
Bataille are implicitly referring to the practice of hierogamy (Grk. heiros gamos), which did not only 
refer to the nuptial bond of marriage; it also referred to the sex acts performed in temples with the 
hierodule, or temple prostitutes, for reasons of hospitality, social duty, sacrifice, or even general 
religious vocation. Different forms of this practice were common in Greece, Babylonia, Sumeria, Egypt, 
and Cannaan. In Genesis 38:21, for example, Judah sleeps with his daughter-in-law Shelah, whom he 
assumes to be a whore; the Hebrew word Judah uses for whore is kedsha, which is cognate with the 
words kadesh (“sanctuary or sacred person) and kodesh  (“sacred place or thing”).
74 Laure and Peignot, Écrits de Laure, 94.
unknown (jamais reconnue), unable to be ultimately subsumed under the false guise of 
such roles.  The ascription of these identities compels the subject to seek out the life 
such roles hide (la simple vie / que je cherche encore), the simple life that lies or rests 
(gît) deep within (au fond de moi). 
Yet this simple life sought suggests another life, perhaps another role, a “life at 
rest” (elle gît) whose script itself goes unrecognized at first.  Again, the life the subject 
seeks “rests deep within” (yet) “at [its] end” (au fond de moi). This, in other words, is 
to say “here lies the simple life,” or “ci-gît la simple vie.”75    The poem masks an 
epitaph, much like the poet’s life masks death, the end of life, a catacomb deep  within 
(au fond de moi). “The simple life,” the life the feminine subject seeks beyond the 
masks of archangel and whore is itself a mask, a mask for death. Does therefore the 
true identity  of the subject’s life rest in death, or is death yet another role ascribed like 
femininity, like life? Life and death—or rather “life” and “death”—are thus much like 
the roles of the whore and archangel, ultimately failing to name an unnamable alterity 
that, like the former life of a cadaver, always “rests” elsewhere.  The feminine subject 
that begins the poem as an archangel or whore reveals itself to be neither simply 
archangel, nor whore, nor even necessarily  “feminine”—and yet all three at the same 
time.  This whore-angel-woman subject is who she is and yet who she is not, who she 
is insofar as she is “not.” She is, in essence, “the other woman.” 
 The poet’s recurrent journey from angel to whore is thus not unlike the journey 
from life to death or selfhood to otherness—and back again.  This journey, these 
journeys that, much like the poem “8,” plunge the feminine subject into the unfamiliar 
and return it to the place of departure reverberate with the classic literary topoi of 
departure and homecoming. Laure’s speakers, like Dante for example, must journey 
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75  Laure frequently exploits the ambiguity of the French fond as both a “bottom, depth” and “end,” 
describing an ambiguous limit between inside and outside. In a letter to Leiris, she writes “je reste la 
comme perdue dans un dessin d’André [Masson] ou sur les pentes de l’Etna…reste la muette “comme 
si rien n’était” étranglé et tout au fond de moi je retrouve une fête magnifique (…)” (Ibid., 266).
into the unfamiliar to become who they are. Dante’s self-realization in La Divina 
Commedia and that of Laure’s poetic speakers are to be distinguished, however. 
Dante’s Hell marks the site of his heroic departure, but for Laure’s subject in the 
following poem, it  signals paradoxically  both the site of the journey is also the site of 
return. Whereas the foreboding entrance to Hell marks for Dante the threshold that, 
once crossed, begins to makes the poet the hero he is, for Laure this marks the 
threshold that makes the “poet” what s/he is and is not:
 Mettre sur ma porte
« Toi qui entres ici
Abandonne tout espoir
de n’être pas
ce que tu es »
ou bien “Ici on vit nu”
 ou nus
 ou nue 76
The poet does not venture to the Hell to begin the journey. Rather, Hell is brought to 
the poet’s own door (ma porte); the poet’s “home” is, as it were, already the journey, 
marking an infernal site of estrangement and self-estrangement, an eternal return to 
oneself, away from oneself. The French porte redoubles this ambiguity  as both a static 
gateway and a carrying-across (Fr. porte, porte-, porter). It is questionable if indeed 
the door is the poet’s door, or even if the poet “is” the poet.   The poetic lineation and 
relative clauses of “abandonne tout espoir / de n’être pas / ce que tu es”--which 
obliquely suggests the subtitle of Nietzsche’s Ecce Homo (Wie man wird, was man 
ist)--provocatively suggest opposing possible meanings: 1) abandon all hope of not 
[being what you are], meaning that there is no hope for overcoming, change, or 
heroism, that the venturing subject will remain the subject it  was prior to entering 
Hell; and 2) abandon all hope of [not being what you are], meaning that identity itself 
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76 Ibid., 115.
implies a hopeless or hellish non-being and otherness.  In the former case, n'être pas 
serves a verb, whereas in the second, it is a substantive; the latter arises as a possibility 
given the multiple possible identities ascribed to the “one that lives bare” (on vit nu), 
which, having “bare life” is also not “one” at all but many (nus, nue), both masculine 
and feminine.  This multiplicity  of (gendered) identities is “found” ironically right 
when and where “one lives” (on vit) on the threshold (porte) that divides the one from 
the many.   Much like the door, “nudity” for Laure also signifies a communal threshold 
between selfhood and otherness, as she writes in Le sacré: “…la nudité—elle est viol 
de soi-même, dénudation, communication à d’autres de ce qui est raison de vivre, or 
cette raison de vivre ‘se déplace.’”77  “Nudity” signifies a form of “ex-posure” that 
makes one available to others (autres) and otherness a communal reason for life 
(raison de vivre).  To be “nude” thus exposes the self to others, the feminine to the 
masculine, life to death, invigorating the poet’s initial hellish “afterlife” with a 
renewed communion with others.   This poem suggests a quasi-Blakean inversion 
whereby a personal hell becomes a possible renewed life with others in heaven.
Conclusion.  Personal identity in Laure therefore describes a state defined and 
redefined as other than itself. In Luce Irigaray’s terms, the feminine in Laure for 
example is indeed “the sex that is not  one,” but not insofar as “she” is sexed feminine, 
but only insofar sexed identity itself always implies a plurality  of identities.  In this 
way, the feminine—which might equally be called the non-feminine, the non-
masculine, or queer—represents a privileged, albeit transient and mutable site of 
identity  construed and compromised in and through a radical otherness.  To be sure, 
this otherness can be performed as one’s power over others in the more “masculine” 
form of sovereignty  and (self-)exception, as in the case of Laure’s Machiavelli or God. 
And yet, this power could not be so performed without one’s prior otherness “within,” 
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i.e., without the power of others that prioritizes the many over the (masculine) one—or 
rather the many as the “feminine” one “that is not one”—and thus forms the basis of 
an ethics. Such an ethics reveals itself to be indissociable from Laure’s revolutionary 
politics as well, insofar as her resistance implies multiple possible subject positions. 
Drawing from Bataille’s own vast work on the subject, this radical space in 
which ethics and politics intersect is what Laure would refer to as the “sacred” state of 
“community” or “communion,” a state of (non-)being that implicates others and 
otherness.  “Le sacré mêlé au Social pour que cela soit  sacré,” she writes, “pour que 
cela soit, il faut à mon sens que cela soit ressenti par les autres, en communion avec 
d’autres.”78   This communion, in its turn, is achieved through the kindred act of 
“communication” for which poetry is the model. “L’œuvre poétique est sacrée en ce 
qu’elle est création d’un évènement topique, ‘communication’ ressentie comme la 
nudité---elle est…communication à d’autres de ce qui est raison de vivre.”79   As 
opposed to literature, which Laure detested, poetry  would be an event (évènement) 
similar to Baktin’s carnival; it crosses the barriers of “authority” and tradition and sets 
upon the path of communal life. As the analysis above shows, this crossing is not 
unlike that implied by  self-identity, (political) movements, nature, sovereignty, or 
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78  Ibid., 88. Laure and Bataille’s concepts of “communion,” “community,” and “communication” are 
largely indistinguishable.  Bataille himself writes in his notes for Le Sacré that Laure’s terminology 
parallels his own. Analysis of Laure’s own literary appropriation of this notion of community,  especially 
as it relates to her relationship to Bataille, can be found in Nadia M. Sahely, "The Laure-Georges 
Bataille Exchange: Celebrating the Dissymmetry of the Couple in Interwar French Thought," Cincinnati 
Romance Review 15 (1996) and Milo Sweedler, "From the Sacred Conspiracy to the Unavowable 
Community: Bataille, Blanchot and Laure's Le Sacré," French Studies: A Quarterly Review 59, no.  3 
(2005). Sweedler offers a more complete analysis of community among these authors in his new book, 
Milo Sweedler, The Dismembered Community: Bataille, Blanchot, Leiris, and the Remains of Laure 
(Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2009). 
79 Ibid., 89. In the notes for Le Sacré (from which this quote is taken) Bataille emphasizes that Laure’s 
sacred is less a sociological or philosophical notion than a “lived experience” (expérience vécue) not 
unlike the “event” to which poetry is compared here (130).  Bataille echoes this sentiment in 
L’expérience intérieure when he writes that poetry is a communal, intoxicating experience: “l’existence 
poétique en moi s’adresse a l’existence poétique en d’autres et c’est un paradoxe, sans doute,  si 
j’attends de semblables ivres de poesie ce que je n’attendrais pas les sachants lucides” (Georges 
Bataille, L'expérience intérieure [Paris: Gallimard, 1954], 136).
femininity in Laure.  All commonly enact the inexorable fusion and diffusion of 
otherness in identity, identity in otherness. One might say  that these are all common, 
even communal possibilities of the infinite potential both implied and performed, 
implied insofar as it is performed, again and again, in and through that which Laure 
calls the sacred.
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CHAPTER IV
AUTOPSIES OF AUTOBIOGRAPHY: INSCRIPTIONS OF SELF-SACRIFICE 
IN MICHEL LEIRIS
Caractère d’intimité du sacré, allié à son 
caractère d'étrangeté. C’est dans le sacré 
qu’on est à la fois le plus soi et le plus 
hors-de-soi.
-Michel Leiris, L’homme sans honneur
 Introduction. Unlike his close friends Colette Peignot and Georges Bataille--
whose evocation of the sacred is singular in its use of “excessive” violence and death--
Michel Leiris offers a more personal, poetic, and surreal vision of the sacred. By the 
time of his participation in the College of Sociology in 1937, Leiris’ writerly 
preoccupations seem to have all but abandoned the ethnography  of the early 30s that 
culminated in his contentious L’Afrique fantôme (1934).  In the late 1930s, four related 
projects--L’Age d’homme, Miroir de la tauromachie, L’homme sans honneur, and Haut 
mal (to which his journal entries may be added)--exhibit common thematic 
investments and make similar pronouncements concerning the sacred, selfhood, and 
the everyday. I would argue that these concerns mark less a historical shift in his 
authorship, however, than an elaboration of the work he began with surrealists in the 
1920s, when he first  met those with whom he would closely collaborate in the College 
years, including Masson, Bataille, and Peignot. In an early  poem from Haut mal 
entitled “Rien n’est jamais fini,” for example, Leiris evokes the vehement operation of 
Nature within him, echoing Peignot’s writing of roughly  the same period; the 
vainglorious violence of this inner torment also takes the tragic form of a bullfight, a 
familiar metaphor he would reprise years later in Miroir (1939).1  Nevertheless, it was 
Lieris’ experiences during the ethnographer Marcel Griaule’s Dakar-Djibouti mission 
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1 Michel Leiris, Haut mal, suivi de Autres lancers, Collection Poésie, 40 (Paris: Gallimard, 1969), 20. 
of 1931-1932--not his surrealist history--that was of primary  importance to other 
members of the College. Leiris personal witnessing of tribal rites in Africa, especially 
animal sacrifice, made him unique among his peers. As Denis Hollier notes in a 2004 
interview, Bataille and Caillois admired him because he had “lived, direct, first-hand” 
experience of the sacred (“expérience du sacré - une expérience vécue, directe, de 
première main”) while in Africa.2  Leiris himself will later admit in Fibrilles that 
ethnography “[s]’avait séduit comme moyen de toucher à des réalités vivantes”3; this 
fact was harmonious with the stated ambitions of the College to practice a “sacred 
sociology,” a discipline that differed from accepted science (une science constituée) by 
including “contagious,” “personal,” and “intimate” accounts of the “présence active du 
sacré.”4 Beyond his initial January  8th, 1938 contribution entitled “Le sacré dans la vie 
quotidienne,” an itinerary of sacred things whose surrealist undercurrents are apparent, 
Leiris would remain a curiously mute participant  in the College, one viewed as an 
ethnographer who left poetry, aesthetics, and surrealism behind, at least until the 
publication of L’Age d’homme in 1939, when familiar surrealist themes like jazz, 
myth, and imagination would forcefully return. 
 Despite these shifts in his writerly preoccupations, it is nonetheless possible to 
trace in Leiris’ work of the 1930s an evolving meditation on subjectivity  and personal 
identity, one which would later become a central feature of his celebrated 
autobiographical auteurism. In what follows, I would like to examine key moments in 
this evolving meditation, not simply to understand Leiris’ diachronic development as 
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2 See Sebastien Gallaire and Denis Hollier,  "Entretien avec Denis Hollier: Le Collège de sociologie, la 
poèsie et le sacré," (http://www.michel-leiris.fr/spip/article.php3?id_article=42). Bataille himself makes 
reference to Leiris’ experience of sacrifice on the February 5th meeting of the College of Sociology 
when he said “selon Leiris, le moment essentiel du sacrifice, le moment de la mise à mort est un 
moment d’extraordinaire intensité” (Georges Bataille and Denis Hollier, Le Collège de sociologie : 
1937-1939 [Paris: Gallimard, 1979], 158). Leiris recounts the sacrifice he witnessed in Gondar and its 
quasi-erotic personal effects on him later in L’Age d’homme.
3 Michel Leiris, Fibrilles, vol. 3, La règle du jeu (Paris: Gallimard, 1966), 290.
4 Bataille and Hollier, Le Collège de sociologie : 1937-1939, 300.
avant-garde author, ethnographer, and poet of the interwar years, but also expose how 
Leirisian selfhood consistently depends on a certain logic of self-sacrifice. As his 
readers know, for Leiris, autobiography is a particularly vital artform of self-creation. 
Indeed, he initially turned to autobiography as a means to fuse literature and life, to 
make artistic creation and self-creation simultaneous if not synonymous endeavors 
which synthetically  transcend the merely aesthetic and broach personal risk, tragedy, 
or even death.  As he states in his first autobiographical work L’Age d’homme, 
autobiography thus understood is “ce qu’est pour le torero la corne acérée du taureau, 
qui seule...confère une réalité humaine à son art.”5  Like bullfighting, autobiography is 
a literary  performance that imperils the artist, bridging the gap between art and life 
paradoxically through self-exposure to the unknown, which exists both in the form of 
the reader and the written “subject” one becomes through writing.  It  therefore follows 
that Leiris most admires those who, like Nietzsche’s tightrope walker in Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra, risk their lives through their art, their means of “making a living.”  Leiris 
expresses a special affinity  for his uncle--himself a tightrope walker--because of 
shared predilection for jeopardy and risk:
Sans vouloir me comparer à lui au point de vue du courage, je me sens 
très proche de cet oncle qui toute sa vie rechercha, avec une constance 
admirable, ce qui pour d’autres n'était qu’un abaissement...tant il avait 
le goût de ce qui est nu et authentique...tant il devait trouver de joie 
aussi à se sacrifier, en cela extrêmement semblable à moi qui ai si 
longtemps recherché (en même temps que redouté)...la souffrance, la 
faillite, l’expiation, le châtiment.6
“Courageous” and “admirable” for Leiris is his uncle’s general willingness to brave 
peril, and this is, to be sure, a virtue that he will associate throughout with the titular 
186
5 Michel Leiris, L'Age d'homme, 2 ed. (Paris: Gallimard, 1964),  10.  For more on Leiris’ practice and 
understanding of autobiography, see Seán Hand, Michel Leiris : Writing the Self,  Cambridge Studies in 
French 70 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).  Hand offers what is perhaps the most 
complete study of the theoretical import of Leirisian autobiography on the concept of self-identity.
6 Leiris, L'Age d'homme, 79-80.
subject: manhood (l’age d’homme). But this manliness is counterintuitive, preferring 
abasement (abaissement), failure (faillite), and punishment (chatiment) to dominance, 
control, or success. It is not his uncle’s fearless triumphs, but that which his uncle lets 
triumph over him that the autobiographer most valorizes.7   In essence, Leiris admires 
his uncle for his power to be courageously powerless; the uncle becomes who he is 
insofar as he can fearlessly, joyfully (de joie) “unbecome” who he is through the very 
act of self-sacrifice (se sacrifier). It is fitting that Leiris champions his virile, acrobatic 
uncle since it is precisely this kind of death qua self-creation that he himself seeks 
through autobiography.
 As the previous example suggests, by  the time of L’Age d’homme, Leiris 
conceives autobiography  to be a literary form of suicide for which self-sacrifice is 
exemplary. In this vein, his stated “désir de m’exposer (dans tous les sens du terme)” 
takes on literary, religious, ethical significance at once. Eschewing the narcissism that 
may be associated with the genre, Leiris is revered for transforming it into a mise-en-
abîme that places the autobiographical “subject” at the limits of authorial possibility 
and possible auto-realization. As such, it does not complete Narcissus’ mortal jump 
into the reflective pool, so to speak, but instead attempts it, suspends it, maintains it as 
a possibility. “Le saut de Narcisse,” he writes, “est un ‘saut de la mort’ qui, 
l’affranchit, ne l’affranchit qu’en l’anéantissant.”8  Autobiography thus becomes a 
quasi-sacrificial act: it is an artistic form of self-creation achieved through self-
abandon to one’s own unknown otherness, that is, the “subject” that one becomes 
through autobiography. When he refers to autobiography in L’Age d’homme as a form 
of “littérature engagée,” it is because the autobiographer “engages” him/herself 
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7 Indeed, I would claim this to be the more general meaning of “virility” (virilité) so often referenced in 
L’Age d’homme, for which Leiris’ prime example is Holophernes. This is roughly the same virility that 
appears in Bataille’s writings of the late 30s in texts like “L’apprenti sorcier,” which similarly concerns 
the subject’s assent to death.
8 Michel Leiris, La règle du jeu, Collection L'Imaginaire (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), 107.
(s’engager) as an unknown other, and this is truly an “engagement” in the largest 
possible sense: it is a form of commitment, departure, and communion. Such an 
engagement is shared by author and audience alike, insofar as the writer broaches the 
autobiographical “subject” in a way analogous to--and thus communal with--the 
reader. By changing the subject (modifier) and helping the subject to realize this 
(prendre conscience), Leiris’ autobiography “introduisit également un élément 
nouveau dans [ses] rapports avec autrui, à commencer par [ses] rapports avec [ses] 
proches.”9  For this reason, autobiography might be said to begin paradoxically with 
others and otherness as well, and it thus must be willing to sacrifice the 
autobiographical self for itself as well as for others, insofar as it can be 
autobiographical at all.  In this way, it is fitting that Jacques Derrida cites in extenso 
the “Persephone” chapter of Leiris’ Biffures in Marges de la philosophie, wherein 
philosophy is likewise thought in relation to its “others.”10  Leiris’ autobiography and 
Derrida’s philosophy are both biffures--crossed-out or crossed-through, that is--by an 
otherness that through crossing continually divides them (biffure, bifur-) between 
presence and absence,  capturing the equivocal play  of identity and difference implied 
in all autobiographical “subjects.” To author a biffure, much like the elided 
pronunciation of “happily” (‘reusement) Leiris discusses in Biffures and elsewhere, is 
not “appropriate”; it is not “une chose à moi” as he says; rather, “il participe de cette 
réalité qu’est le langage de mes frères, de ma soeur, et  celui de mes parents. De chose 
propre à moi, il devient chose commune et ouverte.”11  For Leiris, the biffure of the 
subject is also the subject of autobiography, and this “subject” is therefore somehow 
self-sacrificially suicidal.
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9 Leiris, L'Age d'homme, 15.
10  Drawing upon Leiris’ conceit that an an account of oneself always begins and ends with others in 
Biffures, Derrida claims that philosophy always “penser son autre,” “son autre,” that is, “ce qui la limite 
et dont elle relève dans son essence, sa définition, sa production.” See Jacques Derrida,  Marges de la 
philosophie (Paris: Éditions de minuit, 1972), 1.
11 Michel Leiris, Biffures, La Règle du jeu, vol. I (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), 12.
 Indeed, suicide is a persistent theme in Leiris’ writing, one exemplary in 
highlighting the highly  vital association between Leiris’ literature and life. As Susan 
Sontag has rightly suggested, “it might be said that for [Leiris], life becomes real only 
under the threat of suicide. The same is true of the vocation of literature.”12  Leiris own 
attempted suicide, for example, later becomes the focus of Fibrilles (1956) wherein, 
feeling demoralized after the commercial success of Fourbis (1955), Leiris takes an 
overdose of barbiturates and goes to bed famously stating “tout ça, c’est de la 
littérature.”13   Being suicidal, Leiris was in a state “mariant vie et  mort, ivresse et 
acuité de vue, ferveur et négation” at which he embraced “le plus étroitement cette 
chose fascinante...la poésie.”14 Sentiments like these echo moments in L’Age d’homme 
when he interprets the story of Cleopatra’s suicide like a Freudian dreamwork. 
Cleopatra captures the “deeper meaning” (sens profond) of suicide: “devenir à la fois 
soi et l’autre, mâle et femelle, sujet  et objet, ce qui est tué et ce qui tue---seule 
possibilité de communion avec soi-même...châtiment qu’on s’inflige afin d’avoir le 
droit de s’aimer trop soi-même, telle apparaît donc, en dernière analyse, la 
signification de suicide.”15  As the limit between life and literature, suicide exposes the 
hidden multiplicity masked by  the author’s subjectivity. In Leiris, they are both 
commonly associated with eroticism, aestheticism, and nobility, as the example of 
Cleopatra illustrates. To Cleopatra in turn may  be added the figures of the hero, lover, 
and matador, who similarly  fashion their own deaths nobly in the name of a living 
passion. In his unfinished work Le sacré dans la vie quotidienne (1939), an outgrowth 
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12  Susan Sontag, Against Interpretation and Other Essays (New York: MacMillian, 2001), 66.  Her 
mixed review of Leiris’ L’Age d’homme in this famous collection of essays is useful for understanding 
the text, if not Leiris himself, within the broader context of literary modernism. She indicts the text for 
being “hermetic and opaque, sometimes boring” without, however, giving full weight to the importance 
of hermeticism and everydayness themselves for Leiris and the surrealists (Ibid., 68). 
13 Leiris, Fibrilles, 106.
14 Ibid., 292.
15 ———, L'Age d'homme, 142.
of the essay  he delivered before the College of Sociology, Leiris writes that “la mort 
dont on choisit les conditions (soit suicide...) est moins redoutable que l’autre. Ex. de 
mort noble : tauromachie, chasse aux grandes fauves ; de mort ignoble : assassinat, 
guerre.”16 The autobiographer is noble like Cleopatra or a bullfighter because s/he too 
playfully takes life into his own hands, so to speak, in the act of writing.
 That Leiris champions these figures for their suicidal tendencies, however, 
means ironically that they  will live on, precisely because the act of suicide is never 
properly  “their own.” Suicide heralds another possible life on the horizon of alterity: 
the “life,” so to speak, of the “male and female, subject and object,” etc.  In risking life 
for their art, the acrobat or autobiographer hearken a life greater still as legends, 
myths, martyrs, or heroes.  It is therefore difficult to distinguish suicide from self-
sacrifice in Leiris, since all commonly continually resurrect, and this surreptitious 
resurrection realizes not only  the goal of writing, but the writer him/herself. In this 
vein, it is also possible to think of autobiography  and and other forms of art--poetry, 
myth, fiction, even portraiture--which frequently find their way  into Leiris’ self-
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16 Michel Leiris and Jean Jamin, L'homme sans honneur : notes pour le sacré dans la vie quotidienne : 
transcription et fac-similé (Paris: J.-M. Place, 1994),  15.  It is worth to note that killing others 
(assasinat,  guerre) does not achieve the same effects of self-sacrifice/suicide for Leiris. Given that 
Leiris insists on the disidentification of the subject that occurs in the latter practices, however, one may 
question the extent to which the ethical and valorous death of self-sacrifice can truly be distinguished 
from the sacrifice of others, above all since Leiris insists on a “universal” alterity. By emphasizing the 
idea of suicide and self-sacrifice, the precise motivations and political effects of self-sacrifice are 
secondary concerns for him, though they are typically aesthetic, ethical,  and communal.  Allan Stoekl 
makes a similar observation in his book Politics, Writing, Mutilation:  “Leiris’ [Le règle du jeu] has 
exiled...the most horrifying and unthinkable political alternatives. We might imagine the conjunction of 
the two political extremes in question in an individual...at the moment of his death:..for example, a 
rigorous, rational, and collective political orientation coming up against the passivity of the traitor who 
executes, at the order of the fascists, one of his countrymen. Because both extremes...are embodied in 
the same individual, the person he executes will be himself” (Allan Stoekl, Politics, Writing, 
Mutilation : The Cases of Bataille,  Blanchot, Roussel, Leiris, and Ponge [Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1985], 65). It is worth of note that Leiris does make the following statement in 
L’homme sans honneur,  revealing his own difficulty in distinguishing sacrificial communion from a 
police state: “La communion des flics, dans ce cas, devrait représenter un degré de communion très 
faible; mais est-il bien prouvé que, pour être rudimentaire, cette communion en soit moins 
forte?” (Leiris and Jamin,  L'homme sans honneur : notes pour le sacré dans la vie quotidienne : 
transcription et fac-similé, 58).  In contrast, Bataille is far less apt to distinguish the categories of 
sacrifice and self-sacrifice or the reasons for them, as his controversial accounts of Hiroshima and the 
Leng T’che illustrate.
exposition. When Leiris says, for example, that “l’art  présuppose le refus de la 
condition mortelle,” it does not do so not because it opposes or transcends mortality, 
but because mortality is the sine qua non condition of art’s own immortal refusal, a 
refusal maintained forever in the guise of greater, everlasting life.  Such is the aporia 
of self-sacrifice, which escapes death through a resurrection that nevertheless 
necessitates death itself.
 The immortality of art, of writing, is therefore found less in actual death than 
in duplicity, both in the common sense of deception and in the strong sense of 
doubling (L. duplicitatem). In Fibrilles, this doubling is illustrated to be both temporal 
and spatial. “Je me vois...divisé entre deux durées,” he writes, “[entre] temps de la vie 
et temps du livre, que je n’arrive presque jamais--serait-ce approximativement--à faire 
coïncider.” Lived-time (temps de la vie) is superceded by the time of the book, which 
can only ever be an “approximation” (approximativement) of the former. Analogously, 
the writer-subject and subject-written remain mere faux-semblants of each other, 
because “l’art de se voir du dehors comme si l’on n'était pas soi, faire son portrait écrit 
resterait illusoire...due à ce qu’avant même que la transcription soit achevée la chose a 
transcrire s’est modifiée.” In essence, autobiography is a simulacrum of the writer’s 
life as Other, and yet this Other--as the previous example shows--is always already 
somehow doubled through the act of writing. Through the insistent suppression of the 
subject, the writing of one’s life thus “doubles” as the writing of death which itself, of 
course, can never be written. In its ongoing tangential approach to death, writing can 
thus “peut aussi connaître des paroxysmes et...aiguiller vers un simulacre de mort.”17 
Such writing is not specific to the autobiographer, however; it  is also the “tricherie du 
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17 Leiris, Fibrilles,  204.  This recalls Pierre Klossowski’s famous formulation of the simulacrum, which 
“au sens imitatif est actualisation de quelque chose d’incommunicable en soi ou irreprésentable: 
proprement le ‘phantasme’  dans sa contrainte obsédante." See Pierre Klossowski, La ressemblance 
(Marseille: André Dimanche, 1984), 76.  Leiris’  first publication--Simulacre (1925)--offers a series of 
sordid words, poems, and illustrations that revolve around the familiar surrealist themes of death, 
selfhood, and the unknown.
poète, qui ne joue pas directement avec la mort mais, au maximum, se trouve menacé 
de mort”--a point to which I shall return later. 18  If literature can be as duplicitous as 
Leiris suggests, life--at least insofar as it is suicidal, sacrificial--proves to be no less 
duplicitous, as it opens space for eternally shifting, simulated subjectivity.  
 Emblematic of this doubling and duplicity  are the frequent performative 
contradictions to be found in his writing throughout the 1930s. By the time Leiris 
would concern himself specifically  with the sacred and sacrifice in texts like “Le sacré 
dans la vie quotidienne” and Miroir de la tauromachie in 1939, the stage is set for a 
theoretical formulation of this elusive and equivocal subjectivity he had already 
explored as a surrealist and ethnographer. Indeed, it is this subjectivity that has 
become the center of critical debate: to what degree do Leiris’ surrealist 
preoccupations infiltrate his ethnography? To what degree is he aware of these 
preoccupations in his ethnographic writings of Africa? Does Africa’s foreignness 
represent an unrepresentable, radical alterity, or rather an alterity fetishized and 
appropriated by the fantasies of European science and surrealism? In short, where and 
how does Leiris position himself as a “subject” in his different forms of writing and 
his representation of others? 
 As an ethnographer, Leiris initially  sought to eschew the racist exoticism so 
prominent in interwar France, only later to articulate this exoticism in his own 
ethnographic method and personal aspirations.  This exoticism again arises in his 
fetishized and feminine depictions of Africa which, in turn, challenge phallic and 
phantasmatic desires of fetishism itself. The reason for these contradictions can be 
clarified through analysis of the subjectivity  mentioned above, wherein self-identity is 
grounded in sordid forms of self-expropriation for which self-sacrifice is the model. 
As Leiris’ critic Nathalie Barberger writes, “l'écrivain, dans la posture d’une victime 
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18 Leiris and Jamin,  L'homme sans honneur : notes pour le sacré dans la vie quotidienne : transcription 
et fac-similé, 56. 
sacrée, ne cesse d'écrire le récit de sa mort et de sa résurrection, de se mettre en scène 
en revenant.”19   Self-sacrifice offers a new means of conceptualizing the vexing 
paradoxes of Leiris’ self-reflexive literature as well as his more troubling and 
controversial representations of the Other, including Africa.  To wit, self-sacrifice, 
with its renascent repetitions and deadly detours for the subject, anticipates more 
recent performative theories of identity.
 Human, All Too Human. Many critics have, like Leiris himself, rightly  
questioned if he ever truly parted with his surrealist  preoccupations as an ethnographer 
in the 1930s. Such is James Clifford’s position in his acclaimed The Predicament of 
Culture : Twentieth-Century Ethnography, Literature, and Art, wherein Leiris is 
presented in support of his argument concerning the Eurocentric and colonial features 
of ethnography, a “science of cultural jeopardy” as he calls it, one that much like 
surrealism “presupposes a constant willingness to be surprised, to unmake interpretive 
syntheses, and to value--when it comes--the unclassified, unsought other.” The efforts 
to estrange the familiar--a trend in Leiris’ ethnographic and aesthetic writings both--
are motivations that Clifford convincingly links to surrealism, if not modernism more 
broadly.20  Such estrangement is not strange to exoticism and racist fantasy either, as 
Marianna Torgovnick claims in Gone Primitive: Savage Intellects, Modern Lives. For 
Torgovnick, Leiris’ African expedition only confirmed his shared interwar French 
negrophilia.21 “The real [Africa],” she claims, “fits [Leiris’] image of it, and the site of 
193
19  Nathalie Barberger,  Michel Leiris, l'écriture du deuil,  Objet (Villeneuve-d'Ascq: Presses 
universitaires du Septentrion, 1998), 237.
20  James Clifford, The Predicament of Culture : Twentieth-Century Ethnography, Literature, and Art 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,  1988), 147. Of Leiris and his companion ethnographers, 
Clifford states they “departed in 1931 with a structured aesthetic in mind,  a vision of Africa, and a 
certain (essentially fetishist) conception of how ‘it’ should be collected and represented” (Ibid., 137).  
21 See James Clifford’s article “Negrophilia” in Denis Hollier and R. Howard Bloch, A New History of 
French Literature (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994), 901-8. Clifford cites Leiris’ 
fascination with jazz and “negro” culture as a representation of the avant-garde’s primitivist 
romanticism with African culture. 
‘Paradise’ becomes that of the African woman.”22  Ruth Larson and Denis Hollier, 
however, cite L’Afrique fantôme (1935) and Leiris’ revered ethnography  thesis La 
langue secrète des Dogon de Sanga (1948) respectively as reasons to believe he 
resisted the European political and aesthetic “domestication” of africanness.23  In an 
1988 interview, Leiris himself states that he and the surrealists were anticolonialist 
even before they were Marxist or antibourgeois, though he suggests that such 
sympathies might have partially derived from exoticist fancy.24  Sean Hand, however, 
convincingly  argues a more moderate position regarding Leiris’ journal intime in 
which African otherness offers a means of ethical and cultural self-critique despite (or 
even because) of its surrealist exoticism.25   Debates such as these orbit around two 
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22  Torgovnick here is referring to the Ethopian woman Leiris reports to have fallen in love with in 
Gondar as recounted in L’Age d’homme. See Marianna Torgovnick,  Gone Primitive : Savage Intellects, 
Modern Lives (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990),  112.  Such is also Michael Janis’ position 
in Michael Janis, Africa and Modernism: Transitions in Literature,  Media, and Philosophy, Routledge 
Studies in Cultural History: 6 (New York, NY: Routledge, 2008).
23 See Bataille and Hollier, Le Collège de sociologie : 1937-1939, 97. And Ruth Larson, "Ethnography, 
Thievery, and Cultural Identity: A Rereading of Michel Leiris's L'Afrique fantome," PMLA 112, no. 2 
(1997): 241.  Larson claims that by witnessing and reporting the “theft” of artifacts on the mission, 
Leiris was effectively beginning to distance himself from the extractive ethnography that served French 
colonialism. This move, she claims, anticipates his later attitudes in the 1940s, wherein Leiris argues for 
ethnography in the service of decolonization.
24  Leiris states “basically, we were concerned about the situation of the colonized peoples well before 
we were concerned about the situation of the proletariat...We were much more inclined to be solidary 
[sic] with ‘exotic’ oppressed people that with oppressed living here.” See Sally and Jean Jamin Price, 
"A Conversation with Michel Leiris," Current Anthropology 29, no.  1 (1988): 159.  While there is 
significant credible evidence to assert that Leiris remained a committed anti-colonialist throughout he 
life, the reasons for this, as well as his perception of the colonized and ethnography, would change 
significantly from the 20s to the 50s. For more on Leiris’ attitudes regarding Africa and colonization, 
see Gerard Cogez, "Objet cherché, accord perdu: Michel Leiris et l'Afrique," Homme: Revue Francaise 
d'Anthropologie 151 (1999). and Ruth Larson, "Michel Leiris: Race, Poetry,  Politics: Rereading the 
Mission Lucas," SubStance: A Review of Theory and Literary Criticism 32, no. 3 [102] (2003).
25 Hand’s presentation of L’Afrique fantôme is useful in framing the critical debate surrounding the text 
itself. “The result” of the text,  he explains, “is a dual and sometimes conflicting operation...On the one 
hand, Leiris is drawn immediately to the instances and sites of a distinctly surrealist manifestation of the 
Other, that is, to the sacred and transgressive dimensions of animism, fetishism, [etc.]...on the other 
hand, he simultaneously seeks all the while to comment on these performances of the Other in such a 
way as to map out an existential ethic for his own person.” See Sean Hand, "Phantom of the Opus: 
Colonialist Traces in Michel Leiris's L'Afrique fantôme," Paragraph: A Journal of Modern Critical 
Theory 18, no. 2 (1995): 175.  Sympathetic to Hand’s position, I would claim that it is precisely because 
of the “performance” he speaks of that the “dual” and “conflicting” positions of otherness in L’Afrique 
fantôme subverts the other,  more polemical positions mentioned above. Such performances effectively 
attempt to essentialize a radical alterity that ultimately resists all essentialism. 
related but distinct points of contention concerning Leiris’ interwar writings on Africa, 
including L’Afrique fantôme: the first concerns the role of Leiris’ fetishized 
representations of Africa, as an ethnographer; the second regards the role of 
ethnography--if not  Leiris in particular--in support of French colonialism. If indeed, as 
the critics above have noted, his aesthetic preoccupations as a surrealist are at times 
difficult to distinguish from his ethnographic methods, I would claim that this 
“ethnographic surrealism” anticipated his more self-exploratory writings on selfhood, 
the sacred, and myth in the late 1930s. 
  In the time leading up to the Dakar-Djibouti mission, Leiris’ himself believed 
that ethnography could redress the Eurocentric prejudices that supported racism and 
colonialism. This belief echoed that of Griaule himself, who stated in Documents that 
ethnography in principle maintains distance from its object, even indeed from its own 
methods, in the effort to avoid parochial judgement and prejudice. “L’ethnographie,” 
Griaule writes, “s'intéresse au beau et au laid, au sens européen de ces mots absurdes. 
Elle a cependant tendance à se méfier du beau...Elle se méfie aussi d’elle même--car 
elle est science blanche, c’est-à-dire entachée de préjugés--et elle ne refusera pas une 
valeur esthétique à un objet parce qu’il est courant ou fabriqué en série.”26  Similarly, 
Leiris (initially) thought the presumed objectivity  of “the ethnographer’s eye”--as he 
explains in a 1930 Documents essay of the same name--could redress the prejudice of 
the “mentalité blanche.” His future voyage to Africa, he announces, “doit contribuer à 
dissiper pas mal de ces erreurs et, partant, à ruiner nombre de leurs conséquences, 
entre autres le préjugés de races, iniquité contre laquelle on ne s'élèvera jamais assez.” 
The ethnographer is uniquely  suited to this task, he claims, since s/he places “toutes 
les civilisations sur le même pied et ne considérant aucune d’entre elles comme plus 
valable qu’une autre a priori en dépit de la complexité,” thus making ethnography 
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26 Marcel Griaule, "Un coup de fusil," in Documents: archéologie, beaux-arts, ethnographie, variétés, 
ed. Georges Bataille (Paris: Jean Michel Place, 1991), 46.
itself “la plus généralement humaine, parce que, non limitée--ainsi que la plupart des 
autres--aux hommes blancs, à leur mentalité, à leurs intérêts, elle s'étend à la totalité 
des hommes, qu’elle étudie dans leurs rapports entre eux et non d’une manière 
arbitrairement individuelle.”27  In contrast to the “phantasmagoric” exoticism of 
Raymond Roussel--his foil in this essay--Leiris claims that such a perspective will 
afford him the “best method for acquiring a real, living knowledge” of Africa (une 
connaissance réelle...vivante), the very kind of empirical experience later sought by 
Bataille and other members of the College. As the comments above suggest, however, 
Leiris envisions not only a “real” Africa unmediated by European influence, but 
indeed a kind of mythic proto-reality  before or beyond civilization as such which, as 
seen through the lens of ethnography, reveals a “living” (vivant), “whole 
humanity” (la totalité des hommes).28  For Leiris, therefore, ethnography was initially 
more than a science; it was an ethical project, a humanism, albeit one, as I will show, 
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27  Michel Leiris, "L'oeil de l'ethnographe: a propos de la mission Dakar-Djibouti," in Documents: 
archéologie, beaux-arts, ethnographie, variétés, ed. Georges Bataille (Paris: Jean Michel Place, 1991), 
vol. 1, 407 (emphasis mine). Leiris echos this belief in the preface to the 1950 edition of L’Afrique 
fantôme, where he claims that he wanted to “abattre des cloisons entre lesquelles j'étouffais et élargir 
jusqu'à une mesure vraiment humaine mon horizon. Ainsi conçu, l’ethnographie ne pouvait que me 
décevoir: une science humaine reste une science et l’observation détachée ne saurait, à elle seule, 
amener le contact” (———, L'Afrique fantôme, 2nd ed. [Paris: Gallimard, 1951], 13).
28  In the Predicament of Culture, Clifford associates Leiris and other participants of the College of 
Sociology with what he perceives to be the “essentialist humanism” of the Musée de l’homme. “To 
speak of ‘man’ and the ‘human’ is to run the risk of reducing contingent differences to a system of 
universal essences,” he claims. In support, he cites the following words from Paul Valery, engraved in 
the parapet of the Musée de l’homme (Trocadero) to capture the meaning of this essence: “Tout homme 
crée sans le savoir / comme il respire / mais l'artiste se sent créer / son acte engage tout son être / sa 
peine bien-aimée le fortifie.” While this first passage does evoke the essentialism Clifford describes, he 
fails to consider the rest of the poem, which challenges this interpretation, if not the brand of humanism 
he associates with the museum: “Il dépend de celui qui passe / que je sois tombe ou trésor / Que je parle 
ou me taise, ceci ne tient qu'à toi / Ami n'entre pas sans désir.” As this second stanza suggests, the 
identity of man (l’homme) is a great deal more uncertain, becoming either treasure or tomb, speaker or 
silence depending on the desire of the other (ami). If there is any humanist essentialism to be found in 
this poem from Valery, it is the “essence of human otherness” which, as the final lines suggest,  is quite 
aleatory and precarious. Whatever the broader ideological or cultural impact of the Musée de l’homme, 
it is this more equivocal humanism predicated on otherness that Leiris (like Valery above) evokes in his 
writings of the 1930s. Clifford’s historical argument also does not always give due nuance to the 
College’s authors or the variance in their respective positions on common issues. See Clifford, The 
Predicament of Culture : Twentieth-Century Ethnography, Literature, and Art, 144-5.
predicated upon a mutable sense of humanity.29  Leiris’ is not a classical humanism; it 
inheres not in an ideal human essentialism (as James Clifford suggests), but rather in a 
performative self-estrangement and sacrificial dis-identification for which Leiris’ 
“autobiographical ethnography” is an example.30
  “L’oeil de l’ethnographe” is not his first essay to address the “humanity” of 
the human sciences in Documents, nor is it his first to qualify the meaning of scientific 
objectivity. In “A propos du ‘musée des sorciers’,” a 1929 surrealist  essay vaunting the 
humanism of the occult,  Leiris claims that disciplines like alchemy and magic are 
uniquely “human” because they  seek out the “marvelous” (le merveilleux) and the 
“Absolute” (l’Absolu) in the study of the exterior world.31 The occult sciences, in other 
words, reveal themselves to be “human” practices insofar as they  add subjective 
enchantment to the disenchanting limitations of objective knowledge. As such, they 
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29  Leiris’ colleague and biographer Jean Jamin states likewise that Leiris’ description of the 
ethnographer’s relationship to his/her object evinces a broader ethnical and ontological relationship to 
otherness. Ethnographers “devenir des observateurs observant ces autres qui sont eux-mêmes, à la 
limite cet autre qui est soi-même.” The ethnographer’s position therefore “définit-elle une nouvelle 
position de l’ethnographe par rapport à l’ethnographie, une nouvelle conception de celle-ci: à la fois 
science et morale d’action, connaissance et intervention (engagement dirait-on maintenant) à la fois 
enquête et quête de l'être” (Leiris and Jamin, L'homme sans honneur : notes pour le sacré dans la vie 
quotidienne : transcription et fac-similé, 15). The radical estrangement from the object demanded by 
the ethnographer’s eye, Jamin suggests,  sustains a radical alterity that founds the basis of an ethics. This 
position is generally true and cannot be doubted the case of texts like L’homme sans honneur,  with its 
emphasis on community and communication.  However, given that this alterity is frequently presented 
as paradigmatically African or feminine (in the 1930s) qualifies the more Levinasian alterity implied by 
Jamin’s position.  As my argument suggests,  such alterity is less universal or unqualified than 
continually re-qualified or re-identified through the categories of race, gender, and poetry.
30   “While praising the humanist, progressive aims of the new ethnographic museology,” Clifford 
writes, “Leiris allowed himself a regretful glance backward to the old Trocadero museum, with its 
distinctive ambiance and a ‘certain familiar air (lacking didactic rigidity)’.” This “humanism” for 
Clifford offers a “particular version of human authenticity...All people love,  create, worship. A stable, 
complete ‘humanity’ is confirmed” (Clifford, The Predicament of Culture : Twentieth-Century 
Ethnography, Literature, and Art, 144). As I suggest above, however, this is a mischaracterization of 
Leiris’ humanism (see note 28).
31  The ideas advanced in this essay derive directly from surrealism. Aragon makes mention of the 
marvelous (le merveilleux) in La revolution surréaliste,  and Breton muses in Les manifestes du 
surréalisme that “la peur, l'attrait de l'insolite, les chances, le goût du luxe" are common concerns of the 
marvelous; Breton reprises the idea frequently elsewhere, especially in his discussion of Jacqueline 
Lamba in L’amour fou. See André Breton,  Manifestes du surréalisme, Idées 23 : Littérature (Paris: 
Gallimard,  1973); ———, L'amour fou (Paris: Club français du livre, 1965); and “Idées” in La 
révolution surréaliste, vol. I, 1925.
evince a wholeness, an “absolute” that normative science cannot. In the Absolute, it is 
not only the object of study  that  is made whole,  but indeed humanity itself, insofar as 
it creates a bond between humanity and the world--or even “reproduces the creation of 
the world” (la reproduction de la creation du monde, en plus petit).   They therefore 
resist the “intellectualisme qui amputait l’homme d’une moitié de lui-même” by 
recreating the bonds between subject and object, inner-life and outer world normally 
divided by normative science.32  Given the “human significance” of this practice, it 
ultimately  matters little for Leiris whether such sciences yield objective truth, since 
“ses symboles sont inappréciables au point de vue poétique, donc au point de vue de la 
signification humaine.”33  If aesthetics does not predominate over epistemology in 
Leiris’ humanism, it certainly has a constitutive role to play. The interest of occult 
science lies not merely in the understanding of the material world, but rather in man’s 
unique relationship  to this world, i.e., its “human” value. While the former 
“amputates,” the latter makes whole. Alchemy and the occult are interesting to study, 
he writes, “parce qu’on peut ainsi participer à l'élaboration de cette science humaine et 
se reconnaissant comme telle, science de l’homme, faite par l’homme et pour 
l’homme, qu’il est nécessaire de substituer sans tarder à la science abstraite, morte, 
inhumaine.”34  To study the occult  is essentially to study humanity  itself through 
continually seeking humanitiy’s own otherness, the human being’s own amputated 
human parts. And this, in turn, is a form of study that, contrary to a violent or “dead” 
science, promotes a living, human integrity. As the above suggests, however, such 
integrity  is never entirely integral, never entirely complete, since such a state would of 
course reproduce the inhuman dualism of identity and difference for which normative 
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32  Michel Leiris, "A propos du ‘musée des sorciers’" in Documents: archéologie, beaux-arts, 
ethnographie, variétés, ed. Georges Bataille (Paris: Jean Michel Place, 1991), vol. 1, 112.
33 Ibid., 116. Emphasis mine.
34 Ibid.
science is culpable. Instead, such integrity, if it  is possible at all, can only be acquired 
through the surrendering of the scientific part for a human whole magically and 
mystically infinitely greater.
 Much like ethnography, therefore, the occult sciences harbor “excessive” 
humane value; like the “ethnographer’s eye,” which is able to see beyond the limited 
perspective of a white Europe, so too is the occult able to broaden the limited 
perspective of an inhumane, abstract science. Given this more “human” perspective, 
so to speak, both alchemy and ethnography  constitute true human sciences, indeed 
humane sciences, commonly able to capture (if not create) a synergistic human whole 
greater than the sum of its parts. I consider this to be the very meaning of Leiris’ 
humanism, which is not predicated on sentiment or reason, but desire: to find “the 
human whole” in what is always more-than-whole, indeed more-than-human, that 
“marvelous” or “absolute” otherness that paradoxically both compromises and 
constitutes the wholeness sought. Such is the logic that results from the concept of 
infinity--a concept to which I will later return.
 Despite the shift in his understanding of scientific objectivity from an 
impediment to aid, his conception of the human remains constant, or at least 
constantly inconstant, insofar as it refers to a humanity  always yet to become whole 
through a (partial) otherness. As I will later argue, this is also the function of fetishism 
for Leiris. As such, the human is a form of radical possibility and otherness, always 
open to an infinite multiplicity of identities--raced, gendered, or national--realized 
through self-sacrificial encounters with the strange, exotic, and unknown. This 
“humanism,” which trails throughout his writings as a surrealist, ethnographer, and 
autobiographer, not only forges a thematic link throughout Leiris’ disparate writings of 
the 1930s, but indeed anticipates the self-sacrificial communitarianism her would later 
associate with the sacred. In L’homme sans honneur, for example, Leiris notes that the 
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“caractère d'intimité du sacré [est] allié à son caractère d'étrangeté...parce-qu’on se 
meut, alors, sur le plan de la totalité.”35
 It is therefore both ironic and appropriate that the category  of the “human” 
returns when Leiris questions himself on the Dakar-Djibouti mission. As Michael 
Janis rightly notes, “at some point in his travels across sub-Saharan Africa...Leiris 
finds himself vexingly exotic. Initially lured by the abyss of the unknown...he turns to 
a new abyss, the self.”36  By the summer of 1942, he begins to question the general 
value of the mission which--beside impressing France’s influence on the continent--
was to collect data and artifacts for the musée d'Ethnographie du Trocadéro, the future 
Musée de l’homme.37  As part of his self-examination, Leiris challenges the meaning 
and possibility of the objectivity sought in Griaule’s ethnography. Despite his earlier 
attempts, Leiris ultimately finds such objectivity not only  difficult but--to use his own 
word--“inhumane” (inhumaine). On August 25th, 1932, he expresses his struggle with 
the ethnographic method, which “fait prendre cette position si inhumaine 
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35 Leiris and Jamin,  L'homme sans honneur : notes pour le sacré dans la vie quotidienne : transcription 
et fac-similé, 89.
36 Michael Janis, Africa after Modernism : Transitions in Literature,  Media, and Philosophy, Routledge 
Studies in Cultural History 6 (New York: Routledge, 2008), 53.
37 On March 30th, 1932, for example,  Leiris laments that “le voyage que nous effectuons n’a été jusqu’à 
présent, en somme, qu’un voyage de touristes et ne semble pas près de changer.” The following day, he 
continues: “la vie que nous menons est on ne peut plus plate et bourgeoise.  Le travail,  pas 
essentiellement différent d’un travail d’usine, de cabinet ou de bureau.  Pourquoi l'enquête 
ethnographique m’a-t-elle fait penser souvent à un interrogatoire de police?” (Leiris, L'Afrique fantôme, 
259-60). These sentiments challenge his original vision for the ethnographic mission, which has now 
become more akin to a colonialist tourism, policing,  or industry.  Moments like these, wherein Leiris 
disdains the mission’s methods and achievements, allows critics like Ruth Larson to claim that Leiris 
maintains a critical distance from French ethnography’s colonialist logic, anticipating his later support 
for African decolonization. By recording how some 3,000 artifacts were “acquired” during the mission, 
for example, she claims that Leiris’ journal not only signals the author’s departure from a mythic Africa 
whose phantom grows ever fainter, but also from the colonial logic that Marcel Griaule’s enthnography 
and the Dakar-Djibouti mission itself presumed. Thus, L’Afrique fantôme represents ethnography’s 
resistance to colonization, if not an advance in decolonization itself, challenging the prevalent belief 
that ethnography was wholly the scientific instrument of colonization (see Larson "Ethnography, 
Thievery, and Cultural Identity: A Rereading of Michel Leiris's L'Afrique fantôme." PMLA 112, no. 2 
(1997): 229-42; and  "Michel Leiris: Race, Poetry, Politics: Rereading the Mission Lucas." SubStance: 
A Review of Theory and Literary Criticism 32, no. 3 [102] (2003): 133-45.While Larson’s claims are 
compelling, they are dismissive of Leiris’ ostensible exoticism found in other writings of the period and 
how they might lend themselves to colonialist fantasy.  
d’observateur, dans des circonstances ou il faudrait s’abandonner.”38  To avoid the 
“inhumanity” of the ethnographic observer and become a better ethnographer overall, 
one must abandon oneself (s’abandonner) to certain religious rites and rituals (like 
sacrifice) in order to study them. To abandon oneself to the object of study is to 
become “humane,” and to become so, in turn, is to (re)emerge as a better 
ethnographer. Leiris’ here argues less the unavoidable subjectivity  of ethnography than 
the necessity of the ethnographer-subject to sacrifice itself in order to become itself.
 Even in this radical reevaluation of ethnographic method, however, it is 
nevertheless possible to trace the very same humanism in his claim for ethnography’s 
“inhumanity”: ethnography  becomes inhumane because its insistence on objectivity 
bars the ethnographer from participation in rites that, to be fully grasped, demand the 
cool distance of the scientist be abandoned. The passive reportage of the observer--
which was formerly  the means of transcending subjectivity  in “L’oeil de 
l’ethnographe”--now presents itself a limit to be transcended.  Likewise, on April 4th, 
1932, Leiris writes that  true objectivity  can only be reached at the limit of subjective 
experience in a state of “paroxysm.” The object no longer precludes the subject, but 
rather reveals itself at the height of subjective experience. This will be, he writes, the 
“thesis” of the preface for the manuscript of L’Afrique fantôme, that “c’est  par la 
subjectivité (portée à son paroxysme) qu’on touche à l’objectivité. Plus simplement: 
écrivant subjectivement j’augmente la valeur de mon témoignage, en montrant qu’a 
chaque instant je sais à quoi m’en tenir sur ma valeur comme témoin.”39  The 
ethnographic objectivity  formerly sought in self-denial, self-conscious opposition to 
one’s own subjective bearing, is now found in the attempt to confront the limits of 
subjective observation. The ethnographer subject thereby confers greater value 
(augmenter la valeur) on the object by  reaching paroxysm--i.e., the limit of 
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38 Leiris, L'Afrique fantôme, 433. Emphasis mine.
39 Ibid., 263.
subjectivity itself--for the proper witnessing (témoin, témoignage) of the object 
beyond it. 
 Despite Leiris’ reevaluation of ethnographic method, in other words, the 
“humanism” of ethnographic endeavor remains ironically  quite similar. Whereas the 
humanism of ethnography formerly demanded self-denial through transcendence, it 
now requires complete self-loss through paroxysm. Yet both seek out the same 
“humane” goal: to sacrifice subjectivity in the effort to capture the unique otherness of 
the object. The former method became “inhumane” not because it actually transcended 
subjectivity, but rather because it  reified it; in other words, over and against the 
subjectivity the ethnographer was supposed to deny arose a supervenient subjectivity 
which, through safeguarding the rules of (Griaule’s) method, ironically  limited access 
to the object. Barring thus the ethnographer subject from the alterity  the object 
represents--an alterity which it must nevertheless seek--becomes thus oppressive, 
“inhuman.” The new and true humanity  of Leiris’ ethnographer subject is contrarily 
found in actually ceding itself to the object, it’s other.  And yet, by ceding itself to the 
object in this manner, this subject nevertheless properly recaptures its identity as a 
better or more “humane” ethnographer. In essence, the ethnographer-subject must 
strive for paroxysm and thus abandon itself, sacrifice itself, in order to become itself, 
i.e., the “humane ethnographer.” Indeed this is the very same aporetic logic Leiris will 
later associate with religion, eroticism, and bullfighting, which likewise seek out self-
sacrifice. “Un sacrifice tend vers son paroxysme: la mise à mort,” he writes, “comme 
après la possession de l’objet désiré.”40  Leiris’ more “humane,” “sacrificial” 
ethnography thus differs from Griaule’s insofar as the former does not oppose the 
object to the subject, but rather posits objectivity  within the ethnographer’s own 
subjective horizon as a form of radical self-estrangement. 
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40 Michel Leiris, Miroir de la tauromachie (Paris: Fata Morgana, 1981), 58. Emphasis mine.
 Brought within such a horizon, however, Leiris’ humane self-estrangement is 
no longer strange to personal fantasy, dream, and desire. Such is the double-bind in his 
search to be more objective or humane: the radical alterity of the object gets 
confounded with the desire for this object, recalling the influence of his early 
surrealism. Indeed, Leiris’ stated reasons for going to Africa in “L’oeil de 
l’ethnographe,” L’Afrique fantôme, and L’Age d’homme often eschew the rhetoric of 
benign humanism and indulge in a more dreamlike exoticism. As Leiris suggests in 
“L’oeil de l’ethnographe,” his journey to Africa will be as real as it is fantastic--indeed 
it will make the fantastic real--through
l’accomplissement de certains rêves d’enfance, en même temps qu’un 
moyen de lutter contre la vieillesse et la mort en se jetant à corps perdu 
dans l’espace pour échapper imaginairement à la marche du temps (en 
oubliant aussi sa propre personnalité transitoire par la prise d’une 
contact concret avec un grand nombre d’hommes apparemment très 
différents)...41
To be unbiased and transcend the limited (limitée) preoccupations and prejudices of 
the European observer, Leiris the ethnographer must wholly  project himself into an 
ageless space of escape (se jeter à corps perdu), forget himself (oublier sa propre 
personnalité), and be carried away to a childhood dream (rêves d’enfance, 
imaginarement) or an otherworldly realm--a surreal realm--in which the familiar 
becomes unfamiliar. In essence, the ethnographer must attempt a certain transgression. 
And yet from this elevated, quixotic realm of radical estrangement, he arrives not only 
a “concrete” (concret) engagement with others, but at a more fully human state (de 
manière à devenir assez largement humains) that he wishes his colleagues to share. 
 This humanism resurges in Brisées in his response to Lew Leslie’s 1928 
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41 Leiris, "L'oeil de l'ethnographe: a propos de la mission Dakar-Djibouti," 413. 
minstrel revue Black Birds: “Black Birds nous ramènent très en déca de l’art, à un 
point du développement humain ou ne s’est pas encore hypertrophiée cette conception 
bâtarde, fruit des amours illégitimes de la magie et du jeu libre.”42   In essence, Black 
B i r d s i s m o r e “ h u m a n ” b e c a u s e i t i s m o r e p r i m i t i v e , l e s s 
“developed” (développement), being “magical” (magique), “free” (libre) and, most 
importantly, immanent to true art  (très en deçà). According to a his quasi-Rousseauian 
logic, an undeveloped art ironically leads to a more fully developed humanity. 
Echoing his ironic formulation is the conclusion to “L’oeil de l’ethnographe,” where 
he calls upon his “literary  and artistic friends” to forget their “mediocre, little white 
ways” (médiocres petites manières de blancs) and thereby become, as ethnographers, 
not impartial scientists but the great Songhai hero of legend who forgets himself, 
asking “et moi, qui suis-je?”43 
 Leiris’ “L’oeil de l’ethnographe” thus presents an irony: in pleading for the 
unbiased, humane science that  is ethnography, Leiris evokes the all the racial bias of 
interwar negrophilia.  To become an ethnographer means to forget oneself (as a 
European), to forget oneself is to emulate an African hero, and to become so, in turn, 
is to become “more generally human.” To wit, the self-estrangement and dis-
identification of Leiris’ ethnographer hardly differs from a form of “self-africanizing,” 
however fetishized or fantastic, whereby one becomes “more” than one is 
paradoxically by questioning the “one” that one is (qui suis-je?). The mythic 
“Africanness” so-acquired--one of otherness and self-estrangement--conjures in turn 
all the magic, mystery, and marvel of surrealism. Despite his desire for ethnographic 
objectivity,  Leiris’ passage from 1920s surrealism to the sacred of the late 1930s 
paves a path on which the exotic, the occult, and the marvelous commonly dissolve in 
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42 Michel Leiris, Brisées (Paris: Mercure de France, 1966), 29.
43 Leiris, "L'oeil de l'ethnographe: a propos de la mission Dakar-Djibouti," 414.
what I would call Leiris’ “self-sacrificial humanism.”44 Again, he claims in “L’oeil de 
l’ethnographe” that ethnography is “la plus généralement humaine, parce que, non 
limitée--ainsi que la plupart des autres--aux hommes blancs.” The ethnographer 
traverses the parochial limits of (white) racial, national, and cultural identity in his/her 
pursuit of otherness. 
 This is not unlike the surrealist pursuit of the marvelous (merveilleux), which 
likewise transcends local differences and broaches a universal humanity. Leiris writes 
in his earlier essay “A propos du musée des sorcières” (1929) for example that  “c’est 
ni dans la nature, ni au delà de la nature que le Merveilleux existe, mais intérieurement 
à l’homme, dans la région la plus lointaine en apparence, mais sans doute en réalité la 
plus proche de lui-même.” It is moreover
cette passion du merveilleux dont on retrouve la trace chez presque 
tous les hommes...qui explique non seulement pour une part la 
persistance de l’esprit religieux envers et contre tous les 
démentis...infligés aux diverses religions, mais encore le crédit qu’ont 
rencontre à toutes les époques les sciences occultes, ainsi que les 
pratiques magiques et superstitieuses.”45 
The pursuit of the marvelous, common to (almost) all men (chez presque tous les 
hommes), bespeaks of an intimate yet elusive humanity underlying sacred practices, 
magical, religious, or occult. And this humanity, in turn, is not unlike that of 
ethnographer’s eye or the Africanness of Black Birds: all commonly seek the strange 
within the familiar or make the familiar strange, such that humanity describes not a 
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44  In her article “Poésie/Ethnographie: Michel Leiris et l’Afrique,” Veronique Flambard-Weisbart 
characterizes the sacrificial dimension of this humanism nicely when she states that through his 
“transition du regard subjectif de l'écrivain au regard objectif de l’ethnographe,” Leiris hoped “non 
seulement échapper à lui-même, mais encore et surtout s’ouvrir à une cause plus humaniste” (Veronique 
Flambard-Weisbart, "Poesie/Ethnographie: Michel Leiris et l'Afrique," Francographies: Bulletin de la 
Société des Professeurs Francais et Francophones d'Amerique 2 Special [1993]: 166). The “self-
escape” that enables objectivity and humanism parallels the tropes of self-abandon and self-sacrifice 
found later in L’homme sans honneur and Miroir de la tauromachie.
45  Michel Leiris, "A propos du "musée des sorciers"," in Documents: archéologie, beaux-arts, 
ethnographie, variétés, ed. Georges Bataille (Paris: Jean Michel Place, 1991), 109-10. Emphasis mine.
universal identity, but rather a kind of universal self-estrangement, a “commonly 
uncommon” alterity that precedes and conditions human identity itself.  Thus, Leiris’ 
exoticism and negrophilia serve less to augment the (European) subject through 
fetishistic fantasy than subdue this subject through self-questioning--indeed through 
engaging a certain “marvelous” religiosity, exoticism, or Africanness--within. 
  To the extent that Africa or “Africanness” is a fetishized figure for humanism, 
therefore, it results contrast with those typical of fetishism.  The desires of the fetishist 
do not triumph over “his” trepidation before the threatening object. Instead, the threat 
of the object is realized, even embraced, through successfully compromising the 
fetishist and his defensive disavowal of this threat. Leiris therefore presents a more 
radical form of fetishism that redefines the relationship between the fetishist and the 
fetish.  This fetishism challenges the more normative critical assessment found for 
example in Predicament of Culture, where Clifford claims that Leiris “departed in 
1931 with a structured aesthetic in mind, a vision of Africa, and a certain (essentially 
fetishist) conception of how ‘it’ should be collected and represented.”46   Leiris’ own 
writings on the subject offer greater insight into the unusual consequences fetishism 
has on personal identity.
Fetishism, or Facing the Other. Leiris first advances his own theory of 
fetishism in a brief 1929 Documents essay on Alberto Giacommetti. Whereas 
traditional bourgois art lends itself to what  he calls a fetishisme transposé, an 
adulterated form of the fetish that reifies “moral, logical, and social 
imperatives” (impératifs moraux, logiques et sociaux), “true fetishism” (le vrai 
fetichisme) is something more animated, vital, and erotic. The inferior fetishism 
transposé roughly resembles that of Marx’s commodity  fetish, as it  seems to engender 
or reflect dominant-hegemonic social relationships that Leiris will call a form of 
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trickery (duperie). In contrast to this “fetishism of false-consciousness,” so to speak, 
true fetishism responds to:
amour...de nous-mêmes, projeté du dedans au dehors et revêtu d’une 
carapace solide qui l’emprisonne entre les limites d’une chose précise 
et le situe...dans la vaste chambre étrangère qui s’appelle l’espace.”47
More than a simple erotic, religious, or economic practice, the fetish for Leiris 
signifies love (amour), but this, in turn, belongs neither to the object proper nor to the 
fetishist subject, as it passes outside (au dehors) into empty space (l’espace) while yet 
being trapped (emprisonner) within the fragile shell (carapace) that  defines the 
singularity of the thing (chose precise, situer). 
 The precise character of the fetish’s singularity is highly enigmatic, however, 
since everything else in the description suggests a kind of transcendence or 
omnipresence adverse to the “limites d’une chose précise.” This characterization 
uncannily anticipates Jacques Lacan’s fetish as objet petit a which, much like his 
Ideal-Ego represents less another object or thing strictu sensu than a narcissistic 
projection. Leiris’ comments above suggest the fetish to be a fantastic, albeit empty 
signifier, a sign for nothing but the vacuous “no-thing” (chambre étrangère, l’espace) 
of what Lacan later calls “primary lack.” On the other hand, the fetish object’s “solid 
shell” (carapace solide) and delimitation (limites) might also suggest the phallic 
defensive disavowal, the “je sais bien, mais quand même” as found in the fetishism of 
Sigmund Freud and Octave Mannoni. Whereas in these cases the fetish defensively 
maps the subject’s desire onto the castrating object (in the form of a phallus), I would 
argue that Leiris’ fetishism effects the inverse: the fetish transforms the would-be 
subject through a “face-to-face” confrontation with the object, which represents for 
Leiris a lack both immanent and transcendent.  If normative fetishism describes a form 
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vol. 1, 209.
of disavowal, Leiris’ describes instead a “double-disavowal” that treads along the path 
of a negative dialectics.48
This formulation would come to be more fully articulated in a largely ignored 
and somewhat misunderstood Documents essay, “Le ‘caput mortuum’ ou la femme de 
l’alchemiste.” In this brief essay from 1930, Leiris recounts his correspondence and 
conversations with the American journalist, occultist, and explorer William Seabrook. 
As a writer and an amateur ethnographer in his own right, Seabrook had much to share 
with Leiris, including (according to the latter’s account) his passion for the occult and 
“love of blacks” (les nègres). As Leiris was quick to learn in their 1930 encounter in a 
café near Theatre de l’Odéon, they held more than career interests in common. They 
were both skeptical “en ce qui concerne l'intérêt de la civilisation occidentale 
moderne,” and shared a common belief that one of the greatest singular achievements 
one can accomplish is “l’abolition, par quelque moyen que ce soit (mysticisme, folie, 
aventure, poésie, érotisme...), de cette insupportable dualité établie, grâce aux soins de 
notre morale courante, entre le corps et âme, la matière et l'esprit.”49  In their common 
aversion and redress to this modern Cartesianism, both Seabrook and Leiris turned to 
mysticism and the occult, but whereas Leiris was only a student, Seabrook was an avid 
practitioner. One of the American’s forays into ritual masquerade and disguise was 
documented graphically in a series of photographs sent to Leiris (Figure 4.1), who 
would use them as the centerpiece of “Le caput mortuum.”  
As the very  title suggests, Leiris endeavors to promote the mystical qualities of 
fetishistic practice which, he claims, fuse together the practices of religion and
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48  The castration-complex or Lacanian Real would be fair descriptors for this alterity, though Leiris’ 
himself will defer to Hegelian nomenclature by explaining the fetish to be the Thing-in-itself. Many 
critics (like Derrida) insist that these psychoanalytic categories are likewise phallocentric or narcissistic, 
insofar as they still afford femininity no actual subject-position and privilege the phallus as the “primary 
signifier”; a similar phallocentrism appears in Leiris’ essay, insofar as he identifies with the male 
fetishist’s desire. The results of this desire, however, ultimately subvert this phallocentrism. 
49  ———, "Le caput mortuum, ou la femme de l'alchemiste," in Documents: archéologie,  beaux-arts, 
ethnographie, variétés, vol. 2, 462.
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Figure 4.1. W.B. Seabrook, Untitled. Personal photos 
taken of woman in leather mask featured in Leiris’ essay 
“Le ‘caput mortuum’ ou la femme de l’alchemiste,” 
from Documents 8, 1930.
eroticism. In turn, he implicitly  redresses the “insupportable dualité” mentioned 
above, placing both body and spirit into a common space, indeed a divine space, of 
self-estrangement. Emblematic of this transposition is his example of the dervish 
mystic who confronts the face of God in a vision and recognizes this face to be his 
very own. Leiris’ essay obliquely gestures toward a similar confrontation for the 
Cartesian dualism described above, which is followed by  a series of parallel 
dichotomies between male and female, fetishist and fetishized, identity  and disguise, 
familiarity  and estrangement, God and man. In the self-estrangement effected by 
(Leiris’) fetishism, each of these is categories is ultimately challenged, as is, I would 
claim, the apparent exoticism and misogyny of the examples used.  Other than the so-
called femme de l’alchemiste, three other fetishized examples—a dervish mystic, 
Nerval’s Knight in Aurélia, and Hegel’s caput mortuum—illustrate the “alchemic” 
qualities he finds in fetishism itself. Peripheral to these examples but also implicitly 
fetishized is his love of “les nègres,” reprising his romantic representations of Africa 
elsewhere. Able to transmute identity into otherness, otherness into God, and God into 
identity  qua otherness, Leiris’ fetishism (contra Freud) is unique I argue for its 
embrace of the dismembered subject over the fetishized object or, perhaps more 
precisely, its embrace of the dismembered subject as a fetishized object. In other 
words, Leiris’ fetishism reveals how the fetishistic (male) subject is itself originally 
hardly  more than a dismembered, fetishized (female) object. Insofar as any particular 
thing can become fetishized, the thing will conversely reveal a fetishism prior to 
subjective desire and personal identity. In the masquerade of identity that is fetishism 
for Leiris, each of these is, in essence, the masked alter-ego of the Other--as other. 
This unique formulation of fetishism helps to illuminate the kindred moments of 
exoticism and misogyny found here and elsewhere in Leiris.
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 Leiris’ reference to Hegel’s hermetic metaphor of the caput mortuum is 
illustrative, not only for accentuating the article’s emphasis on mysticism and the 
marvelous, but for anticipating the non-dialectical evocations of identity that would 
predominate later in his work and that of Georges Bataille.  Leiris’ emphasis on the 
“obscurity” and “estrangement” of Hegel’s caput mortuum prefigures the general 
thrust of Bataille’s own famous argument in “Hegel, la mort, et le sacrifice” (1955), 
for example, wherein negativity and death in Hegel are the focus rather than the 
dialectical triumph of Absolute Spirit.  Though Hegel draws widely  from the hermetic 
tradition in advancing his philosophy, the caput mortuum serves as a privileged 
symbol of unresolved dialectics in the Encyclopedia Logic and the Philosophy of 
Nature.50  Hegel first makes mention of the caput mortuum in the Encyclopedia Logic 
in the section entitled “The Second Position of Thought with Respect to Objectivity,” 
the very section Leiris obliquely  references at the end of his essay. In this section, 
Hegel seeks to advance his critique of Kant’s critical philosophy, especially with 
regard to knowledge of the Thing-in-Itself. The Kantian categories of the 
Understanding, Hegel claims, provide for a fettered epistemology, one unable to 
realize full consciousness of the Absolute. The Thing-in-Itself is a privileged example 
in this critique; posited as something that simply exceeds knowledge and 
consciousness, the Kantian Thing-in-Itself takes the form of a “negative” 
manifestation or residue much like the alchemists’ caput mortuum, a useless waste-
product made in the industry of consciousness. Yet Hegel seeks to recuperate this 
waste as a form of dialectical energy by sublimating it, in typically Hegelian fashion, 
into the ongoing march of self-consciousness:
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50  Hegel’s use of the caput mortuum and other hermetic concepts is nicely elaborated in Glenn 
Alexander Magee, Hegel and the Hermetic Tradition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001).  
The thing-in-itself (and here “thing” embraces God, or the spirit, as 
well) expresses the ob-ject, inasmuch as abstraction is made of all that 
it is for consciousness, of all determinations of feeling, as well as of all 
determinate thoughts about it.  It  is easy to see what is left,  namely 
what is completely abstract, or totally empty, and determined only as 
what is “beyond”; the negative of representation, of feeling, of 
determinate thinking, etc.  But it is just as simple to reflect that this 
caput mortuum is itself only the product of thinking, and precisely of 
the thinking that has gone to the extreme of pure abstraction, the 
product of the empty “I” that makes its own empty self-identity into its 
ob-ject.51
In other words, the radical negativity of the Thing-in-Itself, its resolute arrest of all 
“determinate thinking” in the form of a pure abstraction, is itself a determination for 
Hegel, one no more obscure than any other determination. Thus Hegel’s ironic 
sentiment near the end of the section, where he famously states that “we must be quite 
surprised, therefore, to read so often that one does not know what the Thing-in-Itself 
is; for nothing is easier to know than this.”52  The determination of the indeterminate, 
the “abstract,” the “empty” transforms the Thing-in-Itself into a “product” of 
consciousness, and therefore an inextricable part of the common process that 
ultimately  reveals spirit, God, and self-identity to be one. In essence, the caput 
mortuum “masks” the realization of Absolute in Hegel, what one might call the “true 
face” of identity.
 Thus Leiris’ cryptic conclusion concerning the caput mortuum: “tout semble 
pourri quand tout  est régénérée.” Beneath the “deadhead,” the fetishized, degenerate 
masquerade of negativity that is the Thing-in-Itself lies the renaissance of self-identity: 
the fully exposed, naked whole in itself and for itself, according to the Hegelian 
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51  Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel et al., The Encyclopaedia Logic,  with the Zusätze : Part I of the 
Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences with the Zusätze (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1991), 87. See also 
the section entitled “The Doctrine of Essence,” Hegel claims that the negativity attributed to the Thing-
in-Itself is not a useless consequence or byproduct, but rather a constitutive,  internal feature of the thing 
in its “truth,” its “essence,” that makes it a manifestation of the Absolute. 
52 Ibid.
formula. In this vein, it would initially seem that  Leiris himself is fetishizing Hegel or 
masquerading as a Hegelian, seeking to unveil the hidden, fantastic truth beneath the 
dead remains of the caput mortuum. Such would be comparable to Gilles Deleuze’s 
understanding of Freudian fetishism in his essay “Le froid et le cruel,” wherein the 
fetish represents the idealized dialectical resolution of phallic fantasy  and castration.53 
Despite his use of the metaphor, however, Leiris’ purpose is ultimately quite un-
Hegelian. Whereas for Hegel the caput mortuum indicates a misstep  in the alchemy of 
dialectics, a byproduct of false consciousness that, once recognized as such, enables 
the march of self-consciousness to move on, Leiris takes it to be a threshold, a limit, a 
form of abject waste from which identity  itself is derived.54  For Hegel, in other words, 
the caput mortuum is an illusion to be vanquished, a problem to be solved, an error to 
be fixed, since it represents not only the mistaken foreclosure of thought, Essence, or 
the Absolute, but indeed of identity itself and the entire dialectical system upon which 
it rests. It is to be overcome as something wasteful and illusory in the dialectic of self-
identity. For Leiris, however, such illusion and waste represent the vexing, mysterious, 
and enchanting origin of all self-identity in non-identity, i.e. the Thing-in-Itself, that 
which is “énigmatique et attirante autant qu’un sphinx ou une sirène.”55  On the one 
hand fearsome (for Hegel), on the other fascinating (for Leiris), the Thing-in-Itself, 
that which fetishism produces in sacrificing the whole for the part, seems itself sacred, 
a form of taboo at once sexual and religious.
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53  The following passage from Deleuze’s excellent analysis explains the dialectical movement of 
fetishism he finds in Freud: “Il apparaît en ce sens que le fétichisme est d’abord dénégation...; en 
second lieu,  neutralisation défensive...; en troisième lieu, neutralisation protectrice, idéalisante (car...[il] 
se neutralise ou se suspend dans l'idéal, pour mieux annuler les atteints que la connaissance de la réalité 
pourrait lui porter).” See Gilles Deleuze and Leopold Sacher-Masoch, Présentation de Sacher-Masoch, 
le froid et le cruel, avec le texte intégral de la Vénus à la fourrure (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1967), 30.
54  Hegel et al., The Encyclopaedia Logic,  with the Zusätze : Part I of the Encyclopaedia of 
Philosophical Sciences with the Zusätze, 175.
55 Leiris, "Le caput mortuum, ou la femme de l'alchemiste," 465.
 Given this more elusive understanding of the Thing-in-Itself, and despite his 
reference to Hegel, it  might seem that Leiris embraces a more Kantian vision of the 
fetishized Thing-in-Itself as something opaque, mysterious, and unknowable to the 
subject--yet this too is not precise. In contrast to Kant, Leiris seeks this estrangement 
not only in the fetishized Thing-in-Itself, but in the subject-fetishist and the 
consequent self-estrangement effected by  the fetish.  Leiris’ fetishism emphasizes 
neither the unknowable transcendence of the Thing-in-Itself (à la Kant), nor the 
triumphal transcendence of the fetishist’s desire over the object  (à la psychoanalysis), 
nor even the reconciliation of phallic disavowal and castration (à la Deleuze), but 
rather a common estrangement existing before subject and object  are put into 
dialectical relation. This, if any, is the “dialectical negation” Leiris’ evokes in “Le 
caput mortuum”; it  is not  so much the reconciliation of subject with object, the Thing-
for-itself with the Thing-in-Itself, but rather the irreconcilable estrangement each bears 
within and before being for-itself, in-itself. In other words, each wears the mask of the 
Other before the masked other.
 To be sure, the fetishistic violence visited upon women for illustrating such 
otherness in this essay  cannot be understated. Leiris’ critique of fetishism itself 
fetishizes women in violent ways that can be read as either inimical or complementary 
to his argument. He identifies, for example, with the sadistic sexual partner who 
derives pleasure from the masked woman’s pain. Though the dervish or Nerval’s 
knight might illustrate the self-estrangement and divine alterity he sees in fetishism, 
Leiris instead describes a quasi-masturbatory, misogynistic vision of the masked 
woman as she transforms from subject  to object, object to other, other to God in a way 
analogous to the dervish. This vision suggests a sacrifice of the masked woman in 
which the violent means, avowedly cruel (cruauté), sadistic (sadique), evil (satanique) 
end in a form of communion with God: 
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Outre qu’elle souffre sous le cuir, qu’elle est vexée et mortifiée (ce qui 
doit satisfaire nos désirs de puissance et notre fondamentale cruauté), sa 
tête--signe de son individualité et son intelligence--est insultée et niée. 
Devant elle, le partenaire...se trouve en mesure d’user, avec quel plaisir 
sacrilège d’une simple et universelle mécanique érotique! Cette même 
joie que devait ressentir le jeune derviche...en supprimant le visage de 
Dieu pour substituer à celui-ci son propre visage, le partenaire de la 
femme ainsi masquée doit  l'éprouver...Belle comme la vache Hathor, la 
femme masquée telle un bourreau--ou, telle une reine, décapitée--se 
dresse; et, se tenant debout droit devant elle avec sa face devenue celle 
d’un Dieu, le partenaire admire son corps, rendu encore plus 
magnifique par l’absence de visage...la transforme graduellement en 
une sorte de chose en soi obscure...56
A resistant, feminist  reading of Leiris’ scenario above would likely proclaim that 
Leiris’ fetishism is nothing new or different: women are the faceless sex objects, men 
the sadistic sexual subjects who derive pleasure from the woman’s pain. A more subtle 
and sympathetic reading, however, would suggest that the fetish object is ultimately 
not feminine at all. Despite the obvious misogyny of the description, Leiris creates a 
complex series of metonymic equivalences that challenge the dualism existing 
between the male fetishist (i.e., Leiris or the partenaire) and the fetishized object (the 
masked woman). Likewise, the religious and erotic goal of male desire described in 
the narrative becomes enveloped within its violent means. As a result, the sadism and 
misogyny of the vision are more ironical and less straightforward. First, the erotic 
role-play of the masked woman and her male partner is compared to the dervish’s own 
divine self-confrontation, wherein the dualism of male/female, fetishist/fetishized is 
either not found or confounded in the same site of selfhood. As such, it is suggested 
that these sexual partners are parts of a larger whole--i.e., the erotic act, fetishism, 
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56 Ibid. This description continues in the subsequent paragraph wherein he dissects the masked woman 
into crude body parts. These parts, however, recuperate a divine, transcendent “whole” the otherwise 
integral body forbids.  Fetishism is thus “une manière aussi de conjurer les force mauvaises et de braver 
Dieu ou ses succédanés, cerbères du monde...dans une de ses parcelles particulièrement significatives, 
mais qui n’est plus différencié” (emphasis mine). By dissecting the body into parts and “things,” Leiris 
suggests that God is found in what Bataille later called a “base materialism.” See Georges Bataille, 
Œuvres complètes, ed. Michel Foucault (Paris: Gallimard, 1970), vol. I, 225.
even God--that is somehow estranged from itself, just like the dervish is from himself, 
Nerval’s Knight is from himself, or the masked woman is from her true face. The 
actual position of the fetishist partner is also strange, since the masked woman mutates 
into both an executioner and victim (masquée telle un bourreau, ou telle une reine, 
décapitée). These equivalences and reversals suggest less that the mask fetishizes the 
woman for the male-other than that the mask, as it were, accentuates her otherness to 
herself as well as to her partner. While this doubling is the desired effect for Leiris 
(plaisir sacrilège), it  also ironically subverts the privileged position of the woman’s 
sadistic partner as well as Leiris’ identification with him, insofar as the mask 
transforms the fetishized woman into an infinite multiplicity of possible partners with 
mutable genders, sexualities, and subject  positions. The following questions therefore 
arise: does such identification support or challenge the partner’s sadistic, heterosexual 
masculinity? Similarly, does the first-person plurality of “nos desirs” and “notre 
fondamentale cruauté” describe a unified, sadistic, heterosexual, masculine identity, or 
rather a mutable position that traverses the different gendered and sexual identities as 
conjured through the fetish itself? The fetish effects a chimerical assemblage of 
different identities animal and divine, executed and victimized not unlike “un sphinx 
ou une sirène.”57
 Thus the ultimate irony of Leiris’ fetishism: its power and effect derives less 
from masking the true identity  of the object than from unmasking the greater truth that 
there is none in particular. “Depuis la simple parure,” he writes, “il semble bien que 
l’homme, à peine a-t-il pris conscience de sa peau, n’ait rien de plus pressé que d’en 
changer, se précipitant tête baissée dans une excitante métamorphose.”58  Man 
(l’homme) is just as swift to determine his identity as he is to change it; he is always 
“paired” in some sense, beside himself (parure, par, paire). But if this is the case, it 
216
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58 Ibid., 463.
seems unclear which identity, which “skin” (peau) is first noticed (prendre conscience) 
and which is the result of a masquerade or metamorphosis, wherein one “s’affranchir 
de ses étroites limites en revêtant une autre peau.”59  The “skin” so discovered, i.e., 
one’s “original” identity, seems hardly different from the “other skin” (autre peau) of 
masquerade that one assumes immediately  afterward. This suggests that the identity 
presumed original is itself hardly  more than a skin, a playful masquerade, and such is 
the divine nature of Leiris’ fetishism. The sacred quality of fetishism is found 
essentially in its masquerade, its performativity.  
 Indeed, there is no greater evidence for this than the essay itself, which 
performatively contradicts the fetishist through his own fetishism. Like the dervish or 
Nerval’s knight, his masked woman thus confronts herself as he confronts her; each 
stands before the Other as if before God, indeed as God, in combined condemnation 
and apotheosis: she “se dresse; et, se tenant debout droit  devant elle avec sa face 
devenue celle d’un Dieu.”  The French reflexives (se dresser, se tenir) fruitfully 
emphasize the ambiguous subject-object position of the fetishist and the fetish which, 
through masquerade, trade places not only with each other but with divine otherness 
itself. It is thus a form of “true eroticism” (vrai érotisme) which, as he later explains, is 
“un moyen de sortir de soi.”60  With such self-escape and self-estrangement arises the 
queer shift  in Leiris’ fetishism from misogyny to multiplicity, feminine object to 
masculine subject, victim to executioner. 
 Whereas normative fetishism emphasizes the reification of the desired object, 
fetishism for Leiris emphasizes how this transformation itself transforms the subject. 
As such, it ultimately represents a coincident estrangement between the subject and 
object and each to itself. This is, perhaps, the more precise meaning of “love” in his 
essay on Giacommetti or that of L’Age d’homme years later, which represents the 
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“seule possibilité de coïncidence entre le sujet  et l’objet, seul moyen d'accéder au 
sacré que représente l’objet convoité dans la mesure ou il nous est un monde extérieur 
et étrange.”61   Such a coincidence marks not only  transient  meeting of two lovers or 
beloveds, but the divination of oneself and the Other as participants in a common 
masquerade wherein multiple lovers and beloveds become possible for one and all. To 
the extent that  Leiris fetishizes in his writing, he fetishizes others (Africa, women, 
etc.) as much as he does himself, disavowing the identity of the other such that his 
own identity is disavowed. The effects of this double-disavowal are not purely 
negative, however, insofar as it compels ad seriatim an ever-renewed form of identity: 
God, man, woman, victim, executioner. 
 Other Africas. As many critics have noted, Africa is often a frequently  
fetishized figure for Leiris all throughout the 1930s, even after his two-year 
ethnographic journey. At times, this fetishism transcends the playful fancy of 
imagination and broaches the most vulgar racist  or colonialist sentiments. From his 
early essays in Documents to L’Age d’homme, Africa, its peoples, and its culture are 
frequently represented as beatific, prelapsarian, infantilized, and idealized.62  These 
representations of Africa in Leiris’ more aesthetic writings make it  possible to trace the 
tendencies that, by  the late 30s, will more forcefully appear in his writings on the 
sacred, and thus provide cause and context for reconsidering the function and effect of 
such representations.
 Documents offers the earliest traces of the negrophilic fetishism that would 
endure in subsequent years. In the 1929 essay “Civilisation,” written after having seen 
Lew Leslie’s Black Birds at the Moulin Rouge, was a paean to the non-art of “nègres 
américains” which, contrary to the more bourgeois beaux arts, “plongent en nous des 
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62  See Janis, Africa after Modernism : Transitions in Literature, Media, and Philosophy, 52. Janis 
describes the different modes of racist alterity in Leiris’ writings on Africa.
racines profondes et organiques, qui nous pénètrent...communiquant un sang plus 
fort.”63   In the following issue, under the title “Spectacles nègres à New York,” there 
appears a note announcing that Documents is committed to “mettre nos lecteurs au 
courant des nouvelles productions des nègres des Etats-Unis, qu’il faudra...placer au 
premier rang de tout ce qu’on nous donne au monde à voir ou à entendre.”64   In 
November 1929, Leiris publishes two reviews, one of W.B. Seabrook’s The Magic 
Island (on Haitian voodoo) and another of the Parisian show of the Bambara painter 
Kalifala Sidibé. In the Seabrook review, Leiris emphasizes the “hallucinatory 
identification” that occurs between man and animal in Haitian sacrifice. By this point, 
Leiris’ interest in African and negro culture takes a decidedly more mystical and 
religious turn; in the first issue of the following year (1930), he commented on the 
release of several new jazz records, which conjure a sublime “érotisme déchaîné” and 
“caractère d’horreur grandiose”; As a form of music that both frightens (musique à 
faire peur) and seduces (musique à faire aimer), jazz represents “la vraie musique 
sacrée” able to cast entire crowds into a state of trance.65   This “sacred turn” in Leiris’ 
negrophilia, however, will come to complicate the more facile fetishism found earlier. 
 In his 1935 lyric poem from Haut mal entitled “La néréide de la mer Rouge,” 
for example, Africa becomes the fetish object of exoticism par excellence. As the 
analysis above already suggests, however, the consequences of such fetishism do 
challenge the subaltern position of African identity vis à vis European identity, as well 
as any essentialism that could be attributed to either form of identity. The journey  of 
the European voyager in “La néréide,” for example, is indeed exoticized and 
primitivist, but not (by extension) supportive of a cultural logic promoting 
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64 Ibid., 285.
65  ———, "Disques nouveaux," in Documents: archéologie, beaux-arts, ethnographie,  variétés,  ed., 
vol. II, 48. 
essentialism, hegemony, or colonialism.66  The farthest  reaches of Leiris’ exoticist 
revery  ultimately seek not Africa itself, nor even a European vision of Africa, but 
rather I would argue a nameless transnational land for which Europe and Africa are 
either different or confounded.  If Africa indeed signifies an exotic otherness, an 
otherness often quasi-racist or misogynist, it is an otherness affording no secure 
subjective position to the would-be (European) subject. The primitivism of Leiris’ 
Africa signifies less a romantic alternative to European identity than the possibility of 
multiple forms of “Europeanness” and “Africanness,” if not different types cultural 
identity  altogether. In this sense, I would agree with critic Michael Janis when he 
states that Leiris “gives rise to the pivotal questions on Africa and the West [and] the 
metaphysics of the exotic, in the expanded sense of the relation between self and 
other.”67  By  extension, I would associate (for better or worse) Leiris’ exoticism with 
what Victor Segalen has called an “aesthetics of diversity” (l'esthétique du divers), an 
exoticism that is not “une adaptation,” nor “la compréhension parfaite d’un hors soi-
même qu’on étreindrait en soi,” but rather “la perception aiguë et immédiate d’une 
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discours de voyages : Afrique, Antilles (Paris: Karthala, 1999), 25.
67 Janis, Africa after Modernism : Transitions in Literature, Media, and Philosophy, 45.  
incompréhensibilité éternelle.”68 This “eternal incomprehensibility” gets figured in the 
most fanciful forms, but such figuration represents Africa as much as Leiris own 
unknown self, confounding the exotic unknowns both inside and outside that are 
commonly never “perfectly understood” (comprehension parfaite). Both internal and 
external to the subject, Leiris’ exoticism short-circuits the more normative subaltern 
logic according to which exoticism traditionally operates. As Leiris himself states in 
an interview, “ce que j'aime beaucoup, c'est l'Autre qui n'est pas tout-a-fait un autre, 
1'Autre qui apparaît chez vous.”69 As the cases to follow illustrate, this exoticism, both 
distant and intimate, becomes a constitutive feature of what Leiris will later call the 
sacred. “A savoir si, dans le sacré,” he writes in L’homme sans honneur, “il 
n’intervient pas toujours quelque chose d’exotique: idée d’un monde diffèrent, d’un 
domaine sans commune mesure, d’un pays radicalement lointain.”70
  In “La néréide de la mer Rouge,” Leiris sees the journey of his life 
allegorically through the lens of his travels from Marseille and Milan to Dakar and 
Djibouti.  As this vital journey advances, so does the the threat of danger and 
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68  Victor Segalen, Essai sur l'exotisme : une esthétique du divers, Explorations 8 (Montpellier: Fata 
Morgana, 1978), 38.   Segalen’s reevaluation of exoticism challenges its normative association with 
cultural appropriation in the form of racist fantasy. Through the analysis of several colonial short 
stories, he claims that exoticism should be conceived as a kind of irreducible aesthetic encounter much 
like the Kantian sublime. The critical reception of Segalen’s “aesthetics of diversity” varies widely.  In 
her introduction to the English translation,  Yael Schlick claims that Segalen’s essay is a precursor to an 
aesthetics of cultural difference and appreciation.  Edward Said comes to the opposite conclusion, 
allying Segalen with a highly orthodox colonial exoticism in Edward W. Said, Culture and Imperialism, 
1st Vintage Books ed. (New York: Vintage Books, 1994). Clifford’s assessment of Segalen in 
Predicament of Culture has a more mixed conclusion: “Segalen’s program of exoticism is a failure. 
There is no escape; neither is there a stable home. The failure enacted in Segalen’s poetics...is both an 
epitome and a critique of the white man’s relentless quest for himself” (Clifford, The Predicament of 
Culture : Twentieth-Century Ethnography, Literature, and Art, 163). I most agree with Clifford’s 
assessment, and I would group Leiris with Segalen as fellow “troubled” voyagers on “white man’s 
relentless quest”; both paradoxically critique exoticism ironically through committing exoticism in a 
performative contradiction.
69  "Entretien avec M.Haggerty," Jazz Magazine, no. 324, 1984, 35. By this,  Leiris does not mean that 
the other is a narcissistic extension of himself, but rather that the other shares a common alterity 
particular to none. As he mentions earlier in L’Age d’homme, jazz music has the effect of capturing this 
common otherness. 
70 Leiris and Jamin,  L'homme sans honneur : notes pour le sacré dans la vie quotidienne : transcription 
et fac-similé, 30.
dissolution; the greater his distance from Europe, the greater his proximity to death 
and the greater his ambivalent sentiments of fear and fascination. The parallels 
between Africa and femininity likewise become more apparent, tracing a common 
geography  of exoticism, eroticism, myth, and fantasy. Such is the poet’s sole 
companion on this wayward journey:
De l’Atlantique à la mer Rouge
fuyant l’Europe
le voyageur allait sans femme
autre que les idoles pour qui des cierges flambaient dans sa tête
et les sirènes imaginaires nageant
dans l’eau obscure de ses yeux 71
 
In essence, the voyager’s desire is part of both his destination and departure; the sirens 
and idols of his odyssean journey fulgurate in his head (flambaient dans sa tete), swim 
in his eyes (nageant dans...ses yeux), and the vision of this fantastic future fittingly 
substitutes for a wife (femme). Already the feminine, the fantastic, and the unknown 
commingle in the surreal space of the voyager’s imagination. In subsequent stanzas, 
Africa takes the place of this surreal space, evoking a sexist portrait  of a fertile woman 
who willingly exposes herself (se dénuder) and surrenders her bounty: 
L’Afrique se dénudait
rejetant les bijoux qui tintaient entre ses seins proéminents
et des chants la secouaient toute entière
comme un vent de tornade
tandis que le sang lourd des sacrifices coulait entre ses jambes suantes
menstrues éternelles et violentes 72
Leiris seems to present the fantasy  of Africa as self-sacrificing mother who, rejecting 
the “shining jewels between her breasts” (rejetant les bijoux qui tintaient entre ses 
seins) is ready  to be denuded and milked.  Her so-called “blood of sacrifice” (sang 
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71 Leiris, Haut mal, suivi de Autres lancers, 122.
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lourde des sacrifices) is kin to the menstrual blood (menstrues) of a fertile womb 
found between “sweaty  legs” (jambes suantes).  It is as if Leiris is pleading for a 
willing Africa, ready to strip and surrender her fertile womb to a covetous colonial 
Europe. In her work on masculinity  and colonialism, critic Nina Baym has suggested 
that exoticism, like Lieris’ above, often goes hand in hand with masculinist desires 
both colonial and sexual. “The role of the beckoning wilderness, the attractive 
landscape...is given a deeply  feminine quality,” she writes, “where society  is menacing 
and destructive, nature is compliant and supportive.”73
 Challenging this initial interpretation and Baym’s critical position in this case, 
however, is that Africa’s wealth and fertility produce nothing: Africa “rejects” the 
jewels (rejeter), but doesn’t own them, make them, or give them away; she 
menstruates violently, eternally  (éternelles et violentes), but begets no offspring. Its 
almost as if the violent shock of the singing (des chants la secouaient), tornado wind 
(vent de tornade), and “bloody sacrifice” leave nothing of Africa but a catastrophic, 
abject waste of blood and sweat, unfruitful, unyielding, and ultimately useless to the 
would-be colonialist. In this context, the meaning of the pronominal se denuder 
becomes more ambiguous: was Africa stripped, or is Africa “stripping itself” somehow 
as a figure for prodigal waste personified? In the latter case, Africa represents less a 
fruitful and enchanting resource to be exploited than a completely  barren absence, one 
that refuses all productivity and wealth for possible colonial appropriation. Africa’s 
“rejection” and “denudation,” thus understood, become a kind of prodigal (self-)
sacrifice without without redemption. “African identity” thus becomes predicated on 
an exotic otherness, but this otherness is by no means particular to Africa, insofar as it 
becomes shared by the poet voyager.
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73  Nina Baym, "Melodramas of Beset Manhood: How Theories of American Fiction Exclude Women 
Authors," in Locating American Studies: The Evolution of a Discipline, ed. Lucy Maddox (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins U, 1999), 126.
 The proximity  between Africa and the voyager, Africanness and Europeanness 
becomes more apparent in the subsequent stanzas on Gondar and Djibouti. These 
cities commonly evoke a hybrid topography of danger and desire, one that imperils the 
poet through a shared dissolution. In the following stanza, for example, the poet 
voyager and his Abyssinian beloved share a common fate:
Gondar
huttes de paille et de pierres
dans des ruines s'écroulant en morceaux
Des jours durant
j’y fus amoureux d’une Abyssine
claire comme la paille
froide comme la pierre
Sa voix si pure me tordait bras et jambes
A sa vue
ma tête se lézardait
et mon coeur s'écroulait
lui aussi
comme une ruine 74
Gondar is a figure both singular and multiple; in the complex metonymy this stanza 
presents, “it” is at once different people, places, and things referring to a common 
referent that references these references themselves. Indeed the figure of ruins--a 
single place comprised of multiple parts--is much like metonymy itself. At first, 
Gondar is a ruins, with its dilapidated huts of straw and stone, but the sprawling straw 
and stone are also the beloved Abyssinian woman, frigid (froide) and sparse (claire), 
much like, as her name suggests, a foreboding “abyss.”  This ruinous city-woman has 
a torturous effect on the poet, twisting his limbs (tordait bras et jambes), splitting his 
head (tête se lézardait), and causing his heart to crumble (s'écrouler)--just  like the 
straw and stones of the woman and city. All is in common ruin, such that  the identity 
of the speaker is ultimately  itself “ruined”--not only in the sense of “destroyed,” but 
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also in the sense of being simultaneously partial and whole. This compromised 
identity  is likewise seen in the poet’s shifting gaze of the woman, whom he 
subsequently  gazes gazing at him like a Gorgon, imperiling him (A sa vue / ma tête se 
lézardait).  Indeed, Leiris’ Gondar seems fetishized much in the manner of Freud’s 
Medusa, wherein a phallic multiplicity (bras, jambes, pailles, etc.) ironically  betrays 
the absence of the phallus. It  is unclear, however, if Gondar is inscribed strictly  within 
a phallic economy, since the European male speaker, like the Abyssinian, like the city 
itself, are found in a common ruination wherein identity  is made only of broken parts. 
In the end, after all, it is not only the abyssal city or Abyssinian that he sees, but  that 
he sees seeing him; is it this elusive gaze of an other that ultimately resists fetishism, 
or is its elusiveness itself a function of Leiris’ own obscure brand of fetishism? 
Whichever the case, as both the subject and object of the gaze, the poet  would seem 
both the fetishist and fetishized, part and whole, indeed even masculine and feminine, 
European and African. 
 The case of Djibouti in “La néréide de la mer Rouge” is equally equivocal. 
Djibouti offers the very same fetishism and violent femininity found in the figure of 
the Abyssinian. And, likewise, its effects are decisive for the poet  who, beside himself, 
is lured there by his own shadow: 
 Djibouti
magma solaire
que la mer Rouge ronge comme un acide
Les femmes y ont l’odeur du lait de chèvre et la saveur du sel
Vorace chienne
mon ombre infatigable m’y conduit aujourd’hui 75
In contrast to the more pastoral scene in Gondar, Djibouti is a dangerous place of 
infernal heat that even the Red Sea cannot soothe. The “magma solaire” suggests at 
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once the African sun and four major volcanos of Djibouti. Much like the destructive 
sun and volcanoes, the sea likewise “ronge comme un acide.” It is almost as if sun, 
sea, and earth are simultaneously competing and complementary forces of destruction. 
Alongside these threatening forces is ironically placed the erotic of allure of an 
enchanting femininity. By the fifth line of the stanza, which introduces a more 
threatening femininity, it is no longer clear which of the above the “voracious 
bitch” (vorace chienne) alludes to: is it the sea (la mer), the women (les femmes), or 
Djibouti itself, i.e, all of the above? Just when the poet seems to cast Djibouti in the 
form of a femme fatale, his “indefatigable shadow” arises as the unlikely cause for the 
strangely dangerous and desirable place he finds himself in.  Is his shadow, the poet’s 
own Other, in its tireless pursuit for Djibouti, in some sense also possibly a “voracious 
bitch”? In other words, is it Djibouti, himself, or his very own shadow that presents 
the dangerous and alluring femininity found in the lines above?  And does not this 
ambiguity, in turn, suggest multiple possible subject positions for the poet voyager as a 
man, woman, European, and/or African?
 Leiris’ equivocal personification of Africa in “La néréide de la mer Rouge” 
suggests at least two “Africas”: on the one hand, Africa personifies an erotic 
femininity, maternal fruitfulness, and exotic fantasy; on the other, it presents a 
destructive wasteland that denies (colonial) fantasy and appropriation. Despite these 
racist alternatives--the one fantastic, the other fearsome--I would claim that there is 
ultimately  no one or two Africas of which to speak, but many, as the recursive 
metonymic structure suggests. One might say that Leiris’ Africa is a land not only 
foreign to him, but somehow foreign to itself, un pays dépaysé, less because it 
signifies Europe’s Other or the absence of identity than identity’s eternal return. This 
is not unique to Africa however;  there is likewise no single “European,” colonialist, or 
226
ethnographic identity either for Leiris, indeed no particular subjectivity against which 
such Africa(ness) or Europe(aness) could be compared. 
 Much like Africa, jazz offers a similar form of shared self-estrangement for 
Leiris, as his essays in Documents already suggest. Later, in one of his many nostalgic 
moments in L’Age d’homme, he explains that the postwar era assumed a kind of 
venereal religiosity inspired by jazz, with which he again associates a racist 
primitivism:
Dans la période de grade licence qui suivit  les hostilités, le jazz fut un 
signe de ralliement, un étendard orgiaque, aux couleurs du moment. Il 
agissait magiquement et son mode d’influence peut être comparé à une 
possession.  C'était le meilleur élément pour donner leur vrai sens à ces 
fêtes, un sens religieux, avec communion par la danse, l'érotisme...et la 
boisson, moyen le plus efficace de niveler le fosse qui sépare les 
individus les uns des autres dans toute espèce de réunion...il passait 
dans le jazz...abandon à la joie animale de subir l’influence du rythme 
moderne, aspiration sous-jacente à une vie neuve...nous ravageait. 
Première manifestation des nègres, mythe des édens de couleur qui 
devait me mener jusqu’en Afrique et, par-delà l’Afrique, jusqu’à 
l’ethnographie.76
In a paratactic prose that itself reverberates with a jazzy  “rhythme moderne,” the 
magic, danse, orgy, animalism of Leiris’ post-war “possession” is closely tied not to 
the ethnographer’s science, but again to the European’s primitivist fantasy  of 
Africanness.  Within the anomic revery conjured in the description, however, it  is not 
entirely  clear who--or what--is possessing whom. Is the author the one possessed by 
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76  ———, L'Age d'homme, 162.  In the 1950 préface to L’Afrique fantôme, Leiris writes “ces notes 
prises durant mon premier voyage en zone tropicale: répondant à un état d’esprit que j’estime avoir 
dépassé elles ont surtout pour moi valeur rétrospective de document quant à ce qu’un Européen de 
trente ans...poussé à voyager dans des contrées alors assez lointaines parce que cela signifiait pour 
lui...une poésie vécue et un dépaysement,  peut avoir ressenti quand il traversa d’ouest en est cette 
Afrique noire...en s'étonnant--bien naïvement--de ne pas échapper à lui-même...” (———, L'Afrique 
fantôme, 14). Though Leiris admits to failing to “escape himself” (échapper à lui-même), he maintains 
that the trip to Africa was intended to serve as a form of fantasy and escape, one analogous to the 
“edens” he speaks of here in L’Age d’homme. That Leiris refers to himself in the third person is further 
illustrative of the argument here.
primitivism and fantasy, the one unwittingly lead (devait me mener) to an edenic 
Africa, or is it rather the author who “possesses”; is it he who actually “possesses this 
possession” so to speak in rhythmically recounting the jazzy rhythm of a negrophilic 
modernity that so possessed him?77  Leiris’ description here is both a report and a 
performance of postwar exuberance and thus a contradiction, one that through jazz 
crosses the autobiographical gap (niveler le fosse?) between Leiris-the-writer and 
Lieris-the-written. One may  therefore doubt the implied distance sought between the 
nostalgic 1939 Leiris of L’Age d’homme and the negrophilic Leiris of the 1920s. 
While the jazz and Africa are here, to be sure, the subordinated, cultural midwives of 
postwar communal rebirth, they  are also the harbingers of a self-dissolution that forces 
submission (subir) and ravages (ravager) Leiris’ subjective, autobiographical agency. 
In this regard, the elision of the grammatical subject in the concluding sentence is 
suggestive;  it underscores not only his flight of racist fancy, but also a flight from this 
fancy, the self-abandon (abandon) of the subject that paradoxically inspires its rebirth 
(une vie neuve) into an otherness (communion, réunion) for which Africanness, with 
its orgiastic music and colorful Edens, is the exemplar. As such, Africanness--whether 
in the form of jazz, ethnography, bacchanalia, or Africa itself--represents both the 
enchanting means (mode d’influence, moyen) and utopic end (vie neuve, édens, 
jusqu’en Afrique/ethnographie) of the subject’s transformation. The result, therefore, 
is a certain “africanization”--however fetishized or fantastic--of the subject itself 
through such transformative enchantment. For Leiris, Africanness is indeed a form 
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77  In her research on spirit possession in Leiris’  ethnography, critic Irene Albers claims that Leiris’ 
emulation of cultural behaviors (like the case of spirit possession) actually liberates the subject,  hence 
overturning the dualism between subject and object. Concentrating on Leiris’ observation of the zar 
cults in Gondar, she agrees with critical consensus that they “have been described as performing a 
mimetic relation to alterity (Taussig) or as an ‘interpretation of the Other by mimesis’  (Kramer). Re-
enacting the Other leads to a liberation from its power by means of imitation.” I would claim that this is 
also the case for Leiris’  more aesthetic and autobiographical writings of the 1930s as well, which 
exhibit literary representations of such phenomena. See Irene Albers, "Mimesis and Alterity: Michel 
Leiris's Ethnography and the Poetics of Spirit Possession," French Studies: A Quarterly Review LXII, 
no. 3 (2008): 271.
“possession” much like jazz: it represents an otherness operating within one’s identity, 
even an otherness that becomes one’s identity. To become “African,” in other words, 
one must also paradoxically  become other than human, even “inhuman,” and 
“abandon oneself to animal joy” (abandon à la joie animale). Yet such “abandonment” 
means not only that such “Africanness” cannot be attained, but also that there is no 
single Africanness that can result from such abandon. In other words, the primitivist 
representation of African edens and animality  actually  advances, albeit through a 
performative contradiction, an equally performative form of identity  critique in which 
Africa is irreducible to such representation. Yet Leiris’ representation of Africa and 
Africanness (both before and after the mission Dakar-Djibouti) make him distinctive, 
insofar he readily substitutes them--as he does himself--for such alterity.  Such is the 
paradox of Leiris’ exoticism: exoticism highlights otherness, yet such otherness 
transforms the subject that exoticizes through a parallel confrontation with a (non-)
identical otherness within.  Just as Leiris’ his early  exoticism cannot be denied, the 
implicit auto-critique of the subject position that posits these representations, 
therefore, cannot be either.  
 In subsequent years, however, especially after the Mission Lucas (1944-6), 
Leiris would make this auto-critique more explicit and eschew his former exoticism.78 
Africa becomes less an object of admiration and study, less a repository for fantasy 
than a complex geo-political and cultural area of diverse peoples inhumanely 
subjugated by colonial power. To mark the contrast with his Africa of the 1930s, he 
will express regret for his former descriptions and insist on a more sober and mature 
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78 As Ruth Larson explains, the Mission Lucas “marked a turning point in Leiris' relations with Africa. 
Leiris later described how the political, economic, and social problems addressed during this voyage 
required him to look at Africa from a different position from the one he'd had in the 1930s: though he 
still considered himself a critic of colonialism, he was forced, and with considerable effort, he claimed, 
to get rid of his ‘romantisme’.” Leiris’  newfound commitment to the Parti communiste français would 
in part encourage this change of perspective. See Larson, "Michel Leiris: Race, Poetry, Politics: 
Rereading the Mission Lucas," 133.  
understanding of Africa. In his essay “Message de l’Afrique” (1947), he calls this new 
vision Africa an “Afrique bien réelle,” though he cautiously resists defining precisely 
what this is.  Rather than compare Africa to primitivist metaphors of women, edens, 
and mystery, which could potentially essentialize an “inessential” Other, Leiris defers 
to circumlocution and systrophe to articulate the identity of this “new Africa.” Now, 
Africa is described negatively through omission:
Je ne vous retracerai pas ce que fut ce premier voyage de presque deux 
ans en Afrique, ce voyage qui...s’acheva en Abyssinie où j’ai eu la 
bonne fortune de vivre quelques mois dans l’intimité du culte des 
esprits zar, qui rappellent...les Iwa du vaudou haïtien. Je ne vous 
raconterai pas comment, de fil en aiguille et a mesure que je 
m'accoutumais à ce milieu nouveau, je cessai de regarder les Africains 
sous l’angle de l’exotisme, finissant par être plus attentif a ce qui les 
rapprochait des hommes des autres pays qu’aux traits culturels plus ou 
moins pittoresques qui les en différenciaient. Je ne vous dirai pas 
comment, après un second voyage...l’idée mythologique que m'étais 
faite de l’Afrique acheva de se dissiper et laissa place à une Afrique 
bien réelle.79
In the preamble to the 1950 edition of L’Afrique fantôme, Leiris echoes the regrets and 
reservations above and similarly  implies an Africa quite different from the one 
described in the memoir. Again, the “real” Africa that was obscured by  fantasy 
remains obscure due to a similar equivocation:
 
L’Afrique que j’ai parcourue dans la période d’entre les deux guerres 
n'était déjà plus l’Afrique héroïque des pionniers, ni même celle d'où 
Joseph Conrad a tiré son magnifique Heart of Darkness, mais elle était 
également bien différente du continent qu’on voit aujourd'hui sortir 
d’un long sommeil et, par des mouvements populaires tels que le 
Rassemblement Démocratique Africain, travailler à son émancipation. 
De ce coté--je serais tenté de le croire--doit être cherchée la raison pour 
laquelle je n’y trouvai qu’un fantôme.80
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80 Leiris, L'Afrique fantôme, 12. Emphasis mine.
The descriptions of Africa above are more prudent and reserved, deferring rather to the 
enunciation of its incomparable difference from the exotic associations made in the 
mind of a young European (exotisme, pionners, Heart of Darkness, etc.). Leiris now 
emphasizes their local differences (traits culturels) and their plight as victims of 
colonization. Yet he is also careful not to reduce Africa to either a mere sociological 
challenge or a (Marxist) case for decolonization. This “real Africa” (Afrique bien réel), 
so much more than a mere phantom (qu’un fantôme), represents a complex 
multiplicity of traits that can only be represented negatively, through what it is not.  
 This fact reveals however that this “new” representation signifies less a change 
in mode than a change in means. In other words, Africa still represents a form of 
radical alterity, though the representation of this alterity has changed; Africa is now 
de-aestheticized, refusing capture by imagination and metaphor, representing instead a 
diverse multiplicity of “real” people, places, and events that cannot be adequately 
subsumed under the phantasmagoria of exoticist  fantasy.  In essence, Africa is now far 
less essentialized; it  appears to signify a more heteronomous otherness, seemingly 
independent of reference to Leiris’ own problematic subjectivity. Africa is no longer 
Europe’s or Leiris’ exotic Other, but rather somehow other than this Other, as Levinas 
might say. And yet such independence can only  be articulated through a certain 
negation or denial precipitated by the topic of Africa, one that still in effect calls into 
question the limits of Leiris’ own authorial agency and the limits of discourse. That he 
will not speak of his former exoticism, or that he will insist on Africa’s “real” 
difference from it, highlights not only  Africa’s radical difference, but also the self-
differentiation that Leiris must confront in representing Africa, i.e., the confrontation 
between Leiris of 1936 and the Leiris of 1950. This very  confrontation is rendered in 
literary  form through contradictory pronouncements (Je ne vous retracerai pas ce que, 
Je ne vous dirai pas comment) and comparisons (n'était déjà plus, ni même celle 
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d'où), wherein form apparently conflicts with meaning:  “I will not speak of that which 
I speak of”; “Africa is not that which it is.” Negation thus ironically arises as a 
necessary  element of Leiris and (his) Africa both, insofar as it is the only means of 
expressing their commonly inexpressible presence and potentiality.  Leiris’ endeavor 
to evoke an alterity  unique to Africa cannot be achieved without evoking a similarly 
dissimilar alterity in his own account. If Africa is other than Other, in other words, so 
is Leiris in representing it as such.
 While reevaluating the phantasmic Africa of the 1930s, Leiris’ Africa of the 
1940s presents a challenge no less decisive for the representation of identity. Though 
stereotypical metaphors cede to more scrupulous metadiscourse, Africa represents a 
plurality  of identities that ultimately cannot be represented and thus call Leiris‘ own 
authorial representation--if not his self-representation as an author--into radical doubt. 
And this doubt, like the fantasy that preceded it, is grounded in a form of difference 
that not  only  distinguishes Leiris from Africa, but each from itself as a self. Leiris’ 
identity, not unlike Africa, is beholden to an inner-alterity  to which it is sacrificed and 
from which it is estranged. In L’homme sans honneur, this inner-alterity, realized 
through experiences of estrangement, takes on the unknown, nameless name of the 
sacred:
caractère d'intimité du sacré [est] allié à son caractère d'étrangeté. C'est 
dans le sacré qu’on est à la fois le plus soi et le plus hors-de-soi. Parce-
qu’on se meut, alors, sur le plan de la totalité.  Spectacles insolites qui 
vous émerveille, vous dépaysent, vous transportent et devant lesquels, 
pourtant, plus que jamais l’on se reconnaît.81
The self-estrangement characteristic of Leiris and his representation of Africa, 
therefore, come to anticipate not only the concept of the sacred, but also the strange 
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characteristics of its representation. Referenced obliquely, negatively, or 
metonymically, the sacred, allied to its estrangement (allie à son caractère 
d’étrangeté) demands a language that likewise gestures toward the pre-linguistic, non-
linguistic, or silent other, and such is, for Leiris, is the language of myth.
 Poetry, or the Language of Myth.  As the accounts above illustrate, the 
fetishist, autobiographer, ethnographer, and poet  in Leiris all commonly experience a 
sacrificial encounter with a mortal object that repeatedly redefines not only the 
experience itself, but their very identity. The equivocations of language so prominent 
in Leiris’ representations of identity  parallel the equally  equivocal means through 
which identity itself transforms, again and again, in and through sacred confrontations 
with the limits of subjectivity.  To speak, therefore, of a “language of sacrifice” or a 
“literature of the sacred” would appear equally  equivocal, if not impossible, since it 
must not only identify  the fleeting nature of identity  but also how language itself, as a 
means of identification, is itself subject to such shifts of identity and difference.  Such 
a language must expose the very  activity  that  gives rise to the sign, not only to account 
for the sign’s ability, or reliability, to signify something, but to capture the dynamic 
potential of language in its attempt to articulate the inarticulable.
 By the late 30s, Leiris will question the possibility and efficacy of such a 
language. He prefers other, less overtly  linguistic methods of representing the sacred, 
ones that eschew diegesis and instead stress mimesis, action, and performance. As for 
other members of the College, Dionysus becomes the interest and inspiration for all 
things sacred in Leiris; dance, sex, theatre (tragedy), music, and bullfighting impact 
physical life in a manner at once aesthetic, religious, and existential. Like the fight of 
the matador, such “activité passionnelle” represents
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le rythme en matière esthétique, le plaisir pris dans les sports ou les jeux 
(notamment les jeux de hasard) participent à des degrés et à des titres 
divers de cette dynamique émouvante, qui veut que tout  moment durant 
lequel nous nous sentons enfin comme comblés et en accord, vis-à-vis 
aussi bien de nous-mêmes que de la nature ambiante, revête l'aspect d’une 
sorte de tangence, c’est à dire bref paroxysme...situé au carrefour d’une 
union et d’une séparation[.]82
The matador, with his ceremonial and repeated near-death encounters, not only 
embodies but enacts the intersection (carrefour) of life and death, identity (nous, 
union) and alterity (nature, separation) found in paroxysm, the state of sacrifice itself: 
“La corrida, tel un sacrifice,” writes Leiris, “tend vers son paroxysme” (Figure 4.2).83 
Analogous to Leiris’ acrobatic uncle, Leiris’ matador becomes heroic for willingness 
to sacrifice himself repeatedly in the performance of his art, not for his triumphal 
slaughter of the bull. Indeed, in the moment of paroxysm, the moment of sacrifice, the 
bull and the bullfighter confront the same mortal threat. “Homme et taureau sont  posés 
l’un devant l’autre,” Leiris explains, “dans un absolu dépouillement...comme s’il 
importait  qu’ils prennent mutuellement leur mesure avant l'épisode finale ou la 
précipitation des contraires l’un dans l’autre (équilibre de la frénésie, fusion mortelle 
du matador et du taureau) s’exprime par la palpitation.”84
 Frenzy, fusion, palpitation, precipitation: the action of the bullfight is well-
suited to capture the dynamism of sacrifice, especially  in the dramatic form of tragedy 
(l'épisode finale, mortelle). Both aesthetic and religious, the bullfight “se dérouler 
suivant un schéma analogue à celui de la tragédie antique” because, among other 
reasons, “toutes les actions accomplies sont des préparatifs techniques ou cérémoniels 
pour la mort publique du héros, qui n’est autre que ce demi-dieu bestial, le taureau.”85 
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83 Ibid., 58.
84 Ibid., 60-1.
85 Ibid., 31.
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Figure 4.2. André Masson, Untitled (Illustration for Miroir de la tauromachie), 
1938. Masson’s illustrations for Leiris essay obfuscate the different figures and 
elements of the bullfight in order to highlight the associated “aspect d’une sorte 
de tangence, c’est à dire bref paroxysme...situé au carrefour d’une union et d’une 
séparation.”
In the mortal conflict of the bullfight, the bull for Leiris is just as likely to become the 
tragic hero as the matador, insofar as it too, especially in those moments of mortal 
confrontation, is likewise both the perpetrator and victim of the same dramatic action. 
Contrasting with and complementing the tragic result of this drama, however, are its 
more scripted, ritualized (cérémoniels) movements, which for Leiris broach a mythic 
dimension well beyond that of the common sporting event or artform:
Dans la passe tauromachique le torero, en somme, avec ses évolutions 
calculées, sa science, sa technique, représente la beauté géométrique 
surhumaine, l'archétype, l’idée platonicienne. Cette beauté [est] tout 
idéale, intemporelle, comparable seulement à l’harmonie des astres.86  
This more Apollonien dimension of the bullfight, that which passes into a recognizable 
regimen, form, or structure, transforms the transience of the ceremonial confrontation 
into a timeless, venerable act, one whose pattern make it subject to infinite repetition 
like the 
tensions suivies de détentes, pareilles succession de rapprochements et 
d'écarts, pareilles montagnes russes d’ascension et de descentes [,] 
l’alternance des processus de sacralisation et  de désacralisation inhérente à 
toutes les opérations proprement religieuses.87 
Retold as a narrative--which itself exhibits structural patterns--the ritual bullfight 
becomes an analogously structured account of heroic deeds both repeated and 
repetitive, transforming the rite into a veritable form of mythopoeisis. Indeed, Leiris’ 
matador in Miroir de la tauromachie is compared at once to Icarus, Don Juan, and 
Milton’s Satan. If repetition is a constitutive element of religious ritual, so too 
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fois l’ivresse” (Ibid., 51).
therefore is reiteration an essential component of myth as the regulated expression of 
such ritual.  As such, myth becomes literary complement of ritual, insofar as “le mythe 
n’a de réalité qu’en raison du rite auquel il est lié.”88
 I would claim therefore that it is this performative quality  of myth, its necessity  
to be retold that, for Leiris, makes it privileged in the literary representation of the 
sacred. If it faithfully adheres to its origins in ritual and drama, myth--even in the form 
of art or poetry--can overturn the mediation implied in diegetic representation through 
a kind of simultaneous active (re)creation. In other words, myth is or should remain as 
mimetic as possible, reiterating the repetitions inherent in ritual such that the 
reiteration itself becomes ritualized, a form of action, even a speech-act. As such, it 
retains a certain dramatic quality, insofar as it involves an act (Grk. dromenon,”to do,” 
“to accomplish”) of recreation rather than a passive form of representation. In 
L’homme sans honneur, Leiris considers the latter to be the case for the poet and 
modern poetry, which are “cowardly” (lache) insofar as they use the myth-makers 
rather than become myth-makers themselves. Poetry is no longer properly  “dramatic,” 
because it appropriates the sacrificial risks made by myth-makers:
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ritual and myth thus becomes apparent. See Robert Alan Segal, The Myth and Ritual Theory : an 
Anthology (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers, 1998). 
Pourquoi je n'écris pas plus souvent de poèmes? Parce que l’activité 
poétique suppose un tel mythe héroïque, au moins une conscience tragique 
des choses qui ne se retourne pas en pur et simple écrasement. Le poète 
est, essentiellement, quelqu’un qui sent, prend conscience et domine--qui 
domine, transmue son déchirement.89
Poetry reappropriates myth (prendre conscience, dominer) in a manner that betrays 
myth’s connection to the myth-maker’s self-sacrificial act (écrasement, déchirement). 
This “false” reappropriation takes, for example, the reified form of literary celebrity 
and bellelettrism, as well as the use of established myths.  “Le poète n’est  plus 
aujourd’hui un créateur de mythes,” he writes; “Il prend pour sujet son propre mythe, 
Il se forge, et forge, un ‘mythe de la création.”90  In contrast to this inferior form of 
“poesié fictive,” Leiris advances in L’homme sans honneur a new approach to poetry 
that would make it more proximate to creating myth. Echoing the ancient philosophic 
distinction between mythos and logos, he writes that myth “peut être regardé comme 
essentiellement poétique en tant qu’il est  situé aux antipodes de la pensée discursive.” 
“Essentially poetic,” that is, insofar as myth illustrates and remains faithful to its 
origin in poieisis, i.e., the creative act that allows the litterateur to transform him/
herself into a myth-maker (un créateur de mythes) rather than a mere myth-teller.91 
This “mythic poetry” (poésie mythique), written by what he elsewhere calls “the true 
poet” (vrai poète), would be someone who treats “le langage comme une chose 
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et fac-similé, 62.
90 Ibid., 11.
91  Ibid., 113.  Bataille makes the same distinction in L’impossible, whose original title was to be La 
haine de la poésie.  What he calls “true poetry” (la poésie veritable) evokes those experiences associated 
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since it insists on a form of articulation beyond the limits of subjectivity and language. This stands in 
contrast to the conventional understanding of poetry, which without “l'éclat d’un échec” or the “non-
sens de la poésie” remains “only pretty poetry” (que la belle poésie). See Georges Bataille, 
L'impossible: Histoire de rats, suivi de Dianus et de L'Orestie, 2nd ed. (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 
1962), 10, 183-4.  Worthy of mention is Marie-Christine Lala’s analysis of Bataille’s poetics in “The 
Hatred of Poetry in Bataille’s Writing and Thought,” in Carolyn Bailey Gill, Bataille : Writing the 
Sacred, Warwick studies in European philosophy (New York: Routledge, 1995), 105-16.
sacrée” and “celui chez qui l’imagination poétique tend à se substituer à toute autre 
monde de penser, et ce, jusqu’à dans les circonstances les moins favorables, les plus 
tragiques.”92 
 Written in such a “sacred language,” therefore, mythic poetry  implies the 
transformation of poetry into myth; but myth represents less a different literary genre 
than a possibility native to poetry  itself as something “essentially poetic.” If poiesis 
provides the common link between poetry and myth, “mythic poetry” signifies 
therefore not  a redundant appellation but the self-sacrificial transformation of poetry 
“into itself.” Mythic poetry, in other words, bears witness to the self-becoming of 
poetry  itself, a becoming that, instead of abandoning poetry for another form of 
writing, realizes the act of its creation through a mythic confrontation--not unlike a 
bullfight or sacrifice--within the possibilities of poetic language. It describes poetry’s 
own endless creative becoming, the sacrifice of what it is for what it can be, which 
might be more simply  characterized as the act of autopoieisis. Thus Leiris’ 
valorisation of the playful displacements and substitutions that happen in poetic 
language and the act of writing it, which, for him, assume a sacrificial meaning and 
open up a mythic universe. “La substitution en rêve d’une voyelle à une autre, dans le 
corps d’un mot, ou l’addition d’une consonne,” he writes, “me donne la clef de 
l’univers.”93
 Yet a parallel transformation takes place in the poet through writing poetry. 
Again, the poet must substitute his imagination for an entirely different world of 
thought (l’imagination poétique tend à se substituer à toute autre monde de penser). 
“Si j'écris un poème,” writes Leiris, “j’ai--au moins momentanément--l’illusion de la 
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et fac-similé, 62-65. Emphasis mine.
93  Ibid.,  50.  In L’homme sans honneur, Leiris offers a classification of numbers and letters,  grouping 
different symbols according to shape,  sound, and other quasi-mystical, esoteric associations (minerals, 
vegetables, etc.) presumably to highlight the “universe” found in the most rudimentary elements of 
prediscursive language.
‘totalité’,” 94  the very same “totality” broached in all forms of sacred experience, 
wherein “on se meut, alors, sur le plan de la totalité.” The encounter with this 
“totality” has a decisive effect on the poet who, confronted or inspired by this 
“spectacle insolite,” is forced to take a self-alienating voyage paradoxically only  to 
recognize himself anew through such an alienation; such a spectacle “vous 
émerveillent, vous dépaysent, vous transport et devant lesquels, pourtant, plus que 
jamais l’on se reconnaît.”95  The poet’s realization that, through poieisis,  the poet’s 
identity  continually recreates itself as someone other does not reassure the poet, 
however, nor does it reconcile him with this otherness. Rather, it  insists upon the 
infinite potential to be other, to be elsewhere, and thus continually to recognize oneself 
anew, because “totality” realized through poetry and other forms of sacred experience 
is not singular, but multiple; it necessitates finding “toujours un nouveau, un 
hétérogène, un insolite, par rapport au sacré précèdent.”96   The persistence of self-
revelation through poetry assures the poet an ever renewed sense of self and self-
estrangement, but never contents itself, or is able to content itself, with either, since 
such would be a contradictio in ajecto. It is impossible for him to “jamais signer le 
pacte,” as Leiris says; From a form of communion with what is “new, heterogeneous,” 
etc., the poet reemerges with a new identity  that, again, will serve as a point  of 
departure for the next voyage, the next communal encounter with this heteronomous 
totality.  The repeated self-sacrificial confrontations with himself, other than himself, 
and other than this Other, he finds himself estranged, nameless, paradoxically alone 
with this otherness, between a solitary identity and a more communal, unidentified 
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state; he is “à la fois communié, communiant au maximum et se sentir le plus 
désespérément seul.”97
 The poet’s realization that his identity  always rests upon an arresting alterity  
coincides with the analogous self-realization of poetic language, since both are 
reached in and through the self-creative act of poetry, of autopoieisis. That both stem 
from the same repeated, self-creative act, testifies to the generative quality of poetry’s 
presumed mythic action and the ritualization of poetry. As such, poetry therefore 
implies an action that itself is never-ending or incomplete and consequently defies 
total articulation. Mythic poetry, as a kind of speech-act, must be necessarily always 
somehow infelicitous if it is to remain truly mythic; for if the action finishes or fully 
sublimates into language, the dramatic dimension of poetry, its autopoeitic dimension, 
is lost and thus becomes mere poésie fictive.98  The challenge of mythic poetry is 
therefore to sustain the ceaselessly  creative work of autopoieisis without ceding to the 
temptation of becoming wholly “identified” as mere representation. This would, in 
effect, suggest that poetry and the poet are themselves “whole,” thus no longer active 
or creative. Such is the case for all “sacred art”:
L’artiste n’est fonde à regarder son activité comme sacrée que si, d’une 
part, l'exerçant il a le sentiment d'obéir à une nécessité urgente faisant 
figure de sommation et si, d’autre part, l’oeuvre produite est susceptible de 
jouer un pareil rôle de sommation vis-a-vis du spectateur, auditeur ou 
lecteur.99
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and does not achieve its presumed end. See Austin, How to Do Things with Words, 2d ed, William 
James Lectures 1955. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975.
99 Ibid., 138.  
Myth and mythic poetry  like other forms of sacred art  defy  summary, summation 
(sommation, sommaire, somme) because of their insistence on the autopoeitic action 
that makes such art  always an incomplete process, one lacking a sum--and which yet 
nevertheless reveals a kind of “totality” (totalité). To the degree that poetry is sacred, 
therefore, it  is an artform conditioned on the “work” of the artwork, its ritual action, 
its labor of producing a totality  that yet is no-thing in particular. Conceived as such an 
artform, poetry is written in a language that  must  transcend logos and aspire--through 
failure and repetition--to the endless end that is infinity.100  The sacred, like the art, 
poetry, or myth that exhibit it, is a whole, but not a sum. 
 The non-summative quality  of the sacred Leiris evokes permits a brief 
comparison with Kant, whose notion of “absolute magnitude” in his analysis of the 
mathematical sublime is illustrative. Absolute magnitude describes that which is 
“absolutely  great (non comparative magnum),” or “great beyond all comparison”--i.e., 
infinity.101  The sublime evokes infinity because it is a quantity is beyond comparison 
to other quantities, precluding the possibility  of addition or subtraction. In this way, 
despite Kant’s own association of religious experience with the dynamical sublime, 
Kant’s aesthetic concept and the religious concept of the sacred (in Leiris) find a 
common tether, as Rudolf Otto explains in his own quasi-Kantian analysis of religion 
Das Heilige. Like Otto’s concept of the “numinous” (derived from Kant’s 
understanding of noumenon), the Kantian sublime cannot be explicated, is mysterious, 
daunting, and intensely  attractive. Because of these similarities, the sublime may 
stimulate the capacity  to perceive the numinous, and there is a tendency for the 
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sublime to pass over into the numinous and for the numinous to pass over into the 
sublime.102   Yet it is Durkheim that provides perhaps, at least for Leiris, a more 
pertinent example of absolute magnitude in Les formes élémentaires de la vie 
religieuse wherein he explains the following principle of totemism: “quand un être 
sacré se subdivise, il reste tout entier égal à lui-même dans chacune de ses parties…un 
débris de relique a les mêmes vertus que la relique intégrale”; analogously, “la 
moindre goutte de sang contient le même principe actif que le sang tout entier.”103 
Such a pars pro toto logic enables the individual to bond with the tribe or gods 
through common consumption of the sacrificial offering or, contrarily, cause the curses 
and contagion that spread sickness to the whole tribe. By homogenizing all of that 
which comes into contact with it, the sacred always creates an incomplete whole 
greater than the sum of its parts, indeed one ultimately greater beyond all comparison. 
The sacred describes an infinite whole, a somehow always “equal” to itself through its 
fundamentally incomparable (in)equality.
 Like Otto or Durkheim, therefore, Leiris’ obscure calculus of the sacred 
concerns the concept of infinity, which functions mathematically as a singular quantity 
but represents nevertheless an innumerable multiplicity.  In L’homme sans honneur, 
Leiris briefly sketches the idea of “la ‘bonne’ infinité et la ‘mauvaise’ infinité’,” which 
delineate the common oppositions of sacred ambivalence. While infinity  characterizes 
an ecstatic state of community, it is equally descriptive of the alienation and death 
associated with such a state. Alcohol becomes the privileged example of this double-
bind, which “quelquefois...fait sortir de soi” and achieves “la communion réussit,” but 
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“d’autre fois...l’alcool isole” and “tout se perd, s’effiloche.”104    In essence, alcohol 
conjures the sense of infinity  both through the experience of death and rebirth--not 
only through the isolated experience of each, but indeed through the alternation of the 
two that results from repetition (quelquefois, d’autre fois). 
 Conclusion. The multiple in the guise of the singular--like Leiris’ Africa, 
fetishists, poet, or mythology--characterizes both the quantitative and qualitative 
nature of the sacred, which seeks to expose ritualistically, again and again through 
autopoieisis, the infinite multiplicity that underlies all personal identity. As a ritualized 
form of autopoieisis, the sacred in Leiris essentially refers to the performativity  of 
self-sacrifice.  Borrowing Durkheim’s coinage, this might be called the sacred’s 
“active principle” (principe actif); it transforms suicide into self-creation, a creation 
achieved only through a mythic, ritualized encounter with an inexorable otherness that 
always precedes and exceeds it in its ongoing, active process of becoming. “Identité a, 
si l’on y  tient, de là forme et  du fond,” writes Leiris in L’Age d’homme, “mais, plus 
exactement, démarche unique me révélant le fond à mesure que je lui donnais forme, 
forme capable d'être fascinante pour autrui et...de lui faire découvrir en lui-même 
quelque chose d’homophone à ce fond qui m'était  découvert.”105   In his sublime search 
for self, Leiris’ discoveries thus take the form of literary  autopsies, autobiographical 
reports of a personal identity always kept alive through paradoxically passing on.
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CONCLUSION
Your sacred space is where you can find 
yourself again and again.
-Joseph Campbell
 For Georges Bataille, Collette Peignot, and Michel Leiris, the experience of 
death is inherently  self-sacrificial. As the compound word suggests, “self-sacrifice” 
describes a liminal state of being between suicide and survival that  reveals the 
“sovereign” power of existence itself. This power is the sacred--an aporetic notion 
particular to interwar Europe that traces the inner- and outer-limits of subjectivity 
respectively in life and death. Paradoxically sustaining and striving against  each other, 
sustaining each other through such striving, life and death trace the same limit of 
subjectivity. Self-sacrifice describes the subject’s traversal between living identity and 
mortal alterity. “Le sens du sacrifice,” writes Bataille in L'expérience intérieure, “est 
de maintenir tolérable--vivante--une vie que l’avarice nécessaire sans cesse ramène à 
la mort.”1  At the limit  of life and death, self-sacrifice realizes not only  the limits of 
selfhood, but also that of the immanent otherness that  such identity  hides. As such, 
self-sacrifice, which bridges life to death and thereby identity to alterity, reveals the 
common intersubjective origin of the subject, ethics, and politics. Inversely, such 
otherness exposes the inherent difference from oneself that lies at the basis of all 
personal identity, which is realized in self-sacrificial acts of love, revolution, and 
literature.  Once realized, however, once such inner-difference itself becomes 
identified through such acts, such identification itself retraces the limits--whether 
literary, gendered, sexed, or raced--that provisionally divide identity  from alterity, 
limits to be again transgressed in self-sacrifice. As such, self-sacrifice describes the 
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endless rediscovery of others and the otherness within oneself, a performative process 
I call the “divination of identity.” 
 In essence, the divination of identity concerns the violent dialectic of 
subjection and transgression. This dialectic is “negative,” remaining forever 
unresolved in and for subjects. Self-sacrifice, upon which such subjectivity  depends 
and yet cannot fully  endure, itself represents the unresolved dialectical outcome of 
divination. Split between, if not among, life and death, alterity  and personal identity, 
the “self-sacrificial subject” describes at once one, none, and many. For Bataille, this 
subject comes to queer sexed and gendered identity, though it is provisionally ordered 
according to heteronormative degrees of subjectivity  and self-sacrifice. For Laure, 
such subjectivity describes a “movement” that ties together nature, a communitarian 
ethics, and a revolutionary politics. In Leiris, self-sacrifice structures personal 
experience and its representation in autobiography; however fetishized or fantastic are 
his women or Africa, for example, such exoticism cannot be had without a 
commensurate transformation of the distinct poet, autobiographer, or ethnographer 
experiencing them. As these results suggest, the consequences of this “divination” are 
sordid indeed. However, to conclude, I will briefly assess these consequences along 
ethical, political, and aesthetic lines, giving specific attention to the implications of 
self-sacrificial violence. The following points do not intend to be exhaustive, but 
rather balanced, summative conclusions and potential avenues for the further study.
 Within the history  of 20th century French thought, the “ethics of the sacred” 
has been positively  received, describing a form of ontological communion or 
communication that precedes and exceeds subjectivity, law, and life. As explained in 
the previous chapters, Maurice Blanchot and Jean-Luc Nancy  (drawing upon Bataille 
and, to a lesser degree, Hegel) elaborate a theory of community  predicated upon non-
identity  in death. Such a “communauté inavouable” or “communauté désœuvrée” 
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precludes the shared interests or attributes that  normally  delimit  communities--and 
thereby exclude others. As the “groundless ground” of community, death forms an 
incommensurate, asymmetrical, and non-reciprocal relationship among mortal men 
that brings them together paradoxically through their inherent self-difference in death. 
Such is a community with “nothing-in-common,” a community  based on a common, 
undefined alterity that precedes identity itself. The upshot of this theory is elimination 
of social exclusion and the “collective hypostasis” as Jean-Luc Nancy  calls it, which 
might take the form of a commune, race, or nation based on well-defined possessions 
or attributes. Due to Nancy, Blanchot, and others, this mode of communitarianism has 
been fruitfully exposed in the work of Laure and Bataille, highlighting the ethical 
import of their work.2  This more favorable estimation of these authors, however, 
potentially valorizes death in a manner that potentially  occludes the different means 
and forms of death. Conceived simply as a sine qua non existential “human” 
condition, death as a sacred end gets divorced from potentially violent, if not unethical 
means. As a result, all death becomes self-sacrificial, effacing the differences among 
killing, murder, self-sacrifice, suicide, and simply passing away. Such is the 
problematic consequence of a generalized conception of death as self-sacrifice, if not 
the aporetic double-bind of life and death in the sacred. Effacement of these ethico-
juridical classifications of death (as explained in the first chapter) is itself a partial 
consequence of transgression. In part, this result makes credible Agamben’s critique of 
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2  See for example Nadia M. Sahely, "The Laure-Georges Bataille Exchange: Celebrating the 
Dissymmetry of the Couple in Interwar French Thought," Cincinnati Romance Review 15(1996);  Sheri 
Hoem, "Community and the Absolutely Feminine," Diacritics: A Review of Contemporary Criticism 26, 
no. 2 (1996); and most recently Milo Sweedler, The Dismembered Community: Bataille, Blanchot, 
Leiris, and the Remains of Laure (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2009).
Bataille and the College, as well as his claim that homo sacer, being “beyond the law,” 
can be killed, but not murdered or sacrificed.3
 Within this context, the political implications of the sacred are equally mixed. 
As a performative model of personal identity, the sacred subverts the essentialism 
often implied in “being oneself.” As seen in the authors here considered, this is 
especially the case for gendered, raced, and sexed identities. In turn, as the case for 
“community” suggests, such performativity implies a critique of the liberal subject and 
promotes the infinite value of mortal existence beyond its political, ideological, or 
economic use. In essence, it advances a non-essentialist form of humanism that 
critiques the liberal politics of individualism, identity, and personal interest. As such, 
the value of humanity  remains “absolute,” as the first and final chapters explain, and 
thus irreducible to the political, economic, and discursive forces that would limit or 
demean its value. This is a factor that strongly weds these authors in diverse and 
complex ways to Marxism and poststructuralism. Indeed, the incomplete 
reappropration of negativity in self-sacrifice is a direct critique Marx’s dialectical 
materialism and, ultimately, the “ultimate” end of the proletarian general strike. Also, 
by giving a “religious” critique of subject formation, the sacred likewise exposes the 
shortcomings of secularism and representational politics.
 The consequence of such a “sacred life,” however, is that it must lived in 
violent resistance against any orthodoxy  that would potentially profane such a life, and 
the precise limits of this violence--as the previous paragraph suggests--remain unclear. 
This is perhaps the lesson Laure’s literature illustrates; despite her self-proclaimed 
Marxism, the revolution she sought seemed ultimately beyond any political praxis. 
The same claim can be made persuasively for Bataille who, though retaining his 
248
3 As explained in Chapter One, worthy critiques in this vein include Paul Hegarty, "Bataille, Agamben, 
and the Holocaust," Other Voices: A Journal of Critical Thought 2, no. 2 (2002); Jean-Luc Nancy, 
"L'Insacrifiable," in Une pensée finie (Paris: Galilée, 1990); and Dominick LaCapra, History and its 
Limits : Human, Animal, Violence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009).
Marxist allegiances, becomes likewise disenchanted by the late 1930s with Le parti 
communiste français and Le cercle communiste démocratique and begins to theorize 
an “acephalic” society that rejects at once democracy, monarchy, fascism, 
communism, and republicanism.  To be sure, the ostensible target of this radical 
politics in Contre-attaque, Acephale, and the College of Sociology  was fascism, which 
he held to be the final outcome of capitalism and communism alike. Yet these radical 
Left politics he and Laure shared refused, almost by  definition, systematic resistance, 
organization, and commitment, which would “profane” the sacred dimension of 
human existence they sought to expose. Hence their shared radical emphasis on 
sacrificial violence, transgression, and anomie, which they held to be the necessary 
consequences of a life in pursuit of the sacred. While the sheer dynamism of this 
“politics of the sacred” refuses adherence to any  orthodox political program, it 
likewise does not, cannot ultimately  oppose any  such program systematically without 
risking some form of orthodoxy, some form of “profane” political limitation that 
cannot be transgressed. Ultimately, despite the proclamations of its adherents, the 
politics of the sacred is beyond both Right and Left, and thus remains ultimately 
neither entirely  for nor against either. Leiris says as much when he writes “c’est la 
présence de cet élément gauche dont la jonction avec le droit fait éclater--brulure de 
l’ultime transe--le sentiment du sacré.”4  At the risk of oversimplification, it  is likely 
for this reason that the College and Acephale’s “politics of the sacred” did not have the 
impact on the French Left that its members had envisioned. At best, it offers an 
intransigent radicalism; at worst, an ineffectual mysticism or aestheticism. These 
mixed results have caused some to (erroneously) describe it  as a “Left fascism” or 
even fascism itself, insofar as it attempts to reconcile the Left politics of equity with a 
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4 Leiris, Miroir de la tauromachie, 55.
Right politics of unity.5 As I hope the previous study proves, such characterizations are 
reductive, and undermine the performative dimension of these authors and the elusive 
nature of their work.
 As literature, such problematic conflicts among the aesthetic, the useful, and 
the radical are far less apparent, however. While the chimerical combinations of 
poetry, essay, fiction, non-fiction, philosophy, and aphorism manifest in their writings 
are hardly unique among the avant-garde, Bataille, Laure, and Leiris seem singular in 
representing the limits of language and literature--and their transgression--as religious 
performances, forms of ritual sacrifice. Combining a “violent silence” with a profusion 
of voices and literary forms, these authors represent the two sides of the sacred vis à 
vis authorial identity, which itself lies between writing and the unwritten, writer and 
reader. Between these lies the life and death of the author, making literature as such a 
form of sacrifice. “Le sacrifice est  un roman, c'est un conte, illustre de manière 
sanglante”; poetry  is “le sacrifice où les mots sont victimes.”6 By sacrificing itself, this 
literature promotes an analogous sacrificial experience for reader and writer, and thus 
a religious bond between them fostered through an “ambivalent” experience of ecstasy 
and apprehension: the sublime. Indeed, the sublime might be understood as the 
common denominator for all the experiences these authors tether to self-sacrifice, 
including eroticism, revolution, and literature; Rudolf Otto has already suggested (at 
least for Kant) that the sublime is the sacred. If there is any  religious significance to be 
attributed to the literature of these authors, it likely lies in the performative 
representation of sublime experience. It would seem that such experience, at least  for 
them, remains the only possibility for religious experience after ontotheology and the 
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5 As mentioned in the preceding chapters,  this include: Richard Wolin, The Seduction of Unreason : The 
Intellectual Romance with Fascism : from Nietzsche to Postmodernism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 2004); Daniel Lindenberg and Véronique Julia, Les années souterraines : 1937-1947 
(Paris: La Découverte, 1990); and Giorgio Agamben, "Bataille e il paradosso della sovranità," in 
Georges Bataille: il politico e il sacro, ed. Jacqueline Risset (Napoli: Liguori, 1987). 
6 Bataille, Oeuvres complètes, vol. 5, 156
death of God. The sublime, in short, is the only remaining “absolute.” Yet such a 
proposition gives pause: what are the implications of retaining only  radical aesthetic 
experience as the ground for renewed religiosity and communal life? Cannot the 
valorization of sublime experience culminate in an ethically impoverished narcissism 
or, worse yet, the legitimation of a “religiously sanctioned” violence against others? 
Question like these, however, remain beyond the purview of the argument here.
 To conclude, I return to the four propositions advanced in the Introduction. As 
Chapter One illustrates, the sacred in the 20th century history of French thought 
transforms from an ambiguity of taboo and religious experience to an aporetic theory 
of personal identity, due specifically to those figures in and around the College of 
Sociology. Distinct from the radical excess and self-expropriation Bataille, Laure, and 
Leiris envisioned in the sacred, their writings show that such self-expropriation is 
provisionally reappropriated in the guide of a (new) personal identity. “Self-sacrifice” 
in this context describes the provisional, albeit incomplete, reappropriation of self-
expropriated identity in acts of religion and eroticism. The result of self-sacrifice is the 
repeated recreation of personal identity or simulations of selfhood. In consequence, the 
literary  representation of self-sacrifice in the literature of these authors destroys--and 
through such destruction, recreates--an array  of different sexed, gendered, and raced 
identities in turn. Insofar as these identities are neither completely lost in sacrificial 
death, nor fully  recaptured in dialectical “resurrection,” they  represent instead a 
provisional residue resulting from the dialectics of sacrifice. In this way, self-sacrifice 
in the work of these authors anticipates contemporary  performative modes of identity 
critique, highlighting not only the enduring relevance of the sacred for such critique, 
but also urging the reevaluation of the meaning and significance of the sacred in 
French literature and theory.
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APPENDIX
Giorgio Agamben, “Bataille and the Paradox of Sovereignty”
Translated from the Italian by Sean P. Connolly and Andrea Righi
Source: Agamben, Giorgio. “Bataille e il paradosso della sovranità,” in Jacqueline 
Risset, Georges Bataille: il politico et il sacro. Napoli: Liguiori, 1987.
1. The following reflections originate from an anecdote Pierre Klossowski told me a 
few years ago. I met him in his small studio on rue Vergniot so he could tell me about 
his encounters with Walter Benjamin. Even after forty years, he remembered the man 
perfectly: “a babyface with a mustache that seemed to have been glued on.” Among 
the most vivid memories he had was one of a Benjamin with his hands raised in 
admonition (Klossowski at that moment stood up to imitate him) who, regarding the 
activities of Acephale and more particularly the ideas advanced by Bataille in his essay 
“Notion de dépense” (which was published three years earlier in the journal La 
Critique social), repeated: “You are working for fascism!”
2. I have often asked myself what Benjamin could have meant by this statement. He 
was not an orthodox Marxist nor a rationalist afflicted by coniunctivis professoria who 
might have been scandalized by the themes of Bataille’s thought (as was the case years 
later in post-war Italian culture). “Anthropological materialism,” which he had already 
sought to profile in the 1929 essay on surrealism, does not seem very far—at least, not 
at first sight—from the Bataillian project to broaden the theoretico-practical horizon of 
Marxism. (One has only to think of the theme of intoxication [It. ebrezza] which is of 
central importance in this text).  Moreover, Benjamin was well aware of Bataille’s 
unremitting aversion to fascism, which at the time was precisely expressed in a series 
of extremely acute articles and analyses. If it  certainly wasn’t about the general themes 
or the content of Bataille’s thought, what could Benjamin have meant by his obscure 
reproach?
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3. I do not think I can offer an immediate response to this question. Since I believe, 
however, that the problems preoccupying the minds of the period are extremely 
relevant today, I would like to try to broaden the historical scope of Benjamin’s 
admonition and ask the following: In what way could one affirm today that we too, 
without knowing it, work for fascism? Or better still, reversing the question, in what 
way can we claim with certainty  that we are not currently working for that which 
Benjamin could have meant by the term?
4. In order to ask this question, I would like above all to place it in relation to what is 
for me one of the most rigorous attempts to assess the theoretical heritage of Bataille’s 
thought and to develop it in view of a theory of community. Here I’m referring to Jean 
Luc Nancy’s important essay La communauté désœuvrée and to Blanchot’s text La 
communauté inavouable, which somehow represent both a resumption and a 
prolongation of this theory of community.  
5. Nancy as well as Blanchot begin by acknowledging the radical crisis and 
dissolution of community  in our time, and they attempt to question precisely the 
possibility—or the impossibility—of communitarian thought and experience.  It is 
from this perspective that they both turn to Bataille. They commonly recognize in 
Bataille’s work the refusal of any positive community based on the realization of or 
participation in a common assumption (It. presupposto commune).  
6. For Bataille, communal experience more precisely  implies the impossibility  of 
communism as absolute immanence from man to man and the unachievable quality of 
any communal fusion into a collective hypostasis. Bataille opposes this conception of 
community  to a negative community, which would be made possible through the 
experience of death. The community revealed by death does not establish any positive 
link between subjects; rather, it renders their disappearance or death into that  which 
can never in any case be transformed into a kind of communal substance or work.
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7. The kind of community in question here therefore possesses an absolutely singular 
structure; it assumes the impossibility of its own immanence, the very impossibility, 
that is, of a communal being as the subject of community. Community is based in 
some way  on the impossibility  of community  that  is, and it is the experience of this 
impossibility  that permits the establishment of the only community possible.  From 
this point of view, it becomes evident that community can only be the “community of 
those who have no community.” Such would effectively be the model of Bataillian 
community, be it the community  of lovers that he often evoked, the community  of 
artists or, more precisely, the community  of friends that he sought to realize in the 
Acéphale group, for which the Collège de Sociologie was the exoteric manifestation; 
in each case, this negative structure comes to be inscribed at the very center of 
community. 
8. But how can such a community come together (It. attestarsi)? In what kind of 
experience could it  be manifest? The privation of the head, the “acephaly” that 
sanctions participation in the Bataillian group, provides a first possible answer: the 
removal of the head not only signifies the elision of rationality and the exclusion of a 
leader but also above all the auto-exclusion of the very members of the community, 
those who will be present only  through their own decapitation and “passion” in the 
strict sense of the term.
9. This is the experience Bataille defines with the help  of the word “ecstase” or 
ecstasy. As Blanchot saw it, and as was already  implicit in the mystical tradition from 
which Bataille borrowed the term even despite the distance he took from it, the 
important paradox of ekstasis, the absolute being-outside-itself of the subject, is that it 
is no longer there at the very moment of the experience. He must lose himself (It. 
mancare a sé) at the very moment when he should be present to experience it.
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10. The paradox of Bataillian ecstasy  is therefore that the subject  must be there where 
it cannot be, or, vice versa, that  it must be missing there where it must be present. 
Such is the antinomic structure of this inner-experience that  Bataille sought to capture 
all throughout his life; the accomplishment of it constituted what he called 
“l’opération souveraine” or “la soverainté de l’être,” the sovereignty of being. 
11. It certainly was not by chance that Bataille came to prefer this expression more 
than any other definition. With his acute sense of philosophical meaning concerning 
terminological questions, Kojève, in a letter to Bataille held at the Bibliothèque 
Nationale in Paris, explicitly emphasizes that  the most appropriate term for his friend’s 
concern could only be “sovereignty.” And Bataille, at  the end of L’expérience 
intérieure, in a chapter entitled “position decisive,” defines “l’opération souveraine” in 
the following way: “l’opération souveraine, qui ne tient que d’elle-même son autorité, 
expie en même temps cette autorité.” 1
12. What is, in fact, the paradox of sovereignty? If, according to Carl Schmitt’s 
definition, the sovereign is he who possesses the legitimate power to proclaim a state 
of exception and, in doing so, suspends the validity of the juridical order, the paradox 
of the sovereign can be stated thus: the sovereign is inside and outside the system at 
the same time. The specific expression “at the same time” is not superfluous: “having 
in effect  the legitimate power to suspend the validity of the law, the sovereign 
legitimately places himself outside the law.” For this reason, the paradox of 
sovereignty can also be formulated thus: “the law is outside itself; it is itself outside 
the law,” or “I myself, the sovereign, being outside the law, declare that there is 
nothing outside the law.”
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1 In English: “The sovereign operation, which preserves its authority by itself also expiates (éxpier) this 
authority at the same time.”
13. This paradox is very ancient and, if one observes closely, it  is implicit  in the 
oxymoron that  expresses it: the sovereign subject.  The subject (that is to say 
etymologically “he who is below”) is sovereign (i.e., “he who is above”). It is also 
possible that the term “subject,” in conformity with its ambiguous Indo-European root 
from which derives the two contrary Latin prepositions super et  sub, has no other 
meaning than this very paradox, this very residing there-where-it-is-not.  
 14. If indeed the paradox of sovereignty is such, could we say then that  Bataille, in his 
passionate attempt to think about community, successfully broke its circularity? By 
seeking to think beyond the subject, by seeking to think about the ecstasy of the 
subject, in reality  he only thought of its internal limit, its constitutive antinomy: the 
sovereignty of the subject, the being above of that which is below. It is certain that 
Bataille himself realized this difficulty. One can even say that L’expérience intérieure, 
which may  be his most ambitious book, is the attempt to think through this difficulty, 
which he describes at a certain moment as an attempt to stand “sur la pointe d’une 
epingle.”2  He was not able to carry it through however, and the impossibility of 
successfully  conducting the work he undertook on sovereignty is proof of this. It is 
through being conscious of this essential limit that we can hope to recognize the full 
import of his thought (It. raccogliere l’esigenza più propria del suo pensiero). 
15. A similar kind of difficulty  struck another thinker of ecstasy many years earlier—
the Schelling of Philosophy of Revelation—who had entrusted to ecstasy and the 
stupor of reason the task of thinking of the Immemorable, that which always already 
anticipates the thought that  posits it. The problem posed here is actually still much 
older than the formulation of the paradox of sovereignty.  It pertains to a duality 
implicit in the very  way Western philosophy  has tried to think of being (in this sense, 
Bataille was perfectly right to speak of the “sovereignty of being”): being as subject, 
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2 In English: “on the point of a needle.”
hypokeimenon, “matter,” and being as form, eidos, or, in other words, being that is 
always already pre-supposed and being that wholly resides in presence. Aristotle 
understands this antinomy as a duality of potential (It. potenza), dynamis, and 
energeia, act. We customarily think of potential in terms of force and power (It. 
potere), but potential is above all potentia passiva, “passion” in the sense of pathos, 
suffering (It. patimento), or passivity; it is only secondarily potentia activa, or force. 
16. Given these two poles through which Western philosophy has thought being, 
modern thought, from Nietzsche onward, has constantly privileged potential. This is 
the reason why  for Bataille—and those thinkers closest to him, like Blanchot—the 
experience of this passion, this déchaînement des passions is decisive and considered 
to be the ultimate meaning of the sacred.  Kojève emphasized that this passion was to 
be understood as potentia passiva, indicating that the key  passage of L’éxperience 
intérieure is the one where he states “l’expérience intérieure est le contraire de 
l’action.”3
17. However, since thought about sovereignty cannot escape the limits and antinomies 
of subjectivity, thought about passion still remains thought about being. In its attempt 
to surpass being and the subject, contemporary thought has abandoned experience of 
the act, which for centuries has constituted the highest point of metaphysics, only in 
order to push and exasperate the opposing pole of potential to the extreme. In this way, 
however, modern thought does not  go beyond the subject but rather thinks of it in the 
most extreme and exhausted way: that of pure being-below, pathos (L. patire), 
potentia passiva without ever breaking the tie that binds it to its opposing pole.
18. That  which ties the potential and actual together is in fact not something simple; 
it’s a Gordian knot found in the “gift from itself to itself” (Gk. epidosis eis auto) that 
an enigmatic passage from Aristotle (De anima, 417.b) presents in the following 
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terms: “To suffer (paskein) is not something simple; on the one hand, it is a sort of 
destruction (fqora) of one thing by  the opposite, on the other hand, it conserves 
(soteria) what is potential through the agency of action… and such is not a becoming 
other than itself; it  is a becoming of nothing other than itself, something is given both 
to itself and to action.”4 
19. If we return to the Benjaminian anecdote that served as our starting point, could 
we say, to the extent that we are still there where we still think in terms of passion and 
potential, that we work outside fascism, or, if not fascism, certainly  outside the 
totalitarian destiny of the West that Benjamin could have had in mind with his 
admonition? Can we say  that we have solved the paradox of sovereignty? To what 
degree can the thought of passion go beyond act and potential? Is passion without a 
subject truly found beyond pure subjectivity  as self-potential? What kind of 
community  lets itself be thought of as its own starting point, such that it is not simply 
a negative community?
20. Until we can answer these questions—and we are still quite far from doing so—it 
seems that the problem of a human community freed from presupposition 
(presupposto) and without sovereign subjects cannot even be postulated.
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